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Social media has changed how society communicates, transformed how 
individuals access the latest headline news and has altered many aspects of 
everyday life. It has, in turn changed the way in which individuals can target 
other members of society. In recent years, society has seen the likes of 
Facebook and Twitter used to distribute hate speech, accommodate revenge 
pornography and abuse others online. Consequently, the Government and 
the criminal justice system are being put under increasing pressure to tackle 
online abuse. Many of the current legal provisions contained in the law of 
England and Wales were enacted before the creation of social media. Yet 
these Acts are used to prosecute those who conduct abusive behaviour 
online. Issues are therefore arising with the adaptation of Acts of Parliament 
never intended to cover a digital age. 
This thesis will critically examine several Acts of Parliament which have been 
used to control unlawful behaviour on social media sites, including, though 
not limited to, the Public Order Act 1986, the Malicious Communications Act 
1988, and the Protection from Harassment Act 1997. It will be argued that 
the current use of these Acts breaches the fundamental principle of legality in 
the criminal law, before turning to examine freedom of speech and privacy 
online. Legality, at its very basic means the law needs to be accessible and 
clear to maintain the rule of law. 
The final parts of this thesis will examine how other countries and institutions 
govern online behaviour. In the conclusive chapters, recommendations will 
be put forward as to how the legal system and society can better protect 
those who are abused online, including a draft social media Bill and a 
proposed universal code of conduct.  
 
  







For my Dad, who is forever greatly missed. 




I would firstly like to thank Edge Hill University and the Graduate Teaching 
scheme, without which, it is unlikely I would have been able to proceed with 
a PhD. In particular, my colleagues in the Department of Law and 
Criminology who have offered endless support and cups-of-tea when 
needed. I would also like to express my gratitude to my supervisors, 
Professor Francesco Rizzuto and Adam Pendlebury for their continued 
support throughout the completion of this thesis. Their endless 
encouragement has helped me achieve so much in my time at Edge Hill 
University.  
 
To my friends who have always supported me, thank you for letting me vent! 
Without my girls, Kelly Wilson, Charna Hewitt, Jannette McMillian, Lauren 
Postlethwaite and Steph Farish, I would be lost. You have stood by me 
throughout the good and the bad. This PhD journey has not been easy and 
without the support of Grace Robinson, Sharon McAvoy, Kerry Richards and 
Julie Nightingale, I am not sure where I would be now. When everything felt 
so broken, your support helped pick me back up and see this through to the 
end; I am forever in your debt.  
 
To my not so little brother James Bliss, thank you for always being there. I 
have often joked that most kids inherit money, instead, I inherited you, but I 
would not have it any other way. Lastly, I would like to thank my husband, 
Jonathan Higson-Bliss, for always being my shoulder to cry on, my ears to 
vent too and my celebration buddy!  
 
However, the biggest thanks goes to my Dad, Colin Bliss; you are the reason 
I try so hard. Everything I do is to make you proud. I love and miss you more 
each day.  
 
Page 5 of 449 
 
 
Table of Contents 
 
Table of Cases .............................................................................................. 10 
Table of Legislation ....................................................................................... 13 
Table of Figures ............................................................................................ 16 
 
Research Questions ..................................................................................... 17 
 
Introduction  
Introduction ................................................................................................... 18 
Methods and Methodology ............................................................................ 21 
Research Questions ..................................................................................... 25 
Chapter Overview ......................................................................................... 25 
Contribution to knowledge ............................................................................ 31 
 
Contextualisation: The Internet and Online Abuse 
Introduction ................................................................................................... 32 
The Internet: A brief history ........................................................................... 32 
Internet Growth and Usage ........................................................................... 35 
The Internet as an Information Database .................................................. 37 
The Internet as a Political Platform ............................................................ 41 
The Internet as a Public Space ................................................................. 44 
The Internet as a Communications Device ................................................ 46 
Summary ................................................................................................... 47 
Social Media: An Explanation ....................................................................... 48 
Online Abuse ................................................................................................ 52 
The Extent of Online Abuse .......................................................................... 55 
Cyberbullying ............................................................................................. 60 
Online harassment and stalking ................................................................ 63 
Revenge pornography ............................................................................... 66 
The Effects of Online Abuse ......................................................................... 68 
Chapter Overview ......................................................................................... 71 
 
Page 6 of 449 
 
Theoretical Positioning: Legality in the Criminal Law 
 
Introduction ................................................................................................... 72 
The Criminal Justice System and Key Terminology ..................................... 73 
    Actus Reus ................................................................................................ 74 
    Mens Rea .................................................................................................. 75 
Theoretical Stance ........................................................................................ 78 
Criminological Theory: Deterrence and Rational Choice ........................... 78 
Feminism and Digital Feminism ................................................................ 83 
Victimology ................................................................................................ 88 
The Criminal Law and Legality ...................................................................... 93 
Rationale ..................................................................................................... 104 
 
Social Media Gatekeepers 
Introduction ................................................................................................. 105 
Terms of Service Agreements .................................................................... 106 
Community Guidelines: Facebook ........................................................... 107 
Facebook and Hate Speech ................................................................. 108 
Facebook and Bullying ......................................................................... 110 
Facebook and Credible Threats ........................................................... 112 
Facebook and Revenge Porn ............................................................... 113 
Summary .............................................................................................. 114 
Terms of Service: The Twitter Rules ....................................................... 115 
Twitter and Hate Speech ...................................................................... 116 
Twitter and Bullying .............................................................................. 119 
Twitter and Credible Threats ................................................................ 121 
Twitter and Revenge Pornography ....................................................... 123 
Summary .............................................................................................. 124 
Tackling Unlawful Behaviour ....................................................................... 125 
Moderation ............................................................................................... 125 
AI Technology .......................................................................................... 129 
Bullying Prevention Hub: Facebook ........................................................ 131 
Content Blocking: Twitter ......................................................................... 133 
Law Enforcement ..................................................................................... 134 
Chapter Overview ....................................................................................... 137 
Page 7 of 449 
 
Chapter Three: Recommendations ............................................................. 138 
 
Social Media, Criminal Law Regulation and Non-Technology-Based 
Legislation 
Introduction ................................................................................................. 139 
Serious Crime Act 2007 .............................................................................. 140 
Public Order Act 1986 ................................................................................. 156 
Protection from Harassment Act 1997 ........................................................ 171 
Harassment ............................................................................................. 175 
Stalking .................................................................................................... 182 
The Protection from Harassment Act: An Overview ................................ 187 
Chapter Overview ....................................................................................... 190 
Chapter Four: Recommendations ............................................................... 192 
 
Social Media, Criminal Law Regulation and Technology-Based 
Legislation: Part One 
Introduction ................................................................................................. 194 
Computer Misuse Act 1990 ......................................................................... 195 
Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 ......................................................... 211 
Chapter Overview ....................................................................................... 227 
Chapter Five: Recommendations ............................................................... 229 
 
Social Media, Criminal Law Regulation and Technology-Based 
Legislation: Part Two 
Introduction ................................................................................................. 230 
Malicious Communications Act 1988 .......................................................... 232 
Communications Act 2003 .......................................................................... 240 
Malicious Communications Act v Communications Act .............................. 244 
Types of behaviours criminalised ................................................................ 248 
Indecent ................................................................................................... 249 
Obscene .................................................................................................. 249 
False Messages ...................................................................................... 251 
Threatening ............................................................................................. 253 
Menacing Messages ................................................................................ 253 
Grossly Offensive Messages ................................................................... 256 
Page 8 of 449 
 
The Crown Prosecution Guidelines: Social Media Offences ...................... 261 
Chapter Overview ....................................................................................... 268 
Chapter Six: Recommendations ................................................................. 270 
 
Freedom of Expression and Social Media 
Introduction ................................................................................................. 272 
Freedom of Expression ............................................................................... 273 
Article 10: Freedom of Expression .............................................................. 274 
Hate Speech and Freedom of Expression .................................................. 281 
Online Abuse and the Right to Privacy ....................................................... 290 
Chapter Overview ....................................................................................... 299 
Chapter seven: Recommendations ............................................................. 301 
 
International Perspectives of Social Media and the Law 
Introduction ................................................................................................. 302 
The European Union ................................................................................... 302 
Australia ...................................................................................................... 314 
Germany ..................................................................................................... 325 
India ............................................................................................................ 334 
Chapter Overview ....................................................................................... 341 
Chapter eight: Recommendations .............................................................. 343 
 
Recommendations 
Introduction ................................................................................................. 345 
The Criminal Justice System ................................................................... 346 
The Criminal Justice System: The Social Media Bill ............................... 347 
Cyber Harassment and Cyberstalking .................................................. 350 
Cyber Related Revenge Pornography ................................................. 353 
Online Abuse ........................................................................................ 356 
Inciting Others ...................................................................................... 360 
Hate Crime ........................................................................................... 362 
Computer Misuse ................................................................................. 363 
Section Overview ................................................................................. 363 
The Criminal Justice System: The Police ................................................ 363 
Page 9 of 449 
 
The Criminal Justice System: The Crown Prosecution Service Guidelines
 ................................................................................................................. 366 
Education .................................................................................................... 369 
Education: Children ................................................................................. 370 
Education: Parents .................................................................................. 374 
Gatekeepers ............................................................................................... 376 
Gatekeepers: AI Technology ................................................................... 377 
Gatekeepers: Universal Codes of Conduct ............................................. 381 
Regulatory Body ......................................................................................... 385 
Regulatory Body: Ofcom ......................................................................... 385 
Regulatory Body: Digital Authority and e-Safety Commissioner ............. 387 
Chapter Overview ....................................................................................... 390 
 
Conclusion 
Conclusion .................................................................................................. 394 
 
Bibliography 
Bibliography ................................................................................................ 407 
 
Appendix 
Appendix A: Social Media Bill ..................................................................... 439 
Appendix B: Draft Universal Code of Conduct ............................................ 444 
Appendix C: Recommendations Flowchart ................................................. 447 
Appendix D: Flow chart explanation ........................................................... 448 
 
  
Page 10 of 449 
 
 
Table of Cases 
Alison Chabloz v Southwark Crown Court 13 February 2019 (unreported) 
Attorney General v Punch Ltd and Another [2002] UKHL 50, [2003] 1 A.C. 1046 
Bratty Appellant v Attorney-General for Northern Ireland Respondent [1961] 3 
W.L.R. 965, [1963] A.C. 386 
C-203/15 and C-698/15 Tele2 Sverige AB v Post-och telestyrelsen and Secretary of 
State for the Home Department v Tom Watson and Others [2016] ECLI 970 
 
C-324/09 L’Oréal SA and Others v eBay International AG and Others [2011] ECLI 
474 
C-70/10 Scarlet Extended SA v Société belge des auteurs, compositeurs et éditeurs 
SCRL (SABAM) [2011] ECLI 771 
Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 A.C. 457 
Cantoni v. France App no 17862/91 (ECtHR, 15 November 1996) 
Čelebići Camp, Prosecutor v Delalić (Zejnil) and others, Appeal Judgment, Case No 
IT-96-21-A, ICL 96 (ICTY 2001), 20th February 2001, United Nations Security 
Council [UNSC]; International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia [ICTY]; 
Appeals Chamber 
  
Chambers v Director of Public Prosecutions [2012] EWHC 2157 (Admin), [2013] 1 
WLR 183 
 
Chambers v Director of Public Prosecutions, Doncaster Crown Court, 3 March 2011 
(unreported) 
Connolly v Director of Public Prosecution [2007] EWHC 237 (Admin), [2008] 1 
W.L.R. 276 (DC) 
Connolly v DPP [2007] EWHC 237 (Admin), [2008] 1 W.L.R. 276 (DC) 
 
Cox v Riley (1986) 83 Cr. App. R. 54  
 
de Freitas v Permanent Secretary of Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Lands and 
Housing [1999] 1 AC 69 (PC) 80 
Dehal v Crown Prosecution Service [2005] EWHC 2154 
Director of Public Prosecutions v Collins [2005] EWHC 1308 (Admin), [2006] 1 
W.L.R. 308 
Director of Public Prosecutions v Collins [2006] UKHL 40, [2006] 1 W.L.R. 2223 
Director of Public Prosecutions v McKeown [1997] 1 W.L.R. 295 
DPP v Collins [2006] UKHL 40 
Dudgeon v United Kingdom (1981) 4 EHRR 149 
Page 11 of 449 
 
Glimmerven en Hagenbeek v Netherlands [1979] ECTHR 8 
Handyside v United Kingdom (1976)1 EHRR 737 
Kafkaris v Cyprus App no 21906/04 (ECtHR, 12 February 2008) 
Knuller (Publishing, Printing and Promotions) Ltd. and Others Appellants v Director 
of Public Prosecutions Respondent [1972] 3 W.L.R. 143, [1973] A.C. 435 
Lau v Director of Public Prosecutions [2000] 1 F.L.R 799 (DC) 
Majrowski v Guy’s and St Thomas’s NHS Trust [2005] EWCA Civ 251, [2005] Q.B 
848 
Majrowski v Guy’s and St Thomas’s NHS Trust [2006] UKHL 34, [2007] 1 A.C. 224 
Pfeifer v Austria App no 125561/03 [2007] ECTHR 935 
R v Abdul Sherif [2008] EWCA Crim 2653, [2009] 2 Cr. App. R. (S.) 33 
 
R v Alison Chabloz Westminster Magistrates' Court 11 January 2018 (unreported) 
R v Alison Chabloz Westminster Magistrates’ Court 25 May 2018 (unreported) 
R v Andrew Meldrum Woolwich Crown Court 30 May 2014 (unreported) 
R v Blackshaw [2011] EWCA Crim 2312, [2012] 1 W.L.R. 1126 
 
R v Chloe Cowan Canterbury Crown Court 14 July 2016 (unreported) 
 
R v Clayton Kennedy Cardiff Magistrates Court 6 July 2015 (unreported) 
R v Crosskey [2012] EWCA Crim 1645, [2013] 1 Cr. App. R. (S.) 76  
 
R v Darryl O’Donnell Londonderry Magistrates Court 29 July 2011 (unreported) 
R v David Jones Liverpool Magistrates 19 August 2015 (unreported) 
R v Dooley (Michael) [2005] EWCA Crim 3093, [2006] 1 W.L.R. 775 
R v Edward Leonard Hall (1985) 81 Cr. App. R. 260 
R v G and Another [2003] UKHL 50, [2004] 1 A.C. 1034 
R v Gold (Steven William), Schifreen (Robert Jonathan) [1988] A.C. 1063 
R v Jason Asagba Reading Magistrates’ Court 1 September 2015 (unreported) 
R v Jordan Blackshaw Chester Crown Court 16 August 2011 (unreported) 
 
R V Liam Stacey Swansea Crown Court On Appeal From The Magistrates’ Court 
A20120033. 
R v Martin Hartshorn Grimsby Crown Court 4 November 2011 (unreported) 
R v Matthew Woods, Chorley Magistrates Court, 8 October 2012 (unreported) 
 
R v Paul Chambers, Doncaster Magistrates’ Court, 10 May 2010 (unreported) 
 
Page 12 of 449 
 
R v Perry Sutcliffe-Keenan Chester Crown Court 16 August 2011 (unreported) 
 
R v Peter Nunn The City of London Magistrates Court 29 September 2014 
(unreported) 
R v Rhodri Phillips Westminster Magistrates’ Court 13 July 2017 (unreported) 
R v Rimmington, R v Goldstein [2005] UKHL 63, [2006] 1 A.C. 459 
R v Sadique and Hussain (No2) [2013] EWCA Crim 1150, [2013] 2 Cr. App. R. 31 
 
R v Sean Duffy Reading Magistrates’ Court 13 September 2011 (unreported) 
 
R v Sheppard and Whittle [2010] EWCA Crim 65 
R v Smith (Gavin) [2012] EWCA Crim 398, [2012] 1 W.L.R. 3368 
Regina Respondent v Ireland Appellant [1997] 3 W.L.R. 534, [1998] A.C. 147 
Regina Respondent v Woollin Appellant [1998] 3 W.L.R. 382, [1999] 1 A.C. 82 
S v Crown Prosecution Service [2008] EWHC 438 
Shreya Singhal v Union of India (2013) 12 S.C.C. 73 
Southard v Director of Public Prosecutions [2006] EWHC 3349 (Admin), [2007] 
A.C.D. 53 
Stoker v Stoker [2019] UKSC 17 
Sunday Times v United Kingdom (1979) 2 EHRR 245 
SW v United Kingdom, CR v United Kingdom App no 20166/92 (ECtHR, 22 
November 1995) 
Sweet v Parsley [1969] 2 W.L.R. 470, [1970] A.C. 132 
Taylor's Central Garages (Exeter) v Roper [1951] 2 T.L.R. 284 
Welch v United Kingdom App no 17440/90 (ECtHR, 9 February 1995) 
Yildirim v Turkey App no 3111/10 ECTHR 2012-VI 
Page 13 of 449 
 
Table of Legislation  
Cinemas Act 1985 
Communications Act 2003 
Computer Misuse Act 1990 
Contempt of Court Act 1981 
Coroners and Justice Act 2009 
Criminal Damage Act 1971 
Criminal Justice Act 1982 
Criminal Justice Act 2003 
Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 
Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 
Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 
Digital Economy Act 2017 
Forgery and Counterfeiting Act 1981 
Fraud Act 2006 
Gambling Act 2005 
Human Rights Act 1998 
Information Technology Act 2000 
Investigatory Powers Act 2016 
Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 
Malicious Communications Act 1988 
Obscene Publications Act 1959 and 1964 
Offences Against the Person Act 1861 
Police and Justice Act 2006 
Post Office (Amendment) Act 1935 
Post Office Act 1953 
Prevention of Crime Act 1953 
Prosecution of Offences Act 1985 
Protection from Freedoms Act 2012 
Protection from Harassment Act 1997 
Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 
Page 14 of 449 
 
Public Order Act 1936 
Public Order Act 1986 
Serious Crime Act 2007 
Serious Crime Act 2015 
Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 
Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992 
Sexual Offences Act 2003 
Sporting Events (Control of Alcohol ect) Act 1985 
Summary Offences Act 1966 
Telecommunications Act 1984 
 
European Legislation, Conventions, Treaties and Directives  
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms  
 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
 
Consolidated versions of the Treaty of European Union and the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union [2016] C 202/01 
 
Treaty of Lisbon [2007] OJ C-306/1 
 
The Treaty of Rome [1957] 
 
Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market 2016/0280 
 
Directive 2011/93/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 
December 2011 on combating the sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children 
and child pornography 
 
Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 
 
Australia  
Criminal Code Amendment (Sharing of Abhorrent Violent Material) Bill 2019 
  
Enhancing Online Safety Act 2015  
 
Summary Offences Act 1966  
 





Page 15 of 449 
 
Act to Improve Enforcement of the Law in Social Networks (2017) 





Information Technology Act 2000 
 








Page 16 of 449 
 
Table of Figures 
 
Figure 1: Recent Internet usage by age, 2011 and 2018, UK. .................... 36 
 
Figure 2: Expenditure by political group on Facebook advertisements during 
the 2016 General Election. ........................................................................... 43 
 
Figure 3: The effects on women who were subjected to online abuse. ....... 59 
 
Figure 4: Communication devices used to abuse others online as found by 
Brown, Maple and Short. .............................................................................. 64 
 
Figure 5: Tweets intended to stir up hatred against ethnic minorities which 
the Home Affairs Committee reported to Twitter. ........................................ 117 
 
Figure 6: The Number of Prosecutions and Convictions under the Malicious 
Communications Act and the Communications Act between 2006 and 2017.
 .................................................................................................................... 267 
 
Figure 7: The boundaries between inappropriate and unlawful behaviour 
online. ......................................................................................................... 269 
 
Figure 8: The psychological effects on women who experience online abuse 
in the UK. .................................................................................................... 296 
 
Page 17 of 449 
 
 Research Questions  
 
 
1. To what extent does the criminal justice system, social networking 
companies and society govern online abuse aided by social media? 
 
2. How does the current criminal law of England and Wales prohibit 
online abuse? 
 
3. To what extent can other international approaches to online abuse aid 
how the criminal justice system in England and Wales tackles social 
media abuse?  
 
4. How can the criminal justice system, social networking companies and 
society better protect those who are subjected to abusive conduct on 
social media? 
 
Page 18 of 449 
 
Introduction   
 
‘[T]he Internet provides a forum for the dissemination of potentially 
harmful false information to huge audiences. This might mean that 
certain behaviour which has been tolerated offline now arguably 
warrants criminal sanction, at least in online contexts.’1 
 
Many of the harms associated with the Internet are not unique to the digital 
age, in fact, they have always existed within society but now occur more 
openly. The Internet dominates much of society today. In the United 
Kingdom alone 90% of adults are regular users of the Internet.2 It has 
changed many aspects of everyday life, from how we obtain our news, to 
how we communicate with others. The Internet can be both a force for good 
and a force for bad, this is particularly true when examining the use of social 
media in a digital age. 
Introduction  
Though there is no true definition of social media, as discussed in detail in 
the following chapter it has become prevalent within a digital society. In 
essence, social media allows users to instantly communicate with others 
online, build online profiles, and share information with others at the click of a 
button. It has changed many aspects of the physical world such as 
campaigning, which can now be aided or solely run online. For example, 
campaigns have emerged online tackling the subtle everyday sexism that still 
 
1 Law Commission, Abusive and Offensive Online Communications: A Scoping Report (Law 
Com No 381, 2018) [11.122] 
2 Office of National Statistics, ‘Internet users, UK: 2018’ (Office of National Statistics, 31 May 
2018) 
<https://www.ons.gov.uk/businessindustryandtrade/itandinternetindustry/bulletins/internetus
ers/2018> accessed 2 November 2018 
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exists within society,3 campaigns to highlight sexual harassment,4 and 
campaigns to tackle the stigma surrounding domestic violence.5 Yet as will 
be discussed throughout this thesis there is a darker side to social media, in 
which bullying, harassment and trolling are flourishing online. 
 
The use of social media to torment others online, commonly referred to as 
online abuse, is a prevalent problem within society today. Research, as 
discussed in chapter one, has started to emerge exposing both the extent of 
online abuse and the consequences this behaviour can have upon the victim. 
Its effects have included withdrawal from social life,6 changes in a person’s 
online presence,7 and significant mental health issues, including post-
traumatic stress disorder,8 self-harm,9 and suicide.10 However, as discussed 
in detail in the following chapter, like that of social media, there is no true 
definition of abuse, which can lead to inadequacies in the current literature 
 
3 Laura Bates, ‘The everyday sexism project’ (Everydaysexism, 2019) 
<https://everydaysexism.com/> accessed 6 February 2019 
4 Bri Lee, ‘Sharing our stories is the strength at the heart of #MeToo. We must repeal gag 
laws’ The Guardian (London, 19 November 2018) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/nov/19/sharing-our-stories-is-the-
strength-at-the-heart-of-metoo-we-must-repeal-gag-laws> accessed 27 November 2018 
5 Jessamy Gleeson, ‘“(Not) working 9–5”: the consequences of contemporary Australian-
based online feminist campaigns as digital labour’ (2016) 16(1) Media International Australia 
77 <http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/1329878X16664999>  
6 Mudasir Kamal & William J. Newman, ‘Revenge Pornography: Mental Health Implications 
and Related Legislation’ (2016) 44(3) American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law 359, 
362 
7 Committee on Standards in Public Life, Intimidation in Public Life: A Review by the 
Committee on Standards in Public Life (HC 2017-18) 39 
8 Samantha Bates, ‘“Stripped”: An Analysis of Revenge Porn Victims’ Lives after 
Victimization’ (Master of Arts Thesis, Simon Fraser University 2015) 24 
9 Ann John et al, ‘Self-Harm, Suicidal Behaviours, and Cyberbullying in Children and Young 
People: Systematic Review’ (2018) 20 (4) Journal of Medical Internet Research 129 
10 Sarah Knapton, ‘Cyberbullying makes young people twice as likely to self harm or attempt 
suicide’ The Telegraph (London, 22 April 2018) 
<https://www.telegraph.co.uk/science/2018/04/22/cyberbullying-makes-young-people-twice-
likely-self-harm-attempt/> accessed 4 October 2018 
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on online abuse. For the purpose of this thesis and as will be justified in the 
following chapter, abuse is defined as:  
Insulting and hostile behaviour aimed at another online which causes 
the deterioration of another’s physical and mental wellbeing; threats of 
physical and/or sexual violence; insulting and hostile behaviour aimed 
at another because of their (if real or presumed) gender, race, 
ethnicity, religion, national origin, gender identity, sex, disability or 
sexual orientation. 
 
Consequently, abuse is given a subjective meaning, in which the terms such 
as inappropriate, unlawful, and harmful are used interchangeably. It is 
acknowledged that conduct which can be labelled as harmful is not always 
illegal, however, the distinction is not always easy to find; as will be 
illustrated throughout this thesis. Despite issues with definitions increasing 
pressure has been placed on the criminal justice system, the Government 
and social media companies to do more in helping to reduce online abuse. 
 
In 2013 following a number of high-profile cases11 relating to inappropriate 
behaviour online, the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS)12 produced their first 
prosecuting guidelines on communications sent via social media (the 
guidelines).13 The guidelines were produced following growing concerns 
about the lack of consistency with the prosecution of social media offences 
across England and Wales. Yet since the implementation of the guidelines 
prosecutions for social media related offences have been on the decline,14 
 
11 For instance, Chambers v Director of Public Prosecutions [2012] EWHC 2157 (Admin), 
[2013] 1 WLR 183 
12 The role of the CPS will be discussed in detail in chapter two.  
13 The Crown Prosecution Service, ‘Guidelines on Prosecuting Cases Involving 
Communications Sent via Social Media’ (CPS.gov, 2016) 
<http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/a_to_c/communications_sent_via_social_media/> accessed 10 
October 2016 
14 Ministry of Justice, ‘Criminal Justice System statistics quarterly: December 2017’ (Gov.uk, 
17 May 2018) <https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/criminal-justice-system-statistics-
quarterly-december-2017> accessed 25 February 2019 
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despite increasing reports being made to the police.15 In 2017 research 
undertaken by the BBC exposed a dramatic increase in reports being made 
to police forces across England and Wales, concerning malicious 
communications online.16 The BBC uncovered that between 2015 and 2016 
there had been an increase of 36,462 police reports involving malicious 
communications,17 placing significant pressure on police forces across 
England and Wales.  
 
Arguments have therefore started to emerge suggesting that the criminal 
justice system is not keeping pace with changing technology,18 resulting in 
several Government and parliamentary investigations. In April 2019 the 
Government released its first White Paper concerning online harms.19 The 
arguments put forward in the White Paper, which are considered 
‘ambitious’,20 focus on holding social media companies to account for 
inappropriate behaviours which continue to be a problem across their sites. 
Whereas this thesis will focus on a multidimensional approach.  
 
Methods and Methodology   
 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine how the criminal justice system of 
England and Wales, social networks and society can better aid those 
 
15 The BBC, ‘Teenager's life “ruined” by Live.me and Twitter “trolls”’ The BBC (London, 24 




18 Communications Committee, Regulating in a digital world (HL 2017-19, 299) 3 
19 HM Government, Online Harms White Paper (CP 57, 2019) 
20 Ibid., 1 
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subjected to online abuse. To do this, a narrative review of Acts governing 
unlawful social media usage will be deconstructed, keeping into account the 
Acts historical and social background, discussed in detail below. This is a 
similar approach undertaken by Scaife,21 who uses a narrative review of the 
literature to demonstrate to the reader how both the civil and criminal law 
applies in a social media context. However, this thesis constructs a narrative 
review through the lens of legality. Legality, which underpins the theoretical 
perspective of this thesis, is the principle that the law needs to be in place, 
clear and certain in order for individuals to conform to it.22 For an in-depth 
discussion on legality and why other theoretical approaches were 
disregarded, see chapter two.  
 
At its very basic, a narrative review is a comprehensive and critical analysis 
of the current knowledge on a given topic.23 In this case, journal articles, 
books, research studies, case law examples, legal discourse, newspaper 
articles and Acts of Parliament will be scrutinised, to truly understand the 
application of the criminal law in a social media context. This allows for an in-
depth analysis to take place of the current criminal law framework in England 
and Wales and its application in a social media scenario. The benefits of 
conducting a narrative review of the literature throughout this thesis allow for 
the researcher to present a variety of up-to-date studies related to social 
media abuse, as opposed to focussing on primary research conducted purely 
 
21 Laura Scaife, Handbook of Social Media and the Law (Routledge 2015) 
22 Article 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
23 Rumona Dickson, M. Gemma Cherry and Angela Boland, ‘Carrying Out a Systematic 
Review as a Master’s Thesis’ in Angela Boland, M. Gemma Cherry & Rumona Dickson (eds) 
Doing a Systematic Review: A student’s Guide (2nd edn, Sage 2014) 11-12  
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for this study. This allows for a critical analysis of the current social media 
narrative to take place across the thesis as opposed to one separate 
literature review chapter. Whilst other methods could be utilised, such as 
interviews or questionnaires, due to ethical constraints and issues in getting 
participants to take part in the research, it was decided that a narrative 
review was more appropriate for the research questions posed.        
 
The Acts and legal discourse reviewed throughout this thesis have been 
chosen through an analysis of the wider literature, in particular the work of 
Scaife.24 As the focus of this thesis is on the criminal law, civil provisions 
which can be used to govern online conduct, for example defamation, have 
been disregarded as it was beyond the scope and purpose of the research 
questions. There are however other criminal law provisions25 which can be 
used in a social media context which are not discussed in the thesis; 
because of all the Acts used to control online behaviour, the Acts reviewed in 
the following discussions give rise to the most significant arguments that the 
law does not comply with the principle of legality.  
 
Throughout the following discussions, a non-consequentialist approach will 
be used, whereby the researcher is interested in the process undertaken by 
the criminal justice system in determining why a particular Act of Parliament 
is utilised in a given situation. For example, why the Serious Crime Act 2007 
 
24 Scaife n.21 
25 For example, Section 16 Offences Against the Person Act 1861 which prohibits threats to 
kill  
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was used in the case of R v Blackshaw,26 but not in R v Rhodri Phillips,27 as 
discussed further in chapter four. Due to the way in which the criminal justice 
system works in England and Wales, the cases reviewed in the following 
chapters have been chosen as they have either been officially recorded and 
published, or significant case facts were published by the media and 
therefore sufficient information about the cases are in the public domain. The 
following discussions will centre on the concept that the current criminal law 
framework when applied in a social media setting, does not conform to the 
principle of legality, discussed further in chapter two. Consequently, it is 
argued that the current criminal law framework, in a social media context, is 
being either misunderstood by actors in the criminal justice system or indeed 
being used in an arbitrary manner.  
 
Using a non-consequentialist approach through the lens of legality, the 
findings will be presented in a systematic manner, allowing for further 
discussions to take place as to how actors in the criminal justice system, i.e 
the police and the CPS, social networking companies and society can better 
protect those subjected to online abuse. This will be aided further by the 
narrative review of the current social media literature examined throughout 
varies points of this thesis. In addition, to enhance the recommendations put 
forward in chapter nine, an examination of how the European Union, 
Australia, Germany and India have attempted to govern online conduct will 
occur in chapter eight. The primary reason for focussing on these four 
 
26 R v Blackshaw [2011] EWCA Crim 2312, [2012] 1 W.L.R. 1126 
27 R v Rhodri Phillips Westminster Magistrates’ Court 13 July 2017 (unreported) 
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institutions and countries relates to the unique approach each has taken in 
attempting to tackle online abuse.  
Research Questions  
 
Using a narrative review of the literature from the theoretical perspective of 
legality, the following research questions will be answered:  
 
1. To what extent does the criminal justice system, social networking 
companies and society govern online abuse aided by social media? 
 
2. How does the current criminal law of England and Wales prohibit 
online abuse? 
 
3. To what extent can other international approaches to online abuse aid 
how the criminal justice system in England and Wales tackles social 
media abuse?  
 
4. How can the criminal justice system, social networking companies and 
society better protect those who are subjected to abusive conduct on 
social media? 
 
Chapter Overview   
Chapter one provides a contextualisation of the underlying theme of this 
thesis, online abuse. It takes the format of exploring the dominance of the 
Internet within society today. Using the work of Bernal, the purpose of the 
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Internet will be examined,28 before turning to look at social media. As 
highlighted above there is no one true definition of social media, but as will 
be explained in the contextualisation chapter, for the purpose of this thesis 
social media is defined as:  
‘the ability to share, to co-operate, with one another, and to take 
collective actions, all outside the framework of traditional institutions 
and organisations.’29 
 
Though it is estimated that there are over 200 social media companies 
across the globe,30 as explained in chapter one, this thesis will focus on two 
of the biggest social media companies today, Facebook and Twitter. Their 
sheer dominance will be detailed in the contextualisation chapter. The final 
section of chapter one will provide a comprehensive discussion of the extent 
of online abuse today, providing the rationale as to why it is important that 
the law adequately protects individuals from online abuse.  
 
Chapter two will give a brief overview of the criminal justice system in 
England and Wales, before going on to justify why the theoretical position of 
legality was used to underpin key arguments in this thesis. To do this, other 
theoretical concepts, in particular deterrence theory, rational choice theory, 
feminism, digital feminism and victimology will be discussed first before 
turning to examine legality, allowing the researcher to justify their theoretical 
positioning. Legality consists of three interlinking rules: the law must be in 
place, the law must be clear, and the law must be accessible. Though 
 
28 Paul Bernal, The Internet, Warts and All: Free Speech, Privacy and Truth (Cambridge 
University Press 2018) 5-19 
29 Clay Shirky, Here comes everyone (Penguin 2008) 20. For a discussion on different 
definitions of social media see, Christian Fuchs, Social Media a Critical Introduction (Sage 
Publications 2014) 35-37 
30 Scaife n.21, 4 
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elements of other theories, such as those listed above, are present at varies 
points of this thesis, it will be argued that the concept of legality underpins 
the criminal law; failure to abide by this principle can cause 
misunderstandings, leaving victims of online abuse frustrated, alongside 
raising issues with the law being used in an arbitrary manner.   
 
Following growing concerns about the extent of online abuse, social media 
companies have been put under increasing pressure to do more to control 
inappropriate behaviours on their sites.31 Chapter three examines in detail 
how both Facebook and Twitter are currently trying to tackle online abuse. 
The chapter starts by outlining both Facebook and Twitter’s terms of service 
agreements, before turning to look at the different mechanisms each 
company has put in place to make their sites safer for online users. Chapter 
three will conclude by suggesting that self-regulation is currently failing to 
adequately protect users from online abuse, providing the reasoning as to 
why the law needs to intervene.    
 
To determine how the current criminal law framework of England and Wales 
governs online abuse aided by social media, chapter’s four to six examine 
several legislative provisions which have been applied in cases relating to 
online abuse. Chapter four examines in detail legislative provisions which are 
currently being utilised in a social media context, which were never intended 
to cover technology. Each Act, the Serious Crime Act 2007, the Public Order 
Act 1986 and the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, are taken in turn 
 
31 See, Communications Committee n.18  
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and critically analysed from a social media perspective. Here, the purpose 
behind the creation and implementation of each Act will be stated, before 
turning to look at both the actus reus and mens rea of the behaviours 
prohibited under these Acts of Parliament.32 It will be put forward in this 
chapter that each of these Acts does not comply with the principle of legality 
in the criminal law. It will conclude by suggesting a number of 
recommendations to better govern inappropriate conduct carried out online. 
 
Following on from examining non-technology-based Acts of Parliament, 
chapter five discusses both the Computer Misuse Act 1990 and section 33 of 
the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015. Both these provisions were 
implemented to cover new technology, though it is unlikely that the Computer 
Misuse Act was created with social media in mind. Chapter five argues that 
both these Acts conform to the principle of legality in the criminal law, and 
therefore need to be utilised to better protect individuals from online abuse. 
However, chapter five does highlight issues with how section 33 of the 
Criminal Justice and Courts Act is constructed. Section 33 of the Criminal 
Justice and Courts Act prohibits revenge pornography. Revenge porn is:  
‘the sharing of private, sexual materials, either photos or videos, of 
another person without their consent and with the purpose of causing 
embarrassment or distress.’33  
 
The law prohibiting revenge porn has been constructed in a narrow manner. 
For instance, as discussed in chapter five a person who sends revenge porn 
images will only be found guilty if it can be established that they sent the 
 
32 The meaning of actus reus and mens rea will be explained in chapter two. 
33 HM Government, ‘Revenge Porn: The Facts’ (Gov.uk, 2014) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/405286/reve
nge-porn-factsheet.pdf> accessed 19 October 2016  
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image or video in question to cause distress. Consequently, images or 
videos sent for other reasons, for example for financial gain, are outside the 
realms of the Act. 
 
Whereas both the Computer Misuse Act and section 33 of the Criminal 
Justice and Courts Act govern specific conduct carried out online, the 
Malicious Communications Act 1988 and section 127 of the Communications 
Act 2003 can be considered as covering miscellaneous online offences. Both 
these provisions as highlighted in chapter six can be seen to have taken 
precedence in a social media context. Indeed, as argued by Scaife both Acts 
have become interchangeable in recent years.34 Issues have therefore arisen 
throughout the criminal justice system regarding the use of the Malicious 
Communications Act and section 127 of the Communications Act to govern 
inappropriate behaviours online. Chapter six examines in detail these two 
Acts of Parliament, looking at both the actus reus and mens rea of the 
offences prohibited under both provisions. Here, it is argued that the current 
use of the terms ‘menacing’, ‘indecent’ and ‘grossly offensive’ material, does 
not comply with the principle of legality, using case examples to illustrate 
these points. The final part of this chapter will critically analyse the current 
social media prosecuting guidelines implemented by the CPS in 2013, before 
making a number of recommendations. The discussions throughout chapters 
two, three, four, five and six will answer research questions one and two. 
  
 
34 Scaife n.21, 166 
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Moving on from critically analysing the current criminal law framework in 
England and Wales, chapter seven examines freedom of expression and the 
right to privacy, as protected under the European Convention on Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. These two competing rights are not 
unique to the digital age, they have always existed with traditional types of 
media. However, as explored in chapter seven freedom of expression has 
become somewhat the trump card in cases relating to online conduct. Here, 
it is argued that the criminal justice system currently tilts in the direction of 
freedom of expression. This chapter concludes by suggesting that privacy, 
which includes a person’s right to physical and psychological integrity, should 
be considered in the first instance, before turning to examine freedom of 
expression.  
 
In order to answer the third research question chapter eight explores how the 
European Union, Australia, Germany and India are currently attempting to 
tackle inappropriate behaviours online. The rationale for focussing on these 
institutions and countries relates to the different approaches each has taken 
to controlling online abuse. Both the European Union and Australia endorse 
non-legislative approaches to governing online conduct. Whereas Germany 
has implemented the Act to Improve Enforcement of the Law in Social 
Networks (Network Enforcement Act) 2017, which is directly aimed at social 
media companies to do more in removing unlawful content from their sites. In 
contrast, India has implemented a specific legal provision directly aimed at 
the online user. The chapter concludes by suggesting that a mixed-method 
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approach is needed to adequately protect victims from online abuse.  
 
The final research question poses to discuss alternative ways in which the 
criminal justice system and society can better protect those subjected to 
online abuse. Using the arguments put forward in the previous chapters, 
chapter nine suggests several recommendations to help tackle the growing 
issue of online abuse. It is argued in chapter nine that a multidimensional 
approach is needed to keep pace with changing technology whereby we 
need changes within the law, the criminal justice system as a whole, 
education and society in order to better protect those subjected to abusive 
behaviour online. 
 
Contribution to knowledge  
This project makes the following original contributions to knowledge; it will 
consist of: 
1. A critical evaluation of the law’s response to online abuse from the 
perspective of legality; 
2. To put forward several recommendations to help combat the 
growing issue of online abuse, taking into consideration international 
approaches to tackling abuse online;  
3. A proposed social media Bill to better protect individuals from online 
abuse. 
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Chapter One 
Contextualisation: The Internet and Online Abuse 
Introduction   
‘So, the Internet is an information resource, a communications 
medium, a business platform, a political platform and a public space - 
and all at the same time, using the same services and systems, even 
within the same conversations and interactions. It is where people 
converse and socialise, where they organise their “offline” lives, where 
they find jobs and romance, where they shop, where they find 
entertainment.’1 
 
The Internet has altered and shaped society since the 1960s. It has changed 
how society communicates, shops and socialises, in fact the Internet 
dominates much of society today. In that most prevalent of roles, it has 
become ‘… both a nuisance and a positive thing’.2 The following discussion 
will outline the history of the Internet, looking particularly at the emergence of 
Web 1.0 and Web 2.0. Here, emphasis will be placed on the purpose behind 
its creation, before moving on to examine in detail the use of the Internet as 
a new form of instant communication and the development of social media. 
The final parts of this chapter will expose the ongoing issue of social media 
sites being used as a weapon to torment and abuse others online. Before 
turning to look at the creation of the Internet, a brief overview will be given of 
the criminal justice system in England and Wales.    
 
The Internet: A brief history  
 
There is no true definition of what constitutes the Internet, though there is a 
consensus of certain characteristics which can be associated with it: 
‘The Internet is a framework that allows users to exchange information 
at a distance, work, carryout research, discuss, transfer files as well 
 
1 Paul Bernal, The Internet, Warts and All: Free Speech, Privacy and Truth (Cambridge 
University Press 2018) 19  
2 Ursula Smartt, Media & Entertainment Law (Taylor & Francis 2017) 72 
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as a range of other activities.’3  
 
In essence, the Internet ‘is basically a telecommunications system for 
computer networks’4 with its origins stemming back to the 1960s.  
 
In October 1957 Western society was taken by surprise at the 
announcement that the Soviet Union had launched the first man-made object 
into outer space.5 Following this, the then President of the United States of 
America Dwight Eisenhower, created a new research agency, the Advanced 
Research Projects Agency, linked to the Department of Defence. The 
purpose of the agency was to ensure the USA would never again be taken 
by surprise at the emergence of new technology.6 The Advanced Research 
Projects Agency created the world’s first successful computer network, 
known as the ARPANET (the Advanced Research Projects Agency Network) 
in the late 1960s.7  
 
Following the success of ARPANET, further networks were manufactured 
including the Transmission Control Protocol, which allowed networks to be 
created between local computers.8 In 1988 computers based in Canada and 
France were linked to networks created in the United States, paving the way 
for the creation of the World Wide Web.9  
 
3 Kevin M Rogers, The Internet and the Law (Macmillan International Higher Education 
2011) 3 
4 Andrew Murray, Information Technology Law: The Law and Society (3rd edn, Oxford 
University Press 2016) 16  
5 Ibid.,19 
6 Ibid.,17 
7 Ibid., 20 
8 Jeffrey C Jackson, Web Technologies: A Computer Science Perspective (Pearson 
Education 2007) 2  
9 Ibid., 3 
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The World Wide Web consists of millions of interlinked web pages which use 
the Internet to connect. The foundation for the World Wide Web was created 
in 1989 by Sir Tim Berners-Lee.10 Berners-Lee envisioned a database where 
users would be able to obtain any information they desired with minimum 
fuss. In 1990 the first website went ‘live’.11 By 1993 the World Wide Web or 
Web 1.0 as it is commonly referred to, was made available to the wider 
public. The purpose of Web 1.0 was to allow users to actively search 
between static websites.12 In essence, Web 1.0 was an information 
database, whereby users were considered as consumers.13   
 
By the turn of the next millennium, the advancement of changing technology 
had altered Web 1.0 completely. Internet users went from consumers to 
content creators.14 By 2005 it had been accepted that a new version of the 
World Wide Web had been created, Web 2.0:  
‘The term Web 2.0 … is said to describe the period in which websites 
became more interactive, collaborative, and social. This is typically 
contrasted with more passive website interactions, where users simply 
viewed or downloaded content from websites.’15 
 
Web 2.0 unlike its predecessor, was much more interactive, dynamic and 
user-driven.16 The expansion of the World Wide Web changed the job 
 
10 Rogers n.3, 3 
11 Madhumita Murgia, ‘The world's first website went online 25 years ago today’ The 
Telegraph (London, 21 December 2015) 
<https://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/internet/12061803/The-worlds-first-website-went-
online-25-years-ago-today.html> accessed 2 November 2018  
12 Rogers n.3, 213 
13 Matthew Allen, ‘What was Web 2.0? Versions as the dominant mode of internet history’ 
(2012) 15(2) New Media & Society 260, 263   
14 Ibid.,   
15 Law Commission, Abusive and Offensive Online Communications: A Scoping Report (Law 
Com No 381, 2018) [2.29] 
16 Rogers n.3, 213 
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market, altered how individuals communicated, and has become integral to 
the way in which society functions.   
 
Internet Growth and Usage  
Since its creation in 1989 the World Wide Web and the Internet has grown in 
terms of websites and online users.17 In the United Kingdom by 2018, 90% of 
adults were regular Internet users, an increase of 1% on the previous year. 
Of those aged between 16 and 34, 99% were regular users of the Internet, 
demonstrated further in figure one.18 Similarly, Internet usage has increased 
across the world. In 2017 it was reported that 3.58 billion people worldwide 
were users of the Internet, an increase of 190 million on the previous year.19 
With the expansion of Internet usage, the purpose for which it was designed 
has adapted to the changing needs of society. The World Wide Web has 
gone from static websites, whereby users were able to use the Internet as an 
information database, to interactive websites, which allow for instant 
communication, political debate and the selling of goods online.20  
 
 
17 Internet websites have since expanded from 130 in 1993 to 17,087,182 by the end of 
2000. See, Internet Live Stats, ‘Total number of Websites’ (Internet Live Stats, 2018) 
<http://www.internetlivestats.com/total-number-of-websites/> accessed 2 November 2018 
18 Office of National Statistics, ‘Internet users, UK: 2018’ (Office of National Statistics, 31 
May 2018) 
<https://www.ons.gov.uk/businessindustryandtrade/itandinternetindustry/bulletins/internetus
ers/2018> accessed 2 November 2018  
19 Statista, ‘Number of Internet users worldwide from 2005 to 2017 (in millions)’ (Statista, 
2018) <https://www.statista.com/statistics/273018/number-of-internet-users-worldwide/> 
accessed 2 November 2018  
20 Note, this is not a definitive list.  
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Figure 1: Recent Internet usage by age, 2011 and 2018, UK.21 
 
Furthermore, access to the online world has moved away from dial-up 
connections22 on processing computers to easy access via smartphone 
technology.23 Consequently, the purpose of the Internet has expanded, as 
illustrated in the work of Bernal. Bernal suggests that the purpose of the 
Internet can be split into six categories: the use of the Internet as an 
information database, the use of the Internet as a business platform,24 the 
use of the Internet as a political platform, the Internet as a public space, the 
Internet as a communications device, and the use of the Internet in being 
integral to society.25  
 
21 Office of National Statistics n.18  
22 Dial-up refers to ‘the method for connecting to an IPS using a regular telephone line …’. 
See, Gary B Shelly & Jennifer Campbell, Discovering the Internet: Brief (Cengage Learning 
2011) 19  
23 On average in the United Kingdom smartphone users spent 2 hours per day on the 
internet using their mobile phones. See, Ofcom, ‘The UK is now a smartphone society’ 
(Ofcom, 6 August 2015) <https://www.ofcom.org.uk/about-ofcom/latest/media/media-
releases/2015/cmr-uk-2015> accessed 30 November 2018 
24 The use of the Internet as a business platform will not be discussed as it is beyond the 
scope of this thesis.  
25 Bernal n.1, 5-19 
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The Internet as an Information Database  
The original purpose of Web 1.0 was to create an information database 
where users could easily access information from a computer. The concept 
of the World Wide Web as an information database has since expanded; 
users can now actively search for information, access the latest headline 
news,26 and keep updated with the latest celebrity gossip. 
 
Information obtained from the Internet is usually gathered via search engines 
such as Google. Google dominates much of the search engine market 
around the world.27 Encyclopaedias, which were once only obtainable in hard 
copy, are now readily available online. For instance, Wikipedia an online 
encyclopaedia, has over 43 million pages covering a range of topics.28 Yet 
the use of the Internet as a form of imparting information has raised issues 
concerning the validity of the information imparted.  
 
The United Kingdom European Union membership referendum (Brexit)29 in 
2016, and the 2017 General Election in the United Kingdom, along with the 
Presidential campaign in the United States of America in 2016/17, exposed 
growing concerns about the validity of information obtained from the 
 
26 Research undertaken by Ofcom in 2016 exposed that 48% of adults now use the Internet 
for news. See, Ofcom, ‘News consumption in the UK: 2016’ (Ofcom, 29 June 2017) 34 
<https://www.ofcom.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0016/103570/news-consumption-uk-
2016.pdf> accessed 14 November 2018  
27 Bernal n.1, 5 
28 Ibid., 
29 In 2016, the citizens of the United Kingdom voted in favour of leaving the European Union 
following a referendum. The departure of the United Kingdom from the European Union is 
commonly referred to as Brexit. 
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Internet.30 These key political moments were dominated by fake news and 
data harvesting.31 Fake news can be defined as ‘purposefully false and 
provocative misinformation and literally untrue news stories.’32 During these 
political events in the United Kingdom and the United States of America, fake 
news dominated the Internet. For instance, Facebook, the world’s largest 
social media company,33 has made available to an inquiry examining the 
extent of fake news during the Brexit referendum, advertisements and stories 
that were actively shared across their site which were false.34 For example, 
one article which was actively shared across Facebook stated that the 
European Union (EU) blocks citizens ability to speak out and protect polar 
bears,35 a story which was later proven to be false.36 Fake news articles 
were therefore being used to target voters, which became more apparent in 
the wake of the Cambridge Analytica Scandal in 2018.   
 
 
30 Digital, Culture, Media & Sport Committee, Disinformation and “fake news”: Interim Report 
(HC 2017-179 363) 
31 ‘Harvesting data, as its agricultural name suggests, is similar to gathering crops because it 
involves collection and storage with the expectation of future reward.’ See, Gráinne 
Maedhbh Nic Lochlainn, ‘Facebook data harvesting: what you need to know’ The 
Conversation (London, 3 April 2018) <http://theconversation.com/facebook-data-harvesting-
what-you-need-to-know-93959> accessed 5 February 2019 
32 Rob William, ‘Fighting “Fake News” in the Age of Digital Disorientation: Towards “Real 
News” Critical Media Literacy Education, and Independent Journalism for 21st Century 
Citizens’ in Christian Z Goering & Paul L Thomas (eds), Critical Media Literacy and Fake 
News in Post-Truth America (BRILL 2018) 57 
33 Bernal n.1, 5. What is meant by the term social media and the emergence of social media 
is discussed in detail in later parts of this chapter. 
34 Digital, Culture, Media & Sport Committee n.30 
35 Anoosh Chakelian, ‘Facebook releases Brexit campaign ads for the fake news inquiry – 
but what’s wrong with them?’ NewStateman (London, 27 July 2018) 
<https://www.newstatesman.com/politics/media/2018/07/facebook-releases-brexit-
campaign-ads-fake-news-inquiry-what-s-wrong-them> accessed 14 November 2018  
36 Many of the fake news stories surrounding the Brexit campaign were also reported in 
tabloid newspapers.  
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Following the Brexit Referendum and the Presidential campaign in America, 
it publicly37 emerged that Facebook had suffered a major data breach, 
resulting in 87 million Facebook profiles being harvested by Cambridge 
Analytica.38 Aleksandr Kogan, a Psychology Professor at the University of 
Cambridge, created an app39 on Facebook which allowed users to answer 
questions to determine their personality.40 The terms of the app allowed for 
Kogan to harvest not only the profile information of those who chose to use 
the app, but also the personal information of all other online users who were 
friends with the original user of the app. The data collected was later sold to 
Cambridge Analytica, who were able to build political profiles of voters 
across the globe.41 Cambridge Analytica were able to use these political 
profiles to build a further app which allowed them to target individuals with 
specific advertisements, suited to their political ideology. So, for instance 
during the Brexit campaign in the United Kingdom, a pro-Brexit organisation 
paid Cambridge Analytica to target voters with anti-European 
advertisements.42 Many of these advertisements were linked to fake news. 
 
37 Facebook became aware of Cambridge Analytica in 2015 but it was only made public in 
2018. See, Anthony Cuthbertson, ‘Facebook knew about Cambridge Analytica data breach a 
year before Trump election’ The Independent (London, 6 April 2018) 
<https://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/facebook-cambridge-analytica-trump-
election-data-breach-mark-zuckerberg-a8292071.html> accessed 5 February 2019    
38 During the original investigation it was estimated 50 million profiles has been harvested. 
However, following an internal review by Facebook they have since confirmed that 87 million 
profiles were harvested by Cambridge Analytica. See, Guardian News, ‘Mark Zuckerberg 
testifies before Congress’ (YouTube, 10 April 2018) 
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mZaec_mlq9M> accessed 14 January 2019    
39 App is short for an application. Apps are software programmes designed to perform 
specific functions.  
40 Carole Cadwalladr & Emma Graham-Harrison, ‘Revealed: 50 million Facebook profiles 
harvested for Cambridge Analytica in major data breach’ The Guardian (London, 17 March 
2018) <https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/mar/17/cambridge-analytica-facebook-
influence-us-election> accessed 5 February 2019    
41 Ibid., 
42 Patrick Greenfield, ‘The Cambridge Analytica files: the story so far’ The Guardian 
(London, 26 March 2018) <https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/mar/26/the-cambridge-
analytica-files-the-story-so-far> accessed 5 February 2019 
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The full extent of how fake news on social media sites influenced voters 
during these key political moments is unknown. In the United Kingdom a 
Parliamentary Committee was set up to investigate the effects of fake news 
during both the Brexit campaign and the General Election.43 The committee 
highlighted the continuing threat of fake news on democracy, concluding that 
social media companies needed stronger regulation to ensure that they 
became legally liable for harmful content on their sites.44 Yet fake news is not 
a new phenomenon unique to the digital age. Fake news has always been 
part of traditional forms of media. For instance, in 1993 a news story 
emerged stating that the European Union wanted to ban Prawn Cocktail 
crisps.45 In fact, the European Commission had simply informed UK 
negotiators that they had missed out the ‘production of specially flavoured 
crisps’ when drafting a list of food products containing artificial sweeteners 
and flavours.46  
 
Fake news has always been present within society, social media has just 
made it more prevalent than ever.47 Indeed, social media content can reach 
millions in a short period of time:  
‘Kremlin-aligned media published significant numbers of unique 
articles about the EU referendum. 89 Up researchers analysed the 
most shared of the articles, and identified 261 with a clear anti-EU 
bias to the reporting. The two main outlets were RT and Sputnik, with 
 
43 Digital, Culture, Media & Sport Committee n.30, 363 
44 Ibid., 89 
45 Commission, ‘EC to ban prawn cocktail crisps’ (Euro Myths, 16 January 1993) 
<https://blogs.ec.europa.eu/ECintheUK/ec-to-ban-prawn-cocktail-crips/> accessed 16 
February 2019 
46 Ibid., 
47 Tom Baldwin, Ctrl Alt Delete: How Politics and the Media Crashed Our Democracy 
(Oxford University Press 2018) 27 
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video produced by Ruptly. The articles that went most viral had the 
heaviest antiEU bias. The social reach of these anti-EU articles 
published by the Kremlin-owned channels was 134 million potential 
impressions …’.48 
 
The Internet as a Political Platform 
Following the revolution of the Internet, there was a consensus that the 
online world should be beyond the control and interference of the state, as 
illustrated by John Perry Barlow:  
‘I declare the global social space we are building [the Internet] to be 
naturally independent of the tyrannies you seek to impose on us. You 
have no moral right to rule us, nor do you possess any methods of 
enforcement we have true reason to fear.’49  
 
For Barlow, the Internet represented a space beyond the realms of 
government interference, free from political gain and outside the reach of the 
criminal law. His understanding of how the Internet should operate has been 
further supported by cyber-libertarians.50 Those who endorse cyber-
libertarianism suggest that the Internet is a separate entity from that of the 
physical world, and consequently, beyond interference from the state. 
Nevertheless, the expansion of changing technology and its dominance 
within society means that the Internet can no longer be considered as a 
separate entity from ‘real-life’. Unlawful behaviour can be aided or solely 
conducted online. For example, as will be discussed in chapter four the 
 
48 Digital, Culture, Media & Sport Committee n.30, [243] 
49 John Perry Barlow, ‘A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace’ (Electronic 
Frontier Foundation, 8 February 1996) <https://www.eff.org/cyberspace-independence> 
accessed 16 November 2018. Note this declaration was originally sent via email.  
50 For example, see the work of Esther Dyson, George Gilder, George Keyworth & Alvin 
Toffler, ‘Cyberspace and the American Dream: A Magna Carta for the Knowledge Age’ 
(1994) Future Insight <http://www.pff.org/issues-pubs/futureinsights/fi1.2magnacarta.html> 
accessed 26 September 2018 
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social media site Facebook was used as an external aid in the organisation 
of riots throughout the United Kingdom in 2011.  
 
Since 1996, the separation of the Internet from that of ‘real-life’ has been 
eroded, to the point that it can no longer be fully considered as a space 
beyond the reach of government officials.51 Recently, society has seen the 
use of the Internet and in particular social media, as a mechanism for 
political campaigning, as demonstrated in the 2017 General Election in the 
United Kingdom.52  
 
Following an announcement by Theresa May, the then Prime Minister of the 
UK, calling for an early General Election, sites such as Twitter and Facebook 
quickly became utilised as a device for political campaigning.53 In fact, the 
Conservative Party spent £2.1 million on advertising during the election 
campaign on Facebook, more than any other political party,54 as 
demonstrated in figure two. For Margetts, ‘… social media platforms 
emerge[ed] as important players …’55 in the 2017 General Election.       
 
 
51 Barry Wellman & Caroline Haythornthwaite, The Internet in Everyday Life (John Wiley & 
Sons 2008) 
52 Helen Margetts, ‘Why Social Media May Have Won the 2017 General Election’ (2017) 
88(3) The Political Quarterly 386 
53 Mike Wendling, ‘Election 2017: Was it Facebook wot swung it?’ The BBC (London, 10 
June 2017) <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/blogs-trending-40209711> accessed 16 November 
2018  
54 Peter Walker, ‘Tories spent £18.5m on election that cost them majority’ The Guardian 
(London, 19 March 2018) <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/mar/19/electoral-
commission-conservatives-spent-lost-majority-2017-election> accessed 16 November 2018   
55 Margetts n.52, 389  
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Figure 2: Expenditure by political group on Facebook advertisements during 




The use of social media during the 2017 General Election also exposed a 
darker side to the net, online abuse. Throughout the election campaign 
period, MPs in particular female politicians were subjected to highly abusive 
commentary online. Diane Abbot the Labour Shadow Home Secretary, was 
the most abused MP on Twitter57 during the campaign period, receiving more 
than 50% of all abusive tweets sent throughout the campaign:58   
‘I have had death threats, and people tweeting that I should be 
hanged “if they could find a tree big enough to take the fat bitch’s 
weight”. There was an English Defence League-affiliated Twitter 
account- #burnDianeAbbot. I have had rape threats, and been 
described as a “pathetic useless fat black piece of shit”, an “ugly, fat 
black bitch”, and a “nigger”- over and over again.’59     
 
 
56 Joey D'Urso, ‘Who spent what on Facebook during 2017 election campaign?’ The BBC 
(London, 31 March 2018) <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-43487301> accessed 16 
November 2018  
57 Twitter is discussed in detail in later parts of this chapter.  
58 Jessica Elgot, ‘Diane Abbott more abused than any other MPs during election’ The 
Guardian (London, 5 September 2017) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/sep/05/diane-abbott-more-abused-than-any-
other-mps-during-election> accessed 16 November 2018  
59 Rowena Mason, ‘Diane Abbott on abuse of MPs: “My staff try not to let me go out alone”’ 
The Guardian (London, 19 February 2017) 
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Despite the abuse experienced by MPs during the 2017 UK General 
Election, commentators such as Myers argued that online abuse aimed at 
MPs is part of a healthy democracy, where citizens should be able to criticise 
politicians online.60 For Myers what MPs define as abuse is simply ‘… 
criticism, ridicule and insult’.61 Despite this, as will be exposed in later parts 
of this thesis, online abuse is a threat to democracy. It can have a direct 
impact on a person choosing to enter the world of politics, whilst silencing 
political campaigning. The effects of online abuse are discussed in detail in 
later sections of this chapter.     
 
The Internet as a Public Space  
The Internet was, and still is widely considered, a public space whereby 
freedom of speech will prevail:  
‘Governments of the Industrial World, you weary giants of flesh and 
steel, I come from Cyberspace, the new home of Mind. On behalf of 
the future, I ask you of the past to leave us alone. You are not 
welcome among us. You have no sovereignty where we gather.’62  
 
Free speech has become somewhat the trump card to abusive commentary 
online.63 As detailed in chapter seven free speech is considered the right to 
hold an opinion which can be expressed in any medium required by the 
speaker. For libertarians there should be no limit on a person’s expression.64 
Whereas pro-regulators suggest that while the user is present in the physical 
 
<https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/feb/19/diane-abbott-on-abuse-of-mps-staff-try-
not-to-let-me-walk-around-alone> accessed 6 March 2017 
60 Fraser Myers, ‘We must have the right to insult politicians’ (Spiked, 25 September 2018) 
<https://www.spiked-online.com/2018/09/25/we-must-have-the-right-to-insult-politicians/> 
accessed 16 February 2019 
61 Ibid., 
62 Baldwin n.47, 44 
63 Zia Akhar, ‘Malicious communications, media platforms and legal sanctions’ (2014) 20(6) 
Computer and Telecommunications Law Review 179, 181 
64 See for example Barlow n.49 
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world, the Internet cannot be beyond the realms of government 
interference.65  
 
For free speech libertarians the Internet should be beyond the reach of the 
law to protect freedom of expression. The World Wide Web has become 
integral to freedom of expression, it allows users to challenge the State, 
create change within society, and brings individuals with similar ideas 
together. The use of the World Wide Web has now become paramount to 
social change. Nevertheless, as mentioned above since the creation of the 
Internet and the World Wide Web, it has been used as a weapon to target 
other users.  
 
In recent years MPs,66 celebrities,67 campaigners,68 academics,69 and other 
general Internet users,70 have become targets for Internet trolls.71 Free 
speech is often quoted at those who are subjected to this form of abuse 
 
65 Bernal n.1, 19 
66 Elgot n.58 
67 Caroline Davies, ‘Katie Price urges MPs to act after “horrific” online abuse of son’ The 
Guardian (London, 6 February 2018) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/media/2018/feb/06/katie-price-urges-mps-to-make-online-
abuse-a-criminal-offence> accessed 1 May 2018 
68 Alexandra Topping, ‘Jane Austen Twitter row: two plead guilty to abusive tweets’ The 
Guardian (London, 7 January 2014) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/society/2014/jan/07/jane-austen-banknoteabusive-tweets-
criado-perez> accessed 10 October 2016 
69 Ben Dowell, ‘Mary Beard suffers “truly vile” online abuse after Question Time’ The 
Guardian (London, 21 January 2013) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/media/2013/jan/21/mary-beard-suffers-twitter-abuse> 
accessed 26 November 2018  
70 Nadia Khomami, ‘NSPCC records 88% rise in children seeking help for online abuse’ The 
Guardian (London, 14 November 2016) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/society/2016/nov/14/nspcc-records-88-rise-in-children-
seeking-help-for-online-abuse> accessed 26 November 2018 
71 Trolls can be defined as, ‘[a] person who creates controversy in an online setting (typically 
on a social networking website, forum, comment section, or chatroom), disrupting 
conversation as to a piece of content by providing commentary that aims to provoke an 
adverse reaction.’ See, Law Commission n.15, 10 
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online, with arguments being put forward that the Internet should be beyond 
the realms of the criminal law.72 However, free speech in the form of abuse 
can be stifling on freedom of expression. By abusing others online sectors of 
society are having their opinions and voices silenced. This directly affects 
those who are subjected to online abuse as their own right to free speech is 
reduced. Online abuse affects other rights such as privacy. Whereas some 
commentators73 maintain that privacy does not exist online, this is disputed 
by Bernal: ‘[P]eople do have an expectation to privacy even in what might be 
generally be called “public” space on the Internet.’74 The issue of privacy in 
the digital world is discussed further in chapter seven.  
 
The Internet as a Communications Device  
The expansion of changing technology has not only changed how we obtain 
information, adapted political campaigns or indeed altered how we shop, it 
has also transformed how society communicates.75 In 1971 the first email 
between two computers was transmitted.76 Since then, technological 
advances have revolutionised speech, in the form of social media, online 
 
72 Barlow n.49 
73 Ibid., 
74 Bernal n.1, 16 
75 Law Commission n.15, [1.34] 
76 Centre for Computing History, ‘1971: First Network Email sent by Ray Tomlinson’ (Centre 
for Computing History, 2016) <http://www.computinghistory.org.uk/det/6116/First-e-mail-
sent-by-Ray-Tomlinson/> accessed 27 November 2018  
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blogging,77 vlogging78 and live video broadcasts.79  
 
The use of the Internet as a communications medium has been on the 
increase since the early 1990s:  
‘Technological advancement in the 19th century sparked a revolution 
in the speed of communication. The invention of the telegraph was the 
first form of electrical telecommunication that had this effect. 
Subsequent innovations such as the telephone, radio, television, the 
Internet, and most recently, the emergence of social media, have 
radically transformed the way we communicate.’80 
 
By 2015 it was estimated that there were over 200 websites whereby users 
could create online profiles and communicate instantly with others, 
commonly referred to as social media.81 Social media as discussed below, 
allows users to instantly communicate not only with their friends, but in some 
cases with the general public.82 Throwaway comments which in the past 
would have gone undocumented can now be actively shared across the 




77 ‘An online journal, or “web log”, usually maintained by an individual or business and with 
regular entries of content on a specific topic, descriptions of events, or other resources such 
as graphics or videos.’ See, Law Commission n.23, 5 
78 ‘Utilising video recordings to tell a story or to report on information, common on video 
sharing networks such as YouTube (a shortening of “video web log”).’ See, Law Commission 
n.15, 10  
79 Note, this is not a definitive list.  
80 Law Commission n.15, [2.29] 
81 Laura Scaife, Handbook of Social Media and the Law (Routledge 2015) 4 
82 For instance, Twitter allows comments to be made which are publicly viewable to those 
without a Twitter account.  
83 For example, in 2015 an individual tweeted the following: ‘Going to Africa. Hope I don’t get 
AIDS [sic]. Just kidding. I’m white!’ Following the tweet being actively shared across Twitter, 
the individual was arrested and subsequently lost her job. See, Jon Ronson, ‘How One 
Stupid Tweet Blew Up Justine Sacco’s Life’ The New York Times Magazine (New York, 12 
February 2015) <https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/15/magazine/how-one-stupid-tweet-
ruined-justine-saccos-life.html> accessed 5 February 2019 
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As Bernal argues the modern Internet has become integral to society.84 It 
has impacted on all areas of social life. For instance, we have seen the use 
of websites to promote change within society, such as the recent ‘#MeToo’ 
campaign, which highlighted the ongoing issues of sexual violence and 
assault across the world.85 Many of these campaigns have been aided by 
social media. Yet social media has a darker side whereby users can be 
actively abused and targeted by others online.  
 
Social Media: An Explanation  
The term social media covers a range of online conducts for instance, 
blogging, video sharing sites and virtual world reality games can all fall within 
the definition of social media.86 For the purpose of this thesis the term social 
media is used to refer to websites/devices which allow users to create their 
own profiles and commentary, whilst also allowing individuals to 
communicate instantly with others.  
 
Though there is no one true definition of social media, it has come to be 
accepted that social media is: 
‘the ability to share, to co-operate, with one another, and to take 




84 Bernal n.1, 19 
85 Bri Lee, ‘Sharing our stories is the strength at the heart of #MeToo. We must repeal gag 
laws’ The Guardian (London, 19 November 2018) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/nov/19/sharing-our-stories-is-the-
strength-at-the-heart-of-metoo-we-must-repeal-gag-laws> accessed 27 November 2018 
86 Scaife n.81, 8-9 
87 Clay Shirky, Here comes everyone (Penguin 2008) 20. For a discussion on different 
definitions of social media see, Christian Fuchs, Social Media a Critical Introduction (Sage 
Publications 2014) 35-37 
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As outlined by the Law Commission there are several fundamental 
characteristics associated with social media, including the ability to generate 
a profile and actively share information.88 The first generation of social media 
was created in the early 1990s, through websites which allowed users to 
post comments on bulletin-boards.89 Following a demand for online services 
in which individuals could connect with others, new social media sites were 
created aimed at connecting online users.  
 
The first form of social media as society knows it today, emerged in 1997, 
‘SixDegrees.com’, in which users of the site could connect with friends and 
family.90 Following the initial success of SixDegrees other websites started to 
emerge based on a similar format, such as that of ‘Hub Culture’ and 
‘MySpace’.91 Since the creation of SixDegrees, social media usage has been 
on the increase. In 2017, 66% of over 16s in the UK had access to at least 
one social media site, this increased to 96% for those aged between 16 and 
24.92 Two of the biggest forms of social media today, are Facebook and 
Twitter.  
 
On 4 February 2004 Mark Zuckerberg, a college student at Harvard 
University, alongside several other students, launched ‘TheFacebook’, later 
to be renamed ‘Facebook’. The initial purpose of Facebook was to create a 
 
88 Law Commission n.15, [2.32] 
89 Scaife n.81, 4 
90 Ibid., 
91 Ibid., 
92 Office of National Statistics, ‘Internet access – households and individuals, Great Britain: 
2017’ (Office of National Statistics, 3 August 2017) 
<https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/householdcharacteristics/homeinte
rnetandsocialmediausage/bulletins/internetaccesshouseholdsandindividuals/2017> 
accessed 26 November 2018 
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social media site as a communications mechanism for students at Harvard 
University, with the site later being made available to all higher education 
students in the Boston area.93 In 2006 Facebook was released to the world, 
with anyone who claimed94 to be over 13 years of age being able to create a 
Facebook page.  
 
Facebook, since its original launch in 2004, has become the biggest social 
media company today.95 The website ‘… operates as a social networking site 
based on interconnection with other users to generate content.’96 Here users 
must register with the site and build personal profiles of themselves, which 
can include, likes and dislikes, a picture of themselves, their date of birth, 
and other unique information such as where they were educated. In fact, 
Facebook is built on the premise of getting its users to reveal private 
information about themselves.  
 
By 2016 Facebook had expanded to become the sixth-most valuable public 
company in the world. 97 In June 2017 Mark Zuckerberg announced via 
Facebook, that the social media company now had 2 billion users, averaging 
 
93 Sarah Phillips, ‘A brief history of Facebook’ The Guardian (London, 25 July 2007) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2007/jul/25/media.newmedia> accessed 26 
November 2018  
94 Very little is done to verify the age of users on Facebook. Recently, Facebook has 
announced that it will do more to reduce underage usage. See, Josh Constine, ‘Facebook 
and Instagram change to crack down on underage children’ (Tech Crunch, 2018) 
<https://techcrunch.com/2018/07/19/facebok-under-13/> accessed 29 November 2018  
95 Josh Constine, ‘Facebook now has 2 billion monthly users … and responsibility’ (Tech 
Crunch, 2017) <https://techcrunch.com/2017/06/27/facebook-2-billion-users/> accessed 29 
November 2018 
96 Scaife n.81, 9 
97 Smartt n.2, 79 
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around 580,000 new users each day.98 In the United Kingdom alone 32.6 
million citizens are active Facebook users.99   
 
Similar trends have also been mirrored with other social media companies 
such as Twitter. Twitter emerged in 2006 as an alternative form of social 
media. Like that of Facebook, Twitter users can create online profiles though 
their comments, or tweets as they have become known, were originally 
limited to 140 characters.100 In 2015, 500 million tweets were sent every day 
on Twitter, averaging around 6000 tweets per second.101   
 
The creation of social media has had a direct effect on how individuals 
communicate. In turn, traditional forms of reducing speech, such as that of 
bullying, are now present in the online world.102 In recent years, the issue of 
online abuse has dominated much of society, resulting in research being 
undertaken to expose the extent of this phenomenon, both here in the United 
Kingdom and elsewhere. The following discussion will highlight recent 
research exposing the growing trend in online abuse. This will allow for the 
foundations of this thesis to be set by examining whether the current criminal 
law framework in England and Wales,103 adequately protects individuals from 
 
98 James Titcomb, ‘Facebook now has 2 billion users, Mark Zuckerberg announces’ The 
Telegraph (London, 27 June 2017) 
<https://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/2017/06/27/facebook-now-has-2-billion-users-
mark-zuckerberg-announces/> accessed 29 November 2018  
99 Mark Sweney, ‘Is Facebook for old people? Over-55s flock in as the young leave’ The 
Guardian (London, 12 February 2018) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/feb/12/is-facebook-for-old-people-over-55s-
flock-in-as-the-young-leave> accessed 29 November 2018  
100 This has since expanded to 280 characters. 
101 Smartt n.2, 79 
102 See, Law Commission n.15, [1.33]  
103 As noted in the Introduction, the foundation of this thesis will examine the criminal law in 
England and Wales, as opposed to the whole of the United Kingdom. This is simply because 
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online abuse.     
 
Online Abuse  
To examine if the current criminal law framework is adequate in protecting 
those who are subjected to abusive commentary online, first the meaning of 
online abuse must be examined. Like that of social media, there is no one 
true definition of online abuse. Studies which have examined the extent of 
abusive behaviour online all use different definitions of the term. The 
following discussion will outline some of the meanings given to this type of 
behaviour, before turning to look at the extent of online abuse today.  
 
There is no clear consensus as to the meaning of online abuse. In fact, the 
term ‘abuse’ is ambiguous with no agreement in law as to the meaning of 
abusing another. In 1995 the Law Commission during their report into Adult 
Social Care attempted to crystallise the meaning of abuse:  
‘… ill-treatment (including sexual abuse and forms of ill-treatment that 
are not physical); the impairment of, or an avoidable deterioration in, 
physical or mental health; and the impairment of physical, emotional, 
social or behavioural development.’104 
 
Similarly, the Oxford Dictionary gives two definitions of abuse:  
‘“Abusive” is defined variously in the Oxford English Dictionary as first, 
treating someone with cruelty or violence, especially regularly or 
repeatedly, or secondly, speaking to someone in an insulting or 
offensive way.’105 
 
Despite a lack of a consistent definition, it is clear that there are key 
characteristics associated with what can be considered as abuse. For 
 
Scotland and Northern Ireland have their own private laws governing certain criminal 
behaviours.  
104 Law Commission, Adult Social Care (Law Com No 326, 1995) [9.51] 
105 Law Commission n.15, [1.11] 
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instance, physical, sexual or mental ill-treatment fall within the definition of 
abuse.106  
 
Though the definitions above can be used to describe abuse online, their 
application to online abuse may be considered as too wide. The Oxford 
English Dictionary considers abuse to include offensive behaviour. However, 
to criminalise offensive behaviour online could be considered as limiting free 
speech. As affirmed in Handyside v United Kingdom107 citizens have the right 
to be offensive.108 Therefore, a narrower definition of online abuse is needed.  
 
For the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children (NSPCC), 
online abuse, in its simplest form refers to the ill-treatment of another which 
takes place online.109 Like that of the Oxford English Dictionary, the definition 
given by the NSPCC can be considered as too wide. For Lewis, Rowe and 
Wiper, online abuse refers to ‘hostile communications’, which are 
characterised by certain online conduct.110 Like that of traditional forms of 
abuse, certain online behaviours can fall within the definition of online abuse. 
Some of these behaviours stem from traditional forms of mistreatment, which 
have now been mirrored in an online context. For example, bullying which 
 
106 See also, Europe Institute for Gender Equality, ‘Cyber violence against women and girls’ 
(Europe Institute for Gender Equality, 2017) 
<eige.europa.eu/sites/default/files/.../cyber_violence_against_women_and_girls.pd> 
accessed 15 February 2017 
107 Handyside v United Kingdom (1976)1 EHRR 737 
108 Ibid., [49] 
109 NSPCC, ‘Online abuse: What is online abuse?’ (NSPCC, 2018) 
<https://www.nspcc.org.uk/preventing-abuse/child-abuse-and-neglect/online-abuse/> 
accessed 6 December 2018  
110 Ruth Lewis, Michael Rowe & Clare Wiper, ‘Online Abuse of Feminists as An Emerging 
form of Violence Against Women and Girls’ (2017) 57(6) The British Journal of Criminology 
1462 
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would once take place only in the physical world, can now be conducted 
wholly online and has been coined cyberbullying. In addition, new ways to 
taunt and abuse another have emerged online.  
 
In 2018 the Law Commission examined abusive and offensive commentary 
online. Here, like other studies which will be discussed in detail in later 
chapters, the committee did not give an overall definition of online abuse. 
Instead, they defined certain conduct which can be associated with abusing 
another online. For example:  
• Cyberbullying- The use of the Internet to continually taunt another. 
This form of behaviour is commonly associated with the younger 
generation. It is very similar to traditional forms of bullying, but it can 
take place solely online or it can be aided by digital technology; 
• Cyberstalking- Stalking is defined as ‘… repeated incidents, which 
may or may not individually be innocuous acts, but combined 
undermine the victim’s sense of safety and cause distress, fear or 
alarm.’111 Cyberstalking refers to the situation whereby the behaviour 
takes place in an online context; 
• Revenge pornography- The distribution of explicit images or videos 
of another to cause the person in the images or video distress. 
Though this behaviour can occur offline, it has evolved since the 
creation of the World Wide Web; 
• Doxing- Publishing private information about another online such as 
home addresses, with the intention to cause the victim distress; and 
 
111 Europe Institute for Gender Equality n.106 
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• Dogpiling- Encouraging other Internet users to target a specific 
individual. This type of behaviour has commonly been used against 
individuals based in the public domain.  
The above behaviours are not definitive but are conducts which are 
discussed in more detail throughout this thesis. Upon review of the literature, 
for the purpose of this thesis, online abuse is considered:  
Insulting and hostile behaviour aimed at another online which causes 
the deterioration of another’s physical and mental wellbeing; threats of 
physical and/or sexual violence; insulting and hostile behaviour aimed 
at another because of their (if real or presumed) gender, race, 
ethnicity, religion, national origin, gender identity, sex, disability or 
sexual orientation. 
 
Though there are other definitions available, this definition has been 
generated as it covers threats of physical or sexual violence, hate speech 
and reflects the mental anguish associated with online abuse. 
 
The Extent of Online Abuse 
Research has started to emerge in recent years exposing the extent of 
abusive conduct online, though its true scale is unknown. For Essex Police 
Chief Constable Stephen Kavanagh, the current research on online abuse is 
only ‘the tip of the iceberg’, with police forces unable to cope with the scale of 
abuse that is currently taking place online.112 
 
In October 2017 the BBC released a Freedom of Information request 
exposing the number of police reports made between 2015 and 2016, where 
malicious communications were the main element of the crime being 
 
112 The BBC, ‘Teenager’s life “ruined” by Live.me and Twitter “trolls”’ The BBC (London, 24 
October 2017) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-41693437> accessed 30 January 
2018 
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complained about.113 Thirty-eight out of forty-two police forces responded to 
the request. The BBC uncovered that between 2015 and 2016, there had 
been an increase of 36,462 police reports involving malicious 
communications. Yet the findings of the BBC are only a glimpse of the true 
extent of online abuse taking place across the globe.  
 
Facebook, the biggest social media company today has been under 
increasing pressure to actively deal with unlawful behaviour which takes 
place on its platform:  
‘You [Mark Zuckerberg, Facebook CEO] have to ask yourself how you 
will be remembered - as one of the three big Internet giants together 
with Steve Jobs and Bill Gates who have enriched our worlds and our 
societies. Or on the other, in fact, a genius who created a digital 
monster that is destroying our democracies and our societies.’114 
 
Consequently, the company has since released a report exposing the scale 
of online abuse on its site. Facebook, over two three month periods, 
recorded comments and images which breached their community 
guidelines.115 These comments and images were then categorised into 
groups. For instance, graphic violence, spam, hate speech, adult nudity and 
sexual conduct.116    
 
113 Ibid., Here, the term ‘malicious communication’ was used as a generic term for abusive 
commentary sent online. 
114 Alexis C Madrigal, ‘A Belgian Legislator Berates and Scoffs at Mark Zuckerberg’ The 
Atlantic (Boston, 22 May 2018) <https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2018/05/a-
belgian-legislator-berates-and-scoffs-at-mark-zuckerberg/560960/> accessed 16 August 
2018 
115 Facebook’s community guidelines outline the terms of service for its site. In essence, it 
illustrates what conduct is and is not permitted by its users. For an in-depth discussion of 
Facebook’s community guidelines, see chapter three. 
116 Guy Rosen, ‘Facebook Publishes Enforcement Numbers for the First Time’ (Facebook, 
15 May 2018) <https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/05/enforcement-numbers/> accessed 9 
December 2018. See also, Dave Lee, ‘Facebook details scale of abuse on its site’ The BBC 
(London, 15 May 2018) <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-44122967> accessed 9 
December 2018 
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In the first three month period, October 2017 to December 2017, the 
company removed 1.2 million ‘pieces’ of content from its platform which were 
considered to be graphically violent.117 In the following three month period, 
January 2018 to March 2018, this increased by 183% to 3.4 million 
‘pieces’.118 In spite of this, and warnings given by Essex Police Chief 
Constable Stephen Kavanagh, the content removed by Facebook was only 
the ‘tip of the iceberg’. Later research undertaken by Facebook found that for 
every 10,000 posts placed during the same full six-month period, 27 abusive 
posts had been overlooked by the company.119 
 
Facebook also uncovered a growing trend of hate-related speech on its site 
during the same research period. For Facebook hate speech is:  
‘… a direct attack on people based on what we [Facebook] call 
protected characteristics - race, ethnicity, national origin, religious 
affiliation, sexual orientation, caste, sex, gender, gender identity and 
serious disease or disability.’120   
 
During the first data collection period, Facebook removed 1.6 million ‘pieces’ 
of content which were considered to breach the company’s guidelines in 
relation to hate speech.121 In the second three month period this increased to 
2.5 million.122 Facebook’s definition of hate speech is significantly broader 





120 Facebook, ‘Community Standards: Hate Speech’ (Facebook, 2018) 
<https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards/hate_speech> accessed 9 December 
2018 
121 Rosen n.116 
122 Ibid., 
Page 58 of 449 
 
hate speech is considered commentary that is ‘… motivated by hostility or 
demonstrates hostility towards the victim’s disability, race, religion, sexual 
orientation or transgender identity.’123  
 
Recently in the United Kingdom, there has been a drive to change the 
definition of protected characteristics to include a person’s gender or sex. 
Currently, a person who targets another because of their sex is not 
recognised as committing a hate crime. Nevertheless, Nottinghamshire 
Police Force since 2016 has started recording crime in which gender is a 
motivating factor.124 Since then, arguments have been put forward that this 
approach should be implemented across police forces in England and 
Wales.125  
 
In 2017 Amnesty International, a human rights organisation, conducted an 
IPSOS126 poll examining the extent to which women are abused via social 
media.127 The poll was conducted across eight states, including Denmark, 
Italy, New Zealand, Poland, Spain, Sweden, the UK and the USA, looking at 
the online experiences of women aged between 18 and 55. 23% of those 
surveyed stated that they had, on at least one occasion, experienced online 
 
123 The Crown Prosecution Service, ‘Hate Crime’ (CPS.gov, 2018) 
<https://www.cps.gov.uk/hate-crime> accessed 9 December 2018 
124 The BBC, ‘Nottinghamshire Police records misogyny as a hate crime’ The BBC (London, 
13 July 2016) <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-nottinghamshire-36775398> 
accessed 16 February 2019 
125 Libby Brooks, ‘Review brings misogyny as a hate crime a step closer’ The Guardian 
(London, 6 September 2018) <https://www.theguardian.com/society/2018/sep/05/first-step-
to-misogyny-becoming-a-hate-called-amazing-victory> accessed 16 February 2019  
126 IPSOS is a global market research firm. 
127 Amnesty International, ‘Amnesty reveals alarming impact of online abuse against women’ 
(Amnesty International, 20 November 2017) 
<https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/11/amnesty-reveals-alarming-impact-of-
online-abuse-against-women/> accessed 9 December 2018  
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abuse or harassment.128 This had significant effects on those who had been 
subjected to online abuse as shown further in figure three. For instance, 55% 
of participants experienced stress, anxiety or panic attacks directly linked to 
the abusive behaviour they were subjected to online.129 
 
One of the most significant findings of the study uncovered that of those 
women who had been subjected to online abuse, 76% had changed the way 
in which they utilised social media.130 Online abuse which results in the user 
changing their online habits can have a direct effect on a person’s right to 
freedom of expression, as outlined in chapter seven. Freedom of expression 
in the form of abusive online commentary can, in fact, reduce another’s right 
to free speech.  
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During the 2017 General Election in the UK as outlined in previous sections 
of this chapter, social media was at the forefront of many MPs campaign 
strategies. However, social media was also used to target MPs during the 
campaign period. Following the 2017 General Election, Amnesty 
International conducted research directly examining the scale of abuse 
during the election campaign.132 They found that between 1 January 2017 
and 8 June 2017, 900,223 tweets were sent to 177 female MPs, of this 
25,688 were deemed abusive.133  
 
Research studies such as those above, illustrate the growing issue of online 
abuse within society. These studies however do not clearly define what they 
consider to be abusive conduct, leaving flaws within their findings. Despite 
this, it is clear more needs to be done to tackle online abuse. The following 
sections will expose the extent of specific behaviours associated with online 
abuse which have been aided by social media.   
 
Cyberbullying  
Not only has the Internet created new and unique ways to taunt another, 
behaviour which was once confined to the physical world has now emerged 
 
132 Amnesty International UK, ‘Black and Asian women MPs abused more online’ (Amnesty 
International, 2017) <https://www.amnesty.org.uk/online-violence-women-mps> accessed 9 
December 2018. See also, Laura Bliss, ‘Abuse of women MPs is not just a scandal – it’s a 
threat to democracy’ The Conversation (London, 17 July 2017) 
<https://theconversation.com/abuse-of-women-mps-is-not-just-a-scandal-its-a-threat-to-
democracy-80781> accessed 9 December 2018 
133 Ibid., 
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online.134 This is true with cyberbullying.135 Cyberbullying takes the form of 
traditional bullying behaviour but is conducted online. 
  
Each year Ditch the Label with the help of educational institutions conducts a 
survey exposing the extent of bullying in the United Kingdom. In recent years 
they have included the concept of cyberbullying. In 2016 they found that 65% 
of participants had experienced some form of cyberbullying, an increase of 
3% on the previous year.136 By 2018 66% of participants had been subjected 
to cyberbullying, an increase of 1% since 2016.137 Cyberbullying has 
continued to be a problem within the educational sector, calling for the 
Government to announce compulsory lessons in schools teaching young 
people about social media and bullying online.138  
 
As will be discussed in later chapters, educational institutions have been 
slow in creating effective and knowledgeable digital literacy workshops, 
meaning in many cases young people do not fully comprehend the legal 
 
134 Press Association, ‘Social media-related crime reports up 780% in four years’ The 
Guardian (London, 27 December 2012) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/media/2012/dec/27/social-media-crime-facebook-twitter> 
accessed 18 October 2016. The types of conduct reported to the police varied, but it 
included reports of credible threats of violence, menacing messages and sexual offences.   
135 Law Commission n.15, [1.33] 
136 Ditch the Label, ‘The Annual Bullying Survey 2016’ (Ditch the Label, 2016) 14 
<http://www.ditchthelabel.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Annual-Bullying-Survey-2016-
Digital.pdf > accessed 18 October 2016. See also, Ditch the Label, ‘The Annual Bullying 
Survey 2015’ (Ditch the Label, 2015) 18 <http://ditchthelabel.org/downloads/abs2015.pdf> 
accessed 26 February 2016 
137 Ditch the Label, ‘The Annual Bullying Survey 2018’ (Ditch the Label, 2018) 13 
<https://www.ditchthelabel.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/The-Annual-Bullying-Survey-
2018-2.pdf> accessed 12 December 2018 
138 HM Government, ‘Government response to the Internet Safety Strategy Green Paper’ 
(Gov.uk, May 2018) 
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_d
ata/file/708873/Government_Response_to_the_Internet_Safety_Strategy_Green_Paper_-
_Final.pdf > accessed 27 July 2018  
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ramifications of their online behaviour.139 For instance a study conducted by 
Powell-Jones of 184 young people, revealed a lack of understanding in 
participants concerning the law surrounding indecent images, hate speech 
and online abuse.140  
 
Yet cyberbullying can have detrimental effects on those who are subjected to 
it: 
‘The psychological harm inflicted by cyberbullying, just like bullying, is 
reflected in low self-esteem, school failure, anger, anxiety, depression, 
school avoidance, school violence, and suicide.’141  
 
Whereas traditional forms of bullying in young people are associated with the 
‘playground’, cyberbullying can be relentless and can occur around the clock. 
In 2012 Erin Gallagher (13) took her own life after being continually 
subjected to anonymous abusive comments on the social media site, 
ASK.FM.142 Similarly, research conducted by John et al found that individuals 
who were bullied online were twice as likely to self-harm or attempt 
suicide.143   
 
139 Holly Powell-Jones, ‘Online abuse: teenagers might not report it because they often don’t 
see it as a problem’ The Conversation (London, 7 May 2019) 
<https://theconversation.com/online-abuse-teenagers-might-not-report-it-because-they-
often-dont-see-it-as-a-problem-116479> accessed 26 June 2019 
140 Holly Powell-Jones, ‘Research Findings’ (Online Media Law UK, 2019) 
<https://www.onlinemedialawuk.com/phd-research> accessed 26 June 2019. See also, Holly 
Powell-Jones, ‘How do young people interpret and construct risk in an online context?’ (PhD 
Thesis, City London University 2018) 
141 Qing Li, ‘Cyberbullying in High Schools: A Study of Students’ Behaviors and Beliefs about 
This New Phenomenon’ (2010) 19(4) Journal of Aggression, Maltreatment & Trauma 372, 
374 
142 Greg Harkin, ‘Family devastated after tragic Erin (13) takes own life after vicious online 
bullying’ Irish Independent (Dublin, 29 October 2012) <https://www.independent.ie/irish-
news/family-devastated-after-tragic-erin-13-takes-own-life-after-vicious-online-bullying-
28824852.html> accessed 12 December 2018  
143 Ann John et al, Self-Harm, Suicidal Behaviours, and Cyberbullying in Children and Young 
People: Systematic Review (2018) 20(4) J Med Internet Res 
<https://www.jmir.org/2018/4/e129/> accessed 12 December 2018. See also, Sarah 
Knapton n.85 
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Online harassment and stalking  
In recent years social media has been used to harass and stalk others 
online. Harassment as discussed further in chapter four refers to the 
continued unwanted contact between an individual and another to cause 
alarm or distress.144 Whereas stalking has no specific definition, and instead 
a list of behaviours has been produced which can amount to stalking: 
‘The following are examples of acts or omissions which, in particular 
circumstances, are ones associated with stalking- (a) following a 
person; (b) contacting, or attempting to contact, a person by any 
means; (c) publishing any statement or other material - (i) relating or 
purporting to relate to a person, or (ii) purporting to originate from a 
person; (d) monitoring the use by a person of the Internet, email or 
any other form of electronic communication; (e) loitering in any place 
(whether public or private); (f) interfering with any property in the 
possession of a person; [and] (g) watching or spying on a person.’145    
 
Like that of cyberbullying, stalking and harassment can now be aided or 
solely conducted online. The conduct of stalking and harassing another via 
the Internet is now commonly referred to as cyberstalking or cyber 
harassment. As cyber harassment and cyberstalking are inherently 
interlinked, as legally in England and Wales a person cannot be stalked if 
harassment is not present, there continues to be difficulties in establishing 
the boundary between these two behaviours. The distinction between cyber 
harassment and cyberstalking will be further discussed in chapter four.  
 
 
144 Protection from Harassment Act 1997 section 1 
145 Protection from Harassment Act 1997 section 2A(3)  
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In 2003 Bocij conducted a survey examining the extent of cyberstalking 
online.146 Bocij, using an email snowballing sample,147 surveyed 169 
participants aged 16 to 84 years old.148 To conclude if participants had been 
subjected to cyberstalking, Bocji asked a number of questions related to 
certain types of online conduct associated with stalking online. For example, 
the receiving of threatening or abusive emails and the spread of false 
information online. Using this approach Bocji was able to conclude that 
21.9% of his participants had been subjected to what he deemed as 
cyberstalking.149 The research undertaken by Bocji indicates that even 
before the creation of Facebook and Twitter, cyberstalking behaviour was an 
issue within society.  
Figure 4: Communication devices used to abuse others online as found by 




146 Paul Bocij, ‘Victims of Cyberstalking: An Exploratory Study of Harassment Perpetrated 
via the Internet’ (2003) 8(10) First Monday 
<http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/1086> accessed 30 October 2016. This 
statistic was generated using a rigid definition of cyberstalking.   
147 In a snowballing sample the researcher recruits a few participants, who in turn 
recommend others to take part in the study. See, Earl Babbie, The Basics of Social 
Research (Cengage Learning 2007) 205   
148 Bocij n.146 
149 Ibid.,  
150 Brown, Maple & Short n.152 
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Social media has revolutionised how cyberstalking and cyber harassment 
can be conducted. Research undertaken on behalf of Bedfordshire University 
by Brown, Maple and Short, found that of the 353 participants who took part 
in their survey 92% had been subjected to some form of cyberstalking or 
cyber harassment, of this, 94.1% of participants had been left in some form 
of distress.151 In addition, the work of Brown, Maple and Short exposed just 
some of the ways in which a person can harass or stalk another online, 
illustrated in figure four. Yet it was not until 2012 that stalking, and 
harassment became separate criminal offences.152  
 
Despite a consensus that online harassment and stalking are on the 
increase, prosecutions under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, 
which criminalises these types of behaviours in England and Wales, has 
decreased.153 Each year the CPS conducts a report examining violence 
against women and girls in England and Wales. The 2017 report exposed 
that the number of prosecutions brought under the Protection from 
Harassment Act relating to stalking and harassment had decreased by 8.4% 
compared to the previous year.154 Yet a BBC Freedom of Information request 
 
151 Antony Brown, Carsten Maple & Emma Short, ‘Cyberstalking in the United Kingdom: An 
Analysis of the ECHO Pilot Survey’ (University of Bedfordshire National Centre for 
Cyberstalking Research, 2011) 9 
<https://www.beds.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0003/83109/ECHO_Pilot_Final.pdf> 
accessed 25 October 2016 
152 Before 2012 stalking and harassment were considered similar offences and criminalised 
under section 2 of the Protection from Harassment Act.  
153 The BBC, ‘Cyberbullying and trolling reports to Welsh police double’ The BBC (London, 
24 October 2017) <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-wales-41729206> accessed 10 
December 2018 
154 The Crown Prosecution Service, ‘Violence against women and girls report: tenth edition’ 
(CPS.gov, 2017) 7 <https://www.cps.gov.uk/sites/default/files/documents/publications/cps-
vawg-report-2017.pdf> accessed 19 February 2017. Please note, there is an issue with 
these statistics. As uncovered by the Criminal Justice Inspectorates & HM Crown 
Prosecution Service Inspectorate, police forces and the CPS have confused the definitions 
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found an 85% rise in reports made to the police concerning online 
harassment and trolling.155 It can be suggested that despite the increase in 
reports made to the police relating to cyberstalking and cyber harassment, 
fewer prosecutions are being pursued in the criminal justice system.  
 
As in the case with cyberbullying, it is clear that cyberstalking and cyber 
harassment are becoming increasingly problematic for society, with these 
behaviours having significant effects on a person’s mental wellbeing. The 
problematic nature of cyberbullying, cyber harassment and cyberstalking is 
further reflected when examining revenge pornography.   
 
Revenge pornography  
Revenge pornography is the distribution of sexualised images to cause 
distress upon another. Though anyone can become a victim of revenge 
pornography it disproportionally affects women more than men, and is 
considered the ultimate humiliation that can be placed upon a person.156 
Though revenge pornography is not necessarily a new behaviour associated 
with the digital age, revenge porn has been made easier with the aid of new 
technology. For example, in 2010 the first website created solely to host 
revenge pornography was made available to the public.157  
 
 
of stalking and harassment. Consequently, it can be argued that these figures do not truly 
represent the extent of harassment and stalking. See chapter four for more information. 
155 The BBC n.153 
156 HC Deb 19 June 2014, vol 582, col 1368 
157 Scott R Stroud, ‘The Dark Side of the Online Self: A Pragmatist Critique of the Growing 
Plague of Revenge Porn’ (2014) 29(3) Journal of Mass Media Ethics 168, 170  
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In 2015 Westminster Parliament criminalised the conduct of revenge 
pornography under section 33 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act, 
following concerns the behaviour fell outside the criminal law.158 Within the 
first year of the Act receiving Royal Assent, 206 individuals were prosecuted 
under section 33 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act.159 However, the 
BBC in December 2015 placed a Freedom of Information request with all 
forty-three police forces in England and Wales to determine the extent of 
revenge porn.160 In total thirty-one forces replied, where it was found that 
across all thirty-one forces a total of 1,160 reports of revenge pornography 
were made to the police between April 2015 and December 2015. Of this, 
11% of cases resulted in another being charged with the distribution of 
revenge pornography, 7% of defendants received a caution and in 61% of 
cases, no further action was taken.161 By 2017 the total number of successful 
prosecutions for revenge pornography in England and Wales rose to 465.162   
 
The statistics above illustrate the continued issue of revenge pornography in 
a digital society. Section 33 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act was 
implemented both as a form of deterrence and to ensure that: 
‘… those who fall victim to this type of disgusting behaviour … know 
that we [the criminal justice system] are on their side and will do 
everything we can to bring offenders to justice.’163  
 
 
158 HC Deb 19 June 2014, vol 582, col 1372 
159 The BBC, ‘Revenge porn: More than 200 prosecuted under new law’ The BBC (London, 
6 September 2016) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-37278264> accessed 12 February 2018   
160 Peter Sherlock, ‘Revenge pornography victims as young as 11, investigation finds’ The 
BBC (London, 27 April 2016) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-36054273> accessed 
12 February 2018 
161 Ibid., 
162 The Crown Prosecution Service n.154, 17 
163 Chris Grayling, ‘Press release: New law to tackle revenge porn’ (Gov.uk, 12 October 
2014) <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/new-law-to-tackle-revenge-porn> accessed 11 
December 2017 
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As detailed in chapter five the criminalisation of revenge pornography is a 
significant step forward for society, but there continues to be issues with the 
current application of section 33 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act. 
 
The Effects of Online Abuse  
Online abuse as demonstrated above can take many forms, from traditional 
bullying, which can now take place online, to explicit sexualised images 
being actively shared across social media sites. Though there is no one true 
definition of abuse, or in fact no study that truly reflects the extent of online 
abuse, it is becoming an increasing problem for schools, society and the 
criminal justice system. For example, the problems of cyberbullying were 
affirmed by the then Prime Minister Theresa May during Prime Ministers 
Questions on 12 December 2018:  
‘We need to address cyberbullying … this remains a serious issue for 
millions of people … but we [the Government] should all be taking this 
issue seriously and the Government will continue to work on this.’164 
 
As will be discussed throughout this thesis online abuse can have 
detrimental effects on a person’s wellbeing, alongside changing how they 
utilise social media, mirroring some aspects of victimology as outlined in the 
following chapter. 
 
Furthermore, the Law Commission has highlighted several harms associated 
with online abuse:  
‘We have seen that specific harms resulting from being the recipient of 
abusive and offensive communication[s] online can include: (1) 
psychological effects and emotional harms; (2) physiological harms; 
including suicide and self-harm; (3) exclusion from public online space 
 
164 Teressa May, HC Deb 12 December 2018, vol 651, cols 277-288  
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and corresponding feelings of isolation; (4) economic harms; and (5) 
wider societal harms.’165 
 
Ben McKenzie a schoolboy from Scotland in early October 2018, committed 
suicide following relentless bullying online.166 Similarly, those who become 
victims of revenge pornography are prone to suicidal thoughts.167 For 
example, a study conducted in the United States of America found that 51% 
of revenge porn victims considered taking their own life.168 These findings 
have also been mirrored in the work of Bates, who undertook interviews with 
victims of revenge pornography:  
‘The moments after you first see your naked photos on the Internet for 
display is a pivotal moment in your life. It’s a moment when time 
stands still, and everything, EVERYTHING changes. In an instant you 
lose not only your privacy and your confidence, but you are soon 
made to feel you’ve lost your voice as you cry out for help, and it 
seems no one’s listening [sic].’169 
 
Bates’ research which is discussed further in chapter five exposes the real-
life consequences of revenge pornography. Yet for some commentators, if a 
person wishes not to be abused online, they should simply remove 
themselves from the online world,170 reflecting aspects of positivist 
victimology discussed further in chapter two. 
 
 
165 Law Commission n.15, [3.30] 
166 HC Deb 12 December 2018, vol 651, col 276 
167 Sophia Ankel, ‘Many revenge porn victims consider suicide – why aren’t schools doing 
more to stop it?’ The Guardian (London, 7 May 2018) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2018/may/07/many-revenge-porn-victims-
consider-suicide-why-arent-schools-doing-more-to-stop-it> accessed 13 December 2018 
168 Ibid., 
169 Samantha Bates, ‘“Stripped”: An Analysis of Revenge Porn Victims’ Lives after 
Victimization’ (Master of Arts Thesis, Simon Fraser University 2015) 1 
170 For instance, see, Rosalee Dorfman, ‘Can you say “social media prosecutions” with a 
straight face? The Crown Prosecution Service can’ (2013) The Leeds Journal of Law and 
Criminology <http://criminology.leeds.ac.uk/2013/09/05/social-media-prosecutions/> 
accessed 20 October 2016  
Page 70 of 449 
 
A prevalent argument that is raised during discussions and reports of online 
abuse, is that a person can simply remove themselves from the abusive 
situation by shutting down their social media accounts.171 For instance in 
some police forces, this is the main advice given to victims who report online 
abuse.172 In fact, traditional victimology theory emphasises the victims’ role in 
their own victimisation shown further in the work of Mendelsohn, as 
discussed further in the following chapter.173 However, as is apparent above 
and through later chapters of this thesis, social media dominates much of 
society today. Thus, removing oneself from social media is to withdraw from 
an important aspect of social life.174  
 
Consequently, those who are victims of online abuse are being blamed for 
the behaviour they have been subjected to, simply for having a social media 
profile. This victim-blaming approach is akin to the advice given to women 
when it comes to sexual violence within the physical world. For example, 
women who become victims of sexual assaults are often stigmatised by their 
choice of clothing or their decision to walk home alone in the dark. Here, we 
are seeing individuals now being blamed for the abuse they suffer online 
because they happened to have a social media profile.175 To advise victims 
 
171 Ibid., 
172 Criminal Justice Inspectorates & HM Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate, ‘Living in 
fear – the police and CPS response to harassment and stalking’ (justiceinspectorates.gov, 
July 2017) 52 <http://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmicfrs/wp-content/uploads/living-in-
fear-the-police-and-cps-response-to-harassment-and-stalking.pdf> accessed 29 November 
2017 
173 Benjamin Mendelsohn, ‘Une nouvelle branche de la science bio-psycho-sociale: 
la victimologie’ (1956) Revue internationale de criminologie et de police technique 10-31 
found in Rob Mawby & Sandra Walklate, Critical Victimology (Sage 1994) 12 
174 Bernal n.1, 19 
175 Laura Bliss, ‘Abuse of women MPs is not just a scandal – it’s a threat to democracy’ The 
Conversation (London, 17 July 2017) <https://theconversation.com/abuse-of-women-mps-is-
not-just-a-scandal-its-a-threat-to-democracy-80781> accessed 9 December 2018 
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of online abuse to remove themselves from the online world is to curtail their 
own right to freedom of expression. All of which has a direct effect on the 
victim of online abuse, as opposed to the perpetrator of such behaviour.  
 
Chapter Overview  
Since the creation of computer networks and the World Wide Web, Internet 
usage has been on the increase. The Internet has changed how businesses 
operate, has become prominent within politics and has changed how 
individuals communicate. Social media has been a driving force for these 
changes. We have seen Twitter used as a mechanism to highlight the subtle 
everyday sexism present within society.176 We have also seen Facebook 
used as an aid to inform loved ones that a person is safe following real-world 
events;177 it has, as Bernal argues become integral to the way in which 
society operates.178 Yet as demonstrated above social media has a darker 
side whereby it can be used to abuse and torment another person, placing 
increasing pressure on the criminal justice system, society and social 
networking companies to do more.  
 
 
176 Laura Bates, ‘The everyday sexism project’ (Everydaysexism, 2019) 
<https://everydaysexism.com/> accessed 6 February 2019 
177 Facebook, ‘Crises Response’ (Facebook, 2019) 
<https://www.facebook.com/about/crisisresponse/> accessed 6 February 2019 
178 Bernal n.1, 19 




Theoretical Positioning: Legality in the Criminal Law 
Introduction   
‘The law must be open and adequately publicised. If it is to guide 
people, they must be able to find out what it is. For the same reason 
its meaning must be clear. An ambiguous, vague, obscure or 
imprecise law is likely to mislead or confuse at least some of those 
who desire to be guided by it.’1 
Introduction  
One of the fundamental principles underpinning the criminal law is that of 
legality. The law at its very basic must be in place, open and clear for 
individuals to be governed by it. The following discussion will justify the 
theoretical positioning of this thesis: legality. To do this, two key 
criminological perspectives of crime prevention theory, deterrence and 
rational choice theory will be examined, before turning to look at feminist 
theory and victimology, allowing a justification to be put forward as to why the 
principle of legality is the perspective that underpins this thesis. It will be 
argued in further chapters of this thesis that the prosecution of social media 
offences, under the current criminal law framework, breaches the principles 
of legality and consequently undermines the rule of law. To fully comprehend 
the arguments that will take place in the following chapters, the discussion 
below will start by outlining how the Criminal Justice System in England and 
Wales works. In addition, the concepts of actus reus and mens rea will be 
explained, as without these two key criminal law principles, it may be 
considered that no criminal offence has occurred.2  
 
 
1Joseph Raz, ‘The Rule of Law and its Virtue’ (1977) 93 Law Quarterly Review 195,198-199  
2 There are crimes which can be committed without a mens rea needing to be present. 
However, for the purpose of this thesis all crimes which are examined contain a mens rea 
element.  
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The Criminal Justice System and Key Terminology  
The criminal justice system in England and Wales is unique compared to 
other jurisdictions. For criminal law proceedings to commence the 
complained about behaviour needs to be brought to the attention of the 
police. In England and Wales, there are currently 43 police forces, all of 
which have jurisdictional boundaries.3 Each police force investigates crimes 
which have been reported within their jurisdictions, gathering evidence and 
witness statements before presenting the case to the Crown Prosecution 
Service.  
 
Before 1986 prosecutions brought before the courts were instigated by the 
police force investigating the complaint.4 However, following concerns about 
a lack of consistency and objectivity in recommendations for prosecution, a 
national Crown Prosecution Service was created, commonly referred to as 
the CPS.5 The CPS is an independent body who ultimately decide which 
cases should be put forward for prosecution, determine the appropriate 
charge for an offence based on the evidence gathered by the police, and 
prepare a case for court.6    
 
To create consistency across the criminal justice system in England and 
Wales the CPS also produce, with the aid of consultations, prosecuting 
 
3 The Crown Prosecution Service, ‘The Criminal Justice System’ (CPS.gov, 2017) 
<https://www.cps.gov.uk/criminal-justice-system> accessed 24 June 2019  
4 Steve Wilson, Helen Rutherford, Tony Storey & Natalie Wortley, English Legal System (2nd 
edn, Oxford University Press 2016) 56 
5 Ibid., 56. See also, Prosecution of Offences Act 1985 section 1 
6 The Crown Prosecution Service, ‘The Crown Prosecution Service’ (CPS.gov, 2019) 
<https://www.cps.gov.uk/> accessed 24 June 2019  
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guidelines. These guidelines are used to help prosecutors working at the 
CPS in determining whether a case should be put forward for prosecution, 
using a two-stage approach.7 First, the complained about behaviour must 
pass the evidential stage. Here, prosecutors ‘… must be satisfied that there 
is sufficient evidence to provide a realistic prospect of conviction against 
each suspect on each charge’, using the evidence before them.8 A matter 
which does not pass the evidential test, will not proceed to court. However, 
even if the evidential test is surpassed, it does not automatically mean the 
matter is worthy of prosecution, it must also pass the public interest 
element.9  
 
The public interest test consists of a number of relevant factors a prosecutor 
must take into consideration before coming to a decision. For instance, the 
seriousness of the offence, the age and maturity of the suspect and 
proportionality.10 If both these tests are passed a recommendation for 
prosecution will be made and the matter will be put before the courts.  
 
Actus Reus   
In most criminal law proceedings the first step is to establish the actus reus 
of the offence.11 The actus reus ‘… comprises all the elements of the 
definition of the offence except those which relate to the mental element 
 
7 The Crown Prosecution Service, ‘The Code for Crown Prosecutors’ (CPS.gov, 26 October 





11 In some cases, the mens rea needs to be established first. For example, offences 
conducted under section 1 of the Prevention of Crime Act 1953. 
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(mens rea) required on part of the [defendant].’12 Put simply, the actus reus 
is considered the criminal act itself and is either contained in the common 
law definition of the offence or found within an Act of Parliament. For 
example, under section 1 of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 the 
actus reus is ‘… a course of conduct which amounts to the harassment of 
another …’.13 To satisfy a breach of the actus reus of any offence the 
conduct must be voluntary: ‘[the] requirement that it should be a voluntary act 
is essential not only in a murder case, but also in every criminal case.’14  
 
Mens Rea  
With the exception of strict liability offences for a person to be liable for a 
criminal act they need to have the precise ‘… mental element, necessary for 
the crime’, known as the mens rea.15 Like that of the actus reus, the mens 
rea will either be contained in the common law or an Act of Parliament.16 The 
exact mental element required to commit an offence can differ depending on 
the crime, examples include intention, recklessness and knowledge,17 all of 
which are relevant when examining social media offences. 
 
Intention can be split into two categories: a direct intention or an oblique 
intention. Direct intention referrers to ‘… someone’s aim, purpose or 
 
12 Michael J Allen, Criminal Law (14th edn, Oxford 2017) 34 
13 The Protection from Harassment Act 1997 will be discussed in further detail in chapter 
four. 
14 Bratty Appellant v Attorney-General for Northern Ireland Respondent [1961] 3 W.L.R. 965, 
[1963] A.C. 386 per Lord Denning 409 
15 Allen n.12, 76 
16 The courts can also substitute a mens rea element into an offence following the principles 
of Sweet v Parsley [1969] 2 W.L.R. 470, [1970] A.C. 132 where the criminal act is 
considered a true crime as opposed to a regulatory offence.  
17 These are the main mens rea elements present in Acts used to prosecute social media 
related offences.    
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desire.’18 Whereas an oblique intention is considered to occur as a result of 
an indirect consequence of the defendant’s actions.19 Though the overall 
definition of intention has been debated by the courts and the Law 
Commission alike, it has come to be accepted that intention refers to the 
virtual certainty of harm:  
‘Where the charge is murder and in the rare cases where the simple 
direction is not enough, the jury should be directed that they are not 
entitled to infer the necessary intention, unless they feel sure that 
death or serious bodily harm was a virtual certainty (barring some 
unforeseen intervention) as a result of the defendant's actions and 
that the defendant appreciated that such was the case.’20 
 
Though the judgment above uses the example of murder to illustrate 
intention, the courts have come to accept that this approach applies to all 
criminal law offences requiring the mens rea of intent.21  
 
A further mens rea element found in some communication offences is 
knowledge which ‘… involves having seen, heard or experienced something 
[for] yourself.’22 For example, the mens rea needed to prosecute an 
individual for harassment is based on the construction of knowledge, 
whereby the defendant must ‘know or ought to know’ that their actions 
amounted to harassment.23 In Taylor's Central Garages (Exeter) v Roper24 
Devlin J suggested that there was a spectrum applied by the courts when it 
comes to the mens rea of knowledge. First, there is ‘actual knowledge’ which 
 
18 Jacqueline Martin & Tony Storey, Unlocking Criminal Law (4th edn, Routledge 2013) 62   
19 Alan W. Norrie, ‘Oblique intention and legal politics’ (1989) Nov Criminal Law Review 793 
20 Regina Respondent v Woollin Appellant [1998] 3 W.L.R. 382, [1999] 1 A.C. 82 per Lord 
Steyn 93 
21 Allen n.12, 91 
22 Ibid., 96. See also, R v Abdul Sherif [2008] EWCA Crim 2653, [2009] 2 Cr. App. R. (S.) 33 
23 Protection from Harassment Act 1997 section 1(a) 
24 Taylor's Central Garages (Exeter) v Roper [1951] 2 T.L.R. 284 
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is like that of intention.25 The second degree of knowledge for Devlin J is 
‘wilful blindness’, which is considered as ‘closing your eyes and ears to the 
truth’26 and is relevant in cases of harassment. Last, and the furthest from 
‘actual knowledge’ is ‘constructive knowledge’, here it falls on the concept 
that the defendant should have reasonable knowledge that their behaviour 
caused a certain consequence.  
 
The final mens rea element, which is relevant in social media related 
offences, is recklessness. A subjective approach is undertaken in relation to 
recklessness where it must be found that the defendant:  
‘... is aware of a risk that it exists or will exist; [and] … is aware of a 
risk that it will occur; and it is, in the circumstances known to him, 
unreasonable to take the risk.’27  
 
If these elements are found the criteria of recklessness will be satisfied. For 
example, under section 3 of the Computer Misuse Act 1990, it is an offence 
to impair the operation of a computer. Here the mens rea is one of 
recklessness or intent. Consequently, you can be prosecuted for an offence 
under this section of the Act even if your intention was not to impair the 
operation of the computer. If it can be proven that the actus reus and the 
mens rea are present in a matter, the main foundations are established for 
the possible prosecution of a criminal offence.28  
 
25 Allen n.12, 97 
26 Ibid., 97 
27 R v G and Another [2003] UKHL 50, [2004] 1 A.C. 1034 per Lord Bingham [41] 
28 In some criminal offences other matters also need to be proven. For instance, a chain of 
causation.  
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Theoretical Stance  
 
The following discussion will outline several theoretical theories, including, 
deterrence theory, rational choice theory, feminism, digital feminism and 
victimology, before turning to look at the principle of legality; the theoretical 
concept underpinning this thesis. As previously mention, legality is the 
concept that a person cannot be punished without clear and accessible legal 
provisions within a given society. Throughout the following discussions, 
reference will be made as to why legality forms the theoretical perspective of 
this thesis, as opposed to the other perspectives outlined below, allowing the 
researcher to justify their theoretical position.    
 
Criminological Theory: Deterrence and Rational Choice  
Criminology is the study of crime and justice, in which several different 
theoretical perspectives have developed, including biological and 
psychological causes of criminality, many of which were heavily criticised as 
ignoring external factors such as the criminal justice system itself.29 The 
sociology of criminality will be examined in the following sections, whereby 
two key criminological perspectives of crime prevention theory, deterrence 
and rational choice theory, will be examined. 
 
Deterrence, at is very basic, is the idea that by having strong penal sanctions 
this will deter individuals from either reoffending or offending in the first 
 
29 Katherine S. Williams, Textbook on Criminology (7th edn, Oxford University Press 2012) 
301 
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place.30 Stemming from the work of Banduara,31 it is suggested that under 
certain circumstances ‘… punishment can effectively and efficiently control 
behaviour …’.32 Geerken and Grove suggest that for deterrence to work the 
offender needs to know that if they commit a certain act this will be detected 
by the appropriate authorities and once detected the probability of being 
caught, convicted and punished is high, with the punishment outweighing the 
benefit of committing the offence.33 This is a similar approach to Paternoster 
who argues that there needs to be a causal link between justice policy and 
the cost-benefit of committing an offence for deterrence to be successful.34  
 
In a social media context, the current application of the criminal law can be 
seen to offer little deterrence. For instance, the most prominent provision 
used in a social media offence is that of section 127 of the Communications 
Act, which as discussed in chapter six, prohibits the use of a communications 
network to send a malicious, grossly offensive, obscene or indecent 
message, carrying a maximum 6 month custodial sentence. In reality, from a 
review of case law examples and the Crown Prosecution Service Guidelines, 
a sentence of 12 weeks is usually given, which in many cases is 
suspended.35 Consequently, examples are given in the following discussion 
of social media ‘trolls’ reoffending, such as that of John Nimmo, as 
 
30 Richard Sparks, ‘Prison, Punishment and Penality’ in Eugene McLaughlin & John Muncie, 
Controlling Crime (2nd end, The Open University 2001) 204 
31 Albert Bandura, Principles of Behavior Modification (Holt, Rinehart and Winston 1969)   
32 Michael Geerken & Walter Grove, ‘Deterrence: Some Theoretical Considerations’ (1975) 
9(3) Law and Society 497 
33 Ibid., 499 
34 Raymond Paternoster, ‘How much do we really know about criminal deterrence’ (2010) 
100 (3) Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 765, 787 
35 This has been generated from a narrative review of the literature throughout this thesis. 
See introductory chapter for a discussion on methods and methodology. 
Page 80 of 449 
 
highlighted in chapter four,36 arguably because of a lack of deterrence in the 
law.  
 
However, like that of Davis, Croall and Tyrer, the researcher accepts that a 
criminal justice system built purely on deterrence is in itself flawed:  
‘… a deterrence approach to sentencing is an unrealistic policy 
because it assumes that criminals make calculations about the 
likelihood of being detected, arrested and punished, and mostly they 
do not …’.37 
 
The criminal justice system needs to invoke more than deterrence, as 
highlighted in section 142(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, in which 
Parliament has set out considerations the court must take into account when 
sentencing: 
‘Any court dealing with an offender in respect of his offence must have 
regard to the following purposes of sentencing (a) the punishment of 
offenders, (b) the reduction of crime (including its reduction by 
deterrence), (c) the reform and rehabilitation of offenders, (d) the 
protection of the public, and (e) the making of reparation by offenders 
to persons affected by their offences.’ 
 
Deterrence, however, remains one of many factors which underpin the 
criminal justice system in England and Wales.  
 
Yet, in order for deterrence to work, the law itself needs to be clear and 
certain. Consequently, some of the discussions in the following chapters 
mirror some concepts of deterrence theory, though from the perspective of 
legality. As noted above, stronger legal provisions governing online conduct 
 
36 Sandra Laville, ‘Internet troll who sent labour MP antisemitic abused is jailed’ The 
Guardian (London, 10 February 2017) <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-
news/2017/feb/10/internet-troll-who-sent-labour-mp-antisemitic-messages-is-jailed> 
accessed 13 January 2020 
37 Malcolm Davis, Hazel Croall & Jane Tyrer, Criminal Justice (4th edn, Pearson Education 
2010) 417 
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built purely on deterrence leaves open the idea that those who conduct 
online abuse, make a fully conscious decision, weighing up the risks and 
benefits, before partaking in abusive behaviour. However, this is not always 
the case according to Cook, Schaafsma and Antheunis, who’s study found 
that there are a variety of factors that influence internet trolls.38  
Consequently, the following discussions do not take a fully deterrent 
theoretical stance.  
 
Whereas Davis, Croall and Tyrer argue that criminal behaviour stems from 
opportunity, those that endorse a rational choice theoretical approach to 
crime and punishment, such as Becker,39 believe that offenders make 
rational choices, by using a reward benefit analysis. In essence, ‘[p]eople 
choose to offend in order to benefit themselves’.40 For Williams, several 
factors are taken into account by the offender to determine if they should 
commit a certain criminal act.41 First, the offender takes into consideration 
wider external factors such as the likelihood of being caught. Second, an 
offender is more likely to commit a crime ‘… in the absence of suitable 
guardians’42, as demonstrated in the work of Clarke, who found that the 
upper deck of a bus, especially the back rows, were more likely to be 
vandalised due to a lack of supervision.43  Last, how easy it was to obtain the 
target of the offence, for example, an offender is more likely to steal a car if 
 
38 Christine Cook, Juliette Schaafsma & Marjolijn Antheeunis, ‘Under the bridge: an in-depth 
examination of online trolling in a gaming context’ (2017) 20(9) New Media & Society 3323 
39 Gary Becker, ‘Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach’ (1968) 76(2) Journal of 
Political Economy 169  
40 Williams n.29, 312 
41 Ibid., 312-313 
42 Ibid.,  
43 Ronald Clarke, Tackling Vandalism (Home Office Research Study 47, 1978)   
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the vehicle is left unlocked. William’s goes further to suggest that in order to 
reduce the likelihood of a person committing a criminal act, we can simply 
remove the target of the offence, which in turn would reduce crime rates.   
 
This theoretical understanding of crime is somewhat mirrored when 
examining offences conducted by social media. As outlined in the following 
chapter, there is a clear lack of supervision in the online world, whereby 
gatekeepers such as Facebook and Twitter, are doing very little to tackle 
abusive behaviour online. Indeed, cuts to police funding and the criminal 
justice system means that in many cases the internet is becoming like the 
‘wild west’,44 whereby abusive and offensive behaviour can flourish. Yet to 
remove the target of the criminal act, i.e the victim of online abuse, this would 
place the onus on the victim as opposed to the perpetrator, encroaching on 
victim-blaming. As will be outlined in chapter seven, by asking the victim of 
online abuse to remove themselves from social media platforms, we are in 
turn, curtailing their own right to freedom of expression, whilst also punishing 
the victim as opposed to the person committing the offence. As discussed 
below, the internet has become a platform for minority voices to be heard, in 
particular women. Consequently, this thesis does not approach the research 
questions from the perspective of rational choice theory, as this theoretical 
position seems to place an onus on the victim changing their own behaviour 
to reduce criminal acts, as opposed to tackling those who commit the offence 
in the first place.   
 
44 David Omand, ‘The dark net: Policing the internets underworld’ (2016) Winter 2015/16 
World Policy Journal <https://worldpolicy.org/2015/12/09/the-dark-net-policing-the-internets-
underworld/> accessed 13 January 2020 
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Feminism and Digital Feminism  
Feminist theory ‘… is a vibrant intellectual practice that raises new questions, 
brings new evidence, and poses significant challenges to academic 
discipline.’ In essence, feminism is concerned with the lived experiences of 
women within a patriarchal society. Emerging in the late 19th century 
feminism formed as a rebellion against the patriarchal state, which was 
considered to have been built on, and maintained, the dominance of man 
over woman. Indeed, for Millet  
‘our society … is a patriarchy. The fact is evident at once if one recalls 
that the military, industry, technology, universities, science, political 
offices, finances- in short, every avenue of power within the society, 
including ... the police, is entirely in male hands.’45 
 
 
Prior to the emergence of feminism, it was argued that the voices of women 
were being ignored within society:46 ‘The very creation of feminist civil society 
was necessary because women and women’s issues have been and 
continue to be solely neglected by governments.’47 Traditional positivist 
research therefore focused on statistical data gathered from men and 
universally applied to women, indeed, women were seen as ‘other’.48 For 
example, until 2012 women were more likely to be killed or seriously injured 
in a car accident than their male counterparts, as car crash dummies were 
built on the male physique, creating what  Criado-perez refers to as the 
 
45 Kate Millet, Sexual Politics (Avon Books 1971) 25 
46 Pamela Abbott, Claire Wallace & Melissa Tyler, An Introduction to Sociology: Feminist 
Perspectives (3rd ed, Routledge 2005) 9 
47 Ki-Young Shin, ‘Goverance’ in Lisa Disch & Mary Hawkesworth (eds) The Oxford 
Handbook of Feminist Theory (Oxford University Press 2016) 319  
48 Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex (Vintage 1949) 16 
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gender data gap.49 Feminist research studies, invoking what is deemed as 
feminist research methods such as interviews and stories, is therefore 
considered as bridging the gender gap within research and data to influence 
social change within society, which has a direct benefit on women.50  
 
Though there are many strains of feminist theory,51 three common 
characteristics emerge throughout each perspective.52 First, indifferences 
such as race and sex are political concepts that pass for differences within 
society, built upon the ideal of the patriarchal hierarchy. Second, the need to 
challenge the concept that knowledge is universal and impartial. Indeed, for 
Geigner, ‘what constitutes feminist work is a framework that challenges 
existing androcentric or political constructions of women’s lives.’53 Last, the 
need to engage with the complexity of power relations. This is evident when 
it comes to the use of technology and the internet, which as highlighted 
above by Millet is encompassed in patriarchal culture. Cockburn goes as far 
as arguing that men are considered as technologically ‘endowed’ whereas 
women are seen as technically ‘incompetent.’54 Consequently, we have seen 
the emergence of abusive and oppressive behaviour directed at women via 
 
49 Caroline Criado-perez, Invisible Women: Exposing Data Bias in a World Designed for Men 
(2019 Chatto & Windus) 
50 Although the general consensus is that qualitative methodological approaches are 
preferred by feminists, quantitative methods are also used in some feminist research. See, 
Andrea Douget & Natasha S Mauthner, ‘Feminist Methodologies and Epistemology’ in 
Clifford D Bryant & Dennis L Peck (eds), Handbook of 21st Century Sociology (Sage 2006)      
51 Other common feminist theoretical positions include liberal feminism, radical feminism, 
black feminist theory and Marxist feminists. Please note this is not a complete list. 
52 Lisa Disch & Mary Hawkesworth (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Feminist Theory (Oxford 
University Press 2016) 5 
53 Susan Geiger, ‘What’s So Feminist about Women’s Oral History?’ (1990) 2(1) Journal of 
Women’s History 169 
54 Cynthia Cockburn, Brothers: Male Dominance and Technological Change (Pluto Press 
1983) 159 
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the use of social media sites such as Facebook and Twitter, paving the way 
for digital feminism.55 
 
Following the advancements of technology, in particular the internet, 
feminism has evolved to encompass the digital world, changing feminist 
discourse. Prior to the advancement of technology radical feminists, ‘inspired 
by the necessity to expose the collective harms they discovered in 
consciousness-raising groups, to raise public consciousness and to provide 
political response’, organised ‘speak-outs’ in local village halls, the streets 
and public spaces to tell their stories.56 Now, the advancement of digital 
technology has allowed campaigns and activism to solely run online, whilst 
also creating a public platform for women’s voices to be heard. As potently 
put by Powell and Henry, ‘[n]ever before has our society had so many 
publicly available, first-hand accounts of women’s experiences of diverse 
forms and “everyday” infractions of sexual violence.’57         
     
Digital feminism stems from digital criminology, which seeks to conceptualise 
traditional criminological, sociological and political theories in the study of 
crime and justice in line with the advancements in changing technology.58 
For Stratton, Powell and Cameron: 
‘… criminology can account for the enabling and disabling effects of 
technologies … to conceptualise crime, deviance and justice as 
 
55 Paula Hamilton & Mary Spongberg, ‘Twenty Years On: feminist histories and digital media’ 
(2016) 26(5) Women’s History Review 671 
56 Renee Heberle, ‘The Personal is Political’ in Lisa Disch & Mary Hawkesworth (eds) The 
Oxford Handbook of Feminist Theory (Oxford University Press 2016) 598 
57 Anastasia Powell & Nicola Henry, Sexual Violence in a Digital Age (Springer 2017) 26 
58 Anastasia Powell, Gregory Stratton & Robin Cameron, Digital Criminology: Crime and 
Justice in Digital Society (Routledge 2018) 
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increasingly technosocial practices within a digital society.’59 
 
Those who endorse a digital feminist approach to their studies view digital 
criminology from a feminist perspective, in which Jackson argues that 
traditional feminist theory entwines with the digital world in three ways.60 
First, it can be used as a tool for feminist practice, which is evident in the 
recent use of social media to create a movement to call out the use of sexual 
harassment and sexual assault within society through the use of the hashtag 
‘metoo’. Here, using the hashtag individuals spoke publicly on platforms such 
as Twitter to tell their stories of sexual harassment and assault. Second, the 
use of digital technology allows for the sharing of knowledge as evident 
above, and third, as a way of doing feminist practice.61    
 
Whereas traditional forms of research were criticised for ignoring the voices 
of women, digital feminism allows women to have a public platform for which 
their voices can be heard. We have seen the use of social media sites such 
as Facebook and Twitter used to highlight the everyday sexism that exists 
within society with #everydaysexism;62 the use of social media to organise 
protests to challenge the ‘… sexism, racism and xenophobia of the Trump 
Administration’;63 and as a space for women to challenge stereotypical 
 
59 Greg Stratton, Anastasia Powell & Robin Cameron, ‘Crime and Justice in Digital Society: 
Towards a Digital Criminology?’ (2016) 6(2) International Journal for Crime, Justice and 
Social Democracy 17, 24 
60 Sue Jackson, ‘Young Feminists, Feminism and Digital Media 2018’ 28(1) Feminism & 
Psychology 32 
61 Ibid., 
62 Laura Bates, ‘The everyday sexism project’ (Everydaysexism, 2019) 
<https://everydaysexism.com/> accessed 6 February 2019 
63 Kaitlynn Mendes, Jessica Ringrose & Jessalynn Keller, Digital Feminist Activism: Girls 
and Women Fight Back Against Rape Culture (Oxford University Press 2019) 4 
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conceptions of rape;64  highlighting how the internet can be used as both a 
tool and mechanism for feminist practice, whilst also helping to distribute 
knowledge. However, in turn misogynistic attitudes and behaviours towards 
women have also emerged in an online context.  
   
As argued in the following chapters, though anyone can become a victim of 
online abuse, it is apparent that women are becoming subjected to a unique 
form of abuse online in which threats of sexual violence are often used to 
curtail female discourse on social media; online abuse is subsequently 
becoming a feminist issue.65 Throughout this thesis, case studies relating to 
abusive behaviour aimed at women are utilised to demonstrate the 
inadequacies in the current criminal law framework in protecting women from 
online abuse. References are made to traditional feminist arguments 
surrounding victim blaming and victim hierarchy, alongside key arguments 
relating to digital feminism. For instance, Karusala, Bhalla and Kumar 
suggest that advancing technology can be used to maintain patriarchal 
culture by suppressing the voices of women.66  However, this thesis does not 
take a wholly feminist theoretical position, as the findings and 
recommendations put forward in the following discussions, can be argued to 
go against some of the key principles of feminism. For instance, the use of 
 
64 Jessamy Gleeson, ‘“(Not) working 9–5”: the consequences of contemporary Australian-
based online feminist campaigns as digital labour’ (2016) 16(1) Media International Australia 
77 <http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/1329878X16664999> accessed 13 
January 2020 
65 Emma A Jane, ‘Online Misogyny and Feminist Digilantism’ (2016) 30(3) Journal of Media 
and Cultural Studies 284  
66 Navenna Karusala, Apoorva Bhalla & Neha Kumah, Privacy, Patriarchy, and Participation 
on Social Media (2019) 
<https://static1.squarespace.com/static/59f549a3b7411c736b42936a/t/5cc217ed146454000
1305a53/1556223981510/DIS2019.pdf> accessed 13 January 2020 
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the criminal law to govern online behaviour may be considered as 
maintaining the political and patriarchal elite:67 
‘[The state] coercively and authoritatively constitutes the social order 
in the interests of men through legitimating norms, forms, relation to 
society and substantive policies.’68  
 
Consequently, by using the theoretical position of legality, as opposed to 
feminism, it ensures that feminist methodology is not undermined by the 




Victimology relates to an area of study in which the researcher is concerned 
with the relationship between the innocent party of a crime and the 
offender.69 For Kearon and Godfrey, traditionally speaking, victims of crime 
were ignored by the criminal justice system or considered as passive 
bystanders, whereby the state was concerned more with the offender and 
reducing crime rates, rather than listening to the voices of those who were at 
the centre of the criminal act.70 This was further reflected in the judicial 
system, whereby Fry argued that the ‘injured individual slipped out the mind 
of the court’.71 Consequently, an important actor within the criminal justice 
system was being largely ignored and still is, to some degree, today.72 
 
 
67 Meda Chesney-Lind, ‘Patriarchy, Crime, and Justice’ (2006) 1(1) Feminist Criminology 6, 
9  
68 Heberle n.56, 598 
69 Ezzat A Fattah, ‘Victims and Victimology: The Facts and the Rhetoric’ in Ezzat A Fattah 
(ed), Towards a Critical Victimology (Palgrave 1992) 29 
70 Tony Kearon & Barry S. Godfrey, ‘Setting the scene: a question of history’ in Sandra 
Walklate (ed), Handbook of Victims and Victimology (Routledge 2011) 17 
71 Margery Fry, Arms of the law (Howard League for Penal Reform by Gollancz 1951) 125 
72 For instance, the CPS can put forward a recommendation for prosecution against an 
individual even if the victim wishes not to press charges.  
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Victimology emerged as a form of research following the Second World 
War,73 though during early studies emphasis was placed on how the injured 
party had contributed to their own victimisation, illustrated in the work of Von 
Hentig.74 This theoretical position known as positivist victimology is 
characterised by:   
‘the identification of factors which contribute to a non-random pattern 
of victimisation, a focus on interpersonal crimes of violence, and a 
concern to identify victims which may have contributed to their own 
victimisation.’75    
 
Positivist victimology was therefore more concerned with ‘street crime’ as 
opposed to other ‘… kinds of criminal victimisation like violence, rape and 
various forms of abuse, which more often occurred behind closed doors.’76  
As Mawby and Walklate argue, this meant that certain sectors of society 
were ignored in early victimological research, and more often than not, the 
work of positivist victimologists was used to maintain the political elite, 
alongside patriarchal structures.77 
 
Whilst the emergence of positivist victimology allowed for victims of crime to 
become more involved in the criminal justice system, indeed for Karmen, 
positivist victimology influenced the move from ‘crime prevention’ to 
‘victimisation prevention’,78 positivist victimology also encompassed a victim-
blaming orthodox. For instance, Mendelsohn conducted research based on 
 
73 Kearon & Godfrey n.70, 26 
74 Hans von Hentig, The Criminal and his Victim: studies in the Sociobiology of Crime (Yale 
University Press 1948)   
75 Andrew Karmen, Crime Victims: An Introduction to Victimology (Cengage Learning 1990) 
11 
76 Rob Mawby & Sandra Walklate, Critical Victimology (Sage 1994) 9 
77 Ibid., 9-10 
78 Karmen n.75 
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the culpability of a victim within their own victimisation, creating six 
categories of victims, from ‘completely innocent’, that is the ideal victim, to 
‘the most guilty victim’.79 This is further reflected in the work of Fattah who 
suggests that early victimological studies looked at the motivational and 
functional aspects of the victim contributing to their own victimhood, as 
opposed to the offender.80    
 
This concept of victim-blaming is still apparent within the criminal justice 
system today, particularly when examining how the criminal justice system 
and society have dealt with victims of online abuse. As discussed in chapter 
four, and throughout other chapters of this thesis, those who become 
subjected to online abuse, are often stigmatised for having a social media 
account and in some cases, are informed to simply remove themselves from 
the online world if they do not wish to be subjected to such abuse online. For 
example, as outlined in chapter four, the Criminal Justice Inspectorates and 
HM Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate report into the Protection from 
Harassment Act in July 2017 uncovered examples of the police advising 
victims of online harassment, to simply remove themselves from the social 
media platform in question.81 Mirroring rape myth assumptions as discussed 
further in chapter five.  
 
 
79 Benjamin Mendelsohn, ‘Une nouvelle branche de la science bio-psycho-sociale: 
la victimologie’ (1956) Revue internationale de criminologie et de police technique 10-31 
found in Rob Mawby & Sandra Walklate, Critical Victimology (Sage 1994) 12 
80 Fattah n.69, 30 
81 Criminal Justice Inspectorates & HM Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate, ‘Living in 
fear – the police and CPS response to harassment and stalking’ (justiceinspectorates.gov, 
July 2017) 27<http://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmicfrs/wp-content/uploads/living-in-
fear-the-police-and-cps-response-to-harassment-and-stalking.pdf> accessed 29 November 
2017 
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Positivist victimology is therefore not without its faults, resulting in alternative 
perspectives of victimology emerging. Whereas those who take a positivist 
approach to victimology are concerned with street crime and the culpability of 
a victim, those that endorse a radical approach to victimology examine ‘…the 
role of the capitalist state in victimisation’ of a person, alongside taking into 
consideration victims of human right violations, as opposed to street crime.82 
For radical victimologists, in order to understand the victim, we need to 
question the role of the state and ‘… the role of the law within capitalist 
societies in defining the social construction of both the offender and the 
victim.’83 Though elements of radical victimology are present within some 
discussions in this thesis, i.e the idea that human right violations occur on 
behalf of the state who ignore online abuse, the discussion throughout this 
thesis is more akin to critical victimology.  
 
Critical victimology can be seen to encompass key provisions from both 
positivists and radical theorists. In essence, critical victimology:  
‘combines aspects of positivism and radicalism to reconceptualise the 
victim; looks at experiences of individual victims and the influence of 
social-political powers on them; critiques the victim’s construction as a 
“consumer’ of victim services.’84  
 
For Goodey, critical victimology is influenced by policy initiatives, in which it 
is believed that research, activism and policy should be considered together 
to underpin social change in the criminal justice system that respects the 
rights of victims within the process:85   
 
82 Jo Goodey, Victims and Victimology: Research, Policy and Practice (Pearson Education 
Ltd 2005) 93 
83 Mawby & Walklate n.76,13 
84 Goodey n.82, 93 
85 Ibid., 94 
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‘the view of science suggested here places the academic and activist 
in the same critical plane. They are part of the social reality in which 
as knowledge actors both have the capacity to influence the 
processes of social change. They have much to learn from each 
other.’86  
 
For those that endorse a feminist critical victimological approach to criminal 
justice, activism and academic research leads to social change, which better 
protects the victim and erodes the notion of victim-blaming.87 By balancing 
the competing interests or ideologies of both the state and the victim, this 
ensures that a more victim-centred policy is produced.   
 
Throughout the following discussions weight is placed on victims of online 
abuse being better protected by the criminal justice system to reflect the 
seriousness of this conduct. As outlined at varies points in this thesis, online 
abuse can have detrimental effects upon the person subjected to it, 
including, withdrawal from social life,88 post-traumatic stress disorder89 and in 
some cases self-harm and suicide.90 Consequently, there are significant 
arguments made in the following chapters which mirror critical victimology. 
However, these discussions do not take a wholly victimological approach and 
instead, as previously mentioned and discussed in detail below, the theory 
underpinning this thesis is that of legality. For research to be ‘truly’ 
victimological based, the voices of victims need to be heard.91 This ensures 
 
86 Mawby & Walklate n.76, 21-22 
87 Goodey n.82, 99 
88 Mudasir Kamal & William J. Newman, ‘Revenge Pornography: Mental Health Implications 
and Related Legislation’ (2016) 44(3) American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law 359, 
362 
89 Samantha Bates, ‘“Stripped”: An Analysis of Revenge Porn Victims’ Lives after 
Victimization’ (Master of Arts Thesis, Simon Fraser University 2015) 24 
90 Ann John et al, ‘Self-Harm, Suicidal Behaviours, and Cyberbullying in Children and Young 
People: Systematic Review’ (2018) 20 (4) Journal of Medical Internet Research 129 
91 Goodey n.82, 117 
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that ‘patronising assumptions abound that victim services or the police “know 
best” when it comes to the state of mind and the role that crime victims play 
in criminal justice’ are avoided.92 Indeed, the ‘roles of victim and victimizer 
are neither static, assigned nor immutable.’93  
 
The Criminal Law and Legality   
 
At its very basic the principle of legality is defined as ‘no crime without law’94 
and is considered a fundamental principle of natural justice.95 It comprises of 
the logic that individuals should be able to partake in any activities knowing 
whether their behaviour breaches the law. Legality is supported in both 
national and international legal systems, with the principle having specific 
protection under Article 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (the Convention):  
‘The guarantee enshrined in Article 7, which is an essential element of 
the rule of law, occupies a prominent place in the Convention system 
of protection … It should be construed and applied, as follows from its 
object and purpose, in such a way as to provide effective safeguards 
against arbitrary prosecution, conviction and punishment.’96 
 
Under the Convention, Article 7 is an absolute right meaning that States who 
are party to the Convention cannot delegate from this right, even in times of 
 
92 Ibid., 
93 Fattah n.69, 7 
94 Judge Theodor Meron, The Principle of Legality in International Criminal Law (Legal 
Studies Research Papers Series 10-08, 2010) 7 
95 David Luban, ‘Fairness to rightness: Jurisdiction, Legality, and the Legitimacy of 
International Criminal Law’ in Samantha Besson & John Tasioulas (eds), The Philosophy of 
International Law (Oxford University Press 2010) 34     
96 Kafkaris v Cyprus App no 21906/04 (ECtHR, 12 February 2008) [137]  
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national emergency.97 Legality therefore creates certainty within the law and 
is described by Murphy as the ‘… hidden jewel of the Convention.’98 
 
Luban argues that two key rationales uphold the principle of legality in the 
criminal law: the action-guiding character of the law and the insurance that 
the state will not abuse its powers.99 The action-guiding argument stems 
from the philosophical work of Fuller who suggests that the law allows 
individuals to govern their behaviour in accordance with clear and distinct 
rules. Those who break these rules are subject to punishment. Nonetheless, 
those who break rules which are unclear and consequently are incapable of 
guiding those living in a society, should not be subject to punishment.100 
Luban refers to this as ‘the fair notice argument’. Here, a person must be 
seen to have been given ‘constructive notice’ that their actions have 
breached the law.101 For this to occur the law must be accessible and clear.    
 
The second rationale concerns the abuse of power. In the past imprecise 
and flexible legislation was used by States to target oppressed groups in a 
given society. This is clear when examining laws enacted during Nazi 
Germany, which were used to target certain groups of individuals. The 
purpose of legality is to safeguard ‘… against arbitrary punishment by 
governments under a cover of vague, underspecified law.’102 It creates 
 
97 Cian C. Murphy, ‘The principle of legality in criminal law under the European Convention 
on Human Rights’ (2010) 2 European Human Rights Law Review 192, 207. See chapter 
seven for an in-depth discussion of the types of rights contained within the Convention.  
98 Ibid., 206 
99 Luban n.95, 37 
100 Lon L Fuller, The morality of law (Yale University Press 1964)   
101 Luban, n.95, 40 
102 Ibid., 37  
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fairness within the law whilst also ensuring that States adhere to the 
separation of powers. The separation of powers is the idea that each body of 
the State, for instance the executive, the legislature and the judiciary, should 
be segregated and neither body should do the work of another. Though in 
the United Kingdom there is not a complete separation of powers, its 
breaches are considered lawful as it allows for checks and balances to occur 
between different parts of the state.103 Therefore, the principle of legality 
prohibits retrospective law, maintains procedural fairness and creates clear 
distinct legal rules for a given society to adhere to.  
 
From an International Criminal Law perspective, a strict approach is 
maintained with legality. International Criminal Law is, at its very basic, the 
application of criminal law across borders.104 It is considered that there are 
three bodies of International Criminal Law, all of which uphold the principle of 
legality: domestic criminal law which is applied on an international scale; 
treaty-based criminal law (this is the creation of treaties between States 
which criminalises particular conduct); and pure international criminal law 
which includes crimes such as genocide, aggressive war and crimes against 
humanity.105 Each source of International Criminal Law must be publicly 
accessible, clear and beyond doubt.106 For international criminal law 
 
103 Roger Masterman, The Separation of Powers in the Contemporary Constitution: Judicial 
Competence and Independence in the United Kingdom (Cambridge University Press 2010) 
24 
104 Douglas Guilfoyle, International Criminal Law (Oxford University Press 2016) 3 
105 Luban n.95, 19 
106 Darryl Robinson, The Principle of Legality in International Criminal Law (Legal Studies 
Research Papers Series 10-08, 2010) 4 
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theorists, the law must be constructed rigorously to conform to the principle 
of legality, as affirmed in Čelebići.107  
 
However, strict construction of the law is not always achievable, as society 
changes the law needs to be adaptable, as affirmed in R v Rimmington.108 
Rimmington sent numerous letters and parcels containing racially offensive 
material. In total he sent 538 separate articles, all of which were of a racist 
nature. At Southwark Crown Court he was convicted under the common law 
offence of public nuisance, but this was quashed by the House of Lords as it 
was held that his actions had not affected a significant proportion of society, 
the mischief behind the common law offence of public nuisance. During the 
hearing the House of Lords examined the principle of legality, with Lord 
Bingham stating that there are two guiding principles:  
‘… no one should be punished under a law unless it is sufficiently 
clear and certain … and no one should be punished for any act which 




Like that of International Criminal Law theorists, Lord Bingham supports the 
concept that the law needs to be clear and certain, but he also maintains that 
absolute certainty cannot, and will not, always be desirable:    
‘It is accepted that absolute certainty is unattainable, and might entail 
excessive rigidity since the law must be able to keep pace with 




107 Čelebići Camp, Prosecutor v Delalić (Zejnil) and others, Appeal Judgment, Case No IT-
96-21-A, ICL 96 (ICTY 2001), 20th February 2001, United Nations Security Council [UNSC]; 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia [ICTY]; Appeals Chamber  
108 R v Rimmington, R v Goldstein [2005] UKHL 63, [2006] 1 A.C. 459  
109 Ibid., [33]  
110 Ibid., [35] 
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The law needs to be adaptable to reflect the fast-changing nature of society; 
this is especially true with technology. Technology and the Internet have 
evolved at a significant pace and in some instances the law has struggled to 
keep track, as confirmed by the Law Commission in their report examining 
offensive commentary online.111 The law needs to maintain some form of 
openness to resolve legal disputes, but this should not be at the detriment of 
breaching the principles of legality.  
 
As previously stated, the principle of legality is a guaranteed right under 
Article 7, no punishment without law, of the Convention:  
‘No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any 
act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence under 
national or international law at the time when it was committed ...’.    
 
Article 7 consists of two key principles: nullum crimen sine lege (no crime 
without law) and nulla poena sine lege (no punishment without law).112 
Similar to the International Criminal Law perspective, Schaack argues that 
legality helps maintain the separation of powers.113 However, the European 
Court of Human Rights favours ‘… a broad, liberal and progressive 
interpretations … to give “maximum effect” to the provisions.’114   
 
For Murphy the principle of legality in the Convention consists of three 
interrelated rules: only the law can define a crime and prescribe a penalty, 
 
111 Law Commission, Abusive and Offensive Online Communications: A Scoping Report 
(Law Com No 381, 2018) [10.76] 
112 Susana Sanz-Caballero, ‘The principle of nulla poena sine lege revisited: the 
retrospective application of criminal law in the eyes of the European Court of Human Rights’ 
(2017) 28(3) European Journal of International Law 787, 788  
113 Beth Van Schaack, The Principle of Legality in International Criminal Law (Legal Studies 
Research Papers Series 10-08, 2010) 1 
114 Robinson n.106, 5 
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the prohibition of retrospective criminal law, and no harsher penalties can be 
given then those that are prescribed in the law at the time the offence was 
committed. The first rule was restated and affirmed in Kafkaris v Cyprus,115 
where the court upheld the concept that only the law can define a crime, 
affirming that the ‘law’ consists of both Acts of Parliament and the common 
law.116 However, it could be suggested that pure clarity with the law 
encompasses aspects of rational choice theory, which as discussed above 
implies that individuals make a conscious decision before committing an 
offence, which may not necessarily be true.  
 
The jurisprudence of Strasbourg, like that of the International Criminal Court, 
maintains that in order for laws, whether that be legislation or the common 
law, to adhere to the principle of legality it must be accessible and 
foreseeable. Accessibility in its simplest terms, means ‘clarity’, with the 
courts noting:  
‘An individual must know from the wording of the relevant provision 
and, if need be, with the assistance of the courts’ interpretation of it, 
what acts and omissions will make him criminally liable and what 
penalty will be imposed … a law may still satisfy the requirement … 
where the person concerned has to take appropriate legal advice to 
assess, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the 
consequences which a given action may entail.’117 
 
The clarity of the law will be for the courts to decide with an emphasis being 
placed on the individual’s knowledge that their behaviour in question ‘ran a 
real risk of prosecution’,118 reflecting aspects of deterrence theory as 
discussed above. Ignorance is not a defence in law with the courts taking a 
 
115 Kafkaris n.96 
116 Sunday Times v. United Kingdom (no.1) App no 6538/74 (ECtHR, 26 April 1979) 
117 Kafkaris n.96, [140] 
118 Cantoni v. France App no 17862/91 (ECtHR, 15 November 1996)  
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firm approach to those who ‘skate on thin ice’ with the law: ‘those who skate 
on thin ice can hardly expect to find a sign which will denote the precise spot 
where they may fall in.’119 The rationale behind this approach surrounds the 
idea that citizens should know when their behaviour is unlawful, and 
therefore subject to punishment.120 Though this may be true, it does not 
clarify which Act of Parliament an individual will be prosecuted under. When 
it comes to social media related offences, from an examination of case law 
examples discussed in later chapters, it is not always clear why a defendant 
was prosecuted under a particular Act. The lack of clarity exposed in these 
cases brings into question the principle of legality. 
 
Like ‘law’, ‘penalty’ has also been defined by the European Court of Human 
Rights: 
‘The concept of “penalty” in Article 7(1) is, like the notions of “civil 
rights and obligations” and “criminal charge” in Article 6(1), an 
autonomous Convention concept. To render the protection offered by 
Article 7 effective, the Court must remain free to go behind 
appearances and assess for itself whether a particular measure 
amounts in substance to a “penalty” within the meaning of this 
provision.’121 
 
Here, the principle of legality upholds the concept that an individual can only 
be punished to the extent to which is prescribed by law. Though this protects 
against arbitrary punishments, it does not protect individuals from being 
prosecuted under more substantial laws, if their conduct can be adapted to fit 
the actus reus and mens rea of the offence, as seen during the prosecution 
 
119 Knuller (Publishing, Printing and Promotions) Ltd. and Others Appellants v Director of 
Public Prosecutions Respondent [1972] 3 W.L.R. 143, [1973] A.C. 435 per Lord Morris 463 
120 Andrew Ashworth & Jeremy Horder, Principles of Criminal Law (7th edn, Oxford University 
Press 2013) 62 
121 Welch v United Kingdom App no 17440/90 (ECtHR, 9 February 1995) 247  
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of individuals following the 2011 riots in the United Kingdom. As will be 
explained in more detail in chapter four, riots took place across the UK in 
August 2011 following the death of Mark Duggan by armed police. After the 
riots, the then Prime Minister David Cameron spoke openly about how those 
who took part in criminal behaviour during the disorder would feel the full 
force of the law.122 Consequently, criticism was expressed against the 
criminal justice system for imposing severe sentences and harsher 
punishments on individuals who committed criminal acts during the riots.123 
In one case a man was given a custodial sentence of four years contrary to 
the Serious Crime Act 2007, for the creation of a Facebook event page to 
incite others to participate in the riots.124  
 
In addition to accessibility, the law also needs to be foreseeable. The 
European Court of Human Rights treats foreseeability as the concept that 
where there are changes in the law, these changes need to be predictable, 
as demonstrated in SW and CR v United Kingdom.125 The defendants, who 
were both convicted of a similar crime but in different cases, had previously 
been found guilty of rape. During the trial, their defence team argued that 
they could not be found guilty of rape because they had committed the 
offence against their wives and thus, during the marriage ceremony their 
 
122 Andrew Sparrow, ‘David Cameron announces recall of parliament over riots’ The 
Guardian (London, 9 August 2011) <https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2011/aug/09/david-
cameron-announces-recall-parliament> accessed 18 January 2018  
123 Andy McSmith, ‘Tough riot sentences prompt new guidelines for the courts’ The 
Independent (London, 17 August 2011) 
<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/tough-riot-sentences-prompt-new-guidelines-
for-the-courts-2339699.html> accessed 20 January 2018 
124 R v Jordan Blackshaw Chester Crown Court 16 August 2011 (unreported) 
125 SW v United Kingdom, CR v United Kingdom App no 20166/92 (ECtHR, 22 November 
1995)  
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wives had forever consented to sexual activity.126 This argument was 
rejected by the court, and the law was extended to cover rape against a 
spouse.  
 
Following their conviction, both legal teams applied to the European Court of 
Human Rights suggesting that Article 7 of the Convention had been 
breached: no punishment without law. The foundation for their argument 
surrounded the concept that it was not foreseeable that the law would be 
extended to criminalise the conduct of rape against a spouse. However, the 
European Court of Human Rights rejected this argument, holding that the 
House of Lords opinion:  
‘… did no more than continue a perceptible line of case law 
development dismantling the immunity of a husband from prosecution 
for rape upon his wife. There was no doubt under the law as it stood 
on 18 September 1990 that a husband who forcibly had sexual 
intercourse with his wife could, in various circumstances, be found 
guilty of rape.’127 
 
The court accepts the notion that the law must adapt to the changing nature 
of society, but this must be in a predictable manner, so citizens can guide 
their behaviour according to law, similar to that of rational choice theory. 
 
Like that of accessibility, foreseeability does not extend to include certainty 
as to what law a defendant will be prosecuted under where there are several 
provisions available. For instance, if a person in England commits criminal 
damage, with the exception of arson, they will be prosecuted under section 
1(1) of the Criminal Damage Act 1971. If their actions endanger another’s 
 
126 It had previously been suggested under English Common Law that a husband could not 
be guilty of rape against his wife.  
127 SW v United Kingdom n.125, 402 
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life, they will be prosecuted under the same statute, but for a breach of 
section 1(2) of the Act. When it comes to abuse conducted online, it is not 
easy to foresee which Act of Parliament a person will be regarded as 
breaching. In England and Wales, a variety of provisions are used to govern 
online behaviour including, though not limited to, the Malicious 
Communications Act 1988 and the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, 
alongside section 127 of the Communications Act 2003. It will be exposed in 
later discussions that there is a lack of consistency in online abuse 
prosecutions, resulting in the law not being ‘foreseeable’.  
 
As the United Kingdom is a signatory to the Convention, the UK Government 
must comply with Article 7. Following the enactment of the Human Rights Act 
1998, Article 7 can now be invoked in the national courts of the United 
Kingdom against state bodies. Consequently, the courts are under a legal 
obligation to take into consideration human rights when deciding on a legal 
dispute, this includes the concept of ‘no punishment without law.’128  
 
The principle of legality underpins the legal system of the United Kingdom 
and is often referred to as the rule of law:  
‘The rule of law may be interpreted either as a philosophy or political 
theory which lays down fundamental requirements for law, or as a 
procedural device by which those with power rule under the law. The 
essence of the rule of law is that of the sovereignty or supremacy of 
law over man. The rule of law incites that every person - irrespective 
of rank and status in society - be subjected to the law.’129    
 
 
128 The Human Rights Act 1988 section 6  
129 Hilaire Barnett, Constitutional & Administrative Law (5th edn, Cavendish Publishing 2004) 
69  
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The rule of law constitutes several key principles depending on the 
philosophical-theoretical approach of the scholar, though there are some 
overlaps between academics understanding of these principles. For Raz, 
‘[t]he law should conform to standards designed to guide action’,130 which 
among other things, means that ‘all laws should be prospective, open and 
clear’.131 This is a very similar approach to Fuller, as discussed previously.  
 
The law should be action-guiding allowing citizens to conform or disregard 
the law at their own free will. Here, the law needs to be clear for individuals 
to fully comprehend when their behaviour breaches acceptable conduct in a 
given society. With technology-based offences this is not always clear. For 
instance, a breach of section 127(1) of the Communications Act 2003 occurs 
during the sending of grossly offensive messages. The term ‘grossly 
offensive’ is not clearly defined in the statute and the courts have concluded 
that it will take ‘… its ordinary English meaning’, discussed further in chapter 
six.132   
 
Raz’s position on what constitutes the rule of law is comparable to Lord 
Bingham, who similarly argues that there are eight key principles which 
underpin the rule of law.133 For Lord Bingham, one of the criteria for a legal 
rule to uphold the rule of law is that it ‘… must be accessible and so far as 
possible intelligible, clear and predictable’,134 criteria reflected both in the 
 
130 Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law (Oxford University Press 1979) 218 
131 Raz n.1, 214 
132 Connolly v DPP [2007] EWHC 237 (Admin), [2008] 1 W.L.R. 276 per Lord Justice Dyson 
[10] 
133 Lord Bingham, ‘The rule of law’ (2007) 66(1) Cambridge Law Journal 67  
134 Ibid., 69 
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European Court of Human Rights and in International Criminal Law. 
Whereas Murray goes further stating that ‘… the law should be stable and 
certain.’135 The current legal framework used to prosecute social media 
related offences can be considered uncertain and as a result, lacks stability. 
The variety of Acts available means there are inconsistencies in policing and 
prosecutions, all of which undermine the key principles of legality in the 




Though as discussed above other theoretical positions could have been 
utilised to answer the research questions posed, the concept of legality was 
chosen as it can be considered the foundation of any criminal justice system. 
Without, it leaves open two possibilities, the law can be used in an arbitrary 
manner, as exposed further in chapter four in the case to R v Blackshaw,136 
or indeed it can create misunderstandings in the law, in which victims are not 
fully compensated for the harm that is inflicted upon them. In essence, it will 
be argued in the following chapters that the use of some Acts, which were in 
many cases never intended to cover technology, is a fundamental breach of 
the principle of legality in the criminal law. Before this, a discussion on social 
media gatekeepers will take place.  
 
135 Andrew D Murray, ‘Mapping the rule of law for the internet’ in David Mangan & Lorna E 
Gillies (eds), The Legal Challenges of Social Media (Edward Elgar Publishing 2017) 27 
136 R v Blackshaw [2011] EWCA Crim 2312, [2012] 1 W.L.R. 1126 




Social Media Gatekeepers 
Introduction 
‘There was literally nothing enjoyable about the job [Facebook content 
moderator]. You’d go into work at 9am every morning, turn on your 
computer and watch someone have their head cut off. Every day, 
every minute, that’s what you see. Heads being cut off.’1 
    
In recent years social media companies such as Facebook and Twitter, have 
come under increasing pressure to tackle inappropriate behaviour on their 
sites including terrorist propaganda, hate speech and revenge pornography.2 
In fact, both companies have been brought before Parliamentary Committees 
to explain unlawful behaviour that continues to be a problem on their sites.3  
 
The following discussion will examine in detail how both Facebook and 
Twitter are attempting to tackle the growing issue of online abuse.4 It will take 
the format of outlining Facebook and Twitter’s user agreements, examining 
how the two companies govern hate speech, bullying, credible threats of 
violence and revenge pornography on their sites. The final part of this 
chapter will critically review some of the mechanisms Facebook and Twitter 
have implemented in recent years to tackle inappropriate behaviour online. 
 
1 Olivia Solon, ‘Underpaid and overburdened: the life of a Facebook moderator’ The 
Guardian (London, 25 May 2017) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/news/2017/may/25/facebook-moderator-underpaid-
overburdened-extreme-content> accessed 14 January 2019  
2 Nick Hopkins & Julia Carrie Wong, ‘Has Facebook become a forum for misogyny and 
racism?’ The Guardian (London, 21 May 2017) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/news/2017/may/21/has-facebook-become-forum-misogyny-
racism> accessed 14 January 2019   
3 For example, Facebook, Twitter and YouTube were brought before the Communications 
Committee in 2014. See, Communications Committee, Social Media and Criminal Offences 
(HL 2014-15, 37)  
4 As outlined in chapter one the focus of this thesis is on Facebook and Twitter as they are 
two of the biggest social networking companies today. In addition, both companies have 
spoken publicly about how they are continuing to tackle unlawful behaviour online.    
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Terms of Service Agreements  
As explored in chapter one, social media companies can now be considered 
as part of mainstream society. As will be discussed throughout this thesis 
there is a darker side to social media, online abuse. This has resulted in 
social media companies coming under heavy criticism with how they 
currently attempt to eliminate this behaviour online:  
‘Social media companies are highly secretive about the number of 
staff and the level of resources that they devote to monitoring and 
removing inappropriate content.’5  
 
For Bernal, social media sites are ultimately businesses where individual’s 
rights are not always considered a priority.6  
 
Due to the continued failure of both Facebook and Twitter in removing 
unacceptable content online, both companies have come under pressure to 
work quickly to get ahead of this growing problem around the world.7 Each 
company has a terms of service agreement between itself and its users and 
is often the document quoted when they are asked to explain the decision 
not to remove, or in some cases remove certain content. Yet both companies 




5 Hopkins & Wong n.2  
6 Paul Bernal, The Internet, Warts and All: Free Speech, Privacy and Truth (Cambridge 
University Press 2018) 49 
7 Home Affairs Committee, Hate crime: abuse, hate and extremism online (HC 2016-17, 
609) 52 
8 Ibid., 39 
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All social media companies have terms of service agreements, or community 
guidelines between themselves and their users.9 These guidelines outline 
what behaviour is acceptable and unacceptable on their sites, though their 
content can differ dramatically between companies. All users of the site must 
agree to the terms of service, failure to comply can result in content being 
removed, suspensions and in some cases permanent exclusion from the 
site. The following discussion will outline and discuss the terms of services 
for Facebook and Twitter.  
 
Community Guidelines: Facebook  
The most recent statistics suggest that over 1.4 million people use Facebook 
each day.10 Consequently, the content created, shared and liked on the site 
is enormous. Yet Mark Zuckerberg the CEO and founder of Facebook 
maintains that hate speech, bullying and terrorist material is prohibited on its 
site.11 Though, he accepts that the company has ‘made mistakes’ in not 
removing such content quick enough.12 What is and what is not allowed to be 
published on Facebook, is set out in its community guidelines which are built 
on several fundamental key principles: safety, voice and equity.13  
 
 
9 Gabriel Weimann, ‘Why do terrorists migrate to social media?’ in Anne Aly, Stuart 
Macdonald, Lee Jarvis & Thomas Chen (eds), Violent Extremism Online: New Perspectives 
on Terrorism and the Internet (Routledge 2016) 60  
10 Guardian News, ‘Mark Zuckerberg testifies before Congress’ (YouTube, 10 April 2018) 
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mZaec_mlq9M> accessed 14 January 2019  
11 PBS NewsHour, ‘Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg testifies before the European Union 
Parliament’ (YouTube, 22 May 2018) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y70LrlzrkNk> 
accessed 14 January 2019  
12 Guardian News n.10  
13 Facebook, ‘Community Standards: Introduction’ (Facebook, 2019) 
<https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards/> accessed 14 January 2019  
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The community guidelines cover a range of topics including, but not limited 
to, hate speech, credible threats of violence, revenge pornography and 
bullying. Until 2017 it was not known how Facebook applied its community 
guidelines to its site. Following a leak by an internal source at Facebook the 
Guardian newspaper, based in the United Kingdom, published Facebook’s 
moderator manuals, which for the first time gave details as to how the 
company comes to a decision regarding objectionable content on its site.14    
 
Facebook and Hate Speech  
Hate speech is defined by Facebook as:  
‘… a direct attack on people based on … race, ethnicity, national 
origin, religious affiliation, sexual orientation, caste, sex, gender, 
gender identity and serious disease or disability.’15  
 
Content which falls within the definition above is prohibited on its site. For 
instance, comments such as ‘[I] fuckin [sic] hate Christians’ and ‘using my 
freedom of speech to inform that I find homosexuals DISGUSTING [sic]’, will 
be removed from the site.16 Whereas commentary which can be labelled as 
targeting ‘concepts, institutions and beliefs’ will not be considered as 
breaching Facebook’s hate speech policies. For example, a comment stating 
‘I hate Christianity’ would not be labelled as hate speech.17 Facebook 
maintains that in order to protect freedom of expression only conduct that 
falls within their definition of hate speech as given above, which is aimed at 
 
14 The Guardian ‘Facebook Files’ (The Guardian, 2019) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/news/series/facebook-files> accessed 14 January 2019   
15 Facebook, ‘Community Standards: Hate Speech’ (Facebook, 2018) 
<https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards/hate_speech> accessed 9 December 
2018  
16 The Guardian, ‘Hate speech and anti-migrant posts: Facebook's rules’ The Guardian 
(London, 24 May 2017) <https://www.theguardian.com/news/gallery/2017/may/24/hate-
speech-and-anti-migrant-posts-facebooks-rules> accessed 23 January 2019 
17 Ibid., 
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individuals, groups or humans will be removed.18 Therefore, behaviour which 
targets a person because of their social class, appearance or political 
ideology will not be considered as hate speech.19   
 
On average around 66,000 pieces of content are removed each week from 
Facebook for violating hate speech guidelines.20 During discussions before 
the European Parliament in 2018, Mark Zuckerberg emphasised the 
prohibition of hate speech on Facebook.21 However, moderator guidance, 
published by the Guardian newspaper, exposed examples of hate speech 
which were considered not to breach Facebook’s community standards. For 
instance, only recently has Facebook banned images and comments 
mocking those with disabilities, such as individuals with Down’s Syndrome.22 
Whilst on the other hand, a picture of an abusive letter sent to Shaun King, a 
prominent African-American activist, published to highlight the abuse he was 
receiving, was removed by Facebook for breaching hate speech guidelines.23  
 
Facebook has acknowledged that it has a ‘long way’ to go before it can be 




20 Mark Zuckerberg, ‘Building Global Community’ (Facebook, 16 February 2017) 
<https://www.facebook.com/notes/mark-zuckerberg/building-global-
community/10154544292806634/> accessed 14 January 2019  
21 PBS NewsHour n.11 
22 Nick Hopkins, ‘How Facebook allows users to post footage of children being bullied’ The 
Guardian (London, 22 May 2017) <https://www.theguardian.com/news/2017/may/22/how-
facebook-allows-users-to-post-footage-of-children-being-bullied> accessed 14 January 2019   
23 Sam Levin, ‘Facebook temporarily blocks Black Lives Matter activist after he posts racist 
email’ The Guardian (London, 12 September 2016) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/sep/12/facebook-blocks-shaun-king-black-
lives-matter> accessed 14 January 2019  
24 PBS NewsHour n.11 
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maintains that there will always be issues with removing some content as 
language adapts with time.25 For instance, what may be considered as an 
offensive term today, may not be in 10 years’ time. Furthermore, as 
Facebook is available worldwide, there can be a language barrier between 
the user and the person moderating the content, discussed in detail in later 
parts of this chapter.26  
 
Facebook and Bullying  
Like that of hate speech, bullying is not permitted on Facebook.27 Facebook 
defines bullying as conduct that shames or degrades a person which upsets 
or silences the individual.28 As mentioned previously bullying is often 
associated with the younger generation, and Facebook is no exception. 
Here, the company has specific protections for minors (those under 18). For 
instance, posts aimed at minors which contains swearing, sexual content or 
negative character references will be removed, but this protection is not 
given to adults.29 For example, the comment ‘blondes are stupid’ would not 
be removed if it was aimed at a person over the age of 18, as negative 
character references are not prohibited when directed at adults.30 Though if 
the comment was aimed at a minor, the person sending the message would 
be in breach of Facebook’s community standards. Consequently, better 
protection is given to minors when it comes to bullying.  
 
25 Guardian News n.10  
26 Ibid., 
27 Facebook, ‘Community Standards: Bullying’ (Facebook, 2018) 
<https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards/bullying> accessed 3 January 2019  
28 Ibid., 
29 Ibid., 
30 The Guardian n.16  
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Whereas public figures, who Facebook defines as those with over 100,000 
followers or friends, are given the least protection.31 Here, for Facebook 
individuals who place themselves in the public domain should be tolerant of 
abuse online, with the company stating: ‘[W]e want to exclude certain people 
who are famous or controversial in their own right and don’t [sic] deserve our 
protection.’32 Encompassing aspects of Mendelsohn’s theory relating to the 
ideal victim as discussed in the previous chapter.33 Consequently, MPs, who 
during the 2017 General Election in the United Kingdom were subjected to a 
crusade of online abuse,34 may not necessarily be protected by Facebook. 
By having a higher threshold for public figures individuals may be 
discouraged from placing themselves in the public domain, which in turn 
restricts a person’s right to free speech. An issue highlighted further in 
chapter seven. 
 
A strong stance against cyberbullying is needed on social media sites, as 
those who have been subjected to this form of abuse, have in some 
instances taken their own life. Facebook has therefore set a precedent for 
other social networking sites, but it falls short of protecting adults who are 
trolled online. Instead, those aged over 18 would need to rely on the 
 
31 Hopkins n.22 
32 Ibid.,  
33 Benjamin Mendelsohn, ‘Une nouvelle branche de la science bio-psycho-sociale: 
la victimologie’ (1956) Revue internationale de criminologie et de police technique 10-31 
found in Rob Mawby & Sandra Walklate, Critical Victimology (Sage 1994) 12 
34 Sarah Marsh, ‘Surge in crimes against MPs sparks fears over intimidation and abuse’ The 
Guardian (London, 23 October 2018) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/oct/23/crimes-mps-uk-online-intimidation-
abuse> accessed 4 February 2019 
Page 112 of 449 
 
standards of other prohibited behaviours on Facebook, for instance, credible 
threats of violence. 
 
Facebook and Credible Threats   
In order to breach Facebook’s community standards, it must be found that a 
credible threat would result in ‘real-world harm’ before it will be deemed as 
inappropriate.35 Throughout the guidelines, and during Mark Zuckerberg’s 
testament before Congress, significant weight was given to the term ‘real 
world harm’, yet a definitive definition of this term cannot be found. In 
addition, the content needs to be considered as credible. For Facebook 
credibility is dependent on whether the content contains a specific target, 
there is mention of a weapon or if a location and time are present.36 For 
instance, ‘I’ll slit your throat and hang your bloody neck by your weaves’ is 
prohibited on the site.37  
 
Like that of bullying, different criterions of protection are given to certain 
groups of individuals. For example, groups or individuals who are considered 
as ‘vulnerable’, have higher protection than other users.38 Vulnerable 
individuals or groups include, though not limited to, Heads of States and the 
Pope.39 Consequently, a comment such as ‘someone shoot Donald Trump 
[President of the United States]’ was prohibited, but a comment stating ‘to 
 
35 Facebook, ‘Community Standards: Credible Violence’ (Facebook, 2018) 
<https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards/credible_violence> accessed 3 January 
2019 
36 The Guardian, ‘Facebook’s manual on credible threats of violence’ The Guardian (London, 
21 May 2017) <https://www.theguardian.com/news/gallery/2017/may/21/facebooks-manual-
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snap a bitch’s neck, make sure you apply all the pressure to the middle of 
the throat’ was allowed to remain on the site.40 
 
It can be suggested that a comment such as ‘someone shoot Donald Trump’ 
is closer to satire humour than a credible threat of violence, yet this comment 
was actively removed by Facebook. Threats evidently remain on Facebook 
with the Guardian newspaper exposing just some examples of comments 
which remained on the site, despite being reported by users as breaching 
Facebook’s community standards:  
‘“Little girl needs to keep to herself before daddy breaks her face [sic]” 
… “You arseholes better pray to God that I keep my mind intact 
because if I lose it I will literally kill HUNDREDS [sic] of you” … 
“Unless you stop bitching I’ll have to cut your tongue out [sic]”’.41  
 
Consequently, there remains several issues in how Facebook’s community 
standards are used in cases of credible threats of violence on its site.  
 
Facebook and Revenge Porn  
As will be explored in chapter five revenge pornography is a growing issue in 
a digital age. In fact, in one month alone Facebook removed 54,000 potential 
cases of revenge porn.42 Though many countries are now legislating against 
revenge porn, Facebook has its own rules when it comes to the removal of 
such content on its site. In general content that contains: 
 
40 Ibid., 
41 Nick Hopkins, ‘Revealed: Facebook's internal rulebook on sex, terrorism and violence’ The 
Guardian (London, 21 May 2017) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/news/2017/may/21/revealed-facebook-internal-rulebook-sex-
terrorism-violence> accessed 21 January 2019 
42 Nick Hopkins & Olivia Solon, ‘Facebook flooded with “sextortion” and “revenge porn”, files 
reveal’ The Guardian (London, 22 May 2017) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/news/2017/may/22/facebook-flooded-with-sextortion-and-
revenge-porn-files-reveal> accessed 14 January 2019   
Page 114 of 449 
 
‘[v]isible genitalia except in the context of birth giving and after-birth 
moments or health-related situations … Visible anus and/or fully nude 
close-ups of buttocks unless photoshopped on a public figure … 
Uncovered female nipples except in the context of breastfeeding, birth 
giving and after-birth moments, health-related situations [or] Sexual 
intercourse [is prohibited]’.43    
 
However, as will be discussed in later chapters revenge pornography can 
take many forms, such as photoshopped imagery.  
 
For Facebook, revenge pornography will only be removed when three 
criterions are met.44 First, the image or video must be taken in a private 
place. So, for instance a photo taken on a public beach, would not fall within 
this criterion, and consequently it may not be removed by the company. 
Second, the person in the photo or video must be nude or near-nude. The 
term near-nude covers situations whereby a person maybe in their 
underwear or a costume. Last, a lack of consent must be established either 
through commentary on the content or by a caption. If one or more of these 
criterions are missing, for Facebook the content may not fall under their 
revenge porn policies.45      
 
Summary  
Throughout Mark Zuckerberg’s testament before Congress and the 
European Parliament, he accepted that his company had made mistakes in 
the removal of content from its site, by allowing content that clearly breached 
 
43 Facebook, ‘Community Standards: Adult nudity and sexual activity’ (Facebook, 2018) 
<https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards/adult_nudity_sexual_activity> accessed 3 
January 2019    
44 The Guardian, ‘What Facebook says on “sextortion” and “revenge porn”’ The Guardian 
(London, 22 May 2017) <https://www.theguardian.com/news/gallery/2017/may/22/what-
facebook-says-on-sextortion-and-revenge-porn> accessed 3 January 2019    
45 Ibid., 
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the company’s terms of service agreement to remain publicly viewable. What 
Facebook is doing to try and reduce unacceptable behaviour on its site, will 
be examined in later parts of this chapter. The following discussion will 
outline Twitter’s terms of service agreement.  
 
Terms of Service: The Twitter Rules 
When Twitter first launched in 2006, 244 tweets were sent on its first day. 
Five years later users sent 244 tweets in less than a tenth-of-a-second.46 It is 
currently estimated that over 500 million tweets are sent every day on 
Twitter.47 Similarly, like that of Facebook, Twitter continues to have issues 
with hate speech, bullying, credible threats of violence and revenge 
pornography on its site, as highlighted by Twitter’s Chief Executive: ‘[W]e see 
voices being silenced on Twitter every day. We’ve been working to 
counteract this for the past 2 years.’48 Yet the company maintains that 
Twitter:  
‘… is reflective of real conversations happening in the world and that 
sometimes includes perspectives that may be offensive, controversial, 
and/or bigoted.’49  
 
Content that is prohibited on Twitter is outlined in the company’s terms of 
service agreement, ‘The Twitter Rules’, which were significantly updated in 
 
46 Courtney Boyd Myres, ‘5 years ago today Twitter launched to the public’ (TNW, 15 July 
2015) <https://thenextweb.com/twitter/2011/07/15/5-years-ago-today-twitter-launched-to-the-
public/> accessed 28 February 2019 
47 Ursula Smartt, Media & Entertainment Law (Taylor & Francis 2017) 79  
48 Alex Hern, ‘Twitter further tightens abuse rules in attempt to prove it cares’ The Guardian 
(London, 18 October 2017) <https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/oct/18/twitter-
abuse-rules-jack-dorsey-hate-speech-revenge-porn-violent-groups-social-network> 
accessed 17 January 2019  
49 Twitter, ‘Our approach to policy development and enforcement philosophy’ (Twitter, 2019) 
<https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies/enforcement-philosophy> accessed 3 January 
2019 
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2017.50 The Twitter Rules have been created through in-depth research 
examining online discourse, with the company being aided by around forty 
not-for-profit organisations.51 Here, Twitter’s Rules are considered to be 
guided by transparency and empowerment, where freedom of speech will 
prevail.52 The discussion below will outline Twitter’s terms of service 
agreements governing hate speech, abusive behaviour, credible threats of 
violence and revenge pornography. 
 
Twitter and Hate Speech  
Twitter defines hate speech as violence, direct attack or threatening 
behaviour against another:   
‘… on the basis of race, ethnicity, national origin, sexual orientation, 
gender, gender identity, religious affiliation, age, disability, or serious 
disease.’53  
 
The Twitter Rules therefore prohibit content which is motivated by hate, 
prejudice or intolerance, which targets one of the above protected 
characteristics.54 For Twitter, hateful content can take many forms for 
instance, targeting others with reference to mass murder or violent events, 
inciting fear about a sector of society, including promoting exclusion of others 
from a given situation, and unsolicited hateful imagery.55 Though these 
comments alone may not be in breach of Twitter’s guidelines, instead, it 
 
50 Hern n.48 
51 Ibid., 
52 Twitter, ‘Legal request FAQs’ (Twitter, 2019) <https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-
policies/twitter-legal-faqs> accessed 3 January 2019  
53 Twitter, ‘Hateful conduct policy’ (Twitter, 2019) <https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-
policies/hateful-conduct-policy> accessed 3 January 2019  
54 Ibid., 
55 Twitter, ‘Twitter Rules Enforcement’ (Twitter, 2018) 
<https://transparency.twitter.com/en/twitter-rules-enforcement.html#twitter-rules-
enforcement-jan-jun-2018> accessed 18 February 2019  
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needs to be clear that the person being targeted falls within one of the 
protected characteristics above. Between January and June 2018 Twitter 
took action56 against 285,393 accounts for breaching its hate speech 
guidelines.57   
 
Despite a clear definition given by Twitter as to what constitutes hate speech, 
on several occasions representatives from Twitter have been brought before 
Parliamentary Committees to discuss the continued issue of hate speech on 
its site. For instance, in 2017 the Home Affairs Committee raised concerns 
about images on Twitter which they considered to be racist, an example of 
which is shown in figure five. In addition, one image which contained the 
hashtag ‘Deport all Muslims’, was flagged by the committee as inciting hate; 
yet Twitter concluded that the image in question did not breach its terms.58 
Consequently, the image was allowed to remain on Twitter.  
 
Figure 5: Tweets intended to stir up hatred against ethnic minorities which 
the Home Affairs Committee reported to Twitter. 59 
 
 
56 Twitter uses ‘… the term “action” to refer to our range of enforcement actions, which 
include possible account suspension’, Ibid.,  
57 Twitter n.55 
58 Home Affairs Committee, Oral Evidence: Hate Crime and its Violent Consequences (HC 
2017, 609) Q37-39  
59 Home Affairs Committee n.7, [13]  
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Similarly, the Fawcett Society in August 2017 openly criticised Twitter in a 
public letter, following their slow removal of content reported by the Fawcett 
Society:  
‘Numerous examples of abuse, threats, and hate speech on the 
platform were identified and reported early last week [week 
commencing 14 August] - by the morning of the 21st August they 
were still up on the platform, despite the fact that they clearly violate 
Twitter's own community standards that do not allow direct or indirect 
threats or can be categorised as harassment or hateful content. No 
response has been sent to the people who reported them, and no 
action had been taken against the users who posted them.’60  
 
The week before the public letter was sent to Twitter, members of the 
Fawcett society reported content which they believed to be in clear breach of 
Twitter’s guidelines. This included the organisation of a protest by white 
supremacists and anti-Semitic abuse aimed a Liverpudlian MP Luciana 
Berger.61 A week later the content remained on the site yet within hours of 
the Fawcett society’s letter going public, the tweets were removed.  
 
Like that of Facebook hate speech is evidently present on Twitter, with the 
company accepting that mistakes have been made.62 Nonetheless, Twitter 
continues to be slow in the removal of hate content from its site.63  
 
 
60 The Fawcett Society, ‘Twitter is “failing women” experiencing online threats and 
harassment’ (The Fawcett Society, 22 August 2017) 
<https://www.fawcettsociety.org.uk/news/twitter-failing-women-experiencing-online-threats-
harassment> accessed 16 February 2018 
61 Ibid., 
62 Hern n.48 
63 Law Commission, Abusive and Offensive Online Communications: A Scoping Report (Law 
Com No 381, 2018) [2.151] 
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Twitter and Bullying  
Unlike Facebook Twitter does not have terms of services dealing specifically 
with bullying, instead, all unwelcomed conduct falls within ‘abusive behavior’ 
[sic]. Between January and June 2018, 248,629 accounts were action by 
Twitter for abusive behaviour.64 Twitter defines abusive behaviour as conduct 
that harasses, intimidates or reduces another person’s speech,65 though 
emphasis is placed on ensuring freedom of speech is maintained on the site: 
‘[w]e [Twitter] believe that everyone should have the power to create and 
share ideas and information instantly, without barriers.’66  
 
For Twitter, context is a key consideration in determining if certain content 
should be removed from the site:  
‘Some [t]weets may seem to be abusive when viewed in isolation, but 
may not be when viewed in the context of a larger conversation. When 
we [Twitter] review this type of content, it may not be clear whether it 
is intended to harass an individual, or if it is part of a consensual 
conversation.’67  
 
To determine the context of a tweet several factors are taken into account by 
Twitter. First, who is the intended target of the abuse; second, is there a 
public interest element justifying the tweet to remain on the site; third, who 
reported the complained about behaviour.68   
 
Any Twitter user can report content which they believe to be in breach of the 
Twitter Rules. Once reported, moderators, discussed further in later parts of 
 
64 Twitter n.55  
65 Twitter, ‘Abusive behavior’ (Twitter, 2019) <https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-
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this chapter, will determine if the content breaches Twitter’s guidelines. 
There are no limits on who can report abusive behaviour, though Twitter 
maintains that abusive content, which is not directly reported from the victim, 
may not necessarily be removed from its site:  
‘To help our teams understand the context of a conversation, we 
[Twitter] may need to hear directly from the person being targeted, to 
ensure that we have the information needed prior to taking any 
enforcement action.’69 
 
The onus is therefore placed on the victim to report comments which can be 
considered abusive, which can be extremely difficult in dogpiling situations.  
 
As detailed in chapter one dogpiling is the situation whereby a user or users 
actively encourages another to ‘attack’ others online. This can result in a 
person receiving multiple abusive messages. For instance, Jess Phillips MP, 
as will be discussed at varies points in this thesis, has spoken about 
receiving more than 600 threats of rape in one night alone via Twitter.70 
Similarly, Caroline Criado-Perez an active feminist campaigner received 50 
abusive tweets per hour following her campaign to get Jane Austin printed on 
banknotes in England and Wales.71 In these situations, it can be impossible 




70 Sally Hayden, ‘Labour's Jess Phillips received “600 rape and death threats in a single 
day”’ The Independent (London, 27 August 2017) 
<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/labour-mp-jess-phillips-rape-death-
threats-one-day-social-media-attacks-training-a7915406.html> accessed 25 October 2017 
71 The BBC, ‘Caroline Criado-Perez Twitter abuse case leads to arrest’ The BBC (London, 
29 July 2013) <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-23485610> accessed 8 February 2019 
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Twitter and Credible Threats  
Twitter prohibits ‘…specific threats of violence or [the] wish for the serious 
physical harm, death, or disease of an individual or group of people.’72 The 
abuse experienced by Jess Phillips and Caroline Criado-Perez, as discussed 
above, are clear examples of credible threats of violence. For instance, both 
women received explicit tweets threatening sexual assault and physical 
injury:  
‘… someone was talking about giving me a good smashing up the 
arse. Somebody said: “All aboard the rape train.” Some guy tweeted 
another guy asking if he wanted to join in raping me. Then there were 
the death threats. One was from a really bright guy who said: … “I'd 
do a lot worse than rape you. I've just got out of prison and would 
happily do more time to see you berried [sic]”.’73 
 
Many of these comments aimed at Jess Phillips and Caroline Criado-Perez, 
were not removed by Twitter, despite a clear breach of their terms of service 
agreement.74 
 
Credible threats of violence remain problematic for Twitter users. 
Recent research has uncovered many examples of threatening behaviour on 
Twitter. For instance, research undertaken by Amnesty International 
 
72 Twitter, ‘Violent threats and glorification of violence’ (Twitter, 2019) 
<https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies/violent-threats-glorification> accessed 3 
January 2019 
73 Caroline Criado-Perez, see, Simon Hattenstone, ‘Caroline Criado-Perez: ‘“Twitter has 
enabled people to behave in a way they wouldn't face to face”’ The Guardian (London, 4 
August 2013) <https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2013/aug/04/caroline-criado-perez-
twitter-rape-threats> accessed 8 February 2019  
74 Kevin Rawlinson, ‘Twitter faces boycott after “inaction” over rape threats against feminist 
bank notes campaigner Caroline Criado-Perez’ The Independent (London, 27 July 2013) 
<https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/twitter-faces-boycott-after-inaction-
over-rape-threats-against-feminist-bank-notes-campaigner-8734856.html> accessed 8 
February 2019. Between January and June 2018, 47,9251 accounts were actioned for 
breaching Twitter’s credible threats policy. See, Twitter n.55  
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uncovered numerous tweets threating both sexual and physical violence 
against women on the site: 75 
‘Online abuse began for me when I started the Everyday Sexism 
Project – before it had become particularly high-profile or received 
many entries. Even at that stage, it was attracting around 200 abusive 
messages a day. The messages included detailed, graphic, and 
explicit descriptions of rape and domestic violence.’76 
 
Despite this, Twitter maintains that threats are not permitted on its site: 
‘[a]buse and hateful conduct directed at women, including direct threats of 
violence, and harassment, are prohibited on Twitter.’77 However, to be in 
breach of Twitter’s guidelines the threat needs to be direct, credible and 
specific.78 So, for instance a comment stating ‘I will kill you’ may not be in 
breach of Twitter’s Rules.  
 
In recent years, Twitter has been used to directly threaten another, 
particularly women, online: 
‘As a company, Twitter is failing in its responsibility to respect 
women’s rights online by inadequately investigating and responding to 
reports of violence and abuse in a transparent manner.’79  
 
Amnesty International over a 16 month period conducted qualitative and 
quantitative research, to illustrate the continued use of sexual threats against 
women on Twitter.80 Using interviews, focus groups and questionnaires they 
 
75 Amnesty International, ‘Toxic Twitter- A Toxic Place For Women’ (Amnesty International, 
2017) <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/research/2018/03/online-violence-against-women-
chapter-1/> accessed 18 January 2019 
76 Laura Bates, ‘Laura Bates: Violence Against Women Online’ (Amnesty International, 21 
March 2018) <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/research/2018/03/laura-bates-online-
violence-against-women/> accessed 23 January 2019  
77 Amnesty International n.75 
78 Twitter n.72 
79 Amnesty International n.75 
80 Amnesty International, ‘Toxic Twitter- Methodology’ (Amnesty International, 2017) 
<https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/research/2018/03/online-violence-against-women-
methodology/> accessed 18 January 2019 
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were able to expose how women are being subjected to explicit threats of 
sexual violence in order to reduce their voices online, despite this being a 
clear breach of Twitter’s guidelines. 
 
Twitter has specific guidelines prohibiting credible threats of violence. 
However, these guidelines are not always being adequately applied to 
conduct that is in clear breach of the Twitter Rules. The lack of consistency 
in Twitter’s guidelines is further illustrated in the company’s approach to the 
removal of revenge pornography, as discussed below.   
 
Twitter and Revenge Pornography  
As outlined in chapter one and discussed further in chapter five, revenge 
pornography is becoming a significant problem within society. In recent years 
Twitter has attempted to strengthen its terms of service agreements to help 
tackle revenge porn on its site.81 Like that of Facebook, revenge 
pornography is prohibited on Twitter:  
‘You may not post or share intimate photos or videos of someone that 
were produced or distributed without their consent. Media depicting 
sexual violence and/or assault is also not permitted.’82  
 
Unlike Facebook Twitter lacks specific criterions for the removal of content 
which can be labelled as revenge porn, demonstrated in a high-profile 
example of revenge pornography in July 2017. 
 
 
81 Hern n.48  
82 Twitter, ‘About intimate media on Twitter’ (Twitter, 2019) <https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-
and-policies/intimate-media> accessed 18 January 2019  
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Rob Kardashian a reality star from the hit American TV show ‘Keeping up 
with the Kardashian’s’, took to Twitter to post explicit images of his ex-
girlfriend, Blac Chyna, after an argument.83 The tweet contained abusive 
commentary alongside images of her genitalia and a sex tape. These images 
were actively shared across the social media site by some of his 7 million 
followers, with the behaviour of Kardashian being reported worldwide. 
Despite this clear breach of Twitter’s guidelines, Kardashian was not 
suspended from the site instead, the original post was removed by Twitter.84    
 
Similarly, research undertaken by the Fawcett Society as discussed above, 
uncovered revenge porn videos which were reported to the company, but 
subsequently ignored. One of the videos found by the Fawcett Society 
contained graphic images of an apparent rape. Despite reporting this video 
to Twitter, the content remained on Twitter for a further week.85 Twitter, like 
that of many other social media sites, is struggling to keep pace with the 
extent of revenge pornography on its site, despite community guidelines in 
place prohibiting the behaviour.  
 
Summary  
Like that of Facebook, Twitter accepts that it has made mistakes in its 
application of its Twitter Rules to content that is posted on its site.86 It has at 
 
83 Alex Heath, ‘Twitter outlines how it will be tougher on banning revenge porn’ Business 
Insider UK (London, 27 October 2017) <https://www.businessinsider.com/twitter-tougher-
revenge-porn-backlash-2017-10?r=UK> accessed 18 January 2018 
84 Note, Kardashian also uploaded the same pictures to Instagram, another social media site 
run by Facebook, who suspended the account. Ibid., 
85 The Fawcett Society n.60 
86 Heath n.83 
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times allowed extremely abusive and illegal behaviour to remain publicly 
viewable, and there is a clear lack of consistency in the application of its 
terms of service agreement against user-generated content. The following 
discussion will outline how both Facebook and Twitter are attempting to 
tackle the growing issue of online abuse on their sites.  
 
Tackling Unlawful Behaviour  
Despite terms of service agreements between users and social media 
companies, it is clear from the discussion above that issues continue to arise 
with bullying, threats, hate speech and revenge pornography. Both Facebook 
and Twitter are continuing to tackle these issues through a variety of different 
mechanisms. The following sections will outline some of the mechanisms 
used by Facebook and Twitter in order to tackle the growing problem of 
inappropriate behaviour on their sites. This will include examining the use of 
moderators on Facebook and Twitter, the implementation of Artificial 
Intelligence (AI) Technology, Facebook’s bullying prevention hub, and 
Twitter’s use of content blockers, before turning to look at how both 
companies aid law enforcement.  
 
Moderation  
A common mechanism used by both Facebook and Twitter in reducing 
inappropriate content on their sites is the use of moderators. Here, 
individuals are employed to review content, which in many cases has been 
flagged by other online users, to determine if the content should remain on 
the site. To do this, moderators apply the complained about behaviour to the 
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terms of service agreements to establish if the user has breached the 
company’s guidelines. As discussed in the previous chapter, for Williams to 
reduce criminality suitable guardians need to be in place.87 Yet, a whistle-
blower at Facebook has claimed that the high number of posts means that in 
many cases moderators have less than ten seconds to make a decision, 
meaning mistakes are often made,88 with offensive behaviour on the 
increase. 
 
In the past, Facebook has been reluctant to disclose information regarding its 
moderation team.89 Despite this, before the US Congress Mark Zuckerberg 
spoke in detail about self-regulation and the use of moderators to determine 
what content should, or should not, remain on the site. For Zuckerberg, 
currently the only way to tackle hate speech on its site is through the use of 
moderators, and therefore Facebook has invested more money into 
expanding its moderation team.90 By the end of 2018 he anticipated that the 
company would have around 20,000 moderators, working across 7 states, 
twenty-four hours a day to review content flagged by users.  
 
Facebook moderators have several options available when reviewing posts, 
which are determined based on the company’s community guidelines. For 
instance, if the moderator concludes that the flagged content does not 
breach Facebook’s community standards, then the post will be allowed to 
 
87 Katherine S. Williams, Textbook on Criminology (7th edn, Oxford University Press 2012) 
312 
88 Hopkins n.41  
89 Home Affairs Committee, n.58, Q571 
90 Guardian News n.10 
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remain on the site even if it is objectionable to some. For example, as 
discussed previously the comment, ‘to snap a bitch’s neck, make sure you 
apply all the pressure to the middle of the throat’, was allowed to remain on 
Facebook, as it was concluded that the comment did not breach the 
company’s community standards.91 Whereas comments which are found to 
be in breach of Facebook’s terms of service agreement, can be removed or 
the person who posted the content can be suspended from the site.92  
 
Likewise, Twitter employs moderators to review content which has been 
reported by its users. Yet it is currently unknown how many moderators are 
employed by Twitter though it is thought to be in the thousands.93 Like that of 
Facebook, Twitter moderators review any content that is flagged by users as 
breaching the terms of the site, though the outcomes do differ between the 
two companies. Whereas in most cases Facebook will either allow a post to 
remain on its site, remove the post or suspend the user, Twitter moderators 
are given more options. Here, if the flagged content is considered as 
breaching the Twitter Rules, moderators can choose to make a person’s 
Twitter page ‘read-only’. Read-only accounts allow the Twitter users profile to 
remain viewable to the public, but no content can be posted on the site until 
the user has removed the prohibited tweet.94 An overriding reason why 
 
91 Nick Hopkins, ‘Facebook moderators: a quick guide to their job and its challenges’ The 
Guardian (London, 21 May 2017) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/news/2017/may/21/facebook-moderators-quick-guide-job-
challenges> accessed 21 January 2019  
92 Ibid., 
93 Home Affairs Committee n.58, Q571 
94 Twitter, ‘Our range of enforcement options’ (Twitter, 2019) 
<https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies/enforcement-options> accessed 21 January 
2019  
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Twitter allows this option to be available is to ensure freedom of speech is 
not curtailed.95 
 
However as discussed above, Twitter has been criticised for being slow in 
the removal of content which is in clear breach of their guidelines.96 As will 
be outlined in chapter eight, in 2016 the European Commission introduced a 
Code of Conduct aimed at social media companies to create guidelines in 
tackling inappropriate content.97 Twitter has agreed with the European 
Commission to remove unlawful content from its site within 24 hours.98 Yet 
examples will be given throughout this thesis of Twitter failing to remove 
unlawful tweets within the 24 hour time limit set out by the European 
Commission.99  
 
Despite the need for moderators on sites like Facebook and Twitter, the 
number of comments generated on the sites means that moderators are 
often overwhelmed by content which needs to be reviewed.100 In addition, 
there continues to be issues with language and the time taken to remove 
content which violates social media terms of services.101 Consequently, both 
 
95 Twitter n.65 
96 For example, The Fawcett Society n.60 
97 Commission, ‘Tackling Illegal Content Online: Towards an enhanced responsibility of 
online platforms’ COM (2017) 55 final 2. Note, this is not legally binding on social media 
sites. 
98 Ibid.,  
99 For example, see, Gordon Rayner & Kate McCann, ‘Twitter is “failing women” by taking 
too long to remove misogynistic abuse, Yvette Cooper says’ The Telegraph (London, 22 
August 2017) <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/08/21/twitter-failing-women-taking-
long-remove-misogynistic-abuse/> accessed 9 February 2019 
100 Hopkins n.91 
101 Guardian News n.10 
Page 129 of 449 
 
Facebook and Twitter are investing in AI technology to help tackle the 
growing issue of unlawful behaviour online. 
 
AI Technology  
AI technology:  
‘… is an area of computer science that emphasizes [sic] the creation 
of intelligent machines that work and react like humans. Some of the 
activities computers with artificial intelligence are designed for include: 
[s]peech recognition, [l]earning, [p]lanning and [p]roblem solving.’102   
 
AI technology has been implemented into the computer systems of both 
Facebook and Twitter, to review content before it becomes publicly 
viewable.103 In fact, over 99% of terrorist propaganda removed by Facebook 
is flagged by AI technology:104  
‘… one of our [Facebook] greatest opportunities to keep people safe is 
building artificial intelligence to understand more quickly and 
accurately what is happening across our community.’105    
  
During Facebook’s hearings before both Congress and the European 
Parliament, Mark Zuckerberg emphasised the need to invest in AI technology 
to help moderate online content, allowing Facebook to become more 
proactive rather than reactive to unlawful content on its site.106 This is 
particularly true regarding revenge pornography, where Facebook has 
created AI technology to recognise sexually explicit pictures. Nonetheless, 
for AI technology to be successful in reducing revenge pornography, 
 
102 Techopedia, ‘Artificial Intelligence (AI)’ (Techopedia, 2019) 
<https://www.techopedia.com/definition/190/artificial-intelligence-ai> accessed 21 January 
2019  
103 Home Affairs Committee n.58, Q679 
104 Guardian News n.10 
105 Mark Zuckerberg n.20 
106 PBS NewsHour n.11 
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Facebook has indicated the need for users to allow the company access to 
their sexually explicit images:  
‘It’s demeaning and devastating when someone’s intimate images are 
shared without their permission, and we [Facebook] want to do 
everything we can to help victims of this abuse. We’re [Facebook] now 
partnering with safety organizations [sic] on a way for people to 
securely submit photos they fear will be shared without their consent 
…’.107 
 
In England and Wales this would mean users would be able to contact the 
Revenge Porn Helpline to obtain a link to upload their intimate images. 
These pictures would then be ‘scrambled’ by technology at Facebook and 
remain on its servers. If someone later attempted to upload the image to 
Facebook, the AI technology will flag the image and the image would not be 
posted.108  
 
Similarly, Twitter has also empathised the importance of AI technology to 
ensure its terms of service agreement is not being breached.109 Yet Twitter 
has been reluctant to share publicly the advancements of its technology to 
help combat online abuse.110 Despite the advancements in AI technology in 
recent years, there currently remains problems with the use of AI technology 
in tackling hate speech and abusive commentary on social media sites.111  
 
As illustrated above and throughout this thesis, there remains a prominent 
issue of hate speech and abusive commentary on Facebook and Twitter. AI 
 
107 The BBC, ‘Facebook wants your naked photos to stop revenge porn’ The BBC (London, 
23 May 2018) <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/newsbeat-44223809> accessed 23 January 
2019 
108 Ibid., 
109 Home Affairs Committee n.58, Q679 
110 Ibid.,  
111 Ibid., 
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technology is currently unsuccessful when it comes to hate speech and 
online abuse. As explored in detail in chapter one, Facebook in 2018 made 
available to the public for the first time, a transparency report exposing the 
scale of abuse on its site. In one six-month period 4.1 million posts were 
removed from Facebook for breaching its hate speech community 
standards.112 The report also contained information regarding how Facebook 
was made aware of the posts. In the majority of situations, the unlawful 
content came to the attention of Facebook moderators by other Facebook 
users, as opposed to AI Technology with Alex Schultz, the company's head 
of data analytics, commenting:  
‘… there's context that technology just can't do yet … So, in those 
cases [hate speech and abusive commentary] we [Facebook] lean a 
lot still on our review team, who makes a final decision on what needs 
to come down.’113  
 
This was reflected further by Mark Zuckerberg, who suggested that it would 
be another 5 to 10 years before AI technology would be fully successful in 
the removal of hate speech and abusive commentary from its site.114 In the 
meantime, other forms of governance need to be strengthened, such as 
Facebook’s bullying prevention hub.     
  
Bullying Prevention Hub: Facebook  
In an attempt to support victims of cyberbullying, in 2013 Facebook launched 
its bullying prevention hub,115 being one of the first social media companies 
 
112 Dave Lee, ‘Facebook details scale of abuse on its site’ The BBC (London, 15 May 2018) 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-44122967> accessed 29 May 2018 
113 Ibid., 
114 PBS NewsHour n.11 
115 Facebook, ‘Bullying Prevention Hub’ (Facebook, 2019) 
<https://www.facebook.com/safety/bullying> accessed 3 January 2019  
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to ‘… integrate bullying prevention tools directly into a product.’116 The aim of 
the bullying prevention hub is to arm:  
‘…  bullying victims with information on what they can do when they 
see harassing content, recommendations to adults who want to help, 
and even guidance to the person accused of bullying on what he or 
she has done and how he or she can do better.’117 
 
The bullying prevention hub which is available through Facebook’s 
community standards is aimed at minors, parents and educators. The hub 
contains step-by-step instructions to support victims of cyberbullying.118 
 
Individuals can download help sheets which have been created with the aid 
of Yale Centre for Emotional Intelligence. These help sheets include 
proactive advice to those who have become subjected to cyberbullying. So, 
for instance the victim is advised to tell an adult they trust, whilst also 
detailing tools located on Facebook to aid the person being bullied. For 
example, how to unfriend119 or block120  the perpetrator of the abuse.121   
 
Though the bullying prevention hub is not directly tackling cyberbullying, it 
does give victims proactive options to help them in a time of emotional 
distress. Emphasis is placed on educating Facebook users, which in turn 
 
116 Facebook, ‘Facebook Safety’ (Facebook, 6 November 2013) 
<https://www.facebook.com/fbsafety/posts/today-we-are-launching-the-new-bullying-
prevention-hub-offering-important-tools-/600514153319760/> accessed 9 February 2019 
117 Ibid., 
118 Facebook n.115 
119 Unfriending a person means that they cannot see private content on a person’s 
Facebook page. However, all content that is public is still viewable, along with the person 
who has been unfriended being able to contact the user. See, Facebook, ‘Bullying 
Prevention Hub: Teens’ (Facebook, 2019) 
<https://www.facebook.com/safety/bullying/teens> accessed 3 January 2019 
120 Blocking a person means that they are unable to see any aspect of the blockers 
Facebook page. Ibid., 
121 Ibid., 
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empowers the person being targeted ‘[r]ather than simply focus on 
awareness of this information, we’re [Facebook] putting it at people’s 
fingertips at the moment they need it most [sic].’ Yet cyberbullying continues 
to be an issue for Facebook. As discussed in chapter one Ditch the Label 
conducts an annual bullying survey in the United Kingdom. In their 2018 
findings, 66%122 of participants experienced some form of cyberbullying, of 
which 37% had experienced cyberbullying on Facebook.123 Despite the clear 
need for the bullying prevention hub on Facebook, it is not directly tackling 
the growing issue of cyberbullying.  
 
Content Blocking: Twitter  
Whereas Facebook is educating its users, Twitter is using the advancement 
of technology to reduce what its users see on their profiles. In 2017 Twitter 
updated its platform to allow users to have more control with regard to 
content on its site:  
‘You might see content in [t]weets you’d like to avoid. We [Twitter] 
give you the option to mute [t]weets that contain particular words, 
phrases, usernames, emojis, or hashtags.’124  
 
With the aid of technology, an online user can now block certain content from 
their Twitter feed. For example, in the past a victim of dogpiling would have 
had to either tolerate the abuse they were receiving, whilst waiting for Twitter 
to decide on any comments which had been reported, or closedown their 
 
122 Over 9000 individuals took part in the survey.  
123 Ditch the Label, ‘The Annual Bullying Survey 2017’ (Ditch the Label, 2017) 26 
<https://www.ditchthelabel.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/The-Annual-Bullying-Survey-
2017-1.pdf> accessed 9 February 2018 
124 Twitter, ‘How to use advanced muting options’ (Twitter, 2019) 
<https://help.twitter.com/en/using-twitter/advanced-twitter-mute-options> accessed 3 
January 2019  
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Twitter account. Now, if there is a particular word or hashtag associated with 
the abuse, the user can mute that specific word or hashtag to reduce their 
likelihood of seeing the abuse.125 For instance, Caroline Criado-Perez,126  as 
mentioned above, could have muted words, such as ‘fuck’, ‘rape’ and ‘witch’ 
to reduce the likelihood of seeing the abusive messages. Nevertheless, this 
technological advancement by Twitter does not directly stop abuse from 
occurring, it simply hides it from the person being abused. 
 
The content muting option contained on Twitter can be considered as a step 
forward in helping those who are targeted on its site. However, like that of 
Facebook’s bullying prevention hub, it allows for abusive commentary to 
remain on its site, so long as it does not breach the Twitter Rules. It also 
places an onus on victims to highlight key phrases associated with their 
abuse, a factor which may be considered as distressing for some. As 
detailed in chapter seven online abuse can have a significant effect on a 
person’s physiological integrity, which in some cases has resulted in suicide. 
The process of highlighting key phrases associated with a person’s abuse 
would add further pressure on a person who may already be significantly 
fragile due to the abuse they are receiving. 
 
Law Enforcement     
Both Twitter and Facebook maintain within their terms of service agreements 
that they will work with law enforcement when there are serious breaches of 
 
125 Ibid., 
126 For an in-depth discussion of the abuse experienced by Caroline Criado-Perez, see 
chapter four.  
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the law.127 Though, both companies maintain that certain criterions need to 
be established first before they will provide law enforcement with private 
individual data. 
 
For Twitter, information will only be shared with law enforcement where there 
is a valid legal process governed by applicable law.128 Here, the legal 
request would have to be submitted to the appropriate Twitter 
Headquarters.129 So, for example requests by the police in England and 
Wales have to be made to Twitter’s office based in Dublin, in which the 
request needs to be specific: ‘Twitter may file or serve objections for 
requests that are legally defective, overly broad, and/or appear to 
impermissibly burden free expression.’130 Between January and June 2018, 
Twitter narrowed or refused to give the information requested by law 
enforcements, across 53 countries worldwide, in 46% of cases.131 During this 
period law enforcement in the United Kingdom submitted 947 account 
information requests, with 30% of these requests being unsuccessful.132  
 
 
127 Facebook, ‘Information for law enforcement authorities’ (Facebook, 2019) 
<https://www.facebook.com/safety/groups/law/guidelines/> accessed 3 January 2019. 
Twitter, ‘Guidelines for law enforcement’ (Twitter, 2019) <https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-
and-policies/twitter-law-enforcement-support> accessed 3 January 2019 
128 Twitter, ‘Guidelines for law enforcement’ (Twitter, 2019) <https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-
and-policies/twitter-law-enforcement-support> accessed 3 January 2019. Note, there are 
different rules for emergency requests.  
129 Ibid., 
130 Twitter, ‘Legal request FAQs’ (Twitter, 2019) <https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-
policies/twitter-legal-faqs> accessed 3 January 2019  
131 Twitter, ‘Transparency Report: Information Requests’ (Twitter, 2018) 
<https://transparency.twitter.com/en/information-requests.html> accessed 24 January 2019. 
This figure does not include emergency requests.  
132 Ibid., 
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Similarly, Facebook maintains that it will disclose information to law 
enforcement both inside and outside the United States where the request is 
in accordance with their terms of service agreement, and applicable legal 
provisions.133 Like that of Twitter, Facebook has produced a transparency 
report exposing the number of law enforcement requests they have received 
in recent years. Between January and June 2018 Facebook received 
103,815 requests from government organisations requesting user 
information, across 102 countries worldwide.134 In total Facebook did not 
disclose any information in 26% of cases.135 The United Kingdom during the 
same period made 6,538 requests for user information, in which Facebook 
complied with the request in 91% of cases.136   
 
In a time where nearly half of all crimes reported to the police in England and 
Wales, involves some form of social media, social media companies need to 
work alongside law enforcement.137 The discussion above has exposed the 
continuing issues with content posted on social media sites, from hate 
speech to revenge pornography. Though Twitter and Facebook maintain in 
their terms of service agreements that they will work alongside governments 
and the police when it comes to unlawful conduct, they have been slow in 
aiding law enforcement. The slow approach of social media sites in helping 
 
133 Facebook n.127  
134 Facebook, ‘Government Requests for User Data’ (Facebook, 2018) 
<https://transparency.facebook.com/government-data-requests/jan-jun-2018> accessed 24 
January 2019 
135 Ibid., note, figure includes emergency requests.  
136 Ibid., 
137 Kate McCann, ‘Social media giants should be forced to pay for policing social media, 
report backed by Amber Rudd claims’ The Telegraph (London, 1 May 2017) 
<https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/04/30/social-media-giants-should-forced-pay-
policing-social-media/> accessed 24 January 2019 
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the police was highlighted in September 2018 following the murder of a 
schoolgirl in the United Kingdom.138    
 
Lucy McHugh was raped and murdered in July 2018. Following her death, 
Stephen-Alan Nicholson was arrested and subsequently found guilty of her 
murder. During the early stages of his arrest Southampton Police, 
approached Facebook to gain access to Nicholson’s social media page, 
where the company initially failed to provide vital information about Nicholson 
to the police.139 Detectives involved in the case accused Facebook of taking 
an ‘inordinate amount of time’ before allowing them access to his account, 
putting emotional distress upon Ms McHugh’s family.140 Consequently, 
despite specific guidelines being in place, Facebook and Twitter are failing to 
adequately help law enforcement.  
 
Chapter Overview  
The discussion above illustrates just some of the ways in which Facebook 
and Twitter are attempting to limit inappropriate behaviour on their sites. 
None of the approaches are perfect, with mistakes being made. One of the 
major issues surrounds the inconsistency of terms of service agreements 
and its application to ‘real-life’ scenarios. Facebook has shutdown activism, 
 
138 Alex Hern, ‘Why won’t Facebook give access to Lucy McHugh murder suspect’s 
account?’ The Guardian (London, 5 September 2018) <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-
news/2018/sep/05/why-wont-facebook-provide-access-lucy-mchugh-suspect-account> 
accessed 24 January 2019. See also, Fiona Hamilton, ‘Police wait 18 months for evidence 
from social media firms’ The Times (London, 14 September 2018) 
<https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/police-wait-18-months-for-evidence-from-social-media-
firms-6djhnwcj0> accessed 24 January 2019 
139 The BBC, ‘Lucy McHugh death: “Challenge” over accessing Facebook information’ The 
BBC (London, 4 September 2018) <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-hampshire-
45408338> accessed 9 February 2019 
140 Ibid., 
Page 138 of 449 
 
whilst hate speech has been allowed to remain on its site. In addition, Twitter 
has allowed threats to remain on its server, despite numerous requests for its 
removal. Clearly more needs to be done by social media companies to help 
tackle abusive behaviour online, highlighted further in chapter nine. The 
following chapter will discuss how the law is currently being applied in a 
social media setting, through the lens of legality.  
 
Chapter Three: Recommendations  
• Create a universal code of conduct aimed at all social media 
companies to ensure they are protecting individuals from online 
abuse. This universal code of conduct will be created in a clear and 
precise manner;  
• Ensure social media companies are transparent with their users;  
• Updated and regular training for moderators;  
• Any legal provisions that are created ensures that the advancement of 
new technology or new social media companies are not restricted;  
• Ensure social media companies aid law enforcement; and  
• Where social media companies fail to comply with the universal code 
of conduct create a punishment process in the form of a fine, 
governed by the e-Safety Commissioner. 
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Chapter Four 
Social Media, Criminal Law Regulation and Non-
Technology-Based Legislation 
 Introduction   
‘Governments in the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States 
and other countries of the world struggle to draft legislation in order to 
deal with this growing threat to the new electronic global community 
commonly called the Internet.’1  
 
In England and Wales there is no specific Act of Parliament that governs 
conduct carried out online, especially in relation to social media. Instead, the 
criminal law has been shaped and adapted to cover an online context. The 
current criminal law framework in England and Wales used to prosecute 
social media abuse can be split into two categories: technology-based, and 
non-technology-based legislation. Essentially, there are some Acts that have 
been created by Parliament to legislate against technology-based offences, 
though these were not necessarily created with social media in mind.2 These 
legal provisions will be discussed in detail in chapters five and six.  
 
In the following discussion non-technology-based legislation which has been 
used to criminalise social media conduct will be critically evaluated, this will 
include: the Serious Crime Act 2007, the Public Order Act 1986 and the 
Protection from Harassment Act 1997. Each law will be taken in turn, 
explained and critically examined in relation to it’s use in a social media 
context. 
 
1 Ahmad Nehaluddin, ‘Hackers’ criminal behaviour and laws related to hacking’ (2009) 15(7) 
Computer and Telecommunications Law Review 159, 160  
2 For instance, the Malicious Communications Act was enacted in 1988 with the first social 
media site ‘Six Degrees’ not being publicly available until 1997. See, Laura Scaife, 
Handbook of Social Media and the Law (Routledge 2015) 4 
Page 140 of 449 
 
Serious Crime Act 2007 
The Serious Crime Act 2007 made a number of radical changes to the 
criminal law during its implementation.3 The Act originally made no mention 
of technology, the Internet or social media until it was updated in 2015.4 
Despite this, it was used to prosecute several individuals for social media 
related offences following the 2011 riots in the UK.5 Its use to prosecute 
these cases invoked criticism from MPs and the media, with arguments 
suggesting that the defendant’s sentences were ‘too severe’.6 In this 
discussion part two sections 44 to 46 of the Serious Crime Act will be 
critically examined, looking in detail at both the actus reus and mens rea of 
the offences criminalised under these sections. Before this, the background 
surrounding the enactment of the Serious Crime Act will be outlined, 
demonstrating how its use in a social media context falls outside the mischief 
of the Act. It will be put forward in the following discussion that the use of the 
Serious Crime Act to govern social media is uncertain, breaching the 
fundamental principles of legality.    
 
After several consultation papers conducted on behalf of the Government the 
Serious Crime Act 2007 received Royal Assent on 30 October 2007, aiming:  
‘… to make provision[s] about serious crime prevention orders; to 
create offences in respect of the encouragement or assistance of 
crime; to enable information to be shared or processed to prevent 
 
3 For the purpose of this discussion only Part Two of the Serious Crime Act 2007 will be 
considered, as this is the only part of the Act which is relevant in a social media context.  
4 The Serious Crime Act 2007 Schedule One was implemented into the Act by The Serious 
Crime Act 2015 section 47(4) 
5 R v Blackshaw [2011] EWCA Crim 2312, [2012] 1 W.L.R. 1126 
6 Andy McSmith, ‘Tough riot sentences prompt new guidelines for the courts’ The 
Independent (London, 17 August 2011) 
<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/tough-riot-sentences-prompt-new-guidelines-
for-the-courts-2339699.html> accessed 20 January 2018  
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fraud or for purposes relating to proceeds of crime ...’.7 
 
The purpose of the Act was to tackle the ever-growing issue of organised 
crime within society, which was estimated to be worth £20 billion per year.8 
 
Organised crime is ‘… serious crime planned, coordinated and conducted by 
people working together on a continuing basis. Their motivation is often, but 
not always, financial gain.’9 In 2013 a consultation paper examining serious 
and organised crime suggested that this behaviour was a threat to national 
security, and the law needed to be updated to reflect the ‘seriousness’ of the 
offence.10 In 2015 the Serious Crime Act was amended by the Serious Crime 
Act 2015 to reflect the growing need to protect the state from terrorism.11   
 
In the 2007 Act a list of offences can be found which are defined as ‘serious 
crime’, with many of these being added into the Act following the 2013 
consultation.12 These offences include drug trafficking, slavery, people 
trafficking, firearm offences, prostitution and child sex, armed robbery, 
money laundering, fraud, offences in relation to public revenue, bribery, 
counterfeiting, computer misuse, intellectual property, the environment and 
organised crime and inchoate offences.13 Though the Serious Crime Act 
 
7 Serious Crime Act 2007  
8 Home Office, One Step Ahead: A 21st Century Strategy to Defeat Organised Crime (CM 
6167, 2004) 8 
9 National Crime Agency, ‘Organised Crime Groups’ (NCA, 2017) 
<http://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/crime-threats/organised-crime-groups> accessed 2 
January 2018  
10 HM Government, Serious and Organised Crime Strategy (CM 8715, 2013) [1.3]   
11 Ibid.,   
12 The Serious Crime Act 2015. See also, David S Wall & Yulia Chistyakova, ‘How organised 
crime in the UK has evolved beyond the mafia model’ The Conversation (London, 18 May 
2015) <https://theconversation.com/how-organised-crime-in-the-uk-has-evolved-beyond-the-
mafia-model-40782> accessed 2 January 2018  
13 Serious Crime Act 2007 Schedule One  
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arguably now covers technology-based crime, this is from an organised 
criminal perspective, commonly referred to as cybercrime:  
‘Cyber-enabled crime allows crime on a significant scale: a single 
“phishing” email (an email where the sender purports to be a 
trustworthy entity to secure financial or other details) can be used to 
target very large numbers of people ...’.14  
 
Thus, from an examination of the Serious Crime Act the Act is still not 
intended to cover social media abuse between two or more private 
individuals.  
 
The emphasis under the Serious Crime Act is placed on targeting those who 
pose the most substantial threats to the public. The ‘seriousness’ element 
was highlighted throughout the consultation period prior to the Act receiving 
Royal Assent:  
‘The Law Commission’s proposals form an excellent starting point for 
looking at the best way to achieve this [deal with organised crime 
efficiently], and offences suggested above build on this in relation to 
organised crime. They will target those on the periphery of organised 
crime who are difficult to prosecute under the existing legal 
framework.’15 
 
Several key provisions are found under the Act, many of these aimed at 
tackling the mischief behind the Serious Crime Act, combatting organised 
crime. For instance, the Act created Serious Crime Prevention Orders. These 
orders are like Anti-social behaviour orders commonly referred to as ASBOs 
but have more extensive powers. For instance, it can be used to restrict 
where a person lives, limit the places where a person can travel and can 
even dictate terms of employment. A breach of an order of this type can 
 
14 HM Government n.10, [2.37]  
15 Home Office, New Powers Against Organised and Financial Crime (CM 6875, July 2006) 
[2.4] 
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result in a maximum 5 year custodial sentence.16 A further provision relates 
to data sharing between government organisations to tackle fraud.17 For 
example the Act now allows for police forces to liaise with other 
organisations to help build evidence in fraud-related cases.  
 
One of the biggest changes implemented under part 2 of the Serious Crime 
Act relates to inchoate offences. The purpose of part two of the Serious 
Crime Act is to ‘… allow people who assist another to commit an offence to 
be prosecuted regardless of whether the underlying substantive offence is 
actually committed or attempted.’18 Essentially, the Serious Crime Act has 
codified the common law offence of incitement after concerns were raised 
that there was a gap in the law:  
‘… [T]he common law does not recognise inchoate liability for 
assisting the commission of an offence if the offence is not 
subsequently committed or is committed without reference to [the 
defendants] assistance.’19 
 
Under the original common law governing the encouragement of a crime, for 
an action to be brought before the courts it must have been found that the 
person who was encouraged to commit the criminal offence did carry out the 
act. The Serious Crime Act removes this condition, and therefore under this 
Act an individual can be liable for incitement where a further criminal offence 
has not taken place.  
 
 
16 Serious Crime Act 2007 Part 1 section 1  
17 Serious Crime Act 2007 Part 3 
18 The Crown Prosecution Service, ‘Inchoate offences’ (CPS.gov, 2017) 
<http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/h_to_k/inchoate_offences/> accessed 3 November 2017  
19 Law Commission, Inchoate liability for assisting and encouraging crime (Law Com No 
6878, 2006) [3.3] 
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Like that of the other provisions of the Act, the original purpose of this part of 
the Serious Crime Act was to target highly organised criminals:  
‘Under the common law, the police cannot proceed against D 
[defendant] until another person has committed or attempted to 
commit the principal offence. The lack of a general inchoate liability for 
assisting crime sits uneasily with the developments in intelligence-led 
policing which is now an important weapon in the state’s response to 
serious organised crime.’20  
 
Despite the need for the Serious Crime Act to remove the gaps in the 
common law, part two of the Act is considered to be ‘… fundamentally 
flawed’.21 The Serious Crime Act is thought to have been drafted in an 
unnecessarily complex manner, an argument which reoccurs throughout the 
academic literature.22 Originally, prosecutors were reluctant to charge 
individuals for offences contrary to the Serious Crime Act:  
‘I understood from informal discussions with some prosecutors that 
they thought that the offences would typically be avoided when 
determining appropriate charges, because they were considered to be 
too difficult to understand and to prosecute.’23 
 
The reluctance of prosecutors to use the Serious Crime Act during its first 
few years, as Virgo exposed in his research, clearly indicates the lack of 
understanding in the criminal justice system as to when this Act should be 
utilised. Therefore, the Serious Crime Act breaches some of the key 
components of legality in the criminal law.     
 
The principle of legality as explained in the chapter two upholds the idea that 
the law should be accessible. Accessibility simply means that the law needs 
 
20  Ibid., [4.4] 
21 Graham Virgo, ‘Part 2 of the Serious Crime Act 2007 - enough is enough’ (2013) 3 
Archbold Review 7 
22 Ibid.,   
23 Ibid., 8 
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to be clear, an element that is lacking in the Serious Crime Act. In Kafkaris v 
Cyprus24 the European Court of Human Rights stated that the law should be 
clear so that citizens can interpret legal rules, with the help of the courts if 
needed. The reluctance of law enforcers to use the Serious Crime Act, 
simply because they did not fully understand the law, meant that the law 
could never be fully interpreted. Yet the Serious Crime Act was used to 
prosecute several defendants in 2011, arising from their actions of 
encouraging other individuals to partake in criminal behaviour after riots 
broke out across the United Kingdom.   
 
Following the shooting of Mark Duggan by armed police in London a 
demonstration was held outside Tottenham police station, which soon turned 
violent. Riots started to escalate all over the country with the use of violence, 
arson and theft taking place.25 The disorder across the country lasted for five 
days and resulted in deaths, injuries and millions of pounds worth of property 
damage.26 The level of destruction and outrage these actions caused 
brought many cases before the courts, with an emphasis being placed on 
stronger sentences to deter future offenders.27 In several cases part two of 
the Serious Crime Act was used to prosecute defendants for their actions of 
 
24 Kafkaris v Cyprus App no 21906/04 (ECtHR, 12 February 2008) 
25 Vikram Dodd & Caroline Davies, ‘London riots escalate as police battle for control’ The 
Guardian (London, 9 August 2011) <https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2011/aug/08/london-
riots-escalate-police-battle> accessed 3 November 2011  
26 Alexis Akwagyiram, ‘England riots: One year on’ The BBC (London, 6 August 2012) 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-19077349> accessed 3 November 2017  
27 Martin Beckford, ‘London riots: Almost 1,000 jailed as judges give tougher sentences’ The 
Telegraph (London, 22 February 2012) 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/crime/9101436/London-riots-Almost-1000-jailed-
as-judges-give-tougher-sentences.html> accessed 21 January 2018  
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using the social media site, Facebook, to encourage others to participate in 
disorderly behaviour.     
 
In R v Jordan Blackshaw28 the defendant created a Facebook event page: 
‘Smash down in Northwich Town.’29 The page was created on 8 August 
2011, when riots were in full force across the country and being broadcasted 
worldwide. The event aimed to encourage individuals to start a riot in 
Northwich and included specific details as to when and where the riots would 
take place. As the page was made publicly available members of the local 
community quickly reported their concerns to the police, which resulted in 
Blackshaw later being arrested. As a result, the riot he attempted to organise 
never took place. He was charged and pleaded guilty to encouraging riots, 
burglary and criminal damage contrary to section 46 of the Serious Crime 
Act. He received a custodial sentence of four years which was later 
unsuccessfully appealed by his legal team.  
 
In a similar case Sutcliffe-Keenan,30 who under the influence of alcohol, used 
Facebook to create a public group page called ‘The Warrington Riots’. The 
page included a photo of a police officer dressed in riot equipment in a 
‘standoff position’ surrounded by a group of rioters and detailed a place to 
assemble in the Warrington area for the rioters to meet. Like that of 
 
28 R v Jordan Blackshaw Chester Crown Court 16 August 2011 (unreported) 
29 A Facebook event page is a resource used to notify other users of upcoming occasions. 
The page can be created privately, whereby the creator only invites specific users to the 
event or it can be open to the public for anyone to see. Facebook Events, ‘Bring people 
together with Facebook Events’ (Facebook, 2016) 
<https://events.fb.com/#events_landing_hero> accessed 3 November 2017  
30 R v Perry Sutcliffe-Keenan Chester Crown Court 16 August 2011 (unreported) 
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Blackshaw, the page was viewable to the public and was consequently 
reported to local police, resulting in the riot never taking place. Sutcliffe-
Keenan was charged under section 44 of the Serious Crime Act, convicted 
and sentenced to four years imprisonment. His legal team also, 
unsuccessfully, appealed his sentence.       
 
On 18 October 2011 the Court of Appeal heard 10 appeals related to the 
harsh sentences surrounding the United Kingdom riots, including the matters 
of Blackshaw and Sutcliffe-Keenan.31 Though both cases were appealed on 
a number of grounds, one parallel reasoning concerned the disproportionate 
weight given by the judges in relation to deterrence. Deterrence is a 
punishment: 
‘… imposed to make an example of conduct that has occurred or is 
alleged to have occurred. A system of general deterrence works on 
the assumption that there would be more stealing, more murder (to 
name only two offences) if warning examples of stealing or murder 
were not made by the imposition of punishment.’32   
 
Under section 142(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 it states that:  
‘[a]ny court dealing with an offender in respect of his offence must 
have regard to the following purposes of sentencing- (a) the 
punishment of offenders, (b) the reduction of crime (including its 
reduction by deterrence), (c) the reform and rehabilitation of offenders, 
(d) the protection of the public, and (e) the making of reparation by 
offenders to persons affected by their offences.’  
 
In Blackshaw and Sutcliffe-Keenan the Crown Court gave significant weight 
to the concept of deterrence, particularly following the public outcry for 
justice, and consequently the defendants were given increased sentences.33  
 
31 Blackshaw n.5 
32 Jim Morris, ‘The structure of criminal law and deterrence’ (1986) Aug Criminal Law Review 
524, 525 
33 Carly Lightowlers & Hannah Quirk, ‘The 2011 English “Riots”: Prosecutorial Zeal and 
Judicial Abandon’ (2015) 55(1) British Journal of Criminology 65 
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However, as discussed in chapter two, deterrence on its own can be 
considered as a flawed concept as it advocates the notion that criminal 
behaviour is thought out before taking place.     
 
Despite the arguments that disproportionate sentences34 were handed out 
following the disorder in August 2011, the Court of Appeal supported the use 
of the Serious Crime Act in Blackshaw and Sutcliffe-Keenan:     
‘We are unimpressed with the suggestion that in each case the 
appellant did no more than make the appropriate entry in his 
Facebook. Neither went from door to door looking for friends or like 
minded people to join up with him in the riot. All that is true. But 
modern technology has done away with the need for such direct 
personal communication. It can all be done through Facebook or other 
social media. In other words, the abuse of modern technology for 
criminal purposes extends to and includes incitement of very many 
people by a single step.’35 
 
The Court of Appeal upheld the judgments of the Crown Court, despite the 
purpose of the Serious Crime Act being to target serious and organised 
crime. As previously specified the National Crime Agency and the 
Government define serious and organised crime as ‘planned’ and 
‘coordinated’, two aspects missing from Blackshaw and Sutcliffe-Keenan. 
The aim of the Serious Crime Act was to target organised crime in England 
and Wales, with emphasis placed on the most serious of offences such as 
human trafficking and terrorism. However, part two of this Act was used to 
prosecute two defendants for committing social media related offences, 
which can be regarded as non-organised crime, and therefore goes against 
the purpose for which the Serious Crime Act was created.   
 
34 Frank Lowe (ed), ‘The August 2011 Riots- Them and Us’ in Thinking Space: Promoting 
about Race, Culture, and Diversity in Psychotherapy and Beyond (Karnac Books 2014) 226-
227 
35 Blackshaw n.5, per Lord Judge CJ [73] 
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The use of this non-technology-based law to prosecute social media 
offences can be considered as an abuse of the law. Put simply, the actions 
undertaken by Blackshaw and Sutcliffe-Keenan was the creation of a 
Facebook event. The riots never took place, they did not physically contact 
others to become involved in the incident, and both defendants were under 
the influence of alcohol at the time the Facebook pages were created. This is 
supported further by Mitchell. Mitchell argues that the use of the Serious 
Crime Act and the case of Blackshaw leaves open the possibility of ‘over-
punishing’ another,36 a clear breach of the principle of legality. A precedent 
has now been set regarding those who encourage another to commit an 
offence via social media. In addition, in some cases individuals who were 
directly implicated in the riots had a lesser sentence imposed upon them,37 
creating inconsistencies in the legal system.  
 
Under part two of the Serious Crime Act three unique situations of 
encouraging another to commit a criminal offence are prohibited. Both 
sections 44 and 45 have the same actus reus: ‘A person commits an offence 
if he does an act capable of encouraging or assisting the commission of an 
offence.’ In essence, the criminal conduct occurs when the defendant 
actively encourages another to partake in one singular criminal offence. For 
example, the use of social media to encourage a person to cause criminal 
 
36 Barry Mitchell, ‘Sentencing riot-related offending: considering Blackshaw and others’ 
(2011) 10 Archbold Review 4, 7  
37 Owen Bowcott, Haroon Siddique & Andrew Sparrow, ‘Facebook cases trigger criticism of 
“disproportionate” riot sentences’ The Guardian (London, 17 August 2011) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2011/aug/17/facebook-cases-criticism-riot-sentences> 
accessed 26 October 2016 
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damage to another’s property would satisfy the actus reus under these two 
sections. Whereas the mens rea for both sections differ.  
 
To bring an action under section 44 it must be found that the defendant 
intended to encourage a person to commit a criminal offence. As previously 
stated, there is no need for a further criminal act to occur as illustrated in 
Sutcliffe-Keenan. Whereas under section 45 the mens rea is one of belief. 
The Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) guidelines on inchoate offences state 
that the test for belief is similar to how the courts define belief in cases 
concerning stolen goods.38 In R v Edward Leonard Hall belief is defined as:  
‘… something short of knowledge. It may be said to be the state of 
mind of a person who says to himself: “I cannot say I know for certain 
that these goods are stolen, but there can be no other reasonable 
conclusion in the light of all the circumstances, in the light of all that I 
have heard and seen.”’39 
 
So, in relation to section 45, if it can be said that the defendant had a 
‘reasonable conclusion in light of the circumstances’ that his actions may 
result in the encouragement of another to commit a criminal offence, he or 
she can be charged under section 45 of the Serious Crime Act.   
 
It is not always clear when the Serious Crime Act will be used, or another Act 
of Parliament to criminalise actions conducted on social media sites. In 2017 
Rhodri Phillips posted the following tweet: ‘£5,000 for the first person to 
“accidentally” run over this [Gina Miller] bloody troublesome first-generation 
immigrant.’ Phillips posted the tweet following Gina Miller’s legal case 
 
38 The Crown Prosecution Service n.18 
39 R v Edward Leonard Hall (1985) 81 Cr. App. R. 260 per Boreham J 264 
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against the Government regarding how Article 50 should be triggered, in 
order to start the proceedings of the United Kingdom leaving the European 
Union.40 Following the decision of the High Court ruling in favour of Ms Miller, 
she was subjected to racist and sexist abuse online, including the comments 
above directed at Ms Miller from Phillips.41  
 
The conduct of Phillips fulfils the actus reus of either section 44 or 45 of the 
Serious Crime Act: ‘A person commits an offence if he does an act capable 
of encouraging or assisting the commission of an offence.’ Though it may be 
difficult to prove intention under section 44 of the Act, it could have been 
possible to argue the mens rea of belief under section 45 of the Serious 
Crime Act. Yet Phillips was given a 12 week custodial sentence for sending a 
menacing communication contrary to section 127(1) of the Communications 
Act 2003, exposing inconsistencies within the law. Here, the law is not clear 
and therefore not accessible, providing further evidence that the Serious 
Crime Act does not comply with the principle of legality from a social media 
perspective.   
 
Whereas sections 44 and 45 of the Serious Crime Act governs the 
encouragement of one singular criminal act, section 46 states: ‘A person 
commits an offence if he does an act capable of encouraging or assisting the 
 
40 R v Rhodri Phillips Westminster Magistrates’ Court 13 July 2017 (unreported). See also, 
Julia Gregory, ‘Aristocrat faces jail after being menacing and racist about Gina Miller’ The 
Guardian (London, 11 July 2017) <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/jul/11/man-
jail-offering-moneyrun-over-gina-miller-rhodri-philipps-viscount-brexit> accessed 20 July 
2017. 
41 Lisa O’Carroll, ‘Gina Miller: “I’ve been told that as a colored women, I’m not even human”’ 
The Guardian (London, 25 January 2017) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/jan/25/parliament-alone-issovereign-gina-miller-
speaks-out-after-article-50-victory> accessed 6 June 2017 
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commission of one or more of a number of offences.’ This section governs 
the conduct of an individual encouraging another to commit more than one 
criminal offence. So, for instance in the case of Blackshaw it was found that 
he encouraged social media users to partake in riots, burglary and criminal 
damage. Like that of section 45, the mens rea is one of belief. The judgment 
of Blackshaw, though not sufficiently clear, indicated that to bring action 
under section 46 the prosecution did not have to prove the belief that each 
offence would take place, it was enough to prove a belief that at least one of 
the criminal acts may be committed. Whereas the Court of Appeal took a 
different approach in R v Sadique and Hussain (No2).42   
 
Sadique was convicted of assisting in the supply of Class A and Class B 
drugs contrary to section 46 of the Serious Crime Act. He had sold several 
chemicals to another who utilised them to ‘cut’ these illegal substances. 
Though the selling of these chemicals was lawful, it was proven by the 
prosecution that Sadique reasonably understood that the chemicals would be 
used for illegal purposes. The question before the court concerned whether 
under section 46 Sadique needed to believe that all the offences would take 
place, or if it was satisfactory to prove belief in just one of the criminal acts. 
The court held, unlike the judges in Blackshaw, that all the offences needed 
to be established to bring action under section 46.  
 
It is hard to clearly understand the difference between section 45 and 46 by 
applying the judgment of the court in Sadique. Here, under section 46 the 
 
42 R v Sadique and Hussain (No2) [2013] EWCA Crim 1150, [2013] 2 Cr. App. R. 31 
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prosecution would have to prove each offence separately, essentially fulfilling 
the actus reus and mens rea of section 45. As Child’s argues section 46 has 
now been made redundant by the Court of Appeal.43 This leaves issues with 
prosecuting social media related offences under the Serious Crime Act due 
to the lack of clarity as to when section 46 of the Act will apply over that of 
section 45, as both the legislation and the subsequent case law is unclear.   
 
From an International Criminal Law perspective on legality, the law needs to 
be explicit, clear and beyond doubt.44 The Serious Crime Act lacks the 
criteria of being explicit and clear. The judgments of Blackshaw and Sadique 
do very little to bring clarity to this Act of Parliament. Even from a more liberal 
approach as undertaken by the European Court of Human Rights,45 the 
Serious Crime Act breaches the principles of accessibility and foreseeability 
in its use in prosecuting social media related offences.      
 
In addition, the Serious Crime Act was intended to help tackle serious and 
organised crime. Yet its use in Blackshaw to prosecute two individuals for 
social media offences, which falls outside the Acts definition of serious crime, 
is a fundamental breach of the law. The conduct of the defendants was 
reckless, even stupid, but their encouragement of others to join in the riots 
 
43 John J Child, ‘Exploring the mens rea requirements of the Serious Crime Act 2007 
assisting and encouraging offences’ (2012) 76(3) Journal of Criminal Law 220, 222 
44 Čelebići Camp, Prosecutor v Delalić (Zejnil) and others, Appeal Judgment, Case No IT-
96-21-A, ICL 96 (ICTY 2001), 20th February 2001, United Nations Security Council [UNSC]; 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia [ICTY]; Appeals Chamber 
45 Darryl Robinson, The Principle of Legality in International Criminal Law (Legal Studies 
Research Papers Series 10-08, 2010) 5 
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never resulted in a further criminal offence taking place and both defendants 
were remorseful.  
 
Whereas in the matter of Phillips, he was convicted under a lesser offence 
despite his actions being similar to Blackshaw and Sutcliffe-Keenan. Phillips 
actively encouraged others to commit a criminal offence, in this case the 
killing of Ms Miller in exchange for £5,000. Though his actions may not have 
fulfilled the mens rea of intent, it could be argued that the elements of belief 
were present in his conduct. Despite this, he was convicted under the 
Communications Act, which carries a significantly lower sentencing tariff in 
comparison with the Serious Crime Act.46  
 
The use of the Serious Crime Act to prosecute social media offences is 
supported by the CPS in their guidelines on prosecuting communications 
sent via social media: ‘Those who encourage others to commit a 
communications offence may be charged with encouraging an offence under 
the Serious Crime Act 2007.’47 Here, the CPS supports the idea that if an 
individual encourages another, via the use of social media to commit a crime, 
they ‘may be charged’ contrary to the Serious Crime Act. The guidelines go 
further to indicate several online behaviours which may constitute an offence 
under the Act. For instance, they suggest that the conduct of ‘virtual 
 
46 The maximum sentence under section 127 of the Communications Act 2003 is a 6 month 
custodial sentence. Whereas under the Serious Crime Act 2007 sections 44 to 46, the 
defendant is sentenced in line with the offence they had attempted to commit.  
47 The Crown Prosecution Service, ‘Guidelines on prosecuting cases involving 
communications sent via social media’ (CPS.gov, 2016) <https://www.cps.gov.uk/legal-
guidance/guidelines-prosecuting-cases-involving-communications-sent-social-media> 
accessed 10 January 2018 
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mobbing’, also commonly referred to as ‘dogpiling’, can be considered an 
offence under the Serious Crime Act, in certain circumstances. Virtual 
mobbing ‘… occurs when a number of individuals use social media or 
messaging to make comments about another individual ...’.48  
If someone uses social media to encourage others to partake in this form of 
abuse, i.e. the virtual mobbing of another, this may well fall within the actus 
reus of section 44, 45 or 46 of the Serious Crime Act.   
 
The CPS guidelines and the use of the Serious Crime Act in the context of 
social media can be considered as vague. The guidelines support the 
concept that the Act should be utilised when online communications are used 
to encourage others to commit a criminal offence but seems to go no further 
than this. There is a small list of online behaviours which may fall under the 
Serious Crime Act included in the guidelines, for instance virtual mobbing, 
the encouragement of derogatory hashtags and doxing (publishing a 
person’s personal details), though little information is given as to how these 
apply in relation to the Serious Crime Act, except that encouragement is 
needed. This could be because there are currently no relevant case law 
examples to include in the guidelines.  
 
Furthermore, how the Serious Crime Act is constructed has caused issues in 
itself:  
‘Having three new offences where only one would do creates 
complications not just in theory but in practice too, because it enables 
defendants to argue that they have been charged with the wrong one 
 
48 The Crown Prosecution Service, ‘Cybercrime - Legal Guidance’ (CPS.gov, 2018) 
<https://www.cps.gov.uk/legal-guidance/cybercrime-legal-guidance> accessed 10 January 
2018  
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[incorrect offence] ...’.49  
 
From the examination of case law examples and academic commentary, 
there is a lack of clarity when it comes to the use of the Serious Crime Act, 
particularly in a social media context. Though the courts have several 
fundamental roles, one important characteristic of the courts is to decide on 
legal disagreements, and in some instances creating the foundations for 
which future cases can be built. Nonetheless, matters prosecuted under the 
Serious Crime Act fail to give clear guidance for future disputes, especially 
where social media is concerned. This is a fundamental breach of the 
principle of legality. The Serious Crime Act is not accessible or foreseeable, 
and therefore constitutes a violation of this key legal notion.  
 
Public Order Act 1986 
Like that of the Serious Crime Act, the Public Order Act 1986 has been used 
to prosecute social media offences. The discussion below will outline the 
historical background of the Public Order Acts implementation into the legal 
system in England and Wales, before exploring in detail the actus reus and 
mens rea of part three, section 19 of the Act. By critically examining the use 
of the Public Order Act to prosecute social media related offences, issues will 
be exposed with the clarity of the Act and its use to govern technology-based 
criminal conduct.  
    
 
49 John Spencer & Graham Virgo, ‘Encouraging and assisting crime: legislate in haste, 
repent at leisure’ (2008) 9 Archbold News 7 
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During the early 1980s a rise in workplace demonstrations occurred across 
the United Kingdom, such as the Miners’ Strike in 1984 which lasted for over 
a year.50 In addition several riots, resulting in injuries, criminal damage and 
deaths occurred across England and Wales. On 28 September 1985 
violence and disorder erupted in South London Brixton, following the 
accidental shooting of a woman by armed police, causing her serious 
injury.51 The riots resulted in 13,758 burglaries and 53 individuals being hurt, 
one sustaining critical injuries.52 A week later a further riot broke out in 
Tottenham following the death of a woman who suffered heart failure when 
police forced their way into her home. The disorder in Tottenham resulted in 
a police officer being stabbed to death.53 Following the outbreak of these and 
other riots, the Conservative Government decided adequate legislation was 
needed to protect public safety and maintain public order,54 reflecting 
elements of deterrence theory. 
 
Public disorder is considered offences which disrupt a community and should 
be criminalised to keep the peace. It covers a range of scenarios including, 
though not limited to, football violence, riots and protests. Prior to the Public 
 
50 Christine Jeavans, ‘The miners’ darkest year’ The BBC (London, 4 March 2004) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/3494024.stm> accessed 2 January 2018 
51 The BBC, ‘On this day: 1985: Riots in Brixton after police shooting’ The BBC (London, 
2017) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/september/28/newsid_2540000/2540397.s
tm> accessed 2 January 2018  
52 Gareth Parry, Susan Tirbutt & David Rose, ‘From the archive: Riots in Brixton after police 
shooting’ The Guardian (London, 30 September 1985) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/theguardian/2009/sep/30/brixton-riots-1985-archive> 
accessed 2 January 2018 
53 The BBC, ‘What caused the 1985 Tottenham Broadwater Farm riot?’ The BBC (London, 3 
March 2014) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-london-26362633> accessed 2 
January 2018 
54 Jim Driscoll, ‘Protest and Public Order: The Public Order Act 1986’ (1987) Sep Journal of 
Social Welfare Law 280 
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Order Act receiving Royal Assent, public order offences were controlled 
under several Acts of Parliament, including the Public Order Act 1936. The 
1936 Act was enacted by Parliament to control political marches during the 
1930s. Under the 1936 Act, the police had limited powers to contain political 
marches.55 For instance, under section 3 of the Public Order Act 1936 the 
police could only impose conditions on marches when public disorder was at 
risk. Following the enactment of the 1936 Act, the police had to rely on other 
Acts to maintain order including, the Criminal Justice Act 1982 and the 
Sporting Events (Control of Alcohol ect) Act 1985. However, neither of these 
Acts gave the police significant power to control public disorder, resulting in a 
new Act being created: the Public Order Act 1986. 
 
The purpose of the 1986 Act was:  
‘… to abolish the common law offences of riot, rout, unlawful 
assembly and affray and certain statutory offences relating to public 
order; to create new offences relating to public order; to control public 
processions and assemblies; to control the stirring up of racial hatred 
…’.56  
 
The Act was seen to have two objectives. First to ‘… provide a 
comprehensive code as to the organisation and control of processions and 
demonstrations’.57 Second, to create a code relating to disorderly conduct, 
essentially codifying parts of the common law. The Act also introduced new 
offences such as controlling racial hatred. It was ‘aimed at protecting those in 
… communities who [were] most vulnerable to loutish and abusive 
 
55 Andrew Beale, Essential Constitutional Law (2nd edn, Cavendish Publishing Limited 1997) 
83   
56 Public Order Act 1986 
57 Hilaire Barnett, Constitutional & Administrative Law (12th edn, Routledge 2017) 524 
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behaviour- particularly the elderly.’58 Yet twenty-six years later part three of 
the Public Order Act was utilised to control racial hatred aided by social 
media.  
 
Part three of the Public Order Act criminalises the behaviour of ‘racial 
hatred.’ Racial hatred is considered ‘… hatred against a group of persons … 
defined by reference to colour, race, nationality (including citizenship) or 
ethnic or national origins.’59 A literal approach should not be used when it 
comes to ‘race’, words such as ‘African, foreigners and immigrants’ can fall 
within the definition of race.60 In R v Martin Hartshorn61 it was held that the 
use of the word ‘Paki’ amounted to racial hatred and constituted a breach of 
part three, section 19 of the Public Order Act. 
 
Section 19(1) makes it a criminal offence to publish:  
‘… written material which is threatening, abusive or insulting … 
[which she/he] intends thereby to stir up racial hatred, or having 
regard to all circumstances racial hatred is likely to be stirred up ...’.    
 
The actus reus is in the publication of the written material which is either 
threatening, abusive or insulting. These words will take their ‘ordinary English 
meaning.’62 Whereas the mens rea is one of intention or recklessness. It is 
 
58 HC Deb 13 January 1986, vol 89, cols 792-869, 793  
59 Public Order Act 1986 Part 3 section 17  
60 The Crown Prosecution Service, ‘Violent Extremism and Related Criminal Offences’ 
(CPS.gov, 2017) 
<https://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/prosecution/cases_of_inciting_racial_and_religious_ha
tred_and_hatred_based_upon_sexual_orientation.html> accessed 22 October 2017  
61 R v Martin Hartshorn Grimsby Crown Court 4 November 2011 (unreported). See also, 
Dave Higgens, ‘Man jailed for riot race-hate posts’ The Independent (London, 4 November 
2011) <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/man-jailed-for-riot-race-hate-posts-
6257282.html> accessed 22 October 2017  
62 The Crown Prosecution Service, ‘Racist and Religious Hate Crime - Prosecution 
Guidance’ (CPS.gov, 2017) 
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important to note that under section 19(2) of the Public Order Act a defence 
is available:   
‘… it is a defence for an accused who is not shown to have intended 
to stir up racial hatred to prove that he was not aware of the content of 
the material and did not suspect, and had no reason to suspect, that it 
was threatening, abusive or insulting.’ 
 
Therefore, if the defendant can prove that he lacked the intent to cause racial 
hatred, he or she will not have committed an offence under section 19 of the 
Public Order Act.  
 
Consequently, section 19 of the Public Order Act requires several factors to 
be established. First, the conduct in question needs to be ‘threatening, 
abusive or insulting.’ As previously stated, these words take their ‘ordinary 
English meaning’ and are a question based on fact. In addition, the conduct 
does not have to fall under all three categories, one is sufficient. Next, racial 
hatred needs to be established using the definition found under part three, 
section 17 of the Act. Here, ‘race’ and ‘hatred’ are segregated.63 Last, the 
conduct needs to stir up racial hatred or considered likely to stir up this type 
of behaviour. The term likely is defined as ‘… more than merely possible or 
likely.’64 If these factors can be established and the defence under section 




<http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/p_to_r/racist_and_religious_crime/#a07> accessed 22 October 
2017 
63 The Crown Prosecution Service n.60 
64 Ibid.,  
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During parliamentary discussions before the enactment of the Public Order 
Act the inclusion of racial hatred was praised:   
‘I welcome especially the clause dealing with incitement to racial 
hatred. I strongly believe that people of every race and colour deserve 
the protection of the law against racial abuse and the kind of hate 
campaigns that some hon Members, especially those from inner 
London, know what can occur. It is right to give reasonable protection 
to all sections of the community.’65 
 
In the 1970s and early 1980s racial hatred was very much apparent in 
society.66 Several demonstrations were held by National Front, a far-right 
political party, who opposed non-British nationals. These demonstrations and 
marches would often occur through ethnic minority areas and in some cases 
turned violent.67 In 1977 disorder erupted in Lewisham South London, 
following National Front marching through the town in response to ethnic 
minorities living in the area. Overall 111 people were injured during the 
incident and 241 individuals were arrested.68 The growing racial tension and 
the need to criminalise this behaviour was the rationale behind its inclusion in 
the Public Order Act:  
‘There is a problem of racism in Britain - a desperately serious one - 
and it is one to which we must address ourselves. At times of 
economic distress there is a search for scapegoats, and scapegoats 
are often minority ethnic groups.’69  
 
 
65 HC Deb 13 January 1986 n.58 
66 Nathan Hall, Hate Crime (2nd edn, Routledge 2013) 33 
67 Ben Bowling & Coretta Phillips, ‘Racist Victimisation in England and Wales’ in Darnell F. 
Hawkins (ed), Violent Crime: Assessing Race and Ethnic Differences (Cambridge University 
Press 2003) 165  
68 Mark Townsend, ‘How the battle of Lewisham helped to halt the rise of Britain’s far right’ 
The Guardian (London, 13 August 2017) <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-
news/2017/aug/13/battle-of-lewisham-national-front-1977-far-right-london-police> accessed 
10 January 2018  
69 HC Deb 13 January 1986 n.58, 857 
Page 162 of 449 
 
The Public Order Act was considered an opportunity to strengthen the law. 
The purpose, like that of the overall aim of the Act, was to help restore public 
order, yet it has since been used to govern social media related offences.70  
 
In 2012 Liam Stacey was convicted and sentenced to fifty-six days in jail for 
sending racist and obscene tweets, following the collapse of Bolton 
Wanderers star Fabrice Muamba during a football match.71 On 17 March 
2012 Muamba went into cardiac arrest whilst playing in a football match 
against Tottenham Hotspurs, which was being broadcasted live on television. 
For six minutes medical staff helped to resuscitate him on the pitch.72  
 
Following the incident, Stacey, who was a student at Swansea University, 
took to his personal Twitter page to make several racist comments about 
Muamba including: ‘LOL [Laughing out Loud]. Fuck Muamba he’s dead 
[sic]!!! #Haha’ and ‘Go suck a nigger [sic] dick you fucking aids-ridden cunt.’ 
Stacey made numerous tweets of this nature not only aimed at Muamba but 
also other individuals who attempted to defend the footballer.73 His behaviour 
resulted in several complaints being made to the police. Stacey was later 
arrested and convicted under the Public Order Act.     
 
 
70 For instance, R v Sheppard and Whittle [2010] EWCA Crim 65 
71 R V Liam Stacey Swansea Crown Court On Appeal From The Magistrates’ Court 
A20120033. Note, Stacey was prosecuted under section 31(1)(b) of the Public Order Act. 
72 BBC Sport, ‘Bolton's Fabrice Muamba collapses during Spurs-Bolton match’ The BBC 
(London, 17 March 2012) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/sport/football/17417973> accessed 10 
January 2018    
73 Steven Morris, ‘Student jailed for racist Fabrice Muamba tweets’ The Guardian (London, 
27 March 2012) <https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2012/mar/27/student-jailed-fabrice-
muamba-tweets> accessed 10 January 2018  
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The use of the Public Order Act to prosecute social media related offences 
has created a divide amongst academic researchers. Dorfman rejects the 
idea that this law should be used when it comes to social media, especially 
when there is no element of violence present:  
‘… [U]sing the Public Order Act for a few nasty Twitter comments 
which never advocated violence or hatred against specific people is a 
downright abuse of the law; at no time was “public order” ever 
threatened in any reasonable conception of the term.’74 
 
Dorfman argues that the conduct of Stacey lacks the relevant criteria needed 
to prosecute an individual under the Public Order Act, despite Stacey’s 
successful conviction. Though the behaviour of the defendant was abusive 
and had a racial element, his actions did not stir up racial hatred nor could it 
be said that it was likely to cause racial hatred.  
 
Stacey’s behaviour was abusive but at no point can it be said that there was 
a threat to public order. In Dehal v Crown Prosecution Service Moses J 
stated when referring to section 4A of the Public Order Act, that:  
‘… the criminal law should not be invoked unless and until it is 
established that the conduct which is the subject of the charge 
amounts to such a threat to public order as to require the invocation of 
the criminal as opposed to the civil law.’75 
 
This is supported further in the CPS guidelines on social media related 
offences: 
‘… [P]articular care should be taken in dealing with social media 
cases in this way because public order legislation is primarily 
concerned with words spoken or actions carried out in the presence or 
hearing of the person being targeted (i.e. where there is physical 
 
74 Rosalee Dorfman, ‘Can you say “social media prosecutions” with a straight face? The 
Crown Prosecution Service can’ (2013) The Leeds Journal of Law and Criminology 
<http://criminology.leeds.ac.uk/2013/09/05/social-media-prosecutions/> accessed 20 
October 2016  
75 Dehal v Crown Prosecution Service [2005] EWHC 2154 per Moses J [5]  
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proximity between the speaker and the listener) …’.76 
 
The CPS upholds the idea that the Public Order Act should only be used in 
limited circumstances, but it is not clear from the guidelines what constitutes 
these conditions. The guidelines mention the difference between ‘irritating, 
contentious, unwelcome and provocative’ conduct and behaviour that 
provokes violence, though no clarity is given beyond this.  
 
It could be said that the law has adapted to the changing nature of society, 
by allowing the Public Order Act to criminalise conduct carried out online. 
The adaptation of the law to fit the changing circumstances of a given society 
conforms to the principle of legality as affirmed in SW and CR v United 
Kingdom,77 so long as the change is foreseeable. The actus reus of the 
Public Order Act states that the conduct must incite public disorder as public 
order is considered a ‘fundamental social good.’78 Whereas public disorder 
affects the social wellbeing of a society, this was reflected in the tough 
stance taken by Parliament during the implementation of the Public Order 
Act:  
‘The 1986 Act like its predecessor is very much a pragmatic reaction 
to recent events. It was passed against the background of inner-city 
disturbances, soccer hooliganism, racist marches and racist attacks 
on members of the ethnic minorities, mass industrial picketing and the 
resurgence of major public demonstrations. The Act is not founded on 
well articulated premises addressing the scope and ambit of the 
criminal law in the area of public order.’79    
 
 
76 The Crown Prosecution Service n.47 
77 SW v United Kingdom, CR v United Kingdom App no 20166/92 (ECtHR, 22 November 
1995) 
78 HC Deb 13 January 1986 n.58, 792 
79 Driscoll n.54 
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The purpose of the Public Order Act was to regulate public disorder in 
particular, riots, football hooliganism and protests which were very much 
apparent during the early 1980s, an element missing in the matter of Stacey. 
Yet the Act has been used to cover social media related offences, despite 
the Public Order Act being enacted 20 years before Twitter was made 
available to the public. For Haralambous and Geach this is a clear breach of 
the rule of law, and consequently undermines the principle of legality in the 
criminal law.80  
 
As explained previously the rule of law consists of several key principles: no 
individual, regardless of status is above the law, the Government must act 
lawfully, and the law should be applied equally to all those living in a 
society.81 Though there are many theories and approaches to the rule of law, 
those that take a substantive approach82 argue that the law should be explicit 
and therefore certain: ‘… [T]he law must be accessible and so far as possible 
intelligible, clear and predictable …’,83 arguably two areas missing regarding 
the use of the Public Order Act in a social media context.  
 
The purpose of the Public Order Act was to maintain public order during a 
time when demonstrations were on the rise. Despite the purpose of the Act, 
the Public Order Act has since been used to prosecute conduct carried out 
 
80 Nicola Haralambous & Neal Geach, ‘Online Harassment and Public Dis-order’ (2010) 174 
Criminal Law and Justice Weekly 409, 411  
81 Mark Elliot & Robert Thomas, Public Law (3rd edn, Oxford University Press 2017) 65 
82 There are two opposing theoretical positions when it comes to the rule of law: procedural 
and substantive. Those that take a procedural approach argue that so long as the law has 
been enacted in the correct manner, the law should stand. Whereas substantive theorists 
argue that the substance of the law needs to be taken into account. See, Paul Craig, ‘Formal 
and substantive conceptions of the rule of law: an analytical’ (1997) Public Law 467 
83 Lord Bingham, ‘The rule of law’ (2007) 66(1) Cambridge Law Review 67, 69-70 
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on social media, however its use is unclear. For instance, the Public Order 
Act was applied in Stacey but not in the matter of R v Alison Chabloz.84  
 
Chabloz uploaded several YouTube video’s online mocking Holocaust 
victims and survivors, including Anne Frank. In these videos she also made 
‘expressions of anti-Semitic hatred’.85 It was put before the court that her 
actions were ‘… designed to provoke maximum upset and discomfort ...’.86 
Despite this, she was convicted for sending grossly offensive material via a 
communications network contrary to section 127(1) of the Communications 
Act 2003, even though her actions, by applying the case of Stacey, indicate a 
breach of the Public Order Act.  
 
Stacey and Chabloz can both be considered abusive in their content and 
demonstrates racial hatred. Stacey used the phrase, ‘go suck a nigger [sic] 
dick you fucking aids-ridden cunt.’ Chabloz used several anti-Semitic terms, 
including comparing Auschwitz concentration camp to ‘… a theme park just 
for fools.’ The main issue falls on whether the behaviour of both defendants 
was likely to stir up racial hatred. In Stacey the CPS concluded that this was 
the case, though this is not fully accepted in the academic literature.87 
Whereas in Chabloz it is unclear if this was considered by the CPS as 
charges were brought under a different Act of Parliament. If the rationale of 
 
84 R v Alison Chabloz Westminster Magistrates' Court 11 January 2018 (unreported). For 
more information on this case, see chapter six.  
85 ITV News, ‘Blogger “mocked Anne Frank and Holocaust survivors” court told’ ITV News 
(London, 11 January 2018) <http://www.itv.com/news/2018-01-11/blogger-mocked-anne-
frank-and-holocaust-survivors-court-told/> accessed 11 January 2018  
86 Ibid.,   
87 Dorfman n.74 
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Stacey is applied, it is hard to distinguish why Chabloz was not prosecuted 
for a breach of section 19 of the Public Order Act. This is even more 
apparent as during the hearing held at Westminsters’ Magistrates Court, one 
of Chabloz’s videos was played, which was met with a round-of-applause by 
supporters in the public gallery.88 Arguably, the Public Order Act fails to 
uphold the key principles of legality, as it is uncertain when this Act will be 
used in a social media context, as there is a lack of consistency as to when 
the CPS will press charges under the Public Order Act for social media 
related offences.  
 
There is also the potential that a further section of the Public Order Act can 
be used in relation to online abuse, which is currently not being fully utilised. 
Section 4A89 of the Public Order Act makes it an offence to cause a person 
harassment, alarm or distress with intent by using: 
‘… threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour, or disorderly 
behaviour, or displays any writing, sign or other visible representation 
which is threatening, abusive or insulting.’90 
 
Like that of section 19 covering racial hatred, this section was included in the 
Public Order Act to help combat the issue of race-related crime. Section 4A 
could be applied to criminalise the conduct of online harassment, commonly 
referred to as cyber harassment:  
‘Online harassment refers to the sending of repeated threatening or 
harassing electronic communications via email, websites, or other 
digital media that cause another person to be harmed or deeply 
 
88 ITV News n.85 
89 Section 4A was implemented into the Public Order Act 1986 by the Criminal Justice and 
Public Order Act 1994 section 154 
90 Public Order Act 4A(1) 




Though cyber harassment can fall under the Protection from Harassment Act 
1997, as discussed in the following section, the Public Order Act provides 
key advantages over that of the Protection from Harassment Act.  
 
Under the Public Order Act ‘harassment’, ‘alarm’ and ‘distress’ are deemed 
to have separate and distinct meanings:   
‘Harassment, alarm and distress do not have the same meaning. One 
can be harassed, even seriously harassed, without experiencing 
emotional disturbance or upset at all. However, although the 
harassment does not have to be grave, it should not be trivial. The 
court has to find that the words or behaviour were likely to cause 
some real, as opposed to trivial, harassment.’92 
 
Subsequently, it is sufficient if only harassment can be proven in a case, 
there is no need for alarm or distress to be present, elements needed for a 
successful conviction under the Protection from Harassment Act.93 
Furthermore, under the Public Order Act, harassment is not specifically 
defined and therefore a course of conduct does not need to be present. An 
aspect which is needed when bringing an action under the Protection from 
Harassment Act as discussed in the following section.  
 
Social media has created new and unique ways in which an individual can 
harass and torment another, for instance ‘online mobbing’.94 As previously 
stated online mobbing is where someone is attacked or abused online 
 
91 Robert Moore, Cybercrime: Investigating High-Technology Computer Crime (2nd edn, 
Routledge 2011) 129  
92 Southard v Director of Public Prosecutions [2006] EWHC 3349 (Admin), [2007] A.C.D. 53 
per Latham L.J. and Fulford J [10] 
93 Discussed in detail in later parts of this chapter.  
94 Danielle Keats Citron, ‘Cyber Civil Rights’ (2008) 89 Boston Law Review 61  
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continuously by a group of individuals.95 Jess Phillips a Labour MP for 
Birmingham Yardley, has publicly spoken about receiving more than 600 
rape and death threats in one night alone via Twitter.96 Many of these 
comments came from different individuals rather than the same person. 
Though this conduct would fall under the definition of online mobbing, by 
applying the definition of harassment under the Protection from Harassment 
Act, this type of behaviour may not be successfully criminalised under the 
Act. However, it could fall under the Public Order Act. Subsequently, the 
Public Order Act is not being used to its full advantage.    
 
Despite this, the social media guidelines implemented by the CPS, support 
the idea of the Public Order Act being used to prosecute certain specific 
online behaviours, which have emerged since the revolution of the Internet. 
For instance, the creation of false or offensive social media profiles. In S v 
Crown Prosecution Service97 an individual uploaded an image online of a 
security guard, who worked at an animal testing facility. The image had been 
altered to encompass a speech bubble with false information contained 
within it.98 The defendant was successfully convicted under section 4A of the 
 
95 Debarati Halder & Karuppannan Jaishankar, ‘Cyber Socializing and Victimization of 
Women’ (2009) TEMIDA 5, 12 <http://www.doiserbia.nb.rs/img/doi/1450-6637/2009/1450-
66370903005H.pdf> accessed 25 October 2017  
96 Sally Hayden, ‘Labour's Jess Phillips received “600 rape and death threats in a single 
day”’ The Independent (London, 27 August 2017) 
<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/labour-mp-jess-phillips-rape-death-
threats-one-day-social-media-attacks-training-a7915406.html> accessed 25 October 2017  
97 S v Crown Prosecution Service [2008] EWHC 438  
98 For instance, one comment stated that the security guard had been convicted for a violent 
crime in the past.  
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Public Order Act for causing another person harassment, alarm or distress 
by displaying writing which was abusive and insulting.99 
 
Though section 4A of the Public Order Act could be used more effectively to 
tackle online abuse, the main issue regards the Acts lack of clarity. Like that 
of the Serious Crime Act, the use of the Public Order Act in a social media 
context can be seen as a serious breach of the rule of law, and therefore 
does not conform to the principle of legality. The purpose of the Act was to 
maintain public disorder, not to prosecute social media related offences.  
 
The discussion above illustrates the difficulties in establishing when the 
Public Order Act will be used to prosecute a social media offence or when 
another Act of Parliament will take precedence, for instance the 
Communications Act. This brings issues with understanding when the Public 
Order Act will be used in a social media context, especially where online 
abuse is concerned. This leaves two possibilities: victims of online abuse 
being let down by the system, as law enforcers fail to apply the appropriate 
legislation, or abusers being prosecuted and convicted under the wrong Act 
of Parliament.  
 
 
99 David Barrett, ‘Faking social media accounts could lead to criminal charges’ The 
Telegraph (London, 3 March 2016) 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/crime/12180782/Faking-social-media-accounts-
could-lead-to-criminal-charges.html> accessed 11 January 2018  
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Protection from Harassment Act 1997100  
The purpose of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 is to ‘protect the 
victims of harassment … [including from] … so-called stalking behaviour, 
racial harassment, or anti-social behaviour by neighbours.’101 A report 
undertaken by the Criminal Justice Inspectorates and HM Crown Prosecution 
Service Inspectorate in 2017, exposed a lack of understanding across the 
criminal justice system when it came to the use of the Protection from 
Harassment Act. 102 The following discussion will start by defining the 
difference between harassment and stalking, before critically evaluating each 
behaviour separately. Here, the actus reus and mens rea of the offence will 
be explained, before examining its use in a social media context.   
 
It has been widely accepted that the Protection from Harassment Act covers 
the conduct of harassment and stalking online.103 Harassment is considered: 
‘… repeated attempts to impose unwanted communications and 
contact upon a victim in a manner that could be expected to cause 
distress or fear in any reasonable person.’104 
 
 
100 Part of this section has been published in the Journal of Criminal Law. See, Laura Bliss, 
‘The Protection from Harassment Act 1997: Failures by the Criminal Justice System in a 
Social Media Age’ (2019) 83(3) Journal of Criminal Law 217 
101 HL Deb 24 January 1997, vol 1, col 917  
102 Criminal Justice Inspectorates & HM Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate, ‘Living in 
fear – the police and CPS response to harassment and stalking’ (justiceinspectorates.gov, 
July 2017) 15 <http://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmicfrs/wp-content/uploads/living-in-
fear-the-police-and-cps-response-to-harassment-and-stalking.pdf> accessed 29 November 
2017  
103 When the Act was originally enacted in 1997 harassment and stalking were considered 
as one offence. However, in 2012 under the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 section 
111(1), stalking was included in the Protection from Harassment Act as a separate offence.   
104 The Crown Prosecution Service, ‘Stalking and Harassment’ (CPS.gov, 2017) 
<http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/s_to_u/stalking_and_harassment/> accessed 10 November 
2017  
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Whereas stalking is ‘a constellation of behaviours in which one individual 
inflicts on another repeated unwanted intrusions and communications.’105 
Under section 2A(3) of the Protection from Harassment Act examples of 
conduct that would amount to stalking have been listed. For instance: 
‘… following a person … monitoring the use by a person of the 
Internet, email or any other form of electronic communication … [and] 
watching or spying on a person’.  
 
Prior to the 1997 Act coming into force the conduct of both stalking and 
harassment were governed under several Acts of Parliament in England and 
Wales, including the Malicious Communications Act 1988, the 
Telecommunications Act 1984, the Public Order Act 1986 and the Offences 
Against the Person Act 1861,106 demonstrated in Regina Respondent v 
Ireland Appellant.107 The defendant made several malicious phone calls to 
the complainant over a period of three months. This case came before the 
courts prior to the enactment of the Protection from Harassment Act. As a 
result, the court extended the definition of assault and actual bodily harm 
under the Offences Against the Person Act. Here, the House of Lords came 
to the opinion that the conduct of silence could amount to an assault and 
psychiatric injury contrary to section 20 of the Offences Against the Person 
Act.  
 
Despite the successful conviction in Ireland, during a Home Office 
consultation committee examining stalking, it was concluded that the criminal 
 
105 Michele Pathé & Paul Mullen, ‘The impact of stalkers on their victims’ (1997) 170(1) The 
British Journal of Psychiatry 12  
106 Mary Baber & Helena Jeffs, Stalking, harassment and intimidation and the Protection 
from Harassment Bill (Research Paper 96/115, 13 December 1996) 5-6  
107 Regina Respondent v Ireland Appellant [1997] 3 W.L.R. 534, [1998] A.C. 147  
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law was inadequate when it came to protecting individuals from this form of 
abuse:    
‘Though the offences under the Public Order Act may provide a 
sanction against stalkers in some instances, offences under the 
provisions of sections 4 and 4A would be committed only if the stalker 
intended his behaviour to cause the victim to believe that immediate 
violence would be used (section 4) or if harassment, alarm or distress 
is caused (section 4A). There are problems also in applying other 
aspects of the criminal law against stalkers. The Malicious 
Communications Act 1988 requires that the article sent must be 
indecent or grossly offensive. It must also be proved that the sender's 
purpose was to cause distress or anxiety. In the situations where 
stalkers continually send greetings cards, flowers or other unsolicited 
gifts, such intent cannot be proven.’108   
 
Furthermore, the variety of Acts available to prosecute individuals for 
harassment and stalking behaviours has resulted in failures by the criminal 
justice system to adequately protect victims from this type of conduct.109  
 
Evonne Van Heussen, who was the founder of the National Anti-Stalking and 
Harassment Support Association,110 was stalked for a total of 17 years by a 
man she barely even knew between 1975 and 1991.111 Between 1975 and 
1978 she was subjected to mysterious silent phone calls, dead flowers being 
left outside her home and photographs of herself and her children being 
posted through her letterbox. During the first three years Ms Van Heussen 
did not know who was behind the conduct. In 1978 the man responsible 
broke into her house. He held her hostage for eight hours, where he 
attempted to rape her before a neighbour heard her screams and alerted the 
 
108 Home Office, Stalking A Consultation Paper (11 July 1996) [3.4-3.6] 
109 Emma Cook, ‘Harassed relentlessly by a stranger, Evonne von Heussen formed an anti- 
stalking group. Emma Cook reports’ The Independent (London, 22 January 1995) 
<http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/stalked-for-years-by-a-man-she-met-once-
1569160.html> accessed 4 January 2018  
110 Note this organisation no longer exists. 
111 Cook n.109 
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police. Despite Ms Van Heussen only recognising the man as her lecturer 
from two lectures she had attended a few years earlier, the police labelled 
the incident as a domestic issue, resulting in the defendant receiving a 
caution. He continued to stalk her for another thirteen years until Ms Van 
Heussen left the country.       
 
Following stories like Ms Van Heussen’s, and further pressure being placed 
on the Government for a change in the law by pressure groups such as the 
Suzy Lamplugh Trust, in late 1996 the Conservative Government presented 
an anti-stalking Bill. The Bill was first introduced into the House of Commons 
on 5 December 1996 and received Royal Assent on 21 March 1997. The Bill 
was rushed through Parliament by the Conservative Government to prove to 
voters, as at the time a General Election was due to take place, that the 
Government was being tough on crime.112 Consequently, the original Act 
treated stalking and harassment as the same offence, this was amended in 
2012.113   
 
Stalking and harassment are not always easy to distinguish. Academic 
commentary tends to group these types of behaviours together. However, 
stalking and harassment carry different sentencing tariffs and police powers, 
therefore they must be considered separately.114 For the purpose of this 
discussion, harassment and stalking will be critically examined in separate 
 
112 Judith Gowland, ‘Protection from Harassment Act 1997: the "new" stalking offences’ 
(2013) 77(5) Journal of Criminal Law 387 
113 Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 section 111(1) 
114 For example, under the Protection from Harassment Act for stalking offences the police 
have the power to enter and search property under section 2B. 
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subsections, before evaluating the current difficulties in prosecuting these 
two offences. 
 
Harassment       
Although harassment is defined within the Protection from Harassment Act, 
the wording of the Act is considered to be extremely wide, and as a 
consequence it can be used to govern online behaviour, commonly referred 
to as cyber harassment.115 Cyber harassment as stated previously is the use 
of technology to impose unwanted contact upon another person.  
 
Section 1 of the Protection from Harassment Act prohibits116: ‘… a course of 
conduct which amounts to harassment of another, and which he knows or 
ought to know amounts to harassment of the other.’117 Section 2 of the Act, 
makes it a criminal offence to harass another. The actus reus consists of two 
elements: a course of conduct and harassment. Following an amendment to 
the Protection from Harassment Act by the Serious Organised Crime and 
Police Act 2005, a course of conduct is defined as contact on at least two 
occasions.118 However, from an examination of the case law, it is unlikely to 
 
115 Neal Geach & Nicola Haralambous, ‘Regulating harassment: is the law fit for the social 
networking age?’ (2009) 73(3) Journal of Criminal Law 241  
116 Section 2 of the Protection from Harassment Act outlines that a course of conduct is a 
criminal offence under the law.  
117 A further offence of harassment is governed under section 4 of the Protection from 
Harassment Act- putting someone in fear of violence. This has the same actus reus and 
mens rea as section 1 of the Act. However, if it can be found that the defendant ‘knew or 
ought to know’ that their behaviour would cause fear of violence in another, then they will be 
prosecuted under section 4. Here, the court has higher sentencing powers compared to that 
of section 1.   
118 The Protection from Harassment Act 1999 7(3). This was substituted into the Act by the 
Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005. The law treats a course of conduct 
differently, if multiple individuals are involved. Section 7(3)(b) ‘in the case of conduct in 
relation to two or more persons … [a course of conduct is considered] … conduct on at least 
one occasion in relation to each of those persons.’  
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be found that a course of conduct would be present where only two 
instances have occurred:  
‘I fully accept that the incidents which need to be proved in relation to 
harassment need not exceed two incidents, but, as it seems to me, 
the fewer the occasions and the wider they are spread the less likely it 
would be that a finding of harassment can reasonably be made.’119  
   
A minimum requirement has been set by Parliament as to when certain 
behaviours may invoke the Protection from Harassment Act. In most 
circumstances for the criminal justice system to be satisfied that a course of 
conduct is present in a matter, contact must occur on more than two 
occasions. This is a similar argument made by Agate and Ledward. They 
suggest that in most circumstances a course of conduct will only be 
established if it occurs on more than two occasions, which would need to be 
close in terms of time, despite the definition contained in the Act.120 Little 
information can be gathered from the case law, the CPS prosecuting 
guidelines or academic commentary regarding what would constitute a close 
connection with reference to time. This leaves many questions unanswered 
when it comes to prosecuting harassment conducted online. For example, 
could it be said that contact once a month over the course of a year can 
amount to harassment, or would it need to be more contact over a shorter 
period of time?  
 
 
119 Lau v Director of Public Prosecutions [2000] 1 F.L.R 799 (DC) per Mr Justice Schiemann 
[15] 
120 Jennifer Agate & Jocelyn Ledward, ‘Social media: how the net is closing in on cyber 
bullies’ (2013) 24(8) Entertainment Law Review 263, 266. It is important to note that under 
section 1(3) of the Protection from Harassment Act, there is a defence available with regard 
to ‘a course of conduct’: ‘… (a) that it was pursued for the purpose of preventing or detecting 
crime, (b) that it was pursued under any enactment or rule of law or to comply with any 
condition or requirement imposed by any person under any enactment, (c) or that in the 
particular circumstances the pursuit of the course of conduct was reasonable.’  
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The second part of the actus reus is to establish harassment. Under the 
Protection from Harassment Act harassment is defined as ‘alarming’ a 
person or causing them ‘distress’.121 If from the evidence provided it can be 
established that the complained about behaviour amounts to alarming or 
distressing a person, the condition of harassment will be satisfied:  
‘Where the quality of the conduct said to constitute harassment is 
being examined, courts will have in mind that irritations, annoyances, 
even a measure of upset, arise at times in everybody's day-to-day 
dealings with other people. Courts are well able to recognise the 
boundary between conduct which is unattractive, even unreasonable, 
and conduct which is oppressive and unacceptable. To cross the 
boundary from the regrettable to the unacceptable the gravity of the 
misconduct must be of an order which would sustain criminal liability 
…’.122 
 
This has created issues when it comes to the prosecution of harassment in a 
social media situation. In many cases of online harassment the conduct is 
‘disturbing, unpleasant and may transgress the norms of socially acceptable’ 
behaviour, but it is difficult to prove that the conduct crosses a line to warrant 
criminal law intervention under the Protection from Harassment Act.123 For 
example, the abuse inflicted upon Laura Bates a feminist writer, campaigner 
and political activist.  
 
After Ms Bates started her online campaign, ‘The Everyday Sexism Project’, 
aimed at exposing the sexist attitudes that still exist in society today, she 
found herself on the receiving end of abusive online messages:  
‘Within a month of starting the project I was getting 200 messages 
everyday of really, really bad abuse …  Really graphic descriptions of 
 
121 Protection from Harassment Act 1997 section 7(2)  
122 Majrowski v Guy’s and St Thomas’s NHS Trust [2006] UKHL 34, [2007] 1 A.C. 224 per 
Lord Nicolls of Birkenhead [30] 
123 Michael Salter & Chris Bryden, ‘I can see you: harassment and stalking on the Internet’ 
(2009) 18(2) Information & Communications Technology Law 99, 103 
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domestic violence and rape.’124  
 
The receiving of these comments by Ms Bates will have no doubt been 
‘disturbing’ and ‘unpleasant’, but without a course of conduct that amounted 
to harassment, it would have been difficult to prosecute an individual contrary 
to the Protection from Harassment Act.  
 
The mens rea for the criminalisation of harassment is based on the 
construction of knowledge. Under the Protection from Harassment Act in 
order to bring a successful prosecution for harassment it must be proven that 
the defendant, ‘knows or ought to know that the[ir] behaviour would amount 
to [the] harassment of another.’125 The concept of ‘knowledge’ is 
based on the reasonable person test.126 Essentially, it must be established 
that the average sober person in the same position as the defendant would 
come to the knowledge or should have come to the knowledge, that their 
conduct would amount to the harassment of another individual. If both the 
actus reus and mens rea of the offence can be found, then the defendant is 
liable for a breach of section 2 of the Protection from Harassment Act.  
 
The anonymity of the Internet has made it easier for harassment to be 
conducted, as few security questions need to be answered to set up a social 
media profile.127 For instance, to create a Facebook account the user merely 
 
124 Rebecca Holman, ‘“I’ve had death and rape threats simply for starting the conversation 
about everyday sexism”’ (The Debrief, 30 April 2014) 
<https://thedebrief.co.uk/news/opinion/ve-death-rape-threats-simply-starting-conversation-
everyday-sexism/> accessed 12 January 2018  
125 Protection from Harassment Act 1997 section 1(1)(b) 
126 For a discussion on the reasonable person see, Reid Griffith Fontaine, The Mind of the 
Criminal: The Role of Developmental Social Cognition in Criminal Defense Law (Cambridge 
University Press 2012) 13 
127 Salter & Bryden n.123 
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needs an email address as all other questions can be answered using an 
alias.128 Consequently, social media has become a relatively new way to 
harass another.129 However, there are issues with a lack of understanding by 
police forces and the CPS as to when the Protection from Harassment Act 
should be used to prosecute social media offences.130  
 
In 2013 Caroline Criado-Perez, an active feminist campaigner publicly spoke 
out about having the author Jane Austin printed on banknotes in England 
and Wales. Following this public campaign, she was subjected to horrific 
abuse on social media. Comments ranged from ‘shut up’ to ‘rape her nice 
ass.’131 One individual, Peter Nunn, subjected Ms Criado-Perez to a crusade 
of abuse:  
‘He dug up my work history. He dug up my relationship and family 
history. He dug up my family’s work history - including publishing 
home addresses. He wrote reams of blogs about me and my every 
public move. He made numerous videos about me. He set up 
numerous [T]witter accounts all of which spoke almost exclusively 
about me. In these same [T]witter accounts he detailed the best way 
to rape and drown a witch, alongside repeatedly naming me as the 
head of the “witches’ coven”. He also boasted on [T]witter in the same 
account about having bought a gun, and wondered “how much death” 
this gun could buy him.’132 
 
 
128 Facebook, ‘Create An Account’ (Facebook, 2017) 
<https://www.facebook.com/help/345121355559712> accessed 12 November 2017  
129 Azy Barak, ‘Sexual Harassment on the Internet’ (2005) 23(1) Social Science Computer 
Review 77  
130 May Bulman, ‘Victim of online harassment feels “absolutely hopeless” over police 
inaction’ The Telegraph (London, 6 July 2017) 
<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/online-harassment-victim-sussex-
police-inaction-absolutely-hopeless-a7825691.html> accessed 12 November 2017  
131 Alexandra Topping, ‘Jane Austen Twitter row: two plead guilty to abusive tweets’ The 
Guardian (London, 7 January 2014) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/society/2014/jan/07/jane-austen-banknote-abusive-tweets-
criado-perez> accessed 10 October 2016 
132 Caroline Criado-Perez, ‘A Brief Comment on Peter Nunn, Sentenced Today For Twitter 
Abuse’ (Week Women, 2014) <https://weekwoman.wordpress.com/2014/09/29/a-brief-
comment-on-peter-nunn/> accessed 29 October 2016 
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Despite a clear course of conduct being present, which arguably amounted 
to harassment and caused Ms Criado-Perez distress, Nunn was prosecuted 
and found guilty of sending grossly offensive communications contrary to the 
Communications Act 2003, receiving a six week custodial sentence.133 
Subsequently, the police are failing to adequately apply the Protection from 
Harassment Act in relation to social media offences, as highlighted further in 
the prosecution statistics.   
 
Each year the CPS conducts a report specifically scrutinising violence 
against women and girls in England and Wales. The 2016 to 2017 report 
exposed that the number of prosecutions brought under the Protection from 
Harassment Act, declined between 2016 and 2017 by 8.4%.134 As a result, 
an investigation was conducted by the Criminal Justice Inspectorates and 
HM Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate in July 2017. The investigation 
looked into how the police and the CPS use the Protection from Harassment 
Act to prosecute the conduct of harassment and stalking offences across 
England and Wales.  
 
The report exposed a complete failure by the police to investigate, report and 
put forward cases to the CPS for possible prosecution under the Protection 
 
133 R v Peter Nunn The City of London Magistrates Court 29 September 2014 (unreported) 
134 The Crown Prosecution Service, ‘Violence against women and girls report: tenth edition’ 
(CPS.gov, 2017) 7 <https://www.cps.gov.uk/sites/default/files/documents/publications/cps-
vawg-report-2017.pdf> accessed 19 February 2017. Please note, there is an issue with 
these statistics. As uncovered by the Criminal Justice Inspectorates & HM Crown 
Prosecution Service Inspectorate, police forces and the CPS have confused the definitions 
of stalking and harassment. Consequently, it can be argued that these figures do not truly 
represent the extent of harassment and stalking.  
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from Harassment Act, especially where social media related offences were 
concerned. Instead victims were advised to withdraw from social media:     
‘“It wasn’t her (the perpetrator’s) fault for sending abusive Facebook 
messages, it was my fault for being on Facebook … And the only way 
to stop these messages is if I deactivate [sic] my Facebook account, 
and come off social media.”’135 
 
As discussed in chapter one, this approach by the police in relation to social 
media abuse is similar to rape myth assumptions made and given to women 
in order to ‘reduce’ the likelihood of sexual assault. The term rape ‘myth 
assumption’ was first introduced in the 1970s and is used to describe ‘a 
complex set of cultural beliefs thought to support and perpetuate male sexual 
violence against women.’136 For instance, telling women ‘not to walk home 
alone in the dark’ or ‘not to wear revealing clothing’ if they do not wish to be 
raped. These assumptions presumed if women refrain from partaking in 
these types of behaviours, it would reduce their risk of being assaulted. This 
approach is now being mirrored in relation to online abuse. Individuals who 
are being subjected to abuse online are being advised by the authorities to 
remove their online presence, with a stigma still being attached within the 
police when it comes to social media related abuse.137 From a victimology 
stance, here the complainant is being judged on their own victimisation for 
 
135 Criminal Justice Inspectorates & HM Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate n.102, 52  
136 Diana L. Payne, Kimberly A. Lonsway, & Louise F. Fitzgerald, ‘Rape myth acceptance: 
Exploration of its structure and its measurement using the Illinois Rape Myth Acceptance 
Scale’ (1999) 33 Journal of Research in Personality 27  
137 College of Policing, National Crime Agency and National Police Chief’s Council, ‘Digital 




accessed 4 January 2018. See also, David Barrett, ‘Police “dismissive” of online crime, finds 
watchdog’ The Telegraph (London, 22 December 2015) 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/crime/12064353/Police-dismissive-of-online-
crime-finds-watchdog.html> accessed 4 January 2018 
Page 182 of 449 
 
simply having a social media account. By taking this approach to online 
abuse we are not apricating the emotional turmoil associated with becoming 
a target of online abuse, or indeed, placing the victim at the centre of the 
criminal justice system.  
 
Stalking  
As previously stated, before 2012 stalking and harassment were treated as 
the same offence, and both governed under section 1 of the Protection from 
Harassment Act. In 2012 the conduct of stalking was specifically 
implemented into the Protection from Harassment Act under section 111(1) 
of the Protection from Freedoms Act 2012, following concerns that the 
Protection from Harassment Act did not cover stalking sufficiently.138 Like 
that of harassment, it has been accepted that this behaviour can occur online 
and has been coined ‘cyberstalking.’ Cyberstalking is the continued 
behaviour of harassing another individual where there is a course of conduct 
present, via the use of the Internet or electronic communications.139 Though 
there are issues as to when certain behaviours go from cyber harassment to 
cyberstalking.  
 
MacEwan states that not only has the Internet introduced new stalking 
behaviours, but it also allows for direct contact between the perpetrator of the 
offence and the victim, which in many cases can occur ‘around the clock’.140 
 
138 Neil MacEwan, ‘The new stalking offences in English law: will they provide effective 
protection from cyberstalking?’ (2012) 10 Criminal Law Review 767 
139 Paul Bocij, Cyberstalking: Harassment in the Internet Age and how to Protect Your 
Family (Praeger Publishers 2004) 3-4 
140 MacEwan n.138, 771  
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In July 2016 Chloe Cowan141 was sentenced to 3 years imprisonment for 
cyberstalking offences under the Protection from Harassment Act for sending 
‘vile’ tweets online.142 Cowan set up several fake Twitter accounts to stalk 
Denise Fergus, the mother of James Bulger (a toddler who was murdered in 
1993) to taunt her about her son’s death. Messages were sent directly to Ms 
Fergus’ social media account and resulted in her fearing to leave her own 
home.  
 
Despite arguments being raised in 2012 that cyberstalking should be 
specifically included in the Protection from Harassment Act, it was 
considered unnecessary,143 as explained further in later parts of this 
discussion. Therefore, section 2A of the Protection from Harassment Act is 
used to prosecute cyberstalking offences today. This section of the 
Protection from Harassment Act takes a very similar format to that of section 
1 of the Act.144 The actus reus consists of a course of conduct, which fulfils 
the requirements for harassment. Like that of section 1, a course of conduct 
is considered contact that occurs on at least two occasions, which would 
alarm a person or cause them distress to satisfy the element of harassment 
where one person is committing the offence.  
 
 
141 R v Chloe Cowan Canterbury Crown Court 14 July 2016 (unreported) 
142 ITV News, ‘Student who sent “vile” tweets to murdered James Bulger’s mother jailed for 
three years’ ITV News (London, 14 July 2016) <http://www.itv.com/news/2016-07-
14/student-who-sent-vile-tweets-to-murdered-james-bulgers-mother-jailed-for-three-years/> 
accessed 20 October 2016 
143 Home Office, ‘The Protection from Harassment Act 1997: Improving Protection for 
Victims of Stalking’ (2012) 17 
144 Under section 4A of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 a further offence is 
included- stalking involving fear of violence or serious alarm or distress. If it can be found 
that the person being stalked was in fear of violence or serious alarm or distress, this section 
of the Act should be used to prosecute the defendant.  
Page 184 of 449 
 
In addition to this, it must be found that the behaviour being complained 
about amounts to stalking. As previously mentioned, there is no definition of 
stalking contained in the Act, instead a non-exhaustive list of behaviours is 
included:  
‘… (a) following a person; (b) contacting, or attempting to contact, a 
person by any means; (c) publishing any statement or other material – 
(i) relating or purporting to relate to a person, or (ii) purporting to 
originate from a person; (d) monitoring the use by a person of the 
internet, email or any other form of electronic communication; (e) 
loitering in any place (whether public or private); (f) interfering with any 
property in the possession of a person; [and] (g) watching or spying 
on a person’.145   
 
If the conduct being complained about can be regarded as stalking and a 
course of conduct is present which amounts to harassment, then the actus 
reus for section 2A of the Protection from Harassment Act will be satisfied.146 
In addition, similar to that of section 1(1)(b), the mens rea for the offence of 
stalking is based on the construction of knowledge. Here, it must be found 
that the perpetrator ‘knows or ought to know that the[ir] behaviour would 
amount to [the] harassment of another.’147 
 
As previously mentioned during the consultation period before the insertion 
of section 2A into the Protection from Harassment Act, concerns were raised 
that the Act should specifically criminalise cyberstalking, but this was 
dismissed:  
 
145 Protection from Harassment Act 1997 2A(3)  
146 It is important to note that under section 4A(4) of the Protection from Harassment Act, 
there is a defence available with regard to a course of conduct that amounts to stalking: ‘… 
(a) A’s course of conduct was pursued for the purpose of preventing or detecting crime or, 
(b) A’s course of conduct was pursued under any enactment or rule of law or to comply with 
any condition or requirement imposed by any person under any enactment, or (c) the pursuit 
of A’s course of conduct was reasonable for the protection of A or another or for the 
protection of A’s or another's property.’ 
147 Protection from Harassment Act 1997 2A 2(c)  
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‘A number of respondents raised concerns relating to cyberstalking. 
For the most part, social network site operators adopt sensible and 
responsible positions on illegal, inappropriate and offensive content 
hosted on their sites in the terms and conditions they require for use 
of their services. Internet service providers and social media also 
already have a legal obligation to cooperate with the police during 
investigations of allegations of harassment and stalking.’148 
 
However, the concept that social media companies are under a legal 
obligation to cooperate with the police has now been overruled by the Court 
of Justice of the European Union in the joined cases of Tele2 Sverige AB v 
Post-och telestyrelsen and Secretary of State for the Home Department v 
Tom Watson and Others.149 The Court of Justice of the European Union was 
asked to rule on the legality of the Conservative Governments approach to 
surveillance of communications, in relation to combatting terrorism in the 
United Kingdom.  
 
Under the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 the Government attempted to force 
website hosts and phone companies to hold citizens communication data for 
twelve months, allowing the police and other government agencies access to 
this information.150 It was ruled by the Court of Justice of the European Union 
that only in cases relating to terrorism, could the Government force 
companies to hand over data. Consequently, social media companies are 
not under a legal obligation to work with the police in matters of online abuse. 
 
148 Home Office n.143, 17 
149 C-203/15 and C-698/15 Tele2 Sverige AB v Post-och telestyrelsen and Secretary of 
State for the Home Department v Tom Watson and Others [2016] ECLI 970 
150 Alan Travis, ‘“Snooper's charter” bill becomes law, extending UK state surveillance’ The 
Guardian (London, 29 November 2016) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/29/snoopers-charter-bill-becomes-law-
extending-uk-state-surveillance> accessed 8 January 2018  
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For instance, Twitter has been criticised for its reluctance to disclose 
information to legal authorities when approached.151        
 
In 2017 the UK Home Affairs Committee held a review examining hate crime 
and extremist content, which was being made available on social media 
sites.152 Representatives from Facebook, Twitter and YouTube153 attended 
the committee meeting to respond to questions posed to them by MPs about 
their role in reducing abusive and extremist content on their sites. All three 
companies were criticised for being slow in the removal of such content:  
‘The biggest companies have been repeatedly urged by 
Governments, police forces, community leaders and the public, to 
clean up their act, and to respond quickly and proactively to identify 
and remove illegal content. They have repeatedly failed to do so.’154 
 
Social media companies are not only reluctant in working with the criminal 
justice system to disclose information contained on their sites but also, slow 
in the application of removing abusive content.155 With continued issues 
relating to social media companies being slow in aiding law enforcement, 
pressure has been placed on the criminal justice system to adequately 
 
151 Christopher Williams, ‘Twitter refuses to hand member information to police’ The 
Telegraph (London, 29 January 2013) 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/twitter/9834776/Twitter-refuses-to-hand-member-
information-to-police.html> accessed 4 January 2018. In May of 2018 Facebook released 
the scale of abuse on its site, though there are issues with the data given. See, Laura Bliss,  
‘What Facebook isn’t telling us about its fight against online abuse’ The Conversation 
(London, 21 May 2018) <https://theconversation.com/what-facebook-isnt-telling-us-about-its-
fight-against-online-abuse-96818> accessed 29 May 2018  
152 Home Affairs Committee, Hate crime: abuse, hate and extremism online (HC 2016-17, 
609)  
153 Only these three social networking companies were present as they are the only 
companies with representatives in the United Kingdom.  
154 Home Affairs Committee n.152, [36] 
155 The Fawcett Society, ‘Twitter is “failing women” experiencing online threats and 
harassment’ (The Fawcett Society, 22 August 2017) 
<https://www.fawcettsociety.org.uk/news/twitter-failing-women-experiencing-online-threats-
harassment> accessed 16 February 2018 
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support victims of online abuse. Yet law enforcement has continued to 
misunderstand cyberstalking: 
‘Basically they’ve told me [the police], any contact that I receive 
through social media is irrelevant, because they can’t prove that it’s 
associated to them [the abuser].’156 
 
 
Despite cyberstalking not specifically being included in the Protection from 
Harassment Act and misunderstandings by the police, there have been some 
successful prosecutions under the Act for this offence. The first conviction for 
cyberstalking occurred in 2014,157 though this was two years after the 
behaviour of stalking was included in the Act. Furthermore, the conduct of 
cyberstalking has been researched since the turn of the last millennium. For 
instance, in 2003 Bocij examined the extent of cyberstalking within society. 
Using an email snowballing sample, he surveyed 169 participants to examine 
their understanding of cyberstalking, as discussed in detail in chapter one. 
Yet it took eleven years before the first conviction for cyberstalking. Arguably, 
the law has been extremely slow in prosecuting stalking offences conducted 
online.158 
 
The Protection from Harassment Act: An Overview  
 
156 Criminal Justice Inspectorates & HM Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate n.102, 27  
157 R v Andrew Meldrum Woolwich Crown Court 30 May 2014 (unreported). See also, Nicola 
Fifield, ‘Cyber stalker bugged women’s computers to spy on them in their bedrooms’ The 
Telegraph (London, 30 May 2014) 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/crime/10866262/Cyber-stalker-bugged-womens-
computers-to-spy-on-them-in-their-bedrooms.html> accessed 25 October 2016 
158 For another study looking at the effects of cyberstalking see, Antony Brown, Carsten 
Maple & Emma Short, ‘Cyberstalking in the United Kingdom: An Analysis of the ECHO Pilot 
Survey’ (University of Bedfordshire National Centre for Cyberstalking Research, 2011) 
<https://www.beds.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0003/83109/ECHO_Pilot_Final.pdf> 
accessed 25 October 2016. See chapter one for more information on this study.  
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The overall use of the Protection from Harassment Act to govern both cyber 
harassment and cyberstalking is flawed. Recently, the police and the criminal 
justice system have come under criticism with the way in which they deal 
with complaints of harassment and stalking, both in the physical world and 
online.159 This was exposed in detail in the Criminal Justice Inspectorates 
and HM Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate report into the Protection 
from Harassment Act in July 2017. The report exposed a complete failure in 
the justice system to take the behaviours of harassment and stalking 
seriously, particularly where social media was facilitated in the offence.160 
The report goes further to find a failure by some police forces to link all 
conduct undertaken by a defendant together, despite the social media 
prosecution guidelines emphasising the importance of this:  
‘Where an individual receives unwanted communications from another 
person via social media in addition to other unwanted behaviour, all 
the behaviour should be considered together in the round by the 
prosecutor when determining whether or not a course of conduct is 
made out.’161  
 
The guidelines make numerous remarks reminding prosecutors to consider 
the Protection from Harassment Act, yet there has been a decline in 
prosecutions under this Act of Parliament.   
 
In addition, the report found a lack of understanding between forces as to 
what constitutes harassment or stalking, specifically the difference between 
the two behaviours under the Protection from Harassment Act. From a study 
 
159 Rachel Horman, ‘We have a stalking law – so why don’t the police use it?’ The Guardian 
(London, 19 August 2016) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/apr/19/stalking-law-police-lily-allen-
stalked-criminal-justice-system> accessed 22 November 2017  
160 Criminal Justice Inspectorates & HM Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate n.102, 52  
161 The Crown Prosecution Service n.47 
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of 112162 police reports across six forces it was found that the police had 
failed to deal with any of these cases correctly and in many matters, 
misunderstanding the severity of the behaviour being reported. Salter and 
Bryden suggest that the Protection from Harassment Act is ‘the most 
powerful shield available to an online user’, yet there is a failure by the 
criminal justice system to use the Act correctly to protect social media users 
from online abuse. 163  
 
It has been accepted that the Protection from Harassment Act can govern 
online behaviour, and this has been somewhat successful. Nonetheless, the 
review conducted of the Act in 2017 uncovered misunderstandings between 
the behaviours of stalking and harassment within the criminal justice 
system:164  
‘… [L]egislation does not exhaustively define stalking or the particular 
circumstances that make stalking different from those of harassment. 
Therefore, without any additional clarification, what differentiates 
harassment and stalking can be open to interpretation and result in 
confusion.’165    
 
Consequently, a recommendation has been put forward in the report for a 
more definitive definition of stalking to try and combat this issue. 
Nevertheless, the current lack of clarity in the Protection from Harassment 
Act is another example of a fundamental breach of legality, especially where 
social media is facilitated to commit the offence. In addition, as highlighted 
 
162 Of these 112 case studies, 82 had elements of social media/technology-based offences. 
163 Salter & Bryden m.123, 100 
164 This was further affirmed by the Law Commission. See, Law Commission, Abusive and 
Offensive Online Communications: A Scoping Report (Law Com No 381, 2018) [8.161]  
165 Criminal Justice Inspectorates & HM Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate n.102, 24 
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above the Protection from Harassment Act is currently being underutilised in 
social media prosecutions.  
 
As previously stated, in the case of Nunn, one of the individuals convicted for 
sending abusive tweets to the feminist campaigner Caroline Criado-Perez, 
his actions could have constituted a clear breach of the Protection from 
Harassment Act, yet he was convicted under section 127(1) of the 
Communications Act 2003 for the sending of grossly offensive comments. 
This further suggests that the law is currently not being used to its full 
capacity, leaving victims frustrated at the criminal justice system.166 
 
Chapter Overview  
The extent of online abuse today means in certain cases the criminal law 
needs to intervene. This chapter has examined three non-technology-based 
Acts of Parliament, the Serious Crime Act 2007, the Public Order Act 1986 
and the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, which have all been adapted 
to fit a technology-based age. There are however flaws in their application in 
governing social media related offences in particular, online abuse. 
 
The intention of the Serious Crime Act was to criminalise organised and 
serious crime within society. Yet the Act has since been used to prosecute 
individuals for the creation of Facebook event pages during the 2011 riots in 
the United Kingdom, which can be suggested as being beyond the scope of 
Parliament’s original intentions. Legality in the criminal law, as crystallised by 
 
166 Caroline Criado-Perez n.132 
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Luban167 and Fuller168 means that legal provisions need to be action-guiding. 
Here, citizens behaviour should be governed in the context of clear and 
distinct rules. The Serious Crime Act and its use in Blackshaw169 and 
Sutcliffe-Keenan,170 can be considered as a breach of the action-guiding 
principle of the criminal law. As discussed previously, the provisions 
contained in sections 44 to 46 of the Act lacks clarity, and consequently 
individuals cannot govern their behaviour in accordance with the law. Virgo 
has gone as far as to state that the Serious Crime Act ‘needs to be put out of 
its misery and we need to start again.’171 
 
Similarly, the Public Order Act lacks certainty in its application to offences 
carried out with the aid of social media. For Dorfman the use of the Public 
Order Act in the matter of Stacey172 was a clear abuse of the law.173 The 
purpose of the Public Order Act was to prosecute offences which incited 
racial hatred, an element which Dorfman considers to be missing in Stacey. 
Furthermore, the law lacks certainty as to when the Public Order Act should 
be utilised when it comes to social media abuse. As discussed above the Act 
was used to prosecute Stacey for the sending of racist tweets, but it was not 
used in relation to Chabloz 174 who published videos of an anti-Semitic 
nature. More recently, the Public Order Act has been used to arrest 
 
167 David Luban, ‘Fairness to rightness: Jurisdiction, Legality, and the Legitimacy of 
International Criminal Law’ in Samantha Besson & John Tasioulas (eds), The Philosophy of 
International Law (Oxford University Press 2010) 37 
168 Lon L Fuller, The morality of law (Yale University Press 1964)   
169 Blackshaw n.28 
170 Perry Sutcliffe-Keenan n.30 
171 Virgo n.21 
172 Liam Stacey n.71 
173 Dorfman n.74 
174 Alison Chabloz n.84 
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individuals for the publication of a video on social media, in which they burnt 
a replica of Grenfell Tower.175 Yet there continues to be issues with the 
principle of legality and the use of the Public Order Act in a social media 
setting.  
 
Whereas the use of the Serious Crime Act and the Public Order Act can be 
considered as an abuse of the law, the Protection from Harassment Act is 
being underutilised in the criminal justice system, particularly when 
examining cyber harassment and cyberstalking. The lack of clarity contained 
within key provisions of the Act means at times mistakes are being made in 
the criminal justice system. This is further confirmed by the Law Commission 
who argue that a lack of a distinct definition between harassment and 
stalking puts victims at a disadvantage. As put by the Law Commission:  
‘[r]esearch suggests that the prevalence of online harassment is high, 
and stalking by a person unknown to the victim is more common 
online than offline.’176  
 
Chapter Four: Recommendations    
• Create a clear and precise legal rule regulating the encouragement of 
another to commit a further criminal offence or incite others to target 
another online;  
 
175 Grenfell Tower was a block of flats in London which caught fire in 2017, killing 72 people. 
See, Adam Withnall, ‘Grenfell Tower bonfire effigy burning leads to five arrests’ The 
Independent (London, 12 February 2019) 
<https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/grenfell-tower-bonfire-effigy-video-fire-
burning-guy-fawkes-november-5-a8619491.html> accessed 12 February 2019. In April 
2019, it was announced that one individual had been charged contrary to section 127(1) of 
the Communications Act 2003. He was later found not guilty.  
176 Law Commission n.164, [8.9] 
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• Ensure the social media prosecuting guidelines are updated to include 
examples to illustrate when a comment or conduct breaches legal 
provisions;  
• Create a clear and precise legal rule regulating online hate speech. 
Here, what constitutes hate speech will be expanded to cover a range 
of protected characteristics, including gender;  
• With the aid of section 4A of the Public Order Act 1986 create a legal 
provision that conforms to the principle of legality specifically 
criminalising cyber harassment and cyberstalking; 
• Better training for police forces as to what constitutes harassment and 
stalking, especially those conducted online; and   








Social Media, Criminal Law Regulation and Technology-
Based Legislation: Part One 
 
‘“Twitter is not just a closed coffee shop among friends. It goes out to 
hundreds of thousands of people and you must take responsibility for 
it. It is not a place where you can gossip and say things with impunity, 
and we are about to demonstrate that.”'1 
Introduction  
In England and Wales there is currently no specific Act of Parliament aimed 
at criminalising inappropriate behaviour on social media sites. Instead, as 
explored in the previous chapter the criminal justice system has had to adapt 
legislation to fit a social media context. Despite this there are several legal 
provisions which have been created from a technological perspective, 
including, but not limited to, the Computer Misuse Act 1990, section 33 of the 
Criminal Justice and Courts Act, the Malicious Communications Act 1988 
and section 127 of the Communications Act 2003.  
 
Though all the above govern technology-based offences, with the exception 
of section 33 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act, these legal provisions 
were not necessarily created with social media in mind. In fact, the Computer 
Misuse Act, the Malicious Communications Act and the Communications Act 
all predate Facebook and Twitter, two of the biggest social media companies 
today. Yet like that of the Serious Crime Act 2007, the Public Order Act 1986 
and the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, as discussed in chapter four, 
the Computer Misuse Act, the Malicious Communications Act, and section 
 
1 Andrew Read (Solicitor) found in Laura Scaife, ‘The DPP and social media: a new 
approach coming out of the Woods?’ (2013) (18)1 Communications Law 5, 9 
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127 of the Communications Act have since been used to prosecute social 
media-based offences.  
 
This chapter will discuss the current use of the Computer Misuse Act and 
section 33 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act in governing inappropriate 
behaviour online. The Malicious Communications Act and section 127 of the 
Communications Act will be examined separately in the following chapter 
because, of the technology-based legislation, it is the latter two that have 
given rise to most social media criminality.  
 
Computer Misuse Act 1990 
The Computer Misuse Act was enacted into the legal system of England and 
Wales to help tackle the growing issue of computer misuse, which was 
affecting businesses worldwide, in particular computer hacking. Though it is 
rare the Computer Misuse Act has been used to prosecute defendants who 
have ‘hacked’ social media profiles to torment another.2 The discussion 
below will outline the background behind the Acts implementation, before 
examining both the actus reus and mens rea of sections 1 to 3 of the 
Computer Misuse Act. 
 
During the 1900s technology started to evolve within society, with computer 
usage increasing throughout the 1960s.3 Though there is no true definition of 
‘computer’, the courts have come to define it as a ‘… device for storing, 
 
2 Laura Scaife, Handbook of Social Media and the Law (Routledge 2015) 183 
3 Stefan Fafinski, Computer Misuse (Routledge 2009) Chapter Three  
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processing and retrieving information.’4 As technology expanded new 
criminal acts started to occur across the globe, commonly referred to as 
computer misuse. Computer misuse involves ‘… offences or attacks against 
computer systems such as hacking or denial of service (DOS) attacks.’5 Prior 
to the Computer Misuse Act, other Acts of Parliament were being used to 
criminalise computer misuse in the 1970s and 1980s. Nevertheless, issues 
arose with the adaption of these Acts of Parliament, which were never 
intended to cover technology-based crimes.  
 
In Cox v Riley6 the court had to decide whether the actions of the defendant 
in erasing data from a printed circuit card, amounted to criminal damage 
under the Criminal Damage Act 1971. By applying the actus reus of the 
Criminal Damage Act, the damage of property belonging to another, 
contained in section 1 of the Act, it was held that the defendant had 
committed an offence under this Act of Parliament.  
 
Though the criminal justice system was able to pursue a successful 
prosecution in Cox, the use of the Criminal Damage Act to prosecute 
computer misuse offences did create some problems within the legal system. 
The conduct of criminal damage is an offence which is triable either way, 
meaning that the case can be brought before the Magistrates Court or the 
Crown Court depending on the value of the damage, as defined under 
 
4 Director of Public Prosecutions v McKeown [1997] 1 W.L.R. 295 per Lord Hoffman 302 
5 The Crown Prosecution Service, ‘Computer Misuse Act 1990’ (CPS.gov, 2018) 
<https://www.cps.gov.uk/legal-guidance/computer-misuse-act-1990> accessed 23 January 
2018 
6 Cox v Riley (1986) 83 Cr. App. R. 54  
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section 22 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980. Until 1994, if the damage to 
property exceeded more than £2,000 the case would be held before the 
Crown Court.7 In traditional cases of criminal damage this would be easy for 
the courts to distinguish. However, in cases relating to technology it was not 
always easy to value the cost of the damage which had occurred.8  
 
Furthermore, not all cases of computer misuse resulted in successful 
prosecutions. In the 1980s two individuals hacked into British Telecom’s (BT) 
systems gaining access to private information stored on BT’s private 
network.9 They were originally prosecuted under the Forgery and 
Counterfeiting Act 1981, later being overturned by the Court of Appeal. The 
judgment of the Court of Appeal was upheld by the House of Lords: 
‘The appellants’ conduct amounted in essence, as already stated, to 
dishonestly gaining access to the relevant Prestel data bank by a trick. 
That is not a criminal offence. If it is thought desirable to make it so, 
that is a matter for the legislature rather than the courts.’10 
 
Essentially, it was held by the Law Lords that there was no criminal offence 
under English Law that amounted to computer hacking; the defendants were 
cleared of all charges. Following high profile media cases such as Gold, 
concerns were raised about ‘the misuse of computers or computer systems’ 
across the globe.11 
 
 
7 The value is now £5,000 as amended by the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 
section 46.   
8 Law Commission, Criminal Law: Computer Misuse (Law Com No 1986, 1989) [2.32] 
9 R v Gold (Steven William), Schifreen (Robert Jonathan) [1988] A.C. 1063 
10 Ibid., per Lord Justice Lane 1124 
11 Law Commission n.8, [1.1]  
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In 1989 the Law Commission conducted a report examining the issues of 
computer misuse following:   
‘[a]n increasing degree of interest and disquiet [becoming] apparent in 
recent years in relation to the implications of, and the possible misuse 
of, the computerisation that plays an ever growing role in public, 
commercial and indeed in private life.’12 
 
The report focused on the public need to criminalise computer misuse, 
paying particular reference to how this conduct impacted on commercial 
businesses:  
‘Accordingly, after the consultation had closed in March 1989 we 
arranged a series of meetings with computer and software 
manufacturers, computer users in commerce, industry and the 
banking and financial sectors, and those responsible for seeking to 
apply the existing criminal law to cases of computer misuse, in order 
to seek a better understanding of the problems that had evoked the 
expression of opinion on consultation …’.13 
 
The Law Commission examined in detail the legislative framework already 
enacted which could be used to prosecute offences of computer misuse. 
They concluded that there was a gap in the law which needed to be filled to 
fully criminalise this behaviour, due to the high costs that were experienced 
by companies who became subject to this type of conduct. As a result, the 
recommendations within the report were aimed at protecting businesses from 
three growing areas of computer misuse: computer fraud, hacking and the 
alteration of computer data or functions.  
 
Computer fraud was considered by the Law Commission as the manipulation 
of a computer network to dishonestly ‘… obtain money, property or some 
other advantage of value or to cause loss’,14 which was becoming a growing 
 
12 Ibid., [1.1] 
13 Ibid., [1.10]  
14 Ibid., [2.2]  
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problem in the 1970s and 1980s.15 In the consultation period before the Law 
Commission’s report into computer misuse was completed, many companies 
spoke of their losses due to computer fraud. For example, one company 
suffered substantial losses after a computer was reprogramed to produce 
bogus cheques and false entries into a banking system.16  
 
Though the law already criminalised fraudulent behaviour under the Forgery 
and Counterfeiting Act, it was not always successfully used in cases of 
computer fraud, as illustrated in Gold. Under section 1 of the Forgery and 
Counterfeiting Act:  
‘[a] person is guilty of forgery if he makes a false instrument, with the 
intention that he or another shall use it to induce somebody to accept 
it as genuine, and by reason of so accepting it to do or not to do some 
act to his own or any other person's prejudice.’  
 
The term instrument under the Act is defined as ‘… any disc, tape, sound 
track or other device on or in which information is recorded or stored by 
mechanical, electronic or other means.’17 Here, there must be a stored 
record of the omission. In Gold the computer software had wiped the 
defendant’s credentials meaning there was no record of their actions, the 
rationale behind the case being dismissed.  
 
One of the major foundations for the Law Commission’s investigation into 
computer misuse surrounded the conduct of hacking. Computer hacking is:  
‘… the modification of technology, such as the alteration of computer 
hardware or software, in order to allow it to be used in innovative 
 
15 Andrew D Chambers, ‘Computer fraud and abuse’ (1977) 21(3) The Computer Journal 
194 
16 Law Commission n.8, [2.4]  
17 Forgery and Counterfeiting Act 1981 section 8(1)d 
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ways, whether for legitimate or illegitimate purposes.’18 
 
Concerns were raised about hacking following the growing need to protect 
confidential and private information, as the use of computers increased 
throughout the United Kingdom and the globe:  
‘Two French hackers, for example, broke into a life-support system in 
a hospital's intensive care unit and, perhaps unwittingly, turned it off. 
There are several known instances of people breaking into air traffic 
control systems. One trembles to think of the dangers of that ...’.19     
 
Examples of computer hacking, similar to those given above, were specified 
to illustrate the importance of criminalising this conduct, as the legal 
framework prior to the enactment of the Computer Misuse Act was 
inadequate in prosecuting computer hackers. Between 1985 and 1990, 270 
cases of computer misuse, many relating to hacking, had been confirmed by 
the Department of Trade and Industry. Of these cases only six were brought 
before the courts, of which three cases resulted in successful prosecutions.20 
 
The final conduct which the Law Commission investigated was the use of 
technology to alter or destroy information held on a computer, concluding 
that there were several ways in which this conduct could be carried out, for 
instance the ‘physical destruction, electronic erasure [and through] viruses 
and worms.’21 Emphasis was placed on the substantial losses that can be 
experienced by businesses who were subjected to this form of computer 
misuse, whilst also finding that the legal framework in the 1980s did not 
adequately criminalise this conduct. Therefore, the Law Commission 
 
18 Thomas J. Holt, Adam M. Bossler & Kathryn C. Seigfried-Spellar, Cybercrime and Digital 
Forensics: An Introduction (2nd edn, Routledge 2017) Chapter three  
19 HC Deb 9 February 1990, vol 166, cols 1161-1162  
20 HC Deb 9 February 1990, vol 166, col 1134 
21 Law Commission n.8, [2.26]  
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suggested a change in the law, putting forward draft recommendations as to 
what should be included in an Act criminalising computer misuse.   
 
Throughout the Law Commission’s report an emphasis was placed on 
protecting corporations from the ever-growing mischief of computer misuse. 
References were made to public sector companies such as the NHS and air 
traffic control systems, but most of the report focused on private companies 
who had become subjected to computer misuse. Therefore, the 
recommendations made by the Law Commission focussed on the protection 
of large corporations, rather than separate individuals, an element reflected 
within the Computer Misuse Act itself. Following the numerous cases of 
computer misuse and the report conducted by the Law Commission, a 
Private Members’ Bill was introduced into Parliament in 1990 by Michael 
Calvin MP, which later received Royal Assent to become the Computer 
Misuse Act.22  
 
The Computer Misuse Act governs, ‘unauthorised access to computer 
material’,23 ‘unauthorised access with intent to commit or facilitate 
commission of further offences’,24 and ‘unauthorised acts with intent to 
impair, or with recklessness as to impairing, [the] operation of [a] computer, 
ect’.25 Section 1 of the Act makes it an offence for an individual to attempt to 
secure access to any data or programme held on another person’s 
 
22 Private Members’ Bill are introduced into Parliament by MPs who are not Government 
Ministers. For more information on how this procedure works see, Mark Elliot & Robert 
Thomas, Public Law (3rd edn, Oxford University Press 2017) 219   
23 Computer Misuse Act section 1 
24 Computer Misuse Act section 2 
25 Computer Misuse Act section 3  
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computer. The actus reus of the offence is in the unauthorised attempt to 
access data or a programme held on another’s computer. Here, the term 
unauthorised has been defined by Parliament in section 17(5) of the Act:  
‘He is not himself entitled to control access of the kind in question to 
the program or data; and he does not have consent to access by him 
of the kind in question to the program or data from any person who is 
so entitled.’   
 
The Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) guidelines on the Computer Misuse 
Act states that there does not have to be a specific attempt to access a 
certain programme or data held on the computer.26 Whereas the mens rea of 
the offence consists of two elements: knowledge and intent. Here, the 
defendant must have the knowledge that their intended actions of accessing 
the information are unauthorised, mere recklessness will not suffice.27  
 
The defendant does not need to physically access the information, he merely 
needs to attempt to do so in order to be liable under section 1 of the 
Computer Misuse Act, though there needs to be an awareness that by doing 
so they are committing an unauthorised act.28 In a social media context this 
would be the actions of hacking into another person’s social media profile. 
There is no need to cause a person alarm or distress. Put simply, the actions 
of accessing another individual’s social media account without prior 
authorisation would amount to a breach of section 1 of the Computer Misuse 
Act.   
 
 
26 The Crown Prosecution Service n.5  
27 Ibid.,   
28 Computer Misuse Act section 1(1)c 
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This is demonstrated in R v Gareth Crosskey.29 Crosskey hacked into the 
social media account of the famous actress Selena Gomez by deceiving 
Facebook staff. Among other things, this gave him access to her personal 
emails. Using this information, he published several statements online, 
including a comment allegedly taken from Ms Gomez’s account stating that 
‘Justin Bieber sucks’.30 Following this message being made publicly 
available, Ms Gomez received abusive and threating messages via social 
media. In addition, Crosskey attempted to sell the personal information he 
had gained from the unauthorised access to other media outlets, including 
high profile newspaper tabloids. He was subsequently charged and 
convicted under section 1 and section 3 of the Computer Misuse Act.31 
 
Though as previously mentioned, under the Computer Misuse Act there is no 
requirement to cause an individual distress or alarm, it was an aggravating 
factor which the court took into consideration when sentencing Crosskey:    
‘… there was the element of harm to Mr Teefey [her father] and to 
Miss Gomez. The claim that he had access to four of her personal e-
mail accounts caused distress and the fear of wide dissemination of 
personal and intimate correspondence with Mr Bieber on the web. As 
we have already observed, following the unauthorised access to the 
account, there was the posting ‘Justin Bieber sucks’. That could not 
be attributed to the appellant, but it had the consequence that fans of 
Mr Bieber reacted in a manner hostile to Miss Gomez adding to her 
further distress.’32    
 
 
29 R v Crosskey [2012] EWCA Crim 1645, [2013] 1 Cr. App. R. (S.) 76  
30 It was never proven that Crosskey placed this comment online.  
31 How section 3 of the Computer Misuse Act is applied in a social media context will be 
explored in later parts of this discussion.   
32 Crosskey n.29, per Mr Justice Owen [14]  
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Crosskey was sentenced to eight months imprisonment for his actions.33 The 
investigation into the hacking of Ms Gomez’s social media account cost the 
state £50,000 and was described by the ex-Chief Crown Prosecutor for 
London as ‘… the most extensive and flagrant incidence of social media 
hacking to be brought before [the] British courts.’34 
  
The successful prosecution of Crosskey for a breach of section 1 of the 
Computer Misuse Act can be seen as an appropriate decision by the CPS 
and the courts. By applying the principle of legality as outlined in chapter two, 
the Computer Misuse Act can be regarded as accessible and foreseeable. 
Section 1 of the Computer Misuse Act clearly outlines the offence: 
‘A person is guilty of an offence if he causes a computer to perform 
any function with intent to secure access to any program or data held 
in any computer, or to enable any such access to be secured; the 
access he intends to secure, or to enable to be secured, is 
unauthorised; and he knows at the time when he causes the computer 
to perform the function that that is the case.’35     
 
It is therefore foreseeable to the public that if they were to access another 
computer without authorised permission, they will have committed an offence 
under this section of the Act. With reference to Crosskey he would have 
known that his actions would have been unlawful, and he was consequently 
prosecuted under the correct Act of Parliament.  
   
 
33 At Southwark Crown Court Crosskey was sentenced to 12 months imprisonment. On 
appeal this was reduced to 8 months.  
34 Alison Saunders, ‘Facebook Hacker committed serious offence’ (CPS: News Brief, 17 
February 2017) <http://blog.cps.gov.uk/2012/02/facebook-hacker-committed-serious-
offence.html> accessed 11 October 2017  
35 Computer Misuse Act section 1 
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Section 2 of the Computer Misuse Act regulates unauthorised access to a 
computer system where the defendant had the intention of causing a further 
illegal act governed by law. This section consists of two elements. First, the 
defendant must attempt to commit the offence of gaining access to another 
person’s computer without permission, as governed under section 1 of the 
Act. Second, they must do this in order to commit a further criminal offence 
which is prescribed by law. For instance, hacking an individual’s social media 
account to gain access to personal information to commit a further fraudulent 
act, would breach section 2 of the Computer Misuse Act, as fraud is 
criminalised under the Fraud Act 2006. Though currently there are no social 
media abuse cases which have used this section of the Computer Misuse 
Act to prosecute an individual, it remains an important aspect of the law 
which should be considered when it comes to online abuse.   
 
In a BBC Panorama documentary, it was found that Facebook ‘knows more 
about us than any other government organisation.’36 With this in mind, it 
might well be that section 2 of the Computer Misuse Act could become a 
prevalent part of the criminal law when it comes to governing online 
behaviour in certain circumstances. For example, if an individual hacked into 
another person’s social media account, obtaining information which is later 
used to blackmail another, this would amount to a breach of section 2 of the 
Computer Misuse Act.  
 
 
36 BBC Panorama, ‘What Facebook Knows About You’ (BBC IPlayer, 8 May 2017) 
<https://www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/episode/b08qgbc3/panorama-what-facebook-knows-about-
you> accessed 12 October 2017  
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The Computer Misuse Act also regulates ‘unauthorised acts with intent to 
impair, or with recklessness as to impairing, [the] operation of computer, etc’ 
under section 3 of the Act. Essentially, this section governs the conduct of 
damaging another’s computer so that it cannot be used, whilst also 
prohibiting denial of services.37 Denial of services:  
 ‘… are launched against computer systems or networks to cause a 
loss of service to users, typically the loss of network connectivity by 
consuming the bandwidth of the victim network or by overloading its 
computational resources.’38 
 
The actus reus of the offence under section 3 of the Computer Misuse Act is 
the unauthorised access to another’s computer system to affect the use of 
the computer, hinder access to data or programmes or alter data or 
programmes contained on the device. The mens rea covers both intention 
and recklessness. Section 3 of the Computer Misuse Act was used as a 
further provision to criminalise the conduct of Crosskey, as mentioned above. 
After gaining access to Ms Gomez’s Facebook profile he subsequently 
changed her password, denying her and her manager access to the account. 
Consequently, he was prosecuted for a breach of section 3 of the Computer 
Misuse Act, along with breaching section 1 of the Act.    
 
Section 3 of the Computer Misuse Act can apply in relation to social media 
abuse. But like that of the other two sections, its application only occurs in 
limited circumstances. For instance, hacking another’s social media account 
to taunt and abuse a person. This does not necessarily mean that online 
abusers do not use the conduct of hacking to target other individuals, it could 
 
37 This was amended by the Police and Justice Act 2006 section 36   
38 Neil MacEwan, ‘The Computer Misuse Act 1990: lessons from its past and predications for 
its future’ (2008) 12 Criminal Law Review 955, 960 
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be that hacking is underreported due to the disclosure of private 
information.39   
 
Despite the Law Commission emphasising the need to specifically 
criminalise the conduct of computer misuse there were opposing opinions 
following the Computer Misuse Act receiving Royal Assent:    
‘When the Computer Misuse Act arrived, some had already 
questioned why the unauthorised access of confidential information 
held on a computer should be an offence where if the same 
information were held on card index no offence would be 
committed.’40 
 
MacEwan suggests that computer hacking is similar to the conduct of 
trespass to land.41 At its very basic, trespass is entering another’s property or 
land without seeking permission and is a civil law offence.42 This is supported 
further by Brenner, who like that of MacEwan, argues that computer hacking 
has similar characteristics to that of trespass to land:  
‘… hacking is conceptually very similar to trespass in the physical 
world. Similar to trespass, it involves a violation of a use restriction on 
property that is committed by someone who has no right to access the 
property.’43 
 
Both Brenner and MacEwan support the concept that computer hacking 
should be a civil matter due to its similarities with the conduct of trespass. 
Furthermore, Christie argues that the current criminalisation of computer 
hacking results in fewer reports to the police for fear of the information 
 
39 Holt & Schell n.18, 66 
40 MacEwan n.38, 956 
41 Ibid.,  
42 Kirsty Horsey & Erika Rackley, Tort Law (4th edn, Oxford University Press 2015) 515 
43 Susan W Brenner, Cybercrime: Criminal Threats from Cyberspace (Greenwood 
Publishing Group 2010) 51 
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making its way into the public domain during criminal court proceedings.44 
Whereas under civil law proceedings the court can balance the competing 
interests of all parties. For instance:  
‘[t]he civil law can endeavour to balance the competing interests in 
protecting economic endeavour against the desirability of an “open” 
flow of information in society. The criminal law cannot.’45   
 
To bring a case before the civil courts the cost would be inflicted upon the 
party who has already been subjected to computer misuse. As stated in the 
Law Commission’s report computer misuse can have a financial 
consequence for the victim.46 It would be unreasonable to expect individuals 
to pay further money to take legal action against the perpetrator of the 
offence. Furthermore, civil law does not necessarily create a strong deterrent 
for future offenders, unlike that of the criminal law, though as noted in 
chapter two, deterrence does not necessarily work when it comes to the 
criminal law. 
 
Despite this, the Law Commission argued that the criminalisation of 
computer misuse acts as a deterrence factor: ‘The deterrence of such 
invasions of computer systems is a proper public goal.’47 However, as 
technology has evolved, prosecutions under the Computer Misuse Act have 
dropped.48 Between 1990 and 2013, 339 prosecutions were brought under 
the Computer Misuse Act, with 262 individuals being found guilty of an 
 
44 Anna L Christie, ‘Should the law of theft extend to information?’ (2005) 69(4) Journal of 
Criminal Law 349, 356 
45 Grant Hammond, ‘Theft of Information’ (1988) 104(Oct) Law Quarterly Review 527, 528 
46 Law Commission n.8, [1.5] 
47 Ibid., [2.15] 
48 HC Deb 16 May 2012, vol 545, col 175 
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offence under the Act.49 Consequently, very few successful prosecutions 
occur under this Act of Parliament. Whereas pro-criminal law theorists see 
the Computer Misuse Act as a positive approach to combating computer 
hacking.  
 
For Wasik the criminal law must intervene with this type of conduct for 
several reasons.50 First, computers carry a weight of importance within 
society. Although Wasik was writing in the early 1990s, this argument is even 
more relevant today. Most data and personal information is stored online or 
on a computer network, it is therefore important that this information is 
protected. Furthermore, as previously indicated social media companies, 
such as Facebook and Twitter, store vast amounts of information about its 
users which could be used as a form of online abuse. Second, there is a 
public interest element to the Computer Misuse Act. Wasik argues that it is in 
the public interest that individuals do not fear that their computer systems will 
be hacked.51 Consequently, it should be seen that society takes the 
behaviour of hacking seriously. Last, there are national security risks in 
relation to computer hacking. Though this might not be directly linked to 
social media abuse, it warrants criminal law intervention therefore providing a 
prime example as to why the Computer Misuse Act is an important aspect of 
the criminal law.  
 
 
49 Mike Penning, ‘Computer Misuse Act 1990: Written question – 222192’ (Parliament.uk, 22 
January 2015) <http://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/written-questions-answers-
statements/written-question/Commons/2015-01-27/222192/> accessed 12 October 2017  
50 Martin Wasik, ‘Law reform proposals on computer misuse’ (1989) Apr Criminal Law 
Review 257, 260   
51 Ibid.,   
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As discussed above, the Computer Misuse Act has been used in a social 
media related case, Crosskey. Yet the Act is not mentioned in the CPS 
guidelines on social media offences, a clear oversight by the CPS. Indeed, 
the Communications Committee in their 2019 report concerning online 
regulation, support the use of the Computer Misuse Act to target specific 
online behaviours.52 The Computer Misuse Act can be considered as an 
important Act of Parliament in combatting social media abuse. The Act 
conforms to all principles of legality whether that be from an International 
Criminal Law perspective or a European approach. For a law to conform to 
the concept of the rule of law, the legal provision under scrutiny ‘… must be 
accessible and so far as possible intelligible, clear and predictable’.53 The 
Computer Misuse Act conforms to each of these, intelligibility, clarity and 
predictability, but its uses are limited when it comes to social media abuse. 
Essentially the Computer Misuse Act is only applicable where a computer 
system or programme is hacked by an individual who does not have prior 
permission to access the information in question. This does not mean 
however that the Computer Misuse Act is redundant regarding online abuse. 
There are several scenarios where this Act may be suitable, for example 
hacking a person’s social media account to taunt them with personal 
information gained from the unauthorised access. For instance, Emily Robins 
suffered physiological abuse following her ex-boyfriend hacking into her 
Facebook account.54 It therefore needs to be referenced in the social media 
 
52 Communications Committee, Regulating in a digital world (HL 2017-19, 299) [11] 
53 Lord Bingham, ‘The rule of law’ (2007) 66(1) Cambridge Law Review 67, 69 
54 Rosamund Urwin, ‘Half of young women on Facebook suffer abuse’ The Sunday Times 
(London, 2 March 2018) <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/edition/news/half-of-young-women-on-
facebook-suffer-abuse-3lxbhhnjj> accessed 6 March 2019  




Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015  
Revenge pornography has been described as the ultimate humiliation, with 
many victims being female.55 In 2015 the act of disclosing to another a 
sexual image without the consent of the person in the photo, became a 
specific criminal offence under section 33 of the Criminal Justice and Courts 
Act 2015. The following discussion will examine why this conduct was 
considered so fundamentally wrong, that it was specifically criminalised 
under an Act of Parliament.   
 
The evolution of technology has not only created new offences which can be 
conducted online, such as that of online mobbing or doxing, it has also 
allowed offences which were once conducted in a private setting to emerge 
in an online context, this is especially true in relation to revenge 
pornography. Revenge pornography is: 
‘the sharing of private, sexual materials, either photos or videos, of 
another person without their consent and with the purpose of causing 
embarrassment or distress.’56  
 
Though this conduct can occur offline in a technology-based world revenge 
porn is a growing online industry. In some cases, specifically designed 
websites have been created to solely host sexual images for revenge 
purposes.57 The first website created as a platform for revenge porn 
 
55 HC Deb 19 June 2014, vol 582, col 1368 
56 HM Government, ‘Revenge Porn: The Facts’ (Gov.uk, 2014) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/405286/reve
nge-porn-factsheet.pdf> accessed 19 October 2016  
57 It is currently legal for websites to display revenge pornography, but it is illegal for a 
person to upload a picture to these websites.   
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emerged in 2010: ‘isanyoneup.com’. In its first week alone the website had 
more than 14,000 views and in one three month period received 10,000 
photo submissions.58 It has even been reported that in some instances 
women have been forced to send naked pictures of themselves to website 
hosts in order to verify their identity, to get explicit pictures of themselves 
removed from these sites.59 
 
The behaviour of revenge porn can have detrimental effects on a person’s 
wellbeing and in some cases has resulted in psychological harm, including 
victims being diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder,60 resulting in a 
loss of employment,61 and consequently becoming withdrawn from social 
life.62 The behaviour of revenge pornography caught the media’s attention in 
2012 following a sexually explicit video of Tulisa Contostavlos, who at the 
time was a judge on the reality TV show ‘The X Factor’, being posted online 
by her ex-partner.63 The video went viral64 and was reposted across social 
media sites. Since 2010, the posting of revenge pornography has gone 
 
58 Scott R Stroud, ‘The Dark Side of the Online Self: A Pragmatist Critique of the Growing 
Plague of Revenge Porn’ (2014) 29(3) Journal of Mass Media Ethic 168, 170 
59 Alistair Carmichael, ‘Better protection for victims of “revenge porn”’ (alistaircarmichael, 
2016) <http://www.alistaircarmichael.co.uk/amendments_to_crime_and_policing_bill> 
accessed 11 December 2017  
60 Samantha Bates, ‘“Stripped”: An Analysis of Revenge Porn Victims’ Lives after 
Victimization’ (Master of Arts Thesis, Simon Fraser University 2015) 24 
61 Alisdair A. Gillespie, ‘“Trust me, it's only for me”: “revenge porn” and the criminal law’ 
(2015) 11 Criminal Law Review 866, 873 
62 Mudasir Kamal & William J. Newman, ‘Revenge Pornography: Mental Health Implications 
and Related Legislation’ (2016) 44(3) American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law 359, 
362 
63 Keith Perry, ‘Revenge porn: some of the biggest celebrity victims’ The Telegraph (London, 
30 September 2014) <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/celebritynews/11129357/Revenge-
porn-some-of-the-biggest-celebrity-victims.html> accessed 12 February 2018  
64 Viral means ‘content that is shared quickly and widely because of high interest.’ See, 
Jeremy Harris Lipschultz, Social Media Communication: Concepts, Practices, Data, Law and 
Ethics (2nd edn, Routledge 2018) 355 
Page 213 of 449 
 
beyond specially designed websites, to being actively published and shared 
on social media web pages.65  
 
In 2014 California was the first State in the United States of America to 
criminalise the conduct of intentionally distributing ‘… an image of the person 
depicted engaging in specified sexual acts …’ to cause serious emotional 
distress.66 Around the same time research started to emerge examining how 
the law in the UK should also make revenge porn a specific criminal offence. 
For instance, Mitchell argued that following Parliament’s intentions to make 
amendments to the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, this would have provided 
the Government with the perfect opportunity to prohibit the behaviour of 
revenge porn.67  
 
Mitchell went further to give an example of how she felt the law should be 
constructed:  
‘A person (D) commits an offence if- D intentionally or recklessly 
publishes, disseminates and/or distributes by any means an image of 
a person over the age of eighteen, either moving or still, captured by 
D or the subject in any format, of the uncovered, or visible through 
less than fully opaque clothing, body parts of another identifiable 
person or an image of another identifiable person engaged in a sexual 
act, where D knows or ought to know that the depicted person does 
not consent to the distribution of the image.’68  
 
 
65 Shared means actively reposting another person’s comments via your own social media 
profile. 
66 California Penal Code 647 (USA). See also, Suzanne Choney, ‘“Revenge porn” law in 
California could pave way for rest of nation’ NBC News (New York, 3 September 2013) 
<https://www.nbcnews.com/technolog/revenge-porn-law-california-could-pave-way-rest-
nation-8C11022538> accessed 12 February 2018  
67 Justine Mitchell, ‘Censorship in cyberspace: closing the net on “revenge porn”’ (2014) 
25(8) Entertainment Law Review 283 
68 Ibid., 288 
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For Mitchell, the actus reus of the offence would be committed when the 
defendant published or distributed a sexualised image. The mens rea would 
be built on the construction of knowledge, intention and recklessness, 
essentially, giving the criminal justice system a wide interpretation of this 
type of conduct. She states that body parts, under the ideal law prohibiting 
revenge porn would include:  
‘[u]nclothed external genitalia, the perineum and anus of a male or 
female; Buttocks of a male or female; Breasts and nipples of a female; 
and covered erectile genitalia of a male.’69 
 
Whereas:  
‘“sexual act[s]” … is not limited to sexual intercourse including genital-
genital, oral-genital, anal-genital, oral-anal, whether between persons 
of the same or opposite sex.’70 
 
The approach taken by Mitchell in criminalising revenge pornography reflects 
the detrimental effects this type of behaviour can have on a person, as 
exposed further in the work of Bates.  
 
Bates conducted eighteen semi-structured interviews with revenge porn 
‘survivors’, using a snowballing sample.71 Her study aimed to expose the 
mental anguish associated with this form of conduct and its effects on 
everyday life.72 Each participant in the study was able to speak freely about 
their experiences of revenge pornography. For instance, one participant 
 
69 Ibid., 289 
70 Ibid.,  
71 By survivors Bates means those who have been subjected to revenge pornography but 
uses the term ‘survivors’ as it ‘implies a more empowering label rather than giving “victim” 
labels that imply less agency.’ Samantha Bates, ‘Revenge Porn and Mental Health: A 
Qualitative Analysis of the Mental Health Effects of Revenge Porn on Female Survivors’ 
(2017) 12(1) Feminist Criminology 22, 27 
72 Bates n.60  
Page 215 of 449 
 
spoke of the obsessive behaviour she undertook as a result of becoming a 
survivor of revenge porn:  
‘“I didn’t sleep for months … when this happened in 2010, I would pop 
[sic] awake, and I would have to check my e-mail address, my work e-
mail address, my Facebook page, I had this ritual, and I would have to 
perform this ritual. I’d check eBay, I’d Google my name, you know, the 
same thing. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 … I had to do these things. I’d do them 
three or four times, and be able to go back to sleep. But then I’d wake 
up.”’73 
 
Revenge pornography can alter a person’s life dramatically which has been 
the main driving force for its criminalisation across the globe.74  
 
In 2014 a debate was held in Westminster Parliament examining the 
possibility of the creation of a specific criminal offence prohibiting non-
consensual imagery, following the likes of several States in America 
criminalising this form of behaviour.75 During the debate arguments were put 
forward that the concept of revenge pornography was already a criminal 
offence. For instance, the Obscene Publications Act 1959 and 1964 could be 
used to prosecute individuals who distributed sexually explicit images without 
consent.76 Under this Act of Parliament it is a criminal offence to publish an 
image which may ‘… deprave and corrupt persons who are likely, having 
regard to all circumstances, to read, see or hear the matter contained or 
embodied in it.’77 Those convicted under the Obscene Publications Act can 
receive a custodial sentence of up to six months and/or a fine. However, the 
 
73 Ibid., 63-64  
74 Ben Robinson & Nicola Dowling, ‘Revenge porn laws “not working”, says victims group’ 
The BBC (London, 19 May 2019) <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-48309752> accessed 26 
June 2019 
75 HC Deb 19 June 2014, vol 582, col 1374 
76 This was supported in a report conducted by the Communications Committee in 2014. 
See, Communications Committee, Social Media and Criminal Offences (HL 2014-15, 37) 
77 Obscene Publications Act 1959 and 1964 section 1(1) 
Page 216 of 449 
 
conditions under the Act means that the image needs to be at its very basic, 
‘obscene’.  
 
Revenge porn is not always considered obscene due to the imagery or video 
being considered something likely to be part of mainstream society today.78 
Therefore, if the image can be regarded as mainstream there would be no 
offence under the Obscene Publications Act. Other Acts which were 
considered to be applicable to revenge porn prosecutions included the 
Protection from Harassment Act 1997, the Malicious Communications Act 
1988 and the Communications Act 2003. It was put forward that these Acts 
of Parliament all criminalised the conduct of revenge pornography.79  
 
Despite the stance taken by some politicians that revenge pornography was 
already criminalised, Martin Horwood MP disputed this argument:  
‘I am afraid I am going to go a little further than the right hon. Member 
for Basingstoke (Maria Miller) and say that nothing I have heard 
suggests that there are any laws that can be used in a situation when, 
for instance, the image has not been hacked, the person is an adult, 
the photos are not grossly offensive- because they were probably 
taken in a private context originally- and Google, or whichever search 
engine transmits them through links, does not intend to cause offence. 
There do not seem to be any legal remedies among the Acts the 
Minister has mentioned [sic] ...’.80 
 
Following this debate and further pressure from non-government 
organisations,81 the behaviour of revenge pornography was specifically 
 
78 Gillespie n.61, 876 
79 HC Deb 19 June 2014, vol 582, col 1370 
80 HC Deb 19 June 2014, vol 582, col 1373-1374 
81 Holly Jacobs, ‘This is what it is like to be the victim of revenge porn, and why we need to 
criminalise it’ The Telegraph (London, 13 February 2015) 
<http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/this-is-what-it-is-like-to-be-the-victim-of-
revenge-porn-and-why-we-need-to-criminalise-it-10045067.html> accessed 12 February 
2018  
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criminalised under section 33 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act. The first 
conviction for revenge pornography came around four months’ after its 
prohibition.82  
 
Section 33 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act now makes it a specific 
criminal offence: 
 ‘… for a person to disclose a private sexual photograph or film if the 
disclosure is made without the consent of an individual who appears 
in the photograph or film; with the intention of causing that individual 
distress.’ 
 
The Act gives the justice system a wider interpretation in relation to private 
and sexual imagery compared to the Obscene Publications Act and other 
Acts, which were used prior to the changes in the law.83 The actus reus of 
the offence consists of several elements. First, the defendant must ‘disclose 
a private sexual photograph or film’. Here it is considered that ‘[a] person 
“discloses” something to a person if, by any means, he or she gives or shows 
it to the person or makes it available to the person.’84  
 
Second, to satisfy the actus reus of section 33 the image must be both 
private and sexual. Section 35(2) of the Act defines private as ‘… something 
that is not of a kind ordinarily seen in public’, though the picture itself does 
 
82  R v Jason Asagba Reading Magistrates’ Court 1 September 2015 (unreported). See also,   
Siobhan Fention, ‘Revenge porn laws: First person found guilty under new laws to be 
sentenced today’ The Independent (London, 7 August 2015) 
<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/revenge-porn-laws-first-person-found-guilty-
under-new-laws-to-be-sentenced-today-10444898.html> accessed 19 October 2016 
83 Gillespie n.61, 876 
84 The Criminal Justice and Court Act 2015 section 34(2). The law has adapted to cover 
‘availability’ to include modern technology, as demonstrated in R v Dooley (Michael) [2005] 
EWCA Crim 3093, [2006] 1 W.L.R. 775, where it was held that the storing of indecent 
images of children on a shared networked computer file, amounted to ‘availability’. Arguably, 
this approach would also apply to the law criminalising revenge pornography.   
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not have to be taken in a private setting.85 Whereas, an image is considered 
sexual if it falls into one of the following three categories:   
‘… it shows all or part of an individual’s exposed genitals or pubic 
area; it shows something that a reasonable person would consider to 
be sexual because of its nature; or its content, taken as a whole, is 
such that a reasonable person would consider it to be sexual.’86 
 
The CPS guidelines on prosecuting the offence of disclosing private sexual 
photographs and films makes it clear that images which are regarded as 
sexually provocative, may well fall within the second category of what is 
deemed sexual.87  
 
However, the law has been limited to exclude altered images:88   
‘The photograph or film is not private and sexual if …  it is only by 
virtue of the alteration or combination mentioned in subsection (4) that 
the person mentioned in section 33(1)(a) and (b) is shown as part of, 
or with, whatever makes the photograph or film private and sexual.’89  
 
With advances in technology, photos can be easily altered to present to a 
third party an image which replicates a real-life scenario, which in some 
cases has been used to abuse and torment others online. In 2014 Zoe Quinn 
a gamer90 and journalist, had to flee her home after receiving death and rape 
threats online following her publicly speaking out about how female gamers 
 
85 Alisdair A. Gillespie, ‘“Trust me, it's only for me”: “revenge porn” and the criminal law’ 
(2015) 11 Criminal Law Review 866, 869 
86 The Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 section 35(3) 
87 The Crown Prosecution Service, ‘Revenge Pornography - Guidelines on prosecuting the 
offence of disclosing private sexual photographs and films’ (CPS.gov, 2018) 
<http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/p_to_r/revenge_pornography/> accessed 12 December 2017  
88 This issue was further highlighted by the Law Commission, See, Law Commission, 
Abusive and Offensive Online Communications: A Scoping Report (Law Com No 381, 2018) 
[10.171] 
89 The Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 section 35(5)c  
90 Though there is no true definition of a gamer, Desborough suggests ‘[a] gamer is an 
engaged, active, interested and knowledgeable member of the gaming community for whom 
gaming is a primary hobby.’ See, James Desborough, Inside Gamergate: A Social History of 
the Gamer Revolt (Lulu.com 2017) 24   
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were treated in the gaming industry.91 Included in this misogynistic abuse 
were explicit photos of Ms Quinn which had been altered to show her in 
compromising sexual encounters, many of these images being linked to her 
ex-partner. One particular image, which was shared across the Internet was 
of Ms Quinn on all fours, undressed with semen across her chest.92 Though 
the image was altered, because of the advances in technology it was difficult 
for individuals to distinguish that the image was in fact fake. Though this 
case occurred in America, it is a prime example of conduct which was 
essentially conducted for revengeful purposes, which would not be covered 
under section 33 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act in the UK.93 
Subsequently, online abuse, in particular, revenge porn is becoming a 
feminist issue.94  
 
The final part of the actus reus which must be satisfied is that the image 
must be disclosed without the consent of the person in the picture. For 
instance, uploading a sexually explicit photo to a social media site, without 
consent, would satisfy this part of the actus reus. In cases which have come 
 
91 Keith Stuart, ‘Zoe Quinn: “All Gamergate has done is ruin people's lives”’ The Guardian 
(London, 3 December 2014) <https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/dec/03/zoe-
quinn-gamergate-interview> accessed 12 December 2017  
92 Anastasia Powell & Nicola Henry, Sexual Violence in a Digital Age (Springer 2017) 169   
93 The CPS guidelines on social media offences implies that this behaviour could be covered 
under other Acts of Parliament. See, The Crown Prosecution Service, ‘Guidelines on 
prosecuting cases involving communications sent via social media’ (CPS.gov, 2016) 
<https://www.cps.gov.uk/legal-guidance/guidelines-prosecuting-cases-involving-
communications-sent-social-media> accessed 10 January 2018. See also, Alexandra Sims, 
‘Trolling, Abuse, Sexting and Doxxing all targeted in ambitious new legal guidelines’ The 
Independent (London, 10 October 2016) <http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-
and-tech/news/online-abuse-internet-sexting-doxxing-trolling-new-legal-guidelines-crime-
prosecution-service-a7353536.html> accessed 12 February 2018 
94 Emma A Jane, ‘Online Misogyny and Feminist Digilantism’ (2016) 30(3) Journal of Media 
and Cultural Studies 284  
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before the courts this has been self-explanatory with little evidence that 
anyone has disputed this part of the actus reus in a matter.95  
 
The mens rea for a breach of section 33 of the Criminal Justice and Courts 
Act is one of intent. Essentially, it must be found that a person disclosed the 
private and sexual image intending to cause distress to the individual 
displayed in the image. For instance, in R v Clayton Kennedy96 the defendant 
uploaded an explicitly sexual image of his ex-partner on Facebook, intending 
to cause an ‘emotional impact on the victim.’97 The Act imposes a strict test 
when establishing an intention to cause distress:  
‘A person charged with an offence under this section is not to be taken 
to have disclosed a photograph or film with the intention of causing 
distress merely because that was a natural and probable 
consequence of the disclosure.’98     
 
Therefore, the Act entails that a positive requirement for intent is found.99 
Ledward and Agate state that in most cases:  
‘… intent is fairly evident, with many offenders admitting that they 
posted the images in retaliation for a perceived wrongdoing by the 
victim. To date, surprisingly few cases are emerging where the 
alleged offender has relied on the absence of intent in their 
defence.’100  
 
This narrow approach to the law differs from the suggestion put forward by 
Mitchell as discussed previously. She argued that the mens rea for revenge 
pornography should include not only intention but also recklessness to 
 
95 Jocelyn Ledward & Jennifer Agate, ‘“Revenge porn” and s.33: the story so far’ 28(2) 
Entertainment Law Review 40, 41 
96 R v Clayton Kennedy Cardiff Magistrates Court 6 July 2015 (unreported)  
97 Ibid., per magistrate Dr Chantal Nichol. See, The BBC ‘Cardiff man sentenced for 
“revenge porn” post’ The BBC (London, 6 July 2015) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-wales-
south-east-wales-33414500> accessed 15 May 2018  
98 The Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 section 33(8)  
99 Ledward & Agate n.95, 41  
100 Ibid., 
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ensure full protection for victims of this form of abuse. Arguably the term 
‘reckless’ was excluded from section 33 of the Criminal Justice and Courts 
Act, for fear of over-regulation.101 
 
The mens rea for revenge pornography is therefore restricted. If it can be 
found that an individual uploaded an indecent image for anything other than 
to cause distress, even if the victim was distressed, no criminal offence 
would have occurred under section 33 of the Criminal Justice and Courts 
Act. Consequently, the law governing revenge pornography does not 
criminalise the actions of uploading or disclosing an image for sexual 
gratification or financial gain.102 
 
Revenge pornography can have a significant effect on the victim, which was 
further reflected in a statement issued by Alison Saunders former Director of 
Public Prosecutions for the CPS:     
‘Revenge pornography is a particularly distressing crime for the victim, 
which is often, but not always, brought about by the vengeful actions 
of former partners. It is a violation of trust between two people and its 
purpose is to publicly humiliate.’103 
 
Consequently, the criminal justice system has attempted to take a robust 
approach to criminalising the conduct of revenge porn.104 Following the first 
 
101 Tyrone Kirchengast, ‘The Limits of the Criminal Law and Justice: “Revenge Porn” 
Criminalisation, hybrid responses, and the ideal victim’ (2016) 2 UniSA Student Law Review 
96, 98 
102 Dr Samantha Pegg, ‘Wrong on “revenge porn”’ (2015) The Law Society Gazette 
<https://www.lawgazette.co.uk/comment-and-opinion/wrong-on-revenge-
porn/5046957.article> accessed 13 December 2017  
103 The Crown Prosecution Service, ‘Man sentenced for “Revenge Porn” – Reading’ 
(CPS.gov, 2015) 
<http://www.cps.gov.uk/thames_chiltern/cps_thames_and_chiltern_news/man_sentenced_f
or__revenge_porn____reading/> accessed 19 October 2016  
104 Ledward & Agate n.95, 42 
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year of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act being implemented into the legal 
system, 206 individuals were prosecuted under section 33 of the Act for 
disclosing private sexual images.105 By the end of 2017 this had increased to 
465.106 However, research undertaken by ‘5 Live’, supported by the Revenge 
Porn Helpline, has highlighted the continuing issues of section 33 of the 
Criminal Justice and Courts Act. Figures obtained by 5 Live from 19 police 
forces in England and Wales exposed that the number of police 
investigations into revenge porn had more than doubled between 2015 and 
2019. Yet the number of charges during the same period for revenge porn 
related offences dropped by 23%. The Revenge Porn Helpline has been 
heavily critical of the law’s response to revenge pornography, going as far as 
arguing that ‘revenge porn laws are not fit for purpose’.107 Further issues 
were also raised about the lack of police training following a study conducted 
by the University of Suffolk in 2017. This uncovered that 95% of 783 police 
officers, who took part in a survey, had not received training on revenge porn 
legislation;108 despite the success advocated by the CPS on prosecutions for 
revenge pornography in their annual report examining violence against 
women and girls in 2017.109  
 
The studies above illustrate the continued issue of revenge pornography 
across England and Wales. Social media has been paramount in the 
 
105 The BBC, ‘Revenge porn: More than 200 prosecuted under new law’ The BBC (London, 
6 September 2016) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-37278264> accessed 12 February 2018   
106 The Crown Prosecution Service, ‘Violence against women and girls report: tenth edition’ 
(CPS.gov, 2017) 17 <https://www.cps.gov.uk/sites/default/files/documents/publications/cps-
vawg-report-2017.pdf> accessed 30 January 2018 
107 Robinson & Dowling n.74 
108 Ibid., 
109 The Crown Prosecution Service n.106, 1  
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distribution of revenge porn, as exposed by a BBC Freedom of Information 
request in 2016. As outlined in chapter one, the BBC exposed that between 
April 2015 and December 2015 there were 1,160 reports of revenge porn 
related incidences to police forces across England and Wales.110 Of the 
1,160 reports made to the police, 68% of the perpetrators in these matters 
used Facebook to expose explicit images of their victims, 12% used 
Instagram and 5% used Snapchat.111 For instance, David Jones from the 
Merseyside area used social media sites to post explicit pictures of his ex-
girlfriend.112  
    
Despite the prevalence of social media in cases of revenge pornography, 
under section 33 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act social media 
companies, like Facebook and Twitter, are not under a legal obligation to 
remove revenge pornography.113 Instead, the law currently relies on social 
media companies having their own policies in place to remove such content:    
‘Finally, the social media and ISPs need to play their part. They 
should improve their policies, respond so that people can use their 
services safely and ensure that, when images are posted that should 
not be, there are clear ways to take action.’114 
 
However, social media companies have created not only their own policies 
but also their own rules when it comes to revenge pornography. In 2017 the 
Guardian newspaper obtained Facebook’s policies on sexual content, 
 
110 Peter Sherlock, ‘Revenge pornography victims as young as 11, investigation finds’ The 
BBC (London, 27 April 2016) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-36054273> accessed 
12 February 2018  
111 Ibid.,  
112 R v David Jones Liverpool Magistrates 19 August 2015 (unreported). See also, The BBC, 
‘Wallasey man jailed for posting “revenge porn” images’ The BBC (London, 19 August 2015) 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-merseyside-33992110> accessed 28 April 2017 
113 The Crown Prosecution Service n.87  
114 HC Deb 19 June 2014, vol 582, col 1370 
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terrorism and violence posted on its site, including revenge pornography.115 
Facebook indicates that revenge pornography will only be removed from its 
site if three conditions are met:  
‘[The] [i]mages [are] produced in a private setting; AND [the] [p]erson 
in image is nude, near nude, or sexually active; AND [l]ack of consent 
confirmed by: [v]engeful context (e.g. caption, comments, or page 
title), OR [i]ndependent sources (e.g. media coverage, or LE [local 
authority] record [sic].’116   
 
For Facebook, all three of these conditions have to be found for an image or 
video to be removed, in which staff have, in some instances around ten 
seconds to make a decision.117 Consequently, images uploaded for 
revengeful purposes may not always be removed by Facebook. For instance, 
if the image in question has been created in a public place and there is no 
indication in the caption that the photo has been uploaded as an act of 
revenge, it will not be considered as breaching Facebook’s revenge porn 
policies.118   
 
Due to the lack of response by social media sites in relation to revenge 
pornography, victims of this form of abuse must rely on section 33 of the 
Criminal Justice and Courts Act to take action against the perpetrator of this 
behaviour. Nonetheless, the provision is not without fault. Arguments have 
recently been put forward that victims of revenge pornography should be 
 
115 Nick Hopkins, ‘Revealed: Facebook's internal rulebook on sex, terrorism and violence’ 
The Guardian (London, 21 May 2017) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/news/2017/may/21/revealed-facebook-internal-rulebook-sex-
terrorism-violence> accessed 13 February 2018  
116 Ibid.,  
117 Ibid.,   
118 For a further discussion regarding Facebook’s revenge porn policies, see chapter three. 
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entitled to anonymity under the law, as the actions and consequences of 
revenge porn are similar to a sexual assault:  
‘The publication of a complainant’s name may only compound a 
painful invasion into privacy that has already been suffered by the 
disclosure of any intimate sexual images. Moreover, there is currently 
no mechanism for the effective removal of these images when posted 
online, and drawing attention to them by publishing the names of 
complainants redoubles the humiliation.’119 
 
In England and Wales victims of certain sexual offences are unable to be 
identified or have information released about them which may lead to their 
identification, as they have lifelong anonymity under the Sexual Offences 
(Amendment) Act 1992. However, this does not apply to section 33 of the 
Criminal Justice and Courts Act, despite the sexual nature of the offence, as 
it is currently considered a communications offence.120 Ex-policing minister 
Mike Penning argued that the act of revenge pornography mirrors that of 
blackmail, and consequently should not be put on the same statutory footing 
as sexual offences:  
‘… the offence [the disclosure of photographs and/or films without the 
consent of the person appearing in them] is more akin to the existing 
malicious communications offence or to blackmail than it is to a sexual 
offence.’121   
 
Despite the stance taken by Penning, research conducted by ICM has 
exposed that 75% of those surveyed122 believed that anonymity should be 
given to revenge porn victims:  
‘Automatic anonymity for all victims of image-based sexual abuse is 
vital in the interests of justice to ensure increased reporting and 
 
119 Pegg n.102  
120 Robinson & Dowling n.74 
121 This comment was made by the ex-policing minister Mike Penning. See, Ledward & 
Agate n.95, 41 
122 In total 2048 took part in the study. See, Sandra Laville, ‘“Revenge Porn” victims should 
get anonymity, say 75% of people’ The Guardian (London, 19 July 2016) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/law/2016/jul/19/revenge-porn-victims-should-get-anonymity-
say-75-per-cent-of-people> accessed 20 March 2018 
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prosecutions. We know that victims are reluctant to report this 
pernicious crime to the police because they fear their images or 
videos going viral on the Internet.’123 
 
Arguments have been put forward that section 33 of the Criminal Justice and 
Courts Act should include anonymity for victims.124 Currently, in cases of 
revenge pornography, victims can be publicly named in a court of law and in 
some cases in the media, this can result in some individuals not reporting the 
matter to the police for fear that others may be inclined to search for the 
image online.125   
 
There are also issues with how section 33 of the Criminal Justice and Courts 
Act has been drafted. As previously mentioned a narrow approach is given to 
the mens rea of the offence: ‘It is an offence for a person to disclose a 
private sexual photograph or film … with the intention of causing that 
individual distress.’126 Here, for an offence to be committed it must be found 
that the person who disclosed the image did this with the intention to cause 
distress. If this element is missing, an offence has not occurred under this 
Act of Parliament.127 Consequently, the Act misses the opportunity to 
criminalise other reasons why an individual may upload a sexually explicit 
image, such as that of financial gain.  
 
In addition, a narrow meaning has also been given to the term ‘sexual 
material’. The law has been constructed to only cover images which can be 
 
123 Ibid., per Professor Clare McGlynn 
124 Robinson & Dowling n.74 
125 Ibid.,  
126 Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 section 33(1)b  
127 There is a possibility that the defendant can be prosecuted under another Act of 
Parliament. For example, the Communications Act 2003.    
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considered as something not normally seen in public, it exposes a person’s 
genitals, or the reasonable person would come to the decision that the image 
was sexual. This leaves difficulties in prosecuting those who publish an 
image to a third party which may not be considered as sexual in today’s 
climate:  
‘Cases in which victims are depicted in their underwear (but the 
pictures aren’t of a sexual nature or don’t feature sexual actions) are 
unlikely to be considered for prosecution.’128 
 
The distribution of a photo of an individual in their underwear may well cause 
the person distress, but if it cannot be considered a sexual image, then no 
offence would have occurred under section 33 of the Criminal Justice and 
Courts Act.129  
 
Despite issues with the law it can be considered as a positive step forward 
that the law has expanded to specifically criminalise revenge porn. Revenge 
pornography has statutory protection that no other form of online abuse has 
been given, despite its effects having similar consequences to other 
conducts carried out with the aid of social media.  
 
Chapter Overview  
Both the Computer Misuse Act and section 33 of the Criminal Justice and 
Courts Act have been created from a technology perspective and can be 
seen to conform to the principles of legality. These legal provisions are clear 
 
128 Antoinette Raffaela Huber, ‘Revenge porn law is failing victims – here’s why’ The 
Conversation (London, 25 January 2018) <https://theconversation.com/revenge-porn-law-is-
failing-victims-heres-why-90497> accessed 16 March 2018  
129 In late June 2019 it was announced that the Law Commission would review revenge porn 
laws.  
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in their application and uphold the concepts of foreseeability and 
accessibility.  
 
The Computer Misuse Act governs three types of conducts: computer 
hacking, hacking with the intent to cause a further criminal offence and denial 
of service attacks. As demonstrated above the Computer Misuse Act can be 
utilised in a social media context, but only in limited circumstances. Yet there 
is currently no reference to the Computer Misuse Act in the CPS guidelines 
on social media prosecutions.    
 
Like that of computer misuse, revenge pornography has been made a 
specific criminal offence under section 33 of the Criminal Justice and Courts 
Act. Here, it is now illegal to upload a sexually explicit photo of another with 
the intention to cause the individual distress. Though this has been a positive 
step forward by the criminal justice system, issues remain with the 
construction of the law. For example, the Act does not provide anonymity for 
victims of this form of abuse or cover the conduct of altered images. 
Regardless of the flaws that can be found within the Act, the statutory footing 
given to the prohibition of revenge pornography is a positive change 
implemented by Parliament.  
 
The following chapter will examine in detail two further technology-based 
provisions, the Malicious Communications Act 1988 and the 
Communications Act 2003, alongside the CPS guidelines on prosecuting 
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social media offences. In recent years, these two Acts of Parliament have 
become paramount in prosecuting social media related offences.  
 
Chapter Five: Recommendations  
• The inclusion of the Computer Misuse Act 1990 in the CPS social 
media prosecuting guidelines;  
• Better training for law enforcement to ensure the Computer Misuse 
Act 1990 is fully understood within the criminal justice system; 
• Adapt section 33 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 to 
expand the mens rea of the offence to include recklessness;  
• Expand the definition of ‘sexual imagery’; 
• Prohibit revenge pornography in the form of fake images or videos; 
and 
• Ensure anonymity is given to victims of revenge pornography.
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Chapter Six  
 
Social Media, Criminal Law Regulation and Technology-
Based Legislation: Part Two  
Introduction   
‘Grossly offensive messages do not contribute much to improving our 
knowledge or participation as citizens in a democracy. Rather, their 
effect is to distort communications.’1 
 
Like that of the Computer Misuse Act 1990 and section 33 of the Criminal 
Justice and Courts Act 2015, the Malicious Communications Act 1988 and 
section 127 of the Communications Act 2003, govern technology-based 
offences. Though the Malicious Communications Act was originally enacted 
to govern all forms of communications, except those conducted 
electronically, the Act was updated to reflect online exchanges in 2001.2 Both 
the Malicious Communications Act and section 127 of the Communications 
Act have become significant legal provisions in prosecuting social media 
abuse.    
 
Where a complaint about behaviour online does not fall under a specific type 
of conduct, for instance harassment, stalking or revenge pornography, it can 
be considered a somewhat miscellaneous offence. Consequently, the 
behaviour may likely be prosecuted under one of two legal provisions: the 
Malicious Communications Act or section 127 of the Communications Act. 
 
Parts of this chapter have been published in the Journal of Media Law. See, Laura Bliss, 
‘The crown prosecution guidelines and grossly offensive comments: an analysis’ (2017) 9(2) 
Journal of Media Law 173 
1 Thomas Gibbon, ‘Case Comment: Grossly offensive communications’ (2006) 11(4) 
Communications Law 136, 138 (note) 
2 Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 section 43 
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These two provisions are often used to cover trolling online3 and are 
associated with offensive language that generally ‘… becomes a problem 
only when it is foisted on a recipient who may find it objectionable.’4    
 
In an ever-growing technology-based world, individuals are increasingly 
turning to the likes of Facebook and Twitter to vent their frustrations, often 
leaving what has become known as a digital trace:5  
‘[T]wenty years ago where a person made a racist remark in a social 
setting, the chances of the police ever hearing about it were small. 
Now a recipient can direct the police to the statement made online 
and allow them to witness it first hand.’6  
 
Comments made online can be readily searched for by third parties, meaning 
in many cases the statement goes beyond the creator’s original audience.7 
The issue for the criminal justice system is in establishing when a person’s 
online message goes from one intended as a joke to one so grossly 
offensive that it warrants criminalisation.  
 
The following discussion will outline both the Malicious Communications Act 
and section 127 of the Communications Act, taking into account the mischief 
behind their implementation. A comparison of the differences between the 
two provisions will be made before examining in detail the conduct 
criminalised under both legal provisions. In later parts of this discussion the 
 
3 Sarosh Khan, ‘Can the trolls be put back under the bridge?’ (2013) 19(1) Computer and 
Telecommunications Law Review 9, 10 
4 Gibbon n.1, 137  
5 A digital trace can be defined as ‘data produced by people while interacting with digital 
services.’ See, Andreas Jungherr et al, ‘Digital Trace Data in the Study of Public Opinion: An 
Indicator of Attention Toward Politics Rather Than Political Support’ (2017) 35(3) Social 
Science Computer Review 336, 336-337   
6 Jacob Rowbottom, ‘To rant, vent and converse: protecting low level digital speech’ (2012) 
71(2) Cambridge Law Journal 355, 367 
7 Ibid., 365 
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Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) guidelines on social media prosecutions 
will be examined.  
 
Malicious Communications Act 1988 
Since 1935 the criminal law has been used to regulate communications 
which were considered as inappropriate.8 The most significant change to 
communication law came in 1988 with the enactment of the Malicious 
Communications Act. The purpose of the Act was ‘… to make provision[s] for 
the punishment of persons who send or deliver letters or other articles for the 
purpose of causing distress or anxiety.’9   
 
Before the change in the law in 1988, issues arose in relation to poison pen 
letters. Poison pen letters are considered:  
‘a communication, written or otherwise, which is grossly offensive, or 
of an indecent, shocking, or menacing character, [which was sent] for 
the purpose of causing needless anxiety or distress [to the recipient] 
or any other person.’10    
 
Many of these letters, though distressing on behalf of the receiver, fell 
outside the criminal law.11 For instance, under section 11 of the Post Office 
Act 1953 it was an offence to send: 
‘… any indecent or obscene print, painting, photograph, lithograph, 
engraving, cinematograph film, book, card or written communication, 
or any indecent or obscene article whether similar to the above.’ 
 
 
8 For example, the Post Office (Amendment) Act 1935. See also, Alisdair A. Gillespie, 
‘Offensive communications and the law’ (2006) (17)8 Entertainment Law Review 236   
9 Malicious Communications Act 1988  
10 Law Commission, Report on Poison-Pen Letters (Law Com No 147, 1985) [2.1] 
11 Graeme Broadbent, ‘Malicious Communications Act 1988: human rights’ (2007) 71(4) 
Journal of Criminal Law 288 
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Problems occurred in relation to the terms, indecent and obscene. If the 
material was considered to fall outside the realms of indecent or obscene, no 
criminal offence had occurred under the Act.12 For example, the case of a 
coffin being sent through the postal system, though distressing upon the 
recipient, was considered as being beyond the scope of the Post Office 
Act.13 The gap in the law became even more significant for the criminal 
justice system when attempting to prosecute poison pen letters.   
 
In 1981 eight men were killed when their lifeboat went missing off the 
Cornish Coast.14 After this event occurred, some of the widows of those who 
lost their husbands in the disaster received poison pen letters.15 It was found 
that the letters sent to the widows were indeed grossly offensive and caused 
harm upon those who received them, but at the time this was not an offence 
under the law.16 As a result of this and other failures in the law to protect 
victims of this form of abuse, the Law Commission issued a report examining 
the criminal law framework and poison pen letters.   
 
The report conducted in 1985 found that there was a small but significant 
gap in the law whereby communications sent which were grossly offensive, 
fell outside the realms of criminal law intervention.17 Indeed, threats to injure 
 
12 Law Commission n.10, [2.8] 
13 HC Deb 12 February 1988, vol 127, col 620   
14 Shannon Hards, ‘The Penlee Lifeboat disaster happened 36 years ago today - we 
remember the heroes of the Solomon Browne’ CornwallLive (Truro, 19 December 2017) 
<https://www.cornwalllive.com/news/cornwall-news/penlee-lifeboat-disaster-happened-36-
945008> accessed 18 April 2018  
15 Broadbent n.11, 289 
16 HC Deb 12 February 1988, vol 127, col 615  
17 Broadbent n.11, 288 
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a person were not illegal in the criminal law framework of the 1980s.18 If the 
communication could have been considered as defamatory this would be 
contrary to law. The Law Commission found that in many cases the 
comments being communicated did not defame the victim.19     
 
During the consultation period conducted by the Law Commission, emphasis 
was placed on the types of communications which should be criminalised 
under the law. It was clear that there was an intention to cover letters, sent 
via both the postal system and sent privately to individuals which were ‘… 
grossly offensive, or of an indecent, obscene or menacing character which 
caused distress or anxiety on the victim.’20 Concerns arose however as to 
how far the law should go? The Law Commission discussed in detail 
examples of items which could be sent in the post that would cause distress 
or anxiety upon another. For instance, a tape containing grossly offensive 
material or human faeces. The Law Commission concluded that the law 
should extend to cover letters and articles which were considered either 
grossly offensive, indecent, obscene or of a menacing character. The Law 
Commission decided that electronic communications, such as those sent 
online would not be covered under the draft Bill they proposed:   
‘The offence will therefore exclude other forms of communication, 
such as those effected by oral means, by radio, telephone or other 
forms of electronic communication.’21 
 
Therefore, when the Malicious Communications Act was first enacted 
electronic communications, such as messages sent online, were not covered 
 
18 Law Commission n.10, [2.11] 
19 Ibid., [1.2]  
20 Ibid., [4.1]  
21 Ibid., [4.7]  
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under this Act of Parliament. This was amended under section 43 of the 
Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 following the increase in the use of 
technology within society.   
 
The Malicious Communications Act makes it an offence to send:  
‘(a) a letter, electronic communication or article of any description 
which conveys - (i) a message which is indecent or grossly offensive; 
(ii) a threat; or (iii) information which is false and known or believed to 
be false by the sender; or (b) any article of electronic communication  
which is, in whole or part, of an indecent or grossly offensive nature 
…’.22 
 
The actus reus consists of two elements. First, the conduct must either be 
considered a letter, electronic communication or an article which is sent to 
another. Electronic communication is defined in section 2A of the Act as: 
‘(a) any oral or other communication by means of an electronic 
communications network; and (b) any communication (however sent) 
that is in electronic form.’  
 
Therefore, messages sent with the aid of social media would constitute an 
electronic communication. Whereas an article takes a very broad definition 
and is defined under the Obscene Publications Act 1959 and 1964 as 
anything ‘… containing or embodying matter to be read or looked at or both, 
any sound record, and any film or other record of a picture or pictures.’23 For 
example, broken glass sent through the postal system may well fall under 
this Act of Parliament if other elements of the offence are satisfied. The 
actual criminal offence is in the sending of the message, there is no need for 
the intended message to be received by the recipient. This allows the law to 
intervene even if the letter, electronic communication or article is intercepted 
 
22 Malicious Communications Act section 1(1) 
23 Obscene Publications Act 1959 and 1964 section 1(2) 
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by a third party or the recipient does not receive the intended 
communication.24 
 
The second part of the actus reus for an offence to have occurred under the 
Malicious Communications Act concerns the content of the communication. 
Here, it must be found that the complained about letter, article or electronic 
communication falls within at least one of the following categories: indecent 
or grossly offensive, threatening or false. It is sufficient if only part of the 
message falls into one of these categories. For example, it does not have to 
be found that the whole communication was grossly offensive to bring an 
action under the Malicious Communications Act. How the criminal justice 
system defines these terms, indecent or grossly offensive, threatening and 
false will be critically examined in later parts of this chapter.         
 
For the mens rea to be established it must be concluded that the purpose on 
behalf of the sender was to cause anxiety or distress upon the receiver, 
based upon the context of the case.25 Though the Act contains no definition 
of these two terms, it has been found that anxiety is considered as falling just 
short of a recognised psychiatric illness as affirmed in Majrowski v Guy’s and 
St Thomas’s NHS Trust.26 Whereas distress can be defined as ‘oppressive 
and unreasonable behaviour’.27 Clearly, if a person sends a communication 
 
24 Law Commission n.10, [4.4] 
25 Malicious Communications Act section 1(1) 
26 Majrowski v Guy’s and St Thomas’s NHS Trust [2005] EWCA Civ 251, [2005] Q.B 848 per 
Auld LJ [45] 
27 Ibid., per May LJ [82]  
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for another purpose, for instance as an ill-thought-out joke,28 no offence will 
have been committed contrary to this Act of Parliament.  
  
In Connolly v Director of Public Prosecutions29 the defendant was convicted 
under the Malicious Communications Act for the sending of grossly offensive 
materials to several pharmacists. Connolly was a Roman Catholic pro-life 
campaigner and disagreed with pharmacies issuing the morning-after pill to 
female clients. As a form of protest, she sent pictures of aborted foetuses to 
three pharmacies that sold the morning-after pill. One of the matters before 
the court, concerned whether the images had been sent to cause anxiety or 
distress, or was in fact, a form of lawful protest:  
‘A person who sends an indecent or grossly offensive communication 
for a political or educational purpose will not be guilty of the offence 
unless it is proved that his purpose was also to cause distress or 
anxiety.’30 
 
The High Court had to balance Connolly’s right to freedom of expression as 
protected under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, alongside the ‘rights of others’, which would allow 
the court to legitimately infringe her right.31 The images sent to the recipients 
included a photograph of a deceased 21-week-old foetus with the face and 
limbs clearly visible. The court came to the judgment that the images were 
sent to cause anxiety and distress contrary to the Malicious Communications 
Act.   
 
 
28 Chambers v Director of Public Prosecutions [2012] EWHC 2157 (Admin), [2013] 1 WLR 
183 per Lord Judge [28] 
29 Connolly v DPP [2007] EWHC 237 (Admin), [2008] 1 W.L.R. 276 (DC) 
30 Ibid., per Dyson LJ [9] 
31 The infringement freedom of expression will be examined in detail in the following chapter.   
Page 238 of 449 
 
The Malicious Communications Act has also been successful in prosecuting 
offences facilitated via the use of social media. For example, Sean Duffy32 
was given an 18 week custodial sentence for sending indecent and grossly 
offensive communications via Facebook. Duffy trolled several Facebook 
memorial pages which had been created by the friends and family of 
deceased individuals, including a page set up in remembrance of Natasha 
MacBryde.33 Miss MacBryde took her own life at the age of 15 after being hit 
by a train. On the Facebook memorial page Duffy posted a video entitled 
‘Tasha the Tank Engine’, which featured Miss MacBryde’s face being photo-
shopped onto the cartoon character ‘Thomas the Tank Engine’. Other pages 
targeted by Duffy included the remembrance pages of Lauren Drew34 who 
had passed away following an epileptic seizure and Hayley Bates35 who had 
died in a car accident in 2010. 
 
Since the implementation of the Malicious Communications Act into the legal 
system of England and Wales, the Act has undergone several changes. Prior 
to 2015 the Malicious Communications Act created what was a summary 
only36 offence, carrying a maximum custodial sentence and limitation period 
 
32 R v Sean Duffy Reading Magistrates’ Court 13 September 2011 (unreported)  
33 Ben Moore, ‘Facebook internet “troll” Sean Duffy jailed’ The BBC (London, 13 September 
2011) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/uk-england-14907590/facebook-internet-troll-sean-
duffy-jailed> accessed 18 April 2018. See also, The BBC, ‘Who, what, why: What laws 
currently cover trolling?’ The BBC (London, 20 October 2014) 
<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/blogs-magazine-monitor-29686865> accessed 19 February 
2019 
34 Steven Morris, ‘Internet troll jailed after mocking deaths of teenagers’ The Guardian 
(London, 13 September 2011) <https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2011/sep/13/internet-troll-
jailed-mocking-teenagers> accessed 18 April 2017 
35 Ibid., 
36 Summary only offences are criminal acts which are triable in the Magistrates’ Court. 
Consequently, the maximum custodial sentence which can be imposed is up to 6 months 
imprisonment.  
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of six months.37 This was raised as an issue before Parliament by Angie Bray 
MP.38 In her constituency the police attempted to prosecute an individual 
under section 15 of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 2003, following 
an adult male sending sexually explicit pictures to a young female. Yet the 
prosecution failed because a meeting had not taken place, and therefore no 
offence had occurred under the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act. No 
further action could be taken against the individual as the six month limitation 
period under the Malicious Communications Act had surpassed.39  
 
The limitation period also created problems in relation to malicious 
communications sent online, as it restricted the amount of time the police 
could gather evidence to build a case against a defendant.40 To address the 
procedural limitations and sentencing restrictions, section 15 of the Criminal 
Justice and Courts Act 2015 made the Malicious Communications Act an 
either way offence,41 increasing the maximum custodial sentence under the 
Act to two years, reflecting the seriousness of the offence.42   
 
The Malicious Communications Act has become a prominent Act of 
Parliament in governing inappropriate content sent online. Nonetheless, its 
 
37 Limitation periods are ‘the time limit in within which the state may prosecute a particular 
crime.’ See, George P. Fletcher, Basic Concepts of Criminal Law (Oxford University Press 
1998) 10 
38 Ministry of Justice and Lord Faulks QC, ‘Lord Faulks QC speech to the Criminal Justice 
Management Conference’ (Gov.uk, 25 September 2014) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/lord-faulks-qc-speech-to-the-criminal-justice-
management-conference> accessed 18 April 2018 
39 Ministry of Justice, ‘Malicious Communications Impact Statement’ (Gov.uk, 30 May 2015) 
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_d
ata/file/321285/malicious-communicationss-impact-assessment.pdf> accessed 18 April 2018   
40 Ibid., 
41 An either way offence can be tried either in the Magistrates’ Court or the Crown Court.  
42 Ministry of Justice n.39  
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use has been somewhat limited since the enactment of the Communications 
Act in 2003. Indeed, nearly all forms of communication-based offences fall 
within the scope of section 127(1) and (2) of the Communications Act.     
 
Communications Act 2003  
Following the turn of the new millennium the use of technology and electronic 
communications increased dramatically across the globe.43 Subsequently, a 
joint committee report was conducted to explore how advancements in 
technology should be regulated by the law in England and Wales:  
‘We are living at a time of revolution in the ways in which we 
communicate. The worlds of telephone, broadcasting, mobile 
communications and the Internet are changing and converging with 
astonishing speed. Meanwhile, our current regulatory framework was 
designed for a different age. We need to update the framework of 
regulation, and put in place a system that recognises the current fast-
changing picture and can cope with the inevitability of change in years 
to come.’44 
 
In 2003 Parliament enacted the Communications Act to create legislation to 
keep pace with changing technology.45  
 
The Communications Act had several aims. The Act created The Office of 
Communications commonly referred to as Ofcom,46 paved the way for the 
switch from analogue to digital television broadcasting and ensured universal 
Internet access. The Communications Act has a wide application under the 
law covering all forms of modern communications including, though not 
 
43 Sarah E. Dempsey, ‘The Increasing Technology Divide: Persistent portrayals of maverick 
masculinity in US marketing’ (2009) 9(1) Feminist Media Studies 37, 52. See chapter one for 
a discussion on the increase in Internet usage.  
44 HC Deb 12 December 2000, vol 359, col 481  
45 HC Deb 12 December 2000, vol 359, col 483 
46 Ofcom is discussed in detail in chapter nine. 
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limited to, email, social media and SMS messaging.47 Section 127 of the Act, 
specifically governs the improper use of a public electronics communications 
network.48  
 
In Director of Public Prosecutions v Collins49 the defendant made several 
phone calls to his local MPs office, leaving racially aggravated comments on 
an answering machine. Though none of the staff were from an ethnic 
minority background they were distressed by the context of the messages. 
Here, it was confirmed by the House of Lords that section 127 of the 
Communications Act covered all forms of communication including email and 
the telephone. The Law Lords went further to discuss the purpose of the 
Communications Act. In the High Court Sedley LJ in his judgment argued 
that section 127 of the Communications Act was created to protect people 
from unsolicited messages.50 This was rejected by the House of Lords. For 
the Law Lords unsolicited messages were already prohibited under the 
Malicious Communications Act. In the opinion of the House of Lords the 
purpose of section 127 of the Communications Act was:  
‘… to prohibit the use of a service provided and funded by the public 
for the benefit of the public for transmission of communications which 




47 Rowbottom n.6, 363  
48 Note, broadcasters are exempt from prosecution under the Communications Act 2003 
section 127(4). It has even been suggested that this section of the Act can be used to 
prosecute two individual’s making strong racist comments over the telephone. See Director 
of Public Prosecutions v Collins [2006] UKHL 40, [2006] 1 W.L.R. 2223 per Lord Brown of 
Eaton-under-Heywood [26-27]  
49 Ibid., 
50 Ibid., [8]  
51 Ibid., [7] 
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Under section 127(1) of the Communications Act, it is a criminal offence to 
send:  
‘(a) by means of a public electronic communications network a 
message or other matter that is grossly offensive or of an indecent, 
obscene or menacing character; or (b) causes any such message or 
matter to be so sent.’  
 
Whereas section 127(2) prohibits the sending of false messages.52 Like that 
of the Malicious Communications Act the offence is in the sending of the 
message, there is no need for the message to be received. Consequently, 
the actus reus consists of two main elements. First, a message must be sent 
via an electronic communications network, and second, the message sent 
must be of a grossly offensive or of an indecent, obscene or menacing 
character or can be labelled as false. Despite the need in changes to the law 
to help combat issues with the advancements in technology, section 127 of 
the Communications Act simply mirrored section 43 of the 
Telecommunications Act 1984.  
 
Before section 127 of the Communications Act came into force, section 43 of 
the Telecommunications Act made it a criminal offence to send: 
 ‘… by means of a public telecommunication system, a message or 
other matter that is grossly offensive or of an indecent, obscene or 
menacing character.’53  
 
The only change made to the law itself was the term ‘telecommunication 
system’, which was replaced with the phrase ‘electronic communication 
system’, simply allowing the law to extend to cover the Internet, a change 
 
52 False messages will be discussed in detail in later parts of this chapter.  
53 This section of the Act has been repealed by schedule 19(1) of the Communications Act 
2003.  
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which had already occurred under the Malicious Communications Act in 
2001.   
 
However, unlike section 43 of the Telecommunications Act, section 127 of 
the Communications Act does not contain a specific mens rea element.54 
Traditionally criminal acts which lack a definitive mens rea are considered 
strict liability offences.55 However, using the principles laid out in Sweet v 
Parsley,56 the courts have substituted a mens rea element into section 127 of 
the Communications Act, arguing that it would be illogical for there to be no 
mens rea present: 
‘… Parliament cannot have intended to criminalise the conduct of a 
person using language which is, for reasons unknown to him, grossly 
offensive to those to whom it relates, or which may even be thought, 
however wrongly, to represent a polite or acceptable usage. On the 
other hand, a culpable state of mind will ordinarily be found where a 
message is couched in terms showing an intention to insult those to 
whom the message relates or giving rise to the inference that a risk of 
doing so must have been recognised by the sender.’57 
  
Therefore, for an individual to be held liable for a breach of section 127 of the 
Communications Act, it must be found that a grossly offensive, menacing, 
indecent, obscene or false message was sent to another recklessly or with 
intent, as demonstrated in R v Darryl O’Donnell.58   
 
 
54 The mens rea which was present under section 43 of the Telecommunications Act 1984 
was based on the intention to cause ‘annoyance, inconvenience or needless anxiety to 
another’, Telecommunications Act 1984 section 43(1)(b).  
55 For a discussion of strict liability see chapter two.    
56 Sweet v Parsley [1969] 2 W.L.R. 470, [1970] A.C. 132. The principles created by the 
House of Lords in the case allows the court to substitute a mens rea into an offence where 
the criminal act is considered a true crime as opposed to a regulatory offence.  
57 Director of Public Prosecutions v Collins n.48, per Lord Bingham of Cornhill [11] 
58 R v Darryl O’Donnell Londonderry Magistrates Court 29 July 2011 (unreported). See also, 
The BBC, ‘Man fined for Gregory Campbell Facebook comment’ The BBC (London, 29 July 
2011) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-14345649> accessed 29 April 2018   
Page 244 of 449 
 
There are some parallels between the Malicious Communications Act and 
the Communications Act. Both provisions cover similar types of behaviours 
with similarities in the actus resus of the offences. Section 127 of the 
Communications Act was implemented to control communications sent via a 
public network. Whereas the purpose of the Malicious Communications Act 
was to prohibit unsolicited messages. Nevertheless, it is not always clear 
within the law as to why one Act is preferred over that of the other.   
 
Malicious Communications Act v Communications Act  
Both the Malicious Communications Act and section 127 of the 
Communications Act can be regarded as similar. In Collins Lord Bingham 
attempted to distinguish between the two provisions: 
‘First, the object of section 127(1)(a) and its predecessor sections is 
not to protect people against receipt of unsolicited messages which 
they may find seriously objectionable. That object is addressed in 
section 1 of the Malicious Communications Act 1988, which does not 
require that messages shall, to be proscribed, have been sent by post, 
or telephone, or public electronic communications network. The 
purpose of the legislation which culminates in section 127(1)(a) was to 
prohibit the use of a service provided and funded by the public for the 
benefit of the public for the transmission of communications which 
contravene the basic standards of our society. A letter dropped 
through the letterbox may be grossly offensive, obscene, indecent or 
menacing, and may well be covered by section 1 of the 1988 Act, but 
it does not fall within the legislation now under consideration 
[Communications Act]’.59  
 
Whereas the Malicious Communications Act covers all forms of contact 
including those sent by post, the Communications Act only covers behaviour 
conducted through electronic communications. However, Lord Bingham does 
not clarify how the criminal justice system distinguishes which Act of 
 
59 Director of Public Prosecutions v Collins n.48, per Lord Bingham of Cornhill [7] 
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Parliament should take precedence when it comes to electronic 
communications. Indeed, Scaife suggests that both Acts have become 
interchangeable in the legal system of England and Wales.60   
 
In July 2011 an individual received a caution under the Malicious 
Communications Act for sending false information via a communications 
network.61 The anonymous blogger had made allegations that a contestant 
on the television show ‘Britain’s Got Talent’ had been groomed for the show 
by key organisers. The allegations were later proven to be false. 
Nevertheless, it has been suggested that this matter was pursued under the 
wrong Act of Parliament, in fact the individual should have been cautioned 
contrary to the Communications Act.62  
 
For an offence to have been committed under the Malicious Communications 
Act a person must send ‘to another a letter, electronic communication or 
article of any description …’.63 The key phrase here is ‘to another’. Indeed, 
the discourse of the Act suggests that the communication must be directed at 
a specific individual. Therefore, this Act of Parliament should only cover 
offences of private communications rather than public messages. For 
example, a private inbox message sent via Facebook. Consequently, a 
public post on a blogging site should not fall within this Act of Parliament.64  
 
60 Laura Scaife, Handbook of Social Media and the Law (Routledge 2015) 166 
61 Press Association, ‘Britain's Got Talent blogger cautioned by police’ The Guardian 
(London, 3 July 2011) <https://www.theguardian.com/tv-and-radio/2011/jul/03/britains-got-
talent-blogger-cautioned> accessed 1 May 2018  
62 Scaife n.60, 165-166 
63 Malicious Communications Act 1988 section 1 
64 Scaife n.60, 165-166 
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Under the principle of legality as discussed in chapter two, legal provisions 
need to be constructed in a clear and precise manner, for an individual to be 
liable for a criminal offence. In Kafkaris v Cyprus65 the European Court of 
Human Rights noted that:  
‘An individual must know from the wording of the relevant provision 
and, if need be, with the assistance of the courts’ interpretation of it, 
what acts and omissions will make him criminally liable and what 
penalty will be imposed …’.66 
 
Though the Malicious Communications Act and section 127 of the 
Communications Act can be considered as similar provisions, they both carry 
different sentencing tariffs,67 therefore certainty is needed. The discourse of 
the Malicious Communications Act indicates that the Act will only cover 
private communications, yet it was used to prosecute an online blog in 
2011.68  
 
The CPS have attempted to overcome this issue in their 2018 social media 
guidelines by highlighting the key differences between both the Malicious 
Communications Act, and section 127 of the Communications Act, in 
particular the difference between the mental elements of the crime. As 
previously discussed, for an action to be brought under the Malicious 
Communications Act, the sender of the message must have sent the 
communication for ‘… the purpose of causing distress or anxiety.’ Whereas 
 
65 Kafkaris v Cyprus App no 21906/04 (ECtHR, 12 February 2008) 
66 Ibid., [140] 
67 The maximum sentence which can be given under the Malicious Communications 1988 is 
2 years. Whereas the maximum sentence which can be given under section 127 of the 
Communications Act 2003 is 6 months.    
68 Press Association n.61 
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under section 127 of the Communications Act, the sending of the message 
must be done with ‘intent’ or ‘recklessness’ to the sending of a grossly 
offensive, indecent, false or menacing message. Here, the CPS, through the 
analysis of the discourse of the provisions, highlights that a higher evidential 
threshold test will be applied to matters pursued under the Malicious 
Communications Act:69  
‘Section 1 [Malicious Communications Act] requires the sending of a 
letter, electronic communication or article of any description to another 
person. Depending on the facts of the case, a social media 
communication which is merely a blog or a comment posted on a 
website may not suffice as sending to another. Prosecutors should 
consider the evidence that the communication was addressed (either 
by name or in terms) to a specific recipient, and how likely that the 
specific recipient was to receive it (did they also have a Twitter or 
Facebook account?) Section 127 [Communications Act] requires only 
that the message or other matter is sent, and so this will cover the 
posting of a message, and indeed re-posting or other sharing of a 
communication.’70 
 
By applying the 2018 guidelines the use of the Malicious Communications 
Act in the case of the ‘Britain’s Got Talent’ blogger, was indeed pursued 
under the wrong Act of Parliament.   
 
The difficulties in the criminal justice system distinguishing between these 
two legal provisions mean that individuals can, and have been, pursued 
under the wrong legal provision, an argument that is also applicable to the 
Protection from Harassment Act, as discussed in chapter four. In chapter 
four it was argued that the Protection from Harassment Act was being 
applied incorrectly, resulting in victims being failed by the law, as law 
 
69 The Crown Prosecution Service, ‘Guidelines on Prosecuting Cases Involving 
Communications Sent via Social Media’ (CPS.gov, 21 August 2018) [14] 
<https://www.cps.gov.uk/legal-guidance/social-media-guidelines-prosecuting-cases-
involving-communications-sent-social-media> accessed 11 October 2018 
70 Ibid., 
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enforcement regularly misunderstood the differences between harassment, 
stalking and grossly offensive behaviour. The lack of understanding of the 
key differences between the Malicious Communications Act and section 127 
of the Communications Act can leave victims of online abuse at a 
disadvantage, whilst also breaching the principle of legality.  
 
It is important to distinguish between the Malicious Communications Act and 
section 127 of the Communications Act, as both provisions carry different 
sentencing tariffs. Under section 127 of the Communications Act, a person 
found guilty of an offence prohibited under this legal provision can receive a 
maximum custodial sentence of up to six months imprisonment. Whereas 
under the Malicious Communications Act, an individual can be imprisoned for 
a term not exceeding two years.71 It is therefore of paramount importance 
that both the Malicious Communications Act and section 127 of the 
Communications Act are clearly distinguished in the criminal justice system.  
 
Types of behaviours criminalised  
Under the Malicious Communications Act, it is an offence to send a message 
which can be categorised as indecent or grossly offensive, a threat, or a 
message which can be deemed as false. Section 127(1) and (2) of the 
Communications Act prohibits the sending of a message which is false, 
grossly offensive, indecent, obscene or of a menacing character. In the 
discussion below each of these types of conducts will be taken in turn and 
explained in a social media context.   
 
71 Note, both provisions also carry a fine.  




The conduct of sending a communication which is indecent is criminalised 
under both the Malicious Communications Act and section 127(1) of the 
Communications Act. Neither Act defines the term indecent. Instead, the 
courts have come to accept that the term ‘indecent’ takes its ordinary 
meaning in a given society and will be subjective depending on the context of 
a case.72 Under the principles of legality in the criminal law as discussed in 
chapter two, legal provisions must be clear and certain so citizens can abide 
by the law. The idea that the term ‘indecent’ will be subjective depending on 
the case before the courts creates uncertainty within the law. This is 
especially true in matters concerning social media, as what one person may 
find ‘indecent’ another may not. However, it can be considered that indecent 




Obscene is defined as:   
‘… an article [which] … tend[s] to deprave and corrupt persons who 
are likely, having regard to all relevant circumstances, to read, see or 
hear the matter contained or embodied in it ...’.74  
 
Here, a matter will be considered to be obscene if the content goes beyond 
what is acceptable in a multicultural society.75 Though the term, ‘obscene’ 
may be considered as vague, the concept that obscene material is based on 
 
72 Director of Public Prosecutions v Collins n.48, [10] 
73 Ibid., [11]  
74 Obscene Publications Act 1959 and 1964 section 1(1) 
75 Handyside v United Kingdom (1976)1 EHRR 737 
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acceptability in a multicultural society, as opposed to the context of the case 
like that of the term ‘indecent’, allows for the law to adapt to the changing 
nature of society. As Lord Bingham argues:  
‘It is accepted that absolute certainty is unattainable, and might entail 
excessive rigidity since the law must be able to keep pace with 
changing circumstances, some degree of vagueness is inevitable and 
development of the law is a recognised feature of common law 
courts.’76 
 
Indeed, what may have been classified as ‘obscene’ 30 years ago, may not 
be today. Despite section 127(1) of the Communications Act prohibiting 
obscene material, in matters which can be labelled as corrupting and 
depraving a person the defendant will likely be charged under the Obscene 
Publications Act,77  as opposed to section 127(1) of the Communications Act.  
 
In R v Smith (Gavin)78 the defendant had detailed in several online chat 
rooms79 explicit fantasies of sadistic sexual acts to conduct on young 
children. The messages were sent to other individuals who were also taking 
part in the discussion. Instead of being prosecuted for sending obscene 
messages contrary to section 127 of the Communications Act, carrying a 
maximum sentence of 6 months imprisonment,80 he was prosecuted and 
convicted under section 2(1) of the Obscene Publications Act, which carries 
a maximum custodial sentence of up to five years.81  
 
 
76 R v Rimmington, R v Goldstein [2005] UKHL 63, [2006] 1 A.C. 459 per Lord Bingham [35] 
77 This Act is discussed further in later parts of this chapter.   
78 R v Smith (Gavin) [2012] EWCA Crim 398, [2012] 1 W.L.R. 3368  
79 An internet chat room is similar to a conference held online, where members join to speak 
to other individuals who may have the same interests as others in the group. See, Peter 
Reimann, ‘Communities in practice’ in Heimo H. Adelsberger et al (eds), Handbook on 
Information Technologies for Education and Training (2nd edn, Springer 2008) 280  
80 Communications Act 2003 section 127(3) 
81 Obscene Publications Act 1959 and 1964 section 2(1) 
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False Messages   
The Malicious Communications Act and section 127(2) of the 
Communications Act also prohibits the sending of a message which can be 
categorised as false. Put simply, a false communication is the sending of a 
message which contains information which the sender knows to be untrue. 
For instance as discussed above, the anonymous blogger who was given a 
caution under the Malicious Communications Act, for his statements 
surrounding contestants on the reality television show ‘Britain’s Got Talent’.82 
From an analysis of the CPS guidelines it could be suggested that this 
behaviour has now been extended to cover fake online profiles.  
 
In recent years, there has been a rise in the use of fake social media 
accounts created solely to abuse another.83 For instance, Kirstie Allsopp a 
Channel 4 presenter, had to approach the police in 2012 after receiving 
continued sexual threats from two anonymous Twitter accounts. She spoke 
about being told ‘… to shoot [her] own womb [and to] bleed to death with a 
spade in [her] vagina.’84   
 
 
82 Scaife n.60, 165-166 
83 James Titcomb, ‘Facebook admits up to 270m users are fake and duplicate accounts’ The 
Telegraph (London, 2 November 2017) 
<https://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/2017/11/02/facebook-admits-270m-users-fake-
duplicate-accounts/> accessed 30 April 2018. In May 2017 Facebook detailed the scale of 
abuse on its site. Their study found that in one three month period they had removed 583 
million fake accounts. See, Dave Lee, ‘Facebook details scale of abuse on its site’ The BBC 
(London, 15 May 2018) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-44122967> accessed 29 
May 2018. See chapter one for more details.  
84 Josh Halliday, ‘Helen Skelton quits Twitter after abuse from trolls’ The Guardian (London, 
2 August 2012) <https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2012/aug/02/celebrities-quit-
twitter-abuse> accessed 30 April 2018  
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In 2016 following the CPS updating their prosecuting guidelines on social 
media offences, discussed in later parts of this chapter, emphasis was 
placed on tackling the growing trend of anonymous online profiles:  
‘Online communication is developing at such a fast pace, new ways of 
targeting and abusing individuals online are constantly emerging …  
Offenders can mistakenly think that by using false online profiles and 
creating websites under a false name their offences are 
untraceable.’85       
 
The statement given by the CPS during the release of the updated guidelines 
in 2016, proceeded to give examples of behaviours which are criminalised 
under the law, including the creation of a fake social media profile containing 
false information. However, the statement stated that this type of conduct is 
categorised as grossly offensive under the law, as opposed to being 
classified as false.86 The 2016 guidelines themselves made very little 
reference to what constitutes a false message. Instead, the guidelines simply 
stated that the prosecutor should take into consideration that certain types of 
behaviours can be considered as false, with little explanation given.87    
 
In August 2018 the guidelines were further updated regarding what can 
constitute a false communication: 
‘The act of setting up a false social networking account or website, or 
the creation of a false or offensive profile or alias could amount to a 
criminal offence, depending on the circumstance. For example: [1] 
The former estranged partner of a victim creates a profile of the victim 
on a Facebook page, to attack the character of the victim, and the 
profile includes material that is grossly offensive, false, menacing or 
 
85 David Barrett, ‘Faking social media accounts could lead to criminal charges’ The 
Telegraph (London, 3 March 2016) 
<https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/crime/12180782/Faking-social-media-accounts-
could-lead-to-criminal-charges.html> accessed 30 April 2018  
86 Ibid.,  
87 The Crown Prosecution Service, ‘Guidelines on Prosecuting Cases Involving 
Communications Sent via Social Media’ (CPS.gov, 2016) 
<http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/a_to_c/communications_sent_via_social_media/> accessed 10 
October 2016 
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obscene …’.88     
 
The CPS supports the idea that false communications can encompass fake 
online profiles ‘depending on the circumstance[s].’89  
 
Threatening 
The Malicious Communications Act also makes it a criminal offence to 
convey a message which is threatening. Like that of obscene 
communications, it is unlikely that this type of message would be prosecuted 
under this Act of Parliament.90 Instead, other Acts such as section 16 of the 
Offences Against the Person Act 1861, which criminalises the conduct of a 
threat to kill, can be used. The key issue here turns on whether the 
communication can be considered as a credible threat. If it is regarded as 
non-credible then it is likely the sender will be charged with an offence of 
sending either a grossly offensive message or a message of a menacing 
character.          
   
Menacing Messages   
Under both the Malicious Communications Act and the Communications Act 
no definition of ‘menacing’ is included, instead it has come to be accepted 
that a message will be menacing if it can be considered a non-credible 
threat.91 The law has to distinguish between a menacing message and a 
 
88 The Crown Prosecution Service, n.69, [8]  
89 Ibid., 
90 The Crown Prosecution Service n.87 
91 David Allen Green, ‘The “Twitter Joke Trial” returns to the High Court’ (NewStatesman, 22 
June 2012) <https://www.newstatesman.com/blogs/david-allen-green/2012/06/twitter-joke-
trial-david-allen-green> accessed 30 April 2018. See also, Director of Public Prosecutions v 
Collins n.48, per Sedley LJ [10]   
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message which can be labelled as a joke or satire humour, even if it is ill-
thought-out on behalf of the sender.   
 
On 6 January 2010 Paul Chambers took to Twitter to vent his frustration 
following the closure of Doncaster Robin Hood Airport due to bad weather: 
‘Crap! Robin Hood Airport is closed. You’ve got week [sic] and a bit to get 
your shit together otherwise I’m blowing the airport sky high.’92 This tweet 
later came to the attention of airport officials. It was deemed by airport 
officials that the message was a non-credible threat, and therefore reported 
to the police rather than the Ministry of Defence.93  
 
Foster puts forward several arguments as to why the threat was deemed 
non-credible by authorities.94 First, the communication was posted on Twitter 
for widespread reading, which would be considered as unusual in the context 
of threatening to blow an ‘airport sky high’. Second, when examining the 
discourse of the tweet, the language and grammar were inconsistent with the 
intention of terrorism. Last, it would have been unusual for a person to 
threaten terrorism in such a way which makes the sender so easily 
identifiable. Consequently, Chambers was arrested and convicted of sending 
a menacing message contrary to section 127(1) of the Communications 
Act.95    
 
 
92 Chambers was due to fly to Northern Ireland to meet with a girl he had met on Twitter. 
93 Alisdair A. Gillespie, ‘Twitter, jokes and the law’ (2012) 76(5) Journal of Criminal Law 364 
(note) 
94 Steve Foster, ‘Freedom of expression: is there a human right to make a joke?’ (2012) 
17(2) Coventry Law Journal 97, 99 
95 R v Paul Chambers, Doncaster Magistrates’ Court, 10 May 2010 (unreported) 
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Chambers and his legal team appealed his conviction in the Crown Court96 
arguing that his message was intended as a joke, and therefore he did not 
have the relevant actus reus or mens rea needed to commit the offence. This 
was dismissed by the Crown Court who concluded that the tweet sent by 
Chambers was ‘menacing in its content and obviously so. It could not be 
more clear. Any ordinary person reading this would see it in that way and be 
alarmed.’97 He was later permitted to appeal before the High Court.98  
 
The original case heard before the High Court was subjected to a second 
appeal after an agreement was unable to be reached in the first case.99 
Unlike the finding of the Crown Court, the High Court came to the judgment 
that Chambers’ comments, though ‘ill-thought-out’, were intended as a joke 
and as a result quashed his conviction in July 2012:  
‘Satirical, or iconoclastic, or rude comment, the expression of 
unpopular or unfashionable opinion about serious or trivial matters, 
banter or humour, even if distasteful to some or painful to those 
subjected to it should and no doubt will continue at their customary 
level, quite undiminished by this legislation [Communications Act].’100  
 
The judgment of the High Court has been praised with Foster going as far as 
arguing that the case of Chambers was a ‘… victory for common sense’,101 
 
96 Chambers v Director of Public Prosecutions, Doncaster Crown Court, 3 March 2011 
(unreported). For a discussion of the case history see, Gervase de Wilde, ‘News: “Twitter 
Joke” Case goes to the High Court’ (The International Forum for Responsible Media Blog, 8 
February 2012) <https://inforrm.org/2012/02/08/news-twitter-joke-case-goes-to-the-high-
court-gervase-de-wilde/> accessed 2 May 2018     
97 Per Judge Jacqueline Davis found Scaife n.60, 135 
98 Chambers n.28 
99 Scaife n.60, 135 
100 Chambers n.28, per Lord Judge [28]  
101 Steve Foster, n.94, 101 
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after many commentators were heavily critical of the criminal justice systems 
approach to the matter.102 Indeed, Gillespie states:  
‘Paul Chambers should have been told to be careful about his choice 
of tweets, but prosecution was unnecessary, especially given that 
nobody took it seriously.’103 
 
It is estimated that the total cost of this case to the taxpayer was around 
£18,000.104  
 
The police, the CPS and the courts need to ensure they effectively 
distinguish between comments which can be considered as a joke or banter, 
and messages which can be deemed as menacing. This is even more 
apparent when it comes to the criminalisation of grossly offensive messages.  
 
Grossly Offensive Messages   
Both the Malicious Communications Act and section 127 of the 
Communications Act prohibits the conduct of sending grossly offensive 
messages via the use of a communications network. Put simply, it is an 
offence to send a message of a grossly offensive nature via all forms of 
technology under both legal provisions. For the criminal justice system, it is 
denoting what is meant by the term ‘grossly offensive’:  
‘Some of us might draw the boundary in one place, whilst others who 
are particularly concerned about the development of electronic 
communications might draw it in another.’105 
 
 
102 Lilian Edwards, ‘Section 127 of the Communications Act 2003: Threat or Menace?’ 
(2012) 23(4) Computers & Law 22  
103 Gillespie n.93, 368  
104 Nick Cohen, ‘“Twitter joke” case only went ahead at insistence of DPP’ The Guardian 
(London, 28 July 2012) <https://www.theguardian.com/law/2012/jul/29/paul-chambers-
twitter-joke-airport> accessed 2 May 2018   
105 Law Commission n.10, [3.6]  
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In Collins, the matter concerning racist comments being left on an answering 
machine as discussed previously, suggestions were put forward by the 
judiciary as to what constitutes a grossly offensive message. For Sedley LJ 
in the High Court, a message can be labelled as grossly offensive when it 
breaches the ‘… standards of an open and just multiracial society.’106 
Whereas for Lord Bingham, grossly offensive comments can be defined as 
‘… highly abusive, insulting, pejorative, [and of an] offensive character.’107 
Consequently, there is no true meaning in law as to what constitutes a 
grossly offensive message, instead ‘grossly offensive’ is deemed to take its 
ordinary English meaning.108    
 
On 1 October 2012 in Machynlleth Wales, the five year old child April Jones 
was reported missing by her parents.109 The case quickly caught the 
attention of the national press along with her picture being actively shared 
across social media sites.110 During the evening of 1 October Matthew 
Woods from the Lancashire area made several remarks on Facebook in 
relation to the missing schoolchild, before going on to make comments about 
Madeleine McCann, a child who went missing in Portugal in 2007. 
Comments included, ‘I woke up this morning in the back of a transit van with 
two beautiful little girls, I found April in a hopeless place.’ ‘Could have just 
started the greatest Facebook argument EVER [sic]. April fools, who wants 
 
106 Director of Public Prosecutions v Collins n.48, [11] 
107 Ibid., per Lord Bingham of Cornhill [13] 
108 Connolly v Director of Public Prosecutions n.29, per Lord Justice Dyson [10] 
109 Telegraph Reporters, ‘What happened to murdered April Jones and who is Mark 
Bridger?’ The Telegraph (London, 20 June 2017) 
<https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/0/happened-murdered-april-jones-mark-bridger/> 
accessed 29 April 2018  
110 The following day Mark Bridger was arrested, and later convicted of April’s murder. 
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Maddie? I love April Jones.’111 He then went on to make sexually explicit 
comments about the two girls. Because of these messages the next day fifty 
people descended on Woods’ home resulting in the police having to arrest 
him for his own safety. He was later rearrested for sending grossly offensive 
messages contrary to section 127(1) of the Communications Act.  
 
During the court hearing, it was argued by his defence team that ‘[i]n one 
moment of drunken stupidity he [placed] himself as public enemy number 
two - behind only the person who carried out this crime.’112 The chairman of 
the bench Bill Hudson concluded that the comments made by Woods were 
so ‘abhorrent’ that a strong sentence was needed to reflect the severity of 
the crime. Woods was handed down a prison sentence of 12 weeks.113  
 
Whereas a different approach was undertaken in the matter of Daniel 
Thomas.114 Thomas, a Footballer, took to Twitter following the divers Tom 
Daley and Peter Waterfield coming fourth during the 2012 London Olympics: 
‘if there is any consolation for finishing fourth at least [sic] daley and 
waterfield [sic] can go bum each other #teamHIV’. Despite the offensive 
nature of the comment made by Thomas, it was decided by the CPS that the 
statement was not so grossly offensive it warranted criminal law intervention:  
‘There is no doubt that the message posted by Mr Thomas was 
offensive and would be regarded as such by reasonable members of 
 
111 Steven Morris & Dan Sabbagh, ‘April Jones: Matthew Woods jailed over explicit 
Facebook comments’ The Guardian (London, 8 October 2012) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2012/oct/08/april-jones-matthew-woods-jailed> accessed 
29 April 2018  
112 Ibid., 
113 R v Matthew Woods, Chorley Magistrates Court, 8 October 2012 (unreported) 
114 The Crown Prosecution News Brief, ‘DPP Statement on Tom Daley Case and Social 
Media Prosecutions’ (CPS.gov, 2012) <http://blog.cps.gov.uk/2012/09/dpp-statement-on-
tom-daley-case-and-socialmedia-prosecutions.html> accessed 29 April 2018  
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society. But the question for the CPS is not whether it was offensive, 
but whether it was so grossly offensive that criminal charges should 
be brought. The distinction is an important one and not easily 
made.’115   
 
There is a line between offensive and grossly offensive commentary but, it is 
hard to distinguish when a comment crosses the appropriate threshold to 
warrant criminalisation. 116 For Lilienthal and Ahmad, the distinction simply 
falls on whether the reasonable person would find the communication grossly 
offensive.117 However, as argued by Gillespie certain sectors of society will 
always deem a message more grossly offensive than others, bringing issues 
in prosecuting abusive comments under these legal provisions.118 
Nonetheless, this is disputed by Rowbottom who argues that the current use 
of section 127 of the Communications Act and the Malicious 
Communications Act in governing online behaviour can be ‘… overly 
expansive and catch statements that might not warrant such serious 
treatment’,119 which in turn has a chilling effect on free speech.120 Yet there is 
no clear distinction as to when a message goes from one being of an 
offensive nature to one so grossly offensive the criminal law should 
intervene.    
 
Under the principle of legality:  
‘… no one should be punished under a law unless it is sufficiently 
clear and certain … and no one should be punished for any act which 
was not clearly and ascertainably punishable when the act was 
 
115 Ibid., 
116 Laura Bliss, ‘The crown prosecution guidelines and grossly offensive comments: an 
analysis’ (2017) 9(2) Journal of Media Law 173, 177 
117 Gary Lilienthal & Nehaluddin Ahmad, ‘Hate crime and social media in the UK’ (2016) 
22(7) Computer and Telecommunications Law Review 188, 191 
118 Gillespie n.8, 237 
119 Rowbottom n.6, 375 
120 Ibid.,378 




The matters of Woods and Thomas highlight the lack of clarity contained in 
the Malicious Communications Act and section 127(1) of the 
Communications Act in terms of what is considered grossly offensive 
behaviour. Though:  
‘[i]t is accepted that absolute certainty is unattainable, and might entail 
excessive rigidity since the law must be able to keep pace with 
changing circumstances, some degree of vagueness is inevitable 
…’.122 
 
Yet as potently put by Allen: 
‘… in today’s new, challenging digital environment, the existing body 
of legislative instruments, including the Communications Act 2003, do 
not provide for the degree of harmonisations, clarity nor necessary 
efficiency to meet the demands which cases such as Woods are 
placing on them.’123 
 
The lack of clarity and case examples illustrating grossly offensive material, 
means mistakes are occurring within the criminal justice system. For 
instance, the case of R v Alison Chabloz124 illustrates the continued 
misunderstanding of the term grossly offensive.  
 
Chabloz who defines herself as a holocaust revolutionist published several 
videos on the social media site YouTube. These videos contained footage of 
Chabloz performing songs set to the beat of traditional Jewish folk music, 
which contained anti-Semitic hate. ‘Campaign Against Anti-Semitism’, a not-
for-profit organisation, had made numerous complaints to the police about 
Chabloz’s behaviour online, yet no further action was taken by authorities. In 
 
121 R v Rimmington n.76, per Lord Bingham [33]  
122 Ibid., per Lord Bingham [35] 
123 Green n.91 
124 R v Alison Chabloz Westminster Magistrates’ Court 11 January 2018 (unreported) 
Page 261 of 449 
 
fact, at one-point Chabloz herself approached her local police force claiming 
she was being harassed online by the Jewish community, leading to the 
police believing she was a victim of online abuse.125 Following the lack of 
action undertaken by authorities, ‘Campaign Against Anti-Semitism’ chose to 
pursue a private prosecution against Chabloz, before the CPS eventually 
took over the prosecution of the defendant.  
 
Westminster Magistrates’ Court concluded that Chabloz had committed the 
offence of sending grossly offensive content contrary to section 127(1) of the 
Communications Act, a decision later upheld by the Crown Court,126 with the 
prosecution successfully arguing that:  
‘[t]he songs, specifically the language used within them, have been 
carefully considered and composed with the language chosen 
deliberately ... They are anti-Semitic, they are targeting the Jewish 
people as a whole and use both their content and their tone to ensure 
maximum offence.’127 
 
Yet if it had not been for the private prosecution the limitation period under 
section 127(1) of the Communications Act would have lapsed, despite there 
now being social media prosecuting guidelines in place. 
 
The Crown Prosecution Guidelines: Social Media Offences   
Following the matter of Thomas and the case of Chambers, the CPS 
announced plans to create and implement prosecuting guidelines on social 
media related offences.128 This followed further concerns about the lack of 
 
125 Laura Bliss, ‘Social Media: “A Theme Park just for Fools”’ (2018) 82(4) The Journal of 
Criminal Law 301, 303 (note) 
126 Alison Chabloz v Southwark Crown Court 13 February 2019 (unreported) 
127 Bliss n.125, 302  
128 The Crown Prosecution News Brief n.114 
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consistency within police forces to take the matter of online abuse 
seriously.129 The guidelines were released in 2013 later being updated in 
October 2016 and August 2018.   
 
Like that of other criminal offences, a two-stage test130 is applied by 
prosecutors in social media related cases, to establish if a complained about 
matter is worthy of a recommendation for prosecution. The first stage is 
known as the evidential test:  
‘When deciding whether there is enough evidence to charge, Crown 
Prosecutors must consider whether evidence can be used in court 
and is reliable and credible, and there is no other material that might 
affect the sufficiency of evidence. Crown Prosecutors must be 
satisfied there is enough evidence to provide a “realistic prospect of 
conviction” against each defendant.’131 
 
In social media related offences, the CPS must be content that the conduct 
satisfies the actus reus and mens rea of an offence governed by law. In the 
most recent version of the guidelines, Part A lists fifteen specific criminal 
behaviours which can be conducted with the aid of social media, alongside 
the Act of Parliament or common law principle that prohibits such conduct.132 
Here, prosecutors must find a clear breach of at least one of these legal 
provisions contained in the guidelines. The guidelines make it clear that 
 
129 Matthew Weaver, ‘Police are inconsistent in tackling online abuse, admits chief 
constable’ The Guardian (London, 14 April 2016) <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-
news/2016/apr/14/online-abuse-policeinconsistent-digital-crime-stephen-kavanagh> 
accessed 1 March 2017. See also Alex Bailin QC & Edward Craven, ‘Prosecuting social 
media: the DPP’s interim guidelines’ (The International Forum for Responsible Media Blog, 
23 December 2012) <https://inforrm.wordpress.com/2012/12/23/prosecutingsocial-media-
the-dpps-interim-guidelines-alex-bailin-qc-and-edward-craven/> accessed 20 July 2017 
130 For all criminal offences the CPS use a two-stage approach, known as the evidential test 
and the public interest test. See, The Crown Prosecution Service, ‘The Code for Crown 
Prosecutors’ (CPS.gov, 26 October 2018) <https://www.cps.gov.uk/publication/code-crown-
prosecutors> accessed 19 February 2019 
131 Ibid., 
132 The Crown Prosecution Service n.69, [7] 
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when it comes to offences governed under the Malicious Communications 
Act and section 127 of the Communications Act, a high evidential threshold 
will need to be passed before a recommendation for prosecution is made.133  
 
For Edwards the high threshold placed on grossly offensive and menacing 
commentary ensures freedom of expression is not restricted, as endorsed by 
the CPS prosecuting guidelines on social media related offences.134 In the 
previous versions of the guidelines the CPS made it clear that prosecutors 
must take into account an individual’s right to freedom of expression, a factor 
discussed in more detail in the following chapter, alongside ensuring the 
communication goes beyond a joke, when determining if a comment or 
conduct carried out on social media is worthy of prosecution:  
‘Prosecutors are reminded that what is prohibited under section 1 of 
the Malicious Communications Act 1988 and section 127 of the 
Communications Act 2003 is the sending of a communication that is 
grossly offensive. A communication sent has to be more than simply 
offensive to be contrary to the criminal law. Just because the content 
expressed in the communication is in bad taste, controversial or 
unpopular, and may cause offence to individuals or a specific 
community, this is not in itself sufficient reason to engage the criminal 
law.’135   
 
This is a similar approach endorsed in the 2018 version of the guidelines. Yet 
the guidelines do not refer to other ‘rights’ which need to be considered when 
it comes to the protection of victims from abuse online. For example, the right 
to privacy. As will be discussed in chapter seven, privacy is more than a 
person’s right to a private life, it entails a right not to have your mental 
 
133 Ibid., [10-15] 
134 Edwards n.102 
135 The Crown Prosecution Service n.87 
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wellbeing compromised. Online abuse can have a significant effect on a 
person’s mental health, as discussed in chapter one.  
 
The high threshold endorsed by the CPS in matters concerning the Malicious 
Communications Act and section 127 of the Communications Act, puts 
pressure on victims and the police to gather substantial evidence that a 
communications-based offence has taken place. This can be difficult as 
companies such as Facebook and Twitter are slow in aiding law enforcement 
as outlined in chapter three, which means in some cases the limitation period 
has passed before sufficient evidence can be gathered. In addition, as 
highlighted previously the criminal justice system relies on the self-regulation 
of social media companies, which is currently inadequate.136 Further 
endorsed by Rowbottom who argues: 
‘The difficulty with such self-regulatory measures is that it leaves the 
private body to decide what standards apply and make a 
determination about the content.’137 
 
The CPS guidelines are consequently a welcomed approach to the 
governance of online behaviour but are not without fault.138 
 
The second stage, which must be satisfied for a recommendation to be put 
forward by the CPS to prosecute, is that of the public interest element. All 
cases which are put before the courts must be in the public interest.139 Put 
simply, even if the evidential test is met, if a matter can be considered as not 
 
136 Sarah Birkbeck, ‘Can the use of social media be regulated?’ (2013) 19(3) Computer and 
Telecommunications Law Review 83 
137 Rowbottom n.6, 380 
138 Bailin QC & Edward n.129 
139 The Crown Prosecution Service n.87, 7  
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being in the public interest, the CPS will not support an application for 
prosecution. Here, several factors are taken into account:140  
• How likely is the perpetrator to re-offend? Emphasis is placed on 
distinguishing between individuals who make a one-off comment 
online, and those who partake in a campaign of abuse;  
• The age of the defendant. The guidelines make it clear that if the 
defendant is under the age of 18 it is unlikely to be in the public 
interest to prosecute them for social media related offences; 
• Did the suspect express genuine remorse? If the suspect expresses 
genuine remorse it is unlikely that a recommendation for prosecution 
will be put forward. Similarly, if the perpetrator removes the offending 
communication quickly it is unlikely to be in the public interest to 
prosecute;  
• Who was the communication aimed at? Communications which were 
never intended for a wide audience may result in a decision not to 
prosecute;  
• Does the communication contain a hate crime element; and  
• ‘The circumstances of and the harm caused to the victim ...’.141 
The CPS will evaluate all these factors before deciding if a matter should be 
presented before the courts. However, like that of the evidential test the 
guidelines state that ‘… in many cases a prosecution is unlikely to be … in 
the public interest.’142  
 
 
140 The Crown Prosecution Service n.69, [31]  
141 Ibid., [31]  
142 The Crown Prosecution Service n.87 
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Consequently, the high threshold test placed on social media offences 
means that victims of online abuse are often left frustrated at the lack of 
options available to them. For instance, Katie Price an ex-glamour model and 
well-known celebrity personality has successfully led a campaign calling for a 
change in the law surrounding abusive comments online.143 Ms Price has a 
disabled son Harvey who has been subjected to racist abuse online for 
several years. She has been very critical of the criminal justice systems 
approach to the abuse her son has suffered after police dropped charges 
against two Internet trolls who continued to make abusive comments about 
Harvey.144   
 
The purpose of the guidelines was to create consistency across the criminal 
justice system when it came to the reporting and prosecution of social media 
offences. Yet as discussed above mistakes are continuing to be made. For 
example, in the case of Chabloz the original decision by the criminal justice 
system was not to prosecute. Despite this, Chabloz was later found guilty of 
three counts under section 127(1) of the Communications Act following an 
initial private prosecution.145 Furthermore, since the creation of the social 
media guidelines the number of prosecutions and convictions under the 
Malicious Communications Act and section 127 of the Communications Act 
 
143 Petitions Committee, Oral evidence: Online abuse and the experience of disabled people 
(HC 2017, 759) 
144 Caroline Davies, ‘Katie Price urges MPs to act after “horrific” online abuse of son’ The 
Guardian (London, 6 February 2018) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/media/2018/feb/06/katie-price-urges-mps-to-make-online-
abuse-a-criminal-offence> accessed 1 May 2018 
145 As upheld by the Crown Court. See Alison Chabloz n.126 
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has decreased, with the exception of the Malicious Communications Act in 
2014, as demonstrated in figure six.  
Figure 6: The Number of Prosecutions and Convictions under the Malicious 





In 2012, 1,787 individuals were prosecuted for offences contrary to section 
127 of the Communications Act. By 2013 this figure had dropped to 1,315. 
Similarly, during the same period prosecutions under the Malicious 
Communications Act decreased from 772 to 689. By 2017 only 12 
prosecutions were brought under the Malicious Communications Act. 
Likewise, following the guidelines being updated in 2016, a drop in 
prosecutions and convictions occurred under section 127 of the 
Communications Act. The social media guidelines were created to ensure 
consistency across the criminal justice system in England and Wales, not to 
reduce the likelihood of prosecution. This is further reflected in the Law 
 
146 Ministry of Justice, ‘Criminal Justice System statistics quarterly: December 2017’ (Gov.uk, 
17 May 2018) <https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/criminal-justice-system-statistics-
quarterly-december-2017> accessed 25 February 2019 
CPS Guidelines  
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Commission’s report into social media offences where they highlight 
‘controversy over charging and prosecution decisions …’.147  
 
Nonetheless, for Rowbottom:  
‘[t]he legal responses can, however, seem heavy-handed for what 
might have been a statement made with little thought while the 
speaker was sat at a desk at home. Words typed in seconds followed 
by hitting the enter key can lead to a criminal record or costly civil 
litigation.’148 
 
Indeed, section 127 of the Communications Act and the Malicious 
Communications Act can be considered wide enough that it would 
criminalise racist remarks made between two individuals over the 
telephone.149 However, it is important to note the serious effects online 
abuse can have on another, both physically and mentally.150 
 
Chapter Overview 
Despite the Malicious Communications Act and section 127 of the 
Communications Act prohibiting online abuse, these legal provisions are 
insufficient in combatting this growing behaviour. Both provisions govern 
different types of behaviours which can be conducted online. Despite this 
these Acts are mainly used to govern grossly offensive messages.151 Yet the 
high threshold test associated with grossly offensive communications, though 
 
147 Law Commission, Abusive and Offensive Online Communications: A Scoping Report 
(Law Com No 381, 2018) [5.73] 
148 Rowbottom n.6, 356 
149 Director Public Prosecutions v Collins n.48, per Lord Brown [26-27] 
150 For an in-depth discussion on the effects of online abuse see chapter one.  
151 The Crown Prosecution Service n.87 
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protecting freedom of expression, means victims are often being let down by 
the criminal justice system.152  
 
From the discussion above, it can be seen that a spectrum has been created 
within the criminal justice system when it comes to inappropriate 
communications, as illustrated in figure seven. Though issues arise with 
regards to the boundaries between these types of behaviours. For instance, 
offensive comments are beyond the scope of the law, but grossly offensive 
commentary is not. Yet there is no clear distinction in law as to when 
offensive conduct will be deemed grossly offensive: 
‘Or, to put the matter more pertinently, if the two cases of Woods [the 
person who sent grossly offensive messages relating to the missing 
school girl, April Jones] and Thomas [the footballer who sent a 
homophobic tweet about the divers Tom Daley and Peter Waterfield] 
are on either side of a line between comments which are merely 
offensive and those which are grossly so, the question arises as to 
where that line lies.’153 
 
This, in turn has a direct effect on the principle of legality.  
 









152 Sandra Laville, ‘Online abuse: “existing laws too fragmented and don’t serve victims”’ The 
Guardian (London, 4 March 2016) <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-
news/2016/mar/04/online-abuse-existing-laws-too-fragmented-and-dont-serve-victims-says-
police-chief> accessed 1 May 2018 
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As discussed in chapter two the law must be certain, clear and accessible to 
uphold the principle of legality in the criminal law. The Malicious 
Communications Act and section 127 of the Communications Act, lacks 
clarity in terms of what constitutes a grossly offensive communication, which 
in turn leaves individuals at a disadvantage. In recent years various 
individuals in the public domain have been vocal about the abuse they and 
their families have received online, with many of these instances not passing 
the high threshold test contained in the criminal justice system. Indeed:  
‘The confusion in the case law would seem to demonstrate that 
emphasising the importance of context in the CPS guidelines may still 
not be sufficient to guide decisions to charge and prosecute.’ 154 
 
Arguably, the law has ‘tilted’ too far in the direction of freedom of 
expression.155 Those who are subjected to prolonged abuse online are not 
being adequately protected by the law, meaning other human rights are 
being breached. How the criminal justice system is attempting to balance 
inappropriate conduct aided by social media and human rights will be 
examined in the following chapter.   
 
Chapter Six: Recommendations 
• Include a clear and precise definition of false communications with the 
aid of case law examples; 
• Define grossly offensive and menacing material with the aid of case 
law examples and the CPS guidelines on social media prosecutions; 
and 
 
154 Law Commission n.147, [5.76] 
155 Zia Akhtar, ‘Malicious communications, media platforms and legal sanctions’ (2014) 20(6) 
Computer and Telecommunications Law Review 179, 181 
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• Ensure the social media prosecuting guidelines are updated to 
include examples to illustrate when a comment or conduct goes 
beyond someone’s right to freedom of expression.  
 
  




Freedom of Expression and Social Media 
Introduction   
‘As computers become less expensive, simpler to use and 
consequently more common in … homes (and workplaces), as the 
barriers to disseminating information through computers fall, bigots of 
all kinds are rushing to use the power of modern technology to spread 
propaganda.’1  
 
The use of modern technology has changed how individuals communicate 
across the globe. Messages can be sent in an instance and those intended 
to only reach a few reaching thousands within a matter of minutes.2 With 
easy access to the online world, online abuse is becoming an increasing 
problem for jurisdictions across the world.3 Social media has essentially 
turned private individuals into ‘publishers, content creators and news 
sources’.4 With an increase in social media use, law enforcement is 
attempting to balance Article 10 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, against other protected rights.  
 
The discussion below will examine freedom of expression in a social media 
context. To do this, first the definition of freedom of expression will be 
outlined, before turning to look in detail at Article 10 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (the Convention). 
 
1 James Banks, ‘Regulating hate speech online’ (2010) 24(3) International Review of Law 
Computers & Technology 233 
2 Ed Pilkington, ‘Justine Sacco, PR executive fired over racist tweet, “ashamed”’ The 
Guardian (London, 22 December 2013) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/22/pr-exec-fired-racist-tweet-aids-africa-
apology> accessed 5 October 2018 
3 Daniel Boffey, ‘EU threatens to crack down on Facebook over hate speech’ The Guardian 
(London, 11 April 2018) <https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/apr/11/eu-heavy-
sanctions-online-hate-speech-facebook-scandal> accessed 4 September 2018  
4 Anita Bernstein, ‘Abuse and Harassment Diminish Free Speech’ (2014) 35 Pace Law 
Review 1, 8  
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Following on from this, how a person’s right to free speech is applied in the 
context of hate speech and offensive commentary online will be explored 
before turning to examine privacy in a digital age.  
 
Freedom of Expression  
The concept of free speech is considered a fundamental principle of any 
democratic society. It allows individuals to challenge state authorities, whilst 
also promoting change within a jurisdiction. It is considered a right that every 
human should have with States having an obligation to ‘respect, protect and 
promote freedom of opinion and expression.’5 In 1948 the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) was adopted by the United Nations 
General Assembly to create a unilateral understanding of all aspects of 
Human Rights, with article 19 of the UDHR protecting a person’s right to 
freedom of expression:  
‘(1) Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without 
interference. (2) Everyone shall have the right to freedom of 
expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and 
impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either 
orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other 
media of his choice.’      
 
Despite this the growing use of the Internet has blurred the lines between 
freedom of speech and private information. This has led to law enforcement 
struggling to appreciate when a comment made by an individual online goes 
beyond the protection of a person’s right to free speech.6  
 
 
5 Council of the European Union, ‘EU Guidelines: Freedom of Expression Online and Offline’ 
(Europa, 13 May 2014) 3 <https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/eu-human-
rights-guidelines-freedom-expression-online-and-offline>  
6 Alan Sears, ‘Protecting Freedom of Expression over the Internet: An International 
Approach’ (2015) 5(1) Notre Dame Journal of International & Comparative Law 171, 172  
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The right to freedom of expression is protected under several legal 
provisions worldwide, including, though not limited to, Article 19 of the 
UDHR, Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
and Article 10 of the Convention. The United Kingdom is a signatory to these 
legal provisions and is bound to adhere to the protection of freedom of 
expression. Below, Article 10 of the Convention will be examined, as the 
Convention is now part of UK law following the implementation of the Human 
Rights Act 1998.7 
     
Article 10: Freedom of Expression  
The European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
came into force on 21 January 1959 and was signed by all 47 Member 
States of the European Council. The Convention itself consists of several 
Articles protecting what are considered basic human rights, including the 
prohibition of torture, the right to life and freedom of expression. Under 
Article 10 all citizens based in a signatory state are entitled to free speech:  
‘Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall 
include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart 
information and ideas without interference by public authority and 
regardless of frontiers …’.8  
 
In essence, every citizen has the right to express an opinion or thought with 
the European Court of Human Rights upholding the ideal that even offensive 
commentary falls within a person’s right to freedom of expression.9 However, 
 
7 Prior to the Human Rights Act 1998 coming into force, the Convention only applied to the 
Government.  
8 The European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms Article 10(1)  
9 Handyside v United Kingdom (1976) 1 EHRR 737 [49] 
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the right to free speech is not an absolute right and can be restricted in 
certain circumstances.  
 
The Articles contained under the Convention can be split into three distinct 
categories: absolute, limited and qualified. Absolute rights are considered 
those basic human rights which the State cannot infringe under any 
circumstance. So, for instance the prohibition of torture is an absolute right, 
which cannot be breached even in times of national emergency or during 
times of war.10 Whereas Article 5, right to liberty, is a limited right whereby it 
can be restricted under the exceptions contained within the Article itself. For 
instance, an individual can be deprived of their liberty when detained 
following a court conviction.11 The right to freedom of expression is a 
qualified right:  
‘A public authority can sometimes interfere with your rights if it’s in the 
interest of the wider community or to protect other people’s rights. 
These rights are qualified. Qualified rights may need to be balanced 
against other people’s rights or the rights of the wider community to 
achieve a fair outcome.’12  
 
All qualified rights can be restricted when three criterions are met: the 
restriction is prescribed by law, the restriction fulfils at least one of the 
legitimate aims contained in the second paragraph of the Article, and the 
restriction can be considered as necessary in a democratic society.     
 
 
10 The European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms Article 15(2) 
11 The European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms Rights Article 
5(1) a  
12 Citizens Advice, ‘When can a public authority interfere with your human rights?’ (Citizens 
Advice, 2018) <https://www.citizensadvice.org.uk/law-and-courts/civil-rights/human-
rights/when-can-a-public-authority-interfere-with-your-human-rights/> accessed 5 
September 2018 
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In England and Wales several laws exist to prohibit certain types of speech. 
For example, section 127(1) of the Communications Act 2003 prohibits the 
sending of messages which can be considered as grossly offensive, indecent 
or obscene, as discussed in detail in chapter six.13 Nonetheless, the 
European Court of Human Rights has made it clear that the legal rule 
prohibiting free speech must be clear and certain as affirmed in Sunday 
Times v United Kingdom:14  
‘In the Court's opinion, the following are two of the requirements that 
flow from the expression “prescribed by law”. Firstly, the law must be 
adequately accessible: the citizen must be able to have an indication 
that is adequate in the circumstances of the legal rules applicable to a 
given case. Secondly, a norm cannot be regarded as a “law" unless it 
is formulated with sufficient precision to enable the citizen to regulate 
his conduct: he must be able - if need be with appropriate advice - to 
foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the 
consequences which a given action may entail.’15  
 
In this matter, the European Court of Human Rights was asked to consider if 
a tabloid newspapers right to free speech had been infringed after the 
Attorney General sought, and was granted an injunction preventing articles 
from being published on the grounds of Contempt of Court.16 The Sunday 
Times had run several articles detailing an ongoing legal dispute between 
users of the pharmaceutical drug Thalidomide, and the manufacturer of the 
drug Distillers. In the late 1950s and early 1960s Thalidomide had been 
prescribed to pregnant women for morning sickness. However, the side 
 
13 Communications Act 2003 section 127(1) 
14 Sunday Times v United Kingdom (1979) 2 EHRR 245 
15 Ibid., [49] 
16 ‘Contempt of court is the established, if unfortunate, name given to the species of wrongful 
conduct which consists of interference with the administration of justice. It is an essential 
adjunct of the rule of law. Interference with the administration of justice can take many 
forms.’ Attorney General v Punch Ltd and Another [2002] UKHL 50, [2003] 1 A.C. 1046 per 
Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead [2]  
Page 277 of 449 
 
effects of the drug resulted in women who had taken the medication giving 
birth to deformed children.  
 
The newspaper articles which were published by the Sunday Times included 
arguments that Distillers should not amount a legal defence to the allegations 
against them, along with suggesting some of the evidence that may be 
presented before the court. Consequently, the Attorney General was granted 
an injunction for fear that the reports may affect the outcome of the Distillers 
trial, under the common law of Contempt of Court. The Sunday Times 
challenged the decision before the European Court of Human Rights on the 
grounds that the injunction breached their right to freedom of expression. For 
the European Court of Human Rights, free speech could be limited to 
maintain the authority of the judiciary, however the law limiting Article 10 had 
to be sufficiently clear and precise. As a result, the Court concluded that the 
common law of Contempt of Court was not sufficiently clear, breaching the 
applicants right to free speech.17  
 
The Sunday Times case confirms the key principle of legality in the criminal 
justice system. Here the law needs to be sufficiently clear and accessible in 
order to restrict a qualified right. If the law can be considered vague, the 
restriction will not be upheld by the European Court of Human Rights. As 
discussed in detail in the previous chapters several laws in England and 
Wales govern conduct carried out online. Nonetheless, not all these laws can 
 
17 The decision of the European Court of Human Rights paved the way for the creation of the 
Contempt of Court Act 1981.   
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be considered as clear and accessible to adhere to the principle of legality. 
For example, issues arise in relation to the term ‘grossly offensive’ contained 
in section 127(1) of the Communications Act. In fact, as discussed further in 
the following chapter, in India section 66a of the Information Technology Act 
2000 was struck down by the Supreme Court of India, as the term ‘grossly 
offensive’ was considered not to conform with the principle of legality.18  
 
If the law restricting a person’s right to freedom of expression can be 
considered as clear and accessible, next it must be established that the 
restriction meets one of the legitimate aims contained within the second 
paragraph of the Article. Each qualified right within the Convention contains a 
list of situations whereby a right can be restricted, so long as it fulfils one of 
the legitimate aims. The legitimate aims differ depending on the right being 
reviewed. For a restriction on freedom of expression to be upheld it must fulfil 
one of the following situations:  
‘… in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public 
safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of 
health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, 
for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or 
for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.’19  
 
All restrictions on freedom of expression must pursue one of the aims above, 
failure to comply with the principle will render the restriction unlawful.20 
However to pursue one of the legitimate aims, it needs to be necessary in a 
democratic society.  
 
 
18 For further discussions on India and the Information Technology Act see chapter eight. 
19 The European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms Article 10(2)  
20 Handyside n.9, [49] 
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For a restriction to be considered as necessary in a democratic society, it is 
for the courts to establish:  
‘… whether: (i) the legislative objective is sufficiently important to 
justify limiting a fundamental right; (ii) the measures designed to meet 
the legislative objective are rationally connected to it; and (iii) the 
means used to impair the right or freedom are no more than is 
necessary to accomplish the objective.’21 
 
The concept of ‘necessary in a democratic society’ was explored in detail in 
Dudgeon v United Kingdom.22 Dudgeon concerned the lawfulness of a legal 
provision contained in the law of Northern Ireland which criminalised 
homosexuality. For the applicant who sought leave before the European 
Court of Human Rights, the law breached Article 8(1) of the Convention: the 
right to privacy.  
 
Like Article 10, the right to privacy is a qualified right and can be limited when 
it is prescribed by law, fulfils one of the legitimate aims contained in the 
second paragraph of the article, and can also be considered as necessary in 
a democratic society. For the European Court of Human Rights, the law in 
question was sufficiently clear and pursued one of the legitimate aims 
contained under Article 8(2). Nevertheless, issues arose in relation to the 
restriction being necessary in a democratic society:  
‘It cannot be maintained in these circumstances that there is a 
“pressing social need” to make such acts criminal offences, there 
being no sufficient justification provided by the risk of harm to 
vulnerable sections of society requiring protection or by the effects on 
the public. On the issue of proportionality, the Court considers that 
such justifications as there are for retaining the law in force 
unamended are outweighed by the detrimental effects which the very 
existence of the legislative provisions in question can have on the life 
of a person of homosexual orientation like the applicant. Although 
 
21 de Freitas v Permanent Secretary of Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Lands and Housing 
[1999] 1 AC 69 (PC) 80 
22 Dudgeon v United Kingdom (1981) 4 EHRR 149 
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members of the public who regard homosexuality as immoral may be 
shocked, offended or disturbed by the commission by others of private 
homosexual acts, this cannot on its own warrant the application of 
penal sanctions when it is consenting adults alone who are 
involved.’23   
 
Essentially, it was found that criminalising homosexual acts between two 
consenting adults was not considered as necessary in a democratic society 
therefore breaching Article 8 of the Convention.24 The judgment of the 
European Court of Human Rights in Dudgeon illustrates that if there is more 
than one way to achieve a legitimate aim, the State has to use the least 
intrusive method, otherwise the restriction of the Article will be considered 
unlawful.  
 
In the United Kingdom all public bodies must adhere to the protection of 
human rights, as governed under the Human Rights Act 1998.25 Under 
section 6(3) of the Act, public bodies are defined as ‘(a) a court or tribunal, 
and (b) any person certain of whose functions are functions of a public 
nature …’. Here, the criminal justice system including the courts, are under a 
legal duty to consider human rights when coming to a decision on a matter 
before them. For instance, if a person is prosecuted for the sending of 
menacing communications contrary to section 127(1) of the Communications 
Act, the court when determining its judgment, must consider all rights 
contained in the Convention. In cases concerning online abuse, this would 
include the speakers right to freedom of expression and the victims right to 
 
23 Ibid., [60] 
24 Later parts of this chapter will examine in detail the right to privacy as guaranteed under 
Article 8. 
25 Prior to the Human Rights Act 1998, citizens could only invoke their Human Rights before 
the European Court of Human Rights when the State was in breach of their obligations.  
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privacy, discussed in more detail in later parts of this chapter. The following 
sections will outline how freedom of speech is currently applied in matters 
concerning hate speech and offensive commentary online.  
 
Hate Speech and Freedom of Expression 
Hate speech is a growing issue within Western society26 and is defined in the 
criminal justice system of England and Wales as:  
‘… a range of criminal behaviour[s] where the perpetrator is motivated 
by hostility or demonstrates hostility towards the victim’s disability, 
race, religion, sexual orientation or transgender identity.’27  
 
Following a rise in Internet usage society has witnessed an increase in online 
hate speech.28 Though the Convention itself does not contain a ‘free-
standing’ right prohibiting discrimination on grounds of a person’s disability, 
race, or indeed any of the other protected characteristics found in the law of 
England and Wales.29 
 
An individual’s right to freedom of expression includes a variety of different 
forms of communications including, though not limited to, art, radio, books 
and dance. As outlined above the right to free speech can be limited when 
three criterions are met: the restriction is prescribed by law, the restriction 
 
26 Caroline Davies, ‘One-quarter of Britons witnessed hate speech in past year, poll finds’ 
The Guardian (London, 27 January 2018) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/society/2018/jan/27/uk-hate-speech-poll-holocaust-memorial-
day-2018> accessed 1 November 2018  
27 The Crown Prosecution Service, ‘Hate crime’ (CPS.gov, 2018) 
<https://www.cps.gov.uk/hate-crime> accessed 26 September 2018  
28 Rachel Roberts, ‘Online hate crime to be tackled by new national police hub, Home 
Secretary says’ The Independent (London, 8 October 2017) 
<https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/online-hate-crime-amber-rudd-home-office-
national-police-hub-facebook-twitter-trolls-a7988411.html> accessed 5 October 2018  
29 Equality and Human Rights Commission, ‘Article 14: Protection from Discrimination’ 
(Equality Human Rights, 4 May 2016) <https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/en/human-
rights-act/article-14-protection-discrimination> accessed 23 October 2018  
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pursues one of the legitimate aims contained in the second paragraph of the 
article, and the restriction can be considered as necessary in a democratic 
society. In England and Wales hate crime is prohibited under several Acts of 
Parliament. For instance, under part 3 of the Public Order Act 1986 
expressions of racial hatred are prohibited.30 In addition, the restriction of 
hate speech can be considered as pursuing at least one of the legitimate 
aims contained in Article 10(2), ‘protecting the rights of others.’ Here, the 
State can restrict a person’s expressions if it can be considered necessary in 
a democratic society to ensure the protection of other protected rights 
contained in the Convention. Affirmed further in Article 17 of the Convention.  
 
Article 17 states:  
‘Nothing in this Convention may be interpreted as implying for any 
State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or perform 
any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set 
forth herein or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for 
in the Convention.’31  
 
Put simply, a person cannot rely on the protection of a given Article within the 
Convention at the detriment of another Article right. So, for example a person 
cannot spread racial hatred as part of their right to freedom of expression if it 
is considered to significantly affect other rights contained in the Convention. 
For instance, Article 8 the right to privacy, as demonstrated in Glimmerven 
en Hagenbeek v Netherlands.32  
 
 
30 For a discussion on the issues relating to the use of the Public Order Act 1986 in a social 
media context see chapter four. 
31 The European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms Article 17(1) 
32 Glimmerven en Hagenbeek v Netherlands [1979] ECTHR 8 
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The European Court of Human Rights was asked to consider if the 
Netherlands had breached the applicants right to free speech by prohibiting 
them from distributing leaflets. Glimmerven and Hagenbeek, which had 
previously been declared as a prohibited organisation under the Civil Code of 
the Netherlands, had distributed leaflets advocating the removal of ‘all 
Surinamers, Turks and other so-called guest workers from the Netherlands.’ 
Before the court the Dutch Government accepted that they had infringed the 
applicants right to free speech, however the Government successfully 
argued that Article 17 prohibited Glimmerven and Hagenbeek from exploiting 
Article 10 to spread racial hatred:  
‘The Netherlands’ authorities in allowing the applicants to proclaim 
freely and without penalty their ideas would certainly encourage the 
discrimination prohibited by [these] provisions of the Convention … 
[such activities being] contrary to the text and spirit of the 
Convention.’33   
 
The arguments put forward by the Dutch Governments legal team were 
accepted by the European Court of Human Rights, where the court held that 
the applicants right to freedom of expression was lawfully infringed by the 
State.  
 
In recent years, the criminal justice system of England and Wales has seen 
an increase in hate-related offences. Between 2016 and 2017 the police 
recorded 80,393 offences where it was considered that hate crime was a 
motivating factor in the offence, this was an increase of 29% on the previous 
year.34 In particular, the criminal justice system has witnessed a rise in hate 
 
33 Ibid., [196]  
34 Home Office, ‘Statistical News Release: Hate Crime, England and Wales, 2016/17’ 
(Gov.uk, 17 October 2017) 
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speech online,35 calling for the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) to 
announce a ‘crackdown’ on social media hate crime:  
‘When an ever-greater amount of our time is spent online, it is only 
right that we [criminal justice system] do everything possible to ensure 
that people are protected from abuse that can now follow them 
everywhere via the screen of their smartphone or tablet. Whether 
shouted in their face on the street, daubed on a wall or tweeted into 
their living room, hateful abuse can have a devastating impact on 
victims.’36  
 
Significant weight is given to online abuse which targets one of the protected 
characteristics associated with hate crime. Yet this is not necessarily 
reflected in the CPS guidelines on social media prosecutions.  
 
As examined in detail in the previous chapter, the CPS in 2013 released 
guidelines on social media prosecutions following concerns that there was a 
lack of consistency across police forces. The guidelines were later updated 
in 2016 and 2018 to reflect, amongst other things, the link between social 
media related offences and hate crime. The guidelines uphold the idea that 
in order for the law to intervene with conduct carried out on social media, a 
high evidential and public interest threshold will need to be passed, even in 
matters related to hate speech: 
‘The high threshold at the evidential stage and the public interest and 
[European Convention on Human Rights] considerations … apply to 
social media communications offence hate crime cases, as they do to 




ata/file/651851/hate-crime-1617-hosb1717snr.pdf> accessed 26 September 2018 
35 Alison Saunders, ‘Hate is hate. Online abusers must be dealt with harshly’ The Guardian 
(London, 21 August 2017) <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/aug/20/hate-
crimes-online-abusers-prosecutors-serious-crackdown-internet-face-to-face> accessed 26 
September 2018  
36 Ibid., 
37 The Crown Prosecution Service, ‘Guidelines on Prosecuting Cases Involving 
Communications Sent via Social Media’ (CPS.gov, 21 August 2018) [54] 
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Subsequently, communications which can be considered as containing a 
hate crime element will not automatically invoke the criminal law, instead 
prosecutors are encouraged to consider the contextual element behind the 
communication:  
‘When assessing communications that appear to be motivated by 
such discrimination or demonstrate such hostility, prosecutors should 
be alert to any additional reference or context to the communication in 
question. Such references or context may sometimes elevate a 
communication that would otherwise not meet the high threshold to 
one that, in all the circumstances, can be considered grossly 
offensive. For instance, a reference within the communication to a 
recent tragic event, involving many deaths of persons who share any 
of the protected characteristics.’38 
 
Despite the initial stance by the CPS in relation to tackling hate speech 
online, this has not been reflected in the social media prosecuting guidelines. 
Consequently, issues have arisen whereby the police and the CPS have 
neglected to identify when a person’s communications go beyond their right 
to freedom of expression.39 This is evidently true when the complained about 
behaviour falls outside the definition of a hate crime and instead can be 
labelled as offensive commentary.  
 
Offensive Comments and Freedom of Expression  
The following discussion will examine how the courts balance a person’s 
right to freedom of expression against comments which can be defined as 
offensive or abusive. As explored in detail in chapter one online abuse is on 
 
<https://www.cps.gov.uk/legal-guidance/social-media-guidelines-prosecuting-cases-
involving-communications-sent-social-media> accessed 26 September 2018  
38 Ibid., [55] 
39 R v Alison Chabloz Westminsters’ Magistrates Court 25 May 2018 (unreported) 
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the increase.40 Consequently, there has been a rise in reports made to the 
police in relation to abuse conducted online.41 Here, the criminal justice 
system has to distinguish between comments which can be considered as 
merely offensive, and therefore protected under Article 10, against 
comments which go beyond free speech to warrant criminal law intervention.  
 
From the discussions above, a person’s right to freedom of expression 
includes a variety of different modes of communications. In fact, the 
European Court of Human Rights has upheld that freedom of expression, 
includes the right to be offensive as governed by Handyside v UK.42 Richard 
Handyside was prosecuted and convicted under the Obscene Publications 
Act 1959 and 1964, for the distribution of ‘The Little Red School Book’. The 
book which was written by two Danish school teachers was published in 
1969 and contained several pages on sex, drugs and alcohol. Following his 
conviction and subsequent failed appeals in the judicial system in England 
and Wales, Handyside lodged an application before the European Court of 
Human Rights claiming his right to freedom of expression had been 
breached.  
 
Though Handyside’s application was unsuccessful, with the European Court 
of Human Rights concluding that the restriction did not breach Article 10 of 
 
40 The BBC, ‘Teenager's life “ruined” by Live.me and Twitter “trolls”’ The BBC (London, 24 
October 2017) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-41693437> accessed 30 January 
2018 
41 Ibid., 
42 Handyside n.9 
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the Convention, the judges supported the concept that offensive speech 
should be protected:  
‘Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of 
such a society, one of the basic conditions for its progress and for the 
development of every man. Subject to Article 10 (2), it is applicable 
not only to “information” or “ideas” that are favourably received or 
regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to 
those that offend, shock or disturb the State or any sector of the 
population.’43  
 
The European Court of Human Rights maintains that an individual has the 
right to offend another without interference from the state, a concept that is 
supported by cyber-libertarians.    
 
Cyber-libertarianism:  
‘refers to a perspective (some would say philosophy) which claims 
that cyberspace and the Internet should be regarded as uncontrolled 
and unregulated electronic spaces where anyone is free to be 
whatever they wish and express themselves however they like.’44    
 
In essence, for cyber-libertarians ‘earthbound’ laws should not apply to 
cyberspace.45 Dyson, Gilder, Keyworth and Toffler argue that the emergence 
of new technology, such as that of the Internet, has created an ‘Information 
Superhighway’ which should be for the benefit of its users, and consequently 
beyond the reach of the law.46 They go as far as arguing that even computer 
hacking is for the benefit of ‘economic growth and trade leadership’.47 
Similarly, Johnson and Post suggest that if the Internet is to be regulated, 
 
43 Ibid., [49]  
44 David J. Bell, Brian D Loader, Nicholas Pleace & Douglas Schuler, Cyberculture: The Key 
Concepts (Routledge 2004) 35 
45 Paul Bernal, The Internet, Warts and All: Free Speech, Privacy and Truth (Cambridge 
University Press 2018) 20  
46 Esther Dyson, George Gilder, George Keyworth & Alvin Toffler, ‘Cyberspace and the 
American Dream: A Magna Carta for the Knowledge Age’ (1994) Future Insight 
<http://www.pff.org/issues-pubs/futureinsights/fi1.2magnacarta.html> accessed 26 
September 2018  
47 Ibid., 
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provisions need to be independent and separate from the ‘material world’.48 
Here, for cyber-libertarians, technology in particular the Internet, should be 
beyond the reach of government control and regulation. This theoretical 
perspective has gained momentum within some Internet based 
organisations. For instance, Wikipedia founder Jimmy Wales has been vocal 
about the Internet being beyond the realms of State intervention.49  
 
Regardless of the approach endorsed by cyber-libertarians, it has come to 
be accepted that the Internet now represents parts of modern life, which 
does not have a separate identity to ‘real-life’,50 or as potently put by Bernal, 
‘[t]he Internet is now integral to the way society operates.’51 For Bernal:  
‘[c]onversely, some of the activities that have developed on the 
Internet, from the distribution of child abuse imagery to networks of 
extremist material, cyberbullying, hate speech and much more - make 
it impossible for governments not to become involved. If the Internet is 
riven with lawlessness, so is our society; the two cannot be treated 
separately.’52  
 
Most notably, Reed argues that whilst a physical body remains in a place 
controlled by a Government, the law will have to intervene.53 Here, the law 
should govern individuals online conduct but not at the expense of freedom 
of expression. As explored in chapter one the Internet now dominates much 
of society. Its use has changed political discourse, changed how businesses 
 
48 David Johnson & David Post, ‘Law and Borders: The Rise of Law in Cyberspace’ (1996) 
48 Stanford Law Review 1367 
49 David Golumbia, ‘Cyberlibertarianism: The Extremist Foundations of “Digital Freedom”’ 
(Clemson University, South Carolina, September 2013) 
50 Barry Wellman & Caroline Haythornthwaite (eds), The Internet in Everyday Life (John 
Wiley & Sons 2008) 25 
51 Bernal n.45, 19 
52 Ibid., 21 
53 Chris Reed, Internet Law: Text and Materials (Cambridge University Press 2004) 174-175  
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operate and has changed how society communicates. It is clear that the 
Internet cannot be considered as a separate entity from that of ‘real-life’.  
 
From the jurisprudence of both the European Court of Human Rights and the 
courts of the UK, it is clear that different types of speech incur different types 
of protection under the law:  
‘There are undoubtedly different types of speech, just as there are 
different types of private information, some of which are more 
deserving of protection in a democratic society than others. Top of the 
list is political speech. The free exchange of information and ideas on 
matters relevant to the organisation of the economic, social and 
political life of the country is crucial to any democracy. Without this, it 
can scarcely be called a democracy at all.’54  
 
Whereas political speech is given the highest form of protection, speech 
which can be labelled as mere gossip is not necessarily shielded from the 
law.55  
 
Despite low-level speech being given some protection, the jurisprudence of 
the courts and human right bodies indicate that the criminal justice system 
will ‘tilt’ in the direction of freedom of expression.56 In June 2011 the Special 
Rapporteur, along with other human right agencies issued a Joint 
Declaration supporting freedom of expression in a digital age.57 Emphasis 
was placed on the idea that free speech online needs to be protected from 
significant government interference, even in times of public safety and 
national security. The declaration upholds that all citizens should have 
 
54 Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 A.C. 457 per Lady Baroness-Hale [148] 
55 Jacob Rowbottom, ‘To rant, vent and converse: protecting low level digital speech’ (2012) 
71(2) Cambridge Law Review 355, 357 
56 Zia Akhar, ‘Malicious communications, media platforms and legal sanctions’ (2014) 20(6) 
Computer and Telecommunications Law Review 179, 181 
57 Laura Scaife, Handbook of Social Media and the Law (Routledge 2015) 36 
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universal access to the Internet, a concept which has been supported by the 
European Court of Human Rights:  
‘[The Internet is] one of the principal means by which individuals 
exercise their right to freedom of expression and information providing 
as it does essential tools for participation in activities and discussions 
concerning political issues and issues of general interest.’58         
 
The significant protection of free speech, even speech which can be labelled 
as offensive has been supported further by the United Nations. In the United 
Nations Comprehensive Study on Cybercrime they argue that the restriction 
of speech which can be considered as defamatory, obscene or insulting may 
not warrant criminal law intervention.59 Indeed, in matters concerning hate-
related speech and offensive commentary the justice system needs to 
consider:  
‘(i) the context of the statement; (ii) the position or status of the 
speaker; (iii) the intent (negligence and recklessness should not 
suffice); (iv) the content or form of statement; (v) the extent of the 
statement; and (vi) the degree of risk of resulting harm.’60 
 
Consequently, for the United Nations there needs to be a ‘… genuine and 
serious incitement to extremism, as opposed to ideas that simply offend, 
shock or disturb others’61 in order to restrict freedom of expression. Though 
little consideration is given to the effects of becoming a victim of online abuse 
and a person’s right to privacy, discussed further in the following section.   
 
Online Abuse and the Right to Privacy  
For Bernal:   
 
58 Yildirim v Turkey App no 3111/10 ECTHR 2012-VI [52-54] 
59 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Comprehensive Study on Cybercrime- Draft 
(United Nations, February 2013) 116 
60 Ibid., 112 
61 Scaife n.57, 42 
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‘[t]he problem with the Internet is that the boundaries between what is 
public and what is private have been more than just blurred; they have 
been all but obliterated.’62  
 
In fact, social media sites such as Facebook actively encourage users to 
distribute private information, for instance birthdays and general interests.63 
Consequently, the expansion of the Internet has distorted the lines between 
what is considered the public and private domain, clearly illustrated following 
the launch of the Samaritans Rader App.64  
 
In 2014 the Samaritans, a UK based mental health charity, released an 
App65 aimed at reducing suicide. The App once downloaded onto the user’s 
smart device would link to an individual’s Twitter profile to scan tweets in the 
user’s homepage. Using a list of predetermined keywords, the App would 
then point out if someone who they ‘followed’ on Twitter indicated possible 
suicidal tendencies, even if the other user did not have access to the App. 
Following its launch, the Samaritans came under heavy criticism for 
breaching Twitter user’s privacy. The original stance taken by the Samaritans 
was to justify the App’s usage by arguing that comments made on Twitter 
were in the public domain, and as a result there was no expectation of 
privacy. Two months after the App was launched, the Samaritans suspended 
its usage.66   
 
62 Bernal n.45, 18 
63 Lauren Gelman, ‘Privacy, Free Speech, and “Blurry Edged” Social Networks’ (2009) 50(5) 
Boston Collage Law Review 1315, 1328 
64 Bernal n.45, 146-149.  
65 ‘Apps [are] short applications, an app is software, for use on a desktop, laptop, tablet or 
smartphone, that allows the user to apply the power of system software for a particular 
purpose.’ Jeremy Harris Lipschultz, Social Media Communication: Concepts, Practices, 
Data, Law and Ethics (Routledge 2018) 345  
66 Samaritans, ‘Samaritans Rader’ (Samaritans, 10 March 2015) 
<https://www.samaritans.org/how-we-can-help-you/supporting-someone-online/samaritans-
radar> accessed 26 October 2018  
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The distinction between private and public information on the Internet 
continues to be a contentious issue though academics such as Bernal67 and 
Gelman,68 maintain that privacy does exist online. The balancing of Article 8 
the right to privacy, and Article 10 freedom of expression, is not unique to the 
digital age. Much of the jurisprudence relating to these two rights stems from 
traditional forms of media such as the press.69 Under Article 8 of the 
Convention ‘[e]veryone has the right to respect for his private and family life, 
his home and his correspondence.’ As discussed earlier, like that of freedom 
of expression, the right to privacy is a qualified right and can be restricted 
when prohibited by law, necessary in a democratic society, and fulfils one or 
more of the following legitimate aims:  
‘… in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic 
well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for 
the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights 
and freedoms of others.’70 
 
In matters concerning social media the criminal justice system tilts in the 
direction of freedom of expression. For instance, as discussed in chapter six 
the CPS guidelines on social media prosecutions makes significant mention 
of free speech with little reference given to privacy. For Woods, the criminal 
justice systems approach to using Article 10 as opposed to Article 8 when 
concluding if a comment invokes the criminal law is a flaw in itself.71 Article 
 
67 Bernal n.45, 16 
68 Gelman n.63 
69 Lorna Woods, ‘Social Media: it is not just about Article 10’ in David Mangan & Lorna E. 
Gillies (eds), The Legal Challenges of Social Media (Edward Elgar Publishing 2017) 109. 
For Bernal, the use of traditional media law is not necessarily suitable for social media. See, 
Paul Bernal, The Internet, Warts and All: Free Speech, Privacy and Truth (Cambridge 
University Press 2018) 25 
70 The European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms Article 8(2) 
71 Woods n.69, 105 
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10 the right to free speech, is not fully concerned with human interaction 
unlike that of Article 8. Consequently, Article 10 can be considered too 
broad. Here, the European Court of Human Rights has given a significantly 
wide definition of freedom of expression and does not always fully appreciate 
the importance of Article 8.72 Whereas Article 8 is ‘deeply contextual’.73 
 
The competing interests contained in both Article 8 and Article 10 has 
imposed a balancing act within the courts. In Campbell v MGN Limited,74 the 
House of Lords had to directly address the issue of freedom of expression 
versus the right to privacy: 
‘The present case concerns one aspect of invasion of privacy: 
wrongful disclosure of private information. The case involves the 
familiar competition between freedom of expression and respect for 
an individual’s privacy. Both are vitally important rights. Neither has 
precedence over the other. The importance of freedom of expression 
has been stressed often and eloquently, the importance of privacy 
less so. But it, too, lies at the heart of liberty in a modern state. A 
proper degree of privacy is essential for the well-being and 
development of an individual. And restraints imposed on government 
to pry into the lives of the citizen go to the essence of a democratic 
state.’75  
 
On 1 November 2001 The Mirror a newspaper tabloid based in the United 
Kingdom ran a story exposing that Naomi Campbell a well-known 
supermodel, was seeking help for alcohol and drug addictions. The story, 
which was featured on the front page of the paper contained the following 
headline: ‘Therapy: Naomi outside meeting’. The article contained specific 
information regarding the type of treatment she was receiving, how often she 
was attending group sessions, and a photograph of Ms Campbell leaving a 
 
72 Ibid., 
73 Ibid., 117 
74 Campbell n.54 
75 Ibid., per Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead [12] 
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meeting in London. Following the article being published, Ms Campbell 
sought immediate legal action, stating that MGN limited had committed the 
equitable doctrine of breach of confidence and in turn, her privacy had been 
infringed. 
 
The High Court upheld Ms Campbell’s claim, coming to the judgment that the 
actions of MGN limited was unlawful and awarded her £3,500 in damages. 
This decision was later overturned by the Court of Appeal. Consequently, Ms 
Campbell appealed the decision before the House of Lords. Here, the House 
of Lords examined in detail both a person’s right to privacy and a person’s 
right to freedom of expression. The Law Lords by a 3:2 majority, came to the 
opinion that MGN had acted unlawfully by disclosing the details of the 
treatment Ms Campbell was seeking, and for the publication of the picture 
which displayed the supermodel leaving a Narcotics Anonymous group.   
 
Though the case above relates to traditional types of media, in this instance 
tabloid newspapers, the approach undertaken by the Law Lords in coming to 
their opinion indicates a novel method in the balancing of Article 8 and 10, 
which has not been mirrored in matters concerning digital media. First, the 
concept of privacy was examined by the House of Lords. Privacy:  
‘… extends to aspects relating to personal identity, such as a person’s 
name or picture, and furthermore includes a person’s physical and 
psychological integrity; the guarantee afforded by Article 8 of the 
Convention is primarily intended to ensure the development, without 
outside interference, of the personality of each individual in his 
relations with other human beings. There is therefore a zone of 
interaction with others, even in a public context, which may fall within 
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the scope of “private life”.’76    
 
Privacy is more than just the protection of acts conducted in a private setting. 
It includes the right for a person not to have their physical or psychological 
integrity infringed. The concept of privacy underpins free speech,77 complete 
free speech would limit the speech of the minority,78 whilst also having 
significant psychological effects on those subjected to it. 
 
In recent years research has started to emerge examining the effects of 
online abuse. Research undertaken by Amnesty International found that in 
the United Kingdom, of those surveyed, 1 in 5 women had experienced 
abuse online, of these, over half stated that the abuse they experienced was 
misogynistic.79 Amnesty International’s research went further to expose the 
underlying effects this type of abuse can have on victims, as shown in figure 
eight. Of those who took part in the research, 55% of participants in the UK 
stated that they had experienced anxiety, stress or panic attacks as a result 
of online abuse;80 with a further 24% of those surveyed across Denmark, 
Italy, New Zealand, Poland, Spain, Sweden, the UK and USA feeling that 
their family’s safety was at risk.81 Similarly in research conducted by Bates, 
she exposed the underlying psychological effects becoming subjected to 
revenge pornography can have upon an individual: 
 
76 Pfeifer v Austria App no 125561/03 [2007] ECTHR 935 [33] 
77 Bernal n.45, 145 
78 Ibid., 106 
79 Amnesty International UK, ‘Online abuse of women widespread in UK’ (Amnesty 
International, 2017) <https://www.amnesty.org.uk/online-abuse-women-widespread> 
accessed 3 October 2018   
80 Ibid., 
81 Amnesty International, ‘Amnesty reveals alarming impact of online abuse against women’ 
(Amnesty International, 27 November 2017) 
<https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/11/amnesty-reveals-alarming-impact-of-
online-abuse-against-women/> accessed 3 October 2018   
Page 296 of 449 
 
‘... participants discussed their experiences of trust issues, PTSD 
[post-traumatic stress disorder], anxiety, depression, loss of control, 
and how revenge porn affected their self-esteem.’82  
 
 
Figure 8: The psychological effects on women who experience online abuse 
in the UK.83   
 
Bates conducted 18 in-depth interviews with women who had been subjected 
to revenge pornography. In these interviews participants spoke openly about 
the psychological effects this behaviour had on them:  
‘When the actual video was released, um, well, I can admit now that I 
was suicidal, and … to let you know how suicidal I was, I didn’t tell 
anybody because I knew if I told anyone that I just wanted to kill 
myself that they would try to stop me, so I didn’t tell anyone because I 
didn’t [sic] want anyone to stop me.’84  
 
Like that of the research undertaken by Amnesty International, Bates 
exposes the real-life implications becoming subjected to online abuse can 
have on a person. Recently a study conducted by John et al found that those 
 
82 Samantha Bates, ‘Revenge Porn and Mental Health: A Qualitative Analysis of the Mental 
Health Effects of Revenge Porn on Female Survivors’ (2017) 12(1) Feminist Criminology 22, 
38  
83 Amnesty International n.81  
84 Bates n.82, 32  
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aged under 25, were 2.3 times more likely to self-harm or display suicidal 
tendencies as a consequence of cyberbullying.85 If privacy includes the right 
not to be subjected to physical or psychological harm, then the overall effects 
of online abuse need to be taken into consideration by the criminal justice 
system.  
 
Cases which have recently come before the criminal justice system, 
concerning social media, consider in detail freedom of expression, with little 
emphasis placed on privacy. In Campbell the Law Lords examined Ms 
Campbells right to privacy first, before looking at freedom of expression:  
‘…  [The] question is whether the objective of the restriction on the 
article 10 right - the protection of [Ms] Campbell’s right under article 8 
to respect for her private life - is sufficiently important to justify limiting 
the fundamental right to freedom of expression …’.86 
 
Here, the justice system should focus on the infringement of the victims right 
to privacy, before turning to examine freedom of expression. Though 
freedom of expression is important to maintain a democracy, this should not 
be at the detriment of another person’s mental health. Online abuse can 
have significant effects on a person’s wellbeing and in some instances has 
resulted in victims taking their own life.87  
 
 
85 Ann John et al, ‘Self-Harm, Suicidal Behaviours, and Cyberbullying in Children and Young 
People: Systematic Review’ (2018) 20 (4) Journal of Medical Internet Research 129. See 
also, Sarah Knapton, ‘Cyberbullying makes young people twice as likely to self harm or 
attempt suicide’ The Telegraph (London, 22 April 2018) 
<https://www.telegraph.co.uk/science/2018/04/22/cyberbullying-makes-young-people-twice-
likely-self-harm-attempt/> accessed 10 October 2018  
86 Campbell n.54, per Lord Hope of Craighead [113] 
87 Will Worley, ‘Mother of cyber bullying victim pens heartbreaking open letter in response to 
his suicide’ The Independent (London, 6 October 2016) 
<https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/mother-open-letter-cyber-bullying-
victim-suicide-online-social-media-a7347531.html> accessed 4 October 2018. See also, 
Knapton n.85 
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It is not only the psychological effects of online abuse that can affect a 
person’s right to privacy. Berstein argues that abuse and harassment online 
can lead a person to withdraw from social media, which in turn has an effect 
on a person’s right to privacy, along with freedom of expression.88 To 
exclude oneself from the Internet is to put yourself at a disadvantage, as the 
Internet allows individuals to challenge another’s view, whilst also promoting 
change within society.89 
 
For the United Nations, the use of the Internet is considered a right that 
every human being should have: ‘The Special Rapporteur calls upon all 
States to ensure that Internet access is maintained at all times, including 
during times of political unrest.’90 Online abuse limits this right as victims are 
often choosing to withdraw from the online world in a bid to regain some 
control. For example, Sara Payne the mother of Sarah Payne, a schoolgirl 
murdered in July 2000, chose to close her Twitter account following a 
campaign of online harassment.91   
 
 
88 Bernstein n.4, 19 
89 For example, in recent years society has witnessed the emergence of social media to 
challenge societies attitudes to rape, with #BeenRapedNeverReported; campaigns tackling 
the stigma surrounding domestic violence, with #WhyIStayed; and #GirlsLikeUs used to 
combat stereotypical attitudes against transwomen. See, Jessamy Gleeson, ‘“(Not) working 
9–5”: the consequences of contemporary Australian-based online feminist campaigns as 
digital labour’ (2016) 16(1) Media International Australia 77 
<http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/1329878X16664999> accessed 12 August 
2019 
90 Frank La Rue, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the 
right to freedom of opinion and expression’ (Human Rights Council, 16 May 2011) [79] 
<https://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/17session/A.HRC.17.27_en.pdf> 
accessed 3 October 2018  
91 Claire Cohen, ‘Twitter trolls: The celebrities who’ve been driven off social media by abuse’ 
The Telegraph (London, 18 November 2014) <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/women/womens-
life/11238018/Celebrity-Twitter-trolls-The-famous-people-whove-been-driven-off-social-
media-by-abuse.html> accessed 3 October 2018 
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As mentioned in the discussion above Article 17 of the Convention states:  
‘Nothing in this Convention may be interpreted as implying for any 
State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or perform 
any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set 
forth herein or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for 
in the Convention.’  
 
Consequently, freedom of expression cannot be used as an excuse when it 
comes to online abuse that has a significant effect on a person’s right to 
privacy, yet the CPS guidelines on social media prosecutions makes very 
little reference to Article 8 of the Convention. Instead, the guidelines 
emphasis the need to protect freedom of expression. Though free speech is 
an important legal principle, it cannot be considered a ‘trump’ card over that 
of privacy:  
‘Any restriction of the right to freedom of expression must be 
subjected to very close scrutiny. But so too must any restriction of the 
right to respect for private life. Neither Article 8 nor Article 10 has any 
pre-eminence over the other in the conduct of this exercise. As 
Resolution 1165 of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe (1998), para 11, pointed out, they are neither absolute not in 




Chapter Overview  
The approach undertaken by the criminal justice system indicates that when 
it comes to online abuse freedom of expression will be of paramount 
importance. Those who commit abuse online often use the concept of free 
speech to justify their comments but at the same time use this principle to 
reduce another’s speech. The jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Human Rights supports the idea that freedom of expression is vital in a 
 
92 Campbell n.54, per Lord Hope of Craighead [115] 
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democratic society,93 with individuals having a right to be offensive, reflected 
in the criminal justice system in England and Wales. Furthermore, the CPS 
guidelines on social media prosecutions reflect the importance of free 
speech. Contained within the guidelines themselves is a section specifically 
looking at Article 10 of the Convention. Here, the CPS supports the idea that 
free speech will create a high threshold to be passed before the criminal law 
should intervene with online commentary. Yet little reference is made to 
Article 8, the right to privacy.  
 
Privacy is more than someone’s right to a private life away from the public 
domain. It concerns an individual’s right to both physical and psychological 
integrity, online abuse breaches both. The effects of becoming subjected to 
online abuse have been evidenced in numerous reports examining abuse 
online. In some instances, the effects of becoming subjected to abuse and 
online trolling have forced individuals off the Internet. In addition, those who 
have been targeted online have reported suffering from post-traumatic stress 
disorder, and in some instances have committed suicide due to the 
continued abuse they experience,94 all of which infringe upon a person’s right 
to privacy.    
 
Privacy is of paramount importance when it comes to deciding if a person 
should be prosecuted for their online conduct. Presently, emphasis is placed 
on ensuring the perpetrators right to freedom of expression is not infringed, 
 
93 Handyside n.9, [49] 
94 Samantha Bates, ‘Revenge Porn and Mental Health: A Qualitative Analysis of the Mental 
Health Effects of Revenge Porn on Female Survivors’ (2017) 12(1) Feminist Criminology 22 
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with little reference being made to the victims right to privacy. Here, the 
criminal justice system should invoke the approach of the House of Lords in 
Campbell, by examining privacy first before turning to look at freedom of 
expression. This will ensure that the police, the CPS and the courts are 
considering the full effects of online abuse, before coming to a decision.  
 
Chapter seven: Recommendations  
• Update the CPS guidelines on social media prosecutions to ensure 
privacy is included;  
• Ensure better education is given to the police and social media users 
concerning the psychological effects of online abuse; and  
• Digital training for police officers to ensure they fully understand the 
effects of online abuse on those who are subjected to it.  
  




International Perspectives of Social Media and the Law 
Introduction   
‘The open digital spaces they [social media sites] provide must not 
become breeding grounds for, for instance, terror, illegal hate speech, 
child abuse or trafficking of human beings, or spaces that escape the 
rule of law.’1 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to explore how other institutions and States 
use both legislative and non-legislative approaches to govern conduct 
carried out on social media through the lens of legality. Across the globe 
there is no one universal approach to tackling unlawful behaviour online, 
instead States have implemented their own initiatives in an attempt to 
overcome the growing issues of the digital age. These initiatives range from 
non-legally binding codes of conduct to specific laws aimed at both the online 
user and social media companies. The discussion below will outline the 
methods undertaken by the European Union, Australia, Germany and India 
in tackling cybercrime. The rationale for focussing on these institutions and 
States surrounds the different approaches each has taken in tackling illegal 
online conduct.   
 
The European Union  
The concept of the European Union (EU) is built on several principles, 
including the creation of an Internal Market across all Members of States. 
The purpose of the Internal Market is ‘… to promote throughout the 
Community [EU] a harmonious development of economic activities’2 built on 
 
1 Commission, ‘Tackling Illegal Content Online: Towards an enhanced responsibility of 
online platforms’ COM (2017) 55 final 2 
2 Originally contained in The Treaty of Rome [1957] Article 2. Similar provisions are made in 
the Treaty of Lisbon [2007] OJ C-306/1 Article 2  
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four fundamental freedoms: the free movement of people, the free movement 
of goods, the free movement of capital and the free movement of services.3 
Since the creation of the EU, States have had to adapt quickly to the 
changing nature of technology.  
 
To ensure consistency across the EU, directives have been created to help 
establish the boundaries of ‘information society services.’4 A directive, in its 
simplest form is ‘a legislative act that sets out a goal that all EU countries 
must achieve.’5 Each Member of State can choose how they will achieve the 
goal outlined in a directive through its own legal provisions. Consequently, 
following a rise in Internet usage and the changing nature of a technology-
based age, several directives have been created to govern online conduct,6 
with the EU Commission upholding the idea that what is illegal offline is also 
illegal online.7  
 
In 2000 the Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society 
services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market (the 
 
3 Consolidated versions of the Treaty of European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union [2016] C 202/01 
4 Information society services is defined as ‘… any service normally provided for 
remuneration, at a distance, by means of electronic equipment for the processing (including 
digital compression) and storage of data, and at the individual request of a recipient of a 
service …’. See, Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 
June 2000 [17] 
5 Europa.eu, ‘Regulations, Directives and other Acts’ (European Union, 24 May 2018) 
<https://europa.eu/european-union/eu-law/legal-acts_en> accessed 9 July 2018  
6 For example, Article 25 of Directive 2011/93/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 13 December 2011 on combating the sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of 
children and child pornography, criminalises online child pornography. 
7 Commission n.1 
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directive) was adopted into EU law to help establish the boundaries of online 
service providers: 
‘Both existing and emerging disparities in Member States’ legislations 
and case-law concerning liability of service providers acting as 
intermediaries prevent the smooth functioning of the internal market, 
in particular by impairing the development of cross-border services 
and producing distortions of competition; service providers have a 
duty to act, under certain circumstances, with a view to preventing or 
stopping illegal activities …’.8 
 
The directive governs several situations including, the creation of contracts 
online, the selling of goods via the use of the Internet and the liability of 
organisations which catches the activities of social media companies, in 
tackling terrorist-related material, child sexual abuse online and illegal hate 
speech. The directive puts an obligation on Member of States to ensure they 
put measures in place to achieve the purpose of the directive, whilst also 
allowing for freedom of speech to still be maintained across States. 
Consequently, only minimal implementation of the directive is needed to ‘give 
effect to the proper functioning of the internal market’.9  
 
The creation of the directive and its adoption into EU law has created several 
defences for online businesses. For instance, significant protection is given 
to social media companies under Article 1410 of the directive.11 Under Article 
 
8 Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 [40]  
9 Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 [10]  
10 A further two defences are contained in the Directive 2000/31/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000. Article 12(1) protects internet service 
providers from liability for illegal content sent via their telecommunications network. Whereas 
Article 13(1) protects the storing of data by information society service providers. 
11 Lorna Woods, ‘When is Facebook liable for illegal content under the E-commerce 
Directive? CG v. Facebook in the Northern Ireland courts’ (The International Forum for 
Responsible Media Blog, 28 January 2017) <https://inforrm.org/2017/01/28/when-is-
facebook-liable-for-illegal-content-under-the-e-commerce-directive-cg-v-facebook-in-the-
northern-ireland-courts-lorna-woods/> accessed 10 July 2018   
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14(1) social media sites are considered under EU law as ‘hosts’ rather than 
‘publishers’:  
‘Where an information society service is provided that consists of the 
storage of information provided by a recipient of the service, Member 
States shall ensure that the service provider is not liable for the 
information stored at the request of a recipient of the service …’.  
 
The purpose of the directive was to create consistency across EU Member of 
States in the regulation of information service providers, whilst also ensuring 
the development of the Internet, trade and the economy.12 Put simply, 
information society services such as that of Twitter and Facebook cannot be 
held liable for conduct carried out on their sites as they are not considered 
the publishers of the information, they merely play host to the content. 
However, Article 14(2) imposes some limitations on this concept:  
‘a) the provider does not have actual knowledge of illegal activity or 
information and, as regards claims for damages, is not aware of facts 
or circumstances from which the illegal activity or information is 
apparent; or (b) the provider, upon obtaining such knowledge or 
awareness, acts expeditiously to remove or to disable access to the 
information.’13  
 
From the evidence given it must be found that the provider had actual 
knowledge of the illegal content on its site. If sufficient knowledge is given, 
service providers must act ‘expeditiously’ to remove such content from its 
site, to rely on the defence of ‘hosting’. If it can be established that the 
service provider in question had actual knowledge of the illegal content on its 
site and it did not act ‘expeditiously’ to remove such content, it can give rise 
 
12 Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on 
certain legal aspects of information society services 
13 Article 13(1) Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 
June 2000 
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to legal repercussions, as shown in L’Oréal SA and Others v eBay 
International AG and Others.14  
 
In July 2011 a case was brought before the Court of Justice of the European 
Union following L’Oréal products being sold on the Internet selling site eBay 
without the companies consent. L’Oréal, a cosmetic based business had 
strict trademark regulations whereby its products could only be sold by 
companies who had gained the appropriate consent of the business. In the 
matter at hand a number of its products were being sold on eBay illegally, 
including sample bottles which were never intended for resale. The case 
originated in the High Court of the UK where a preliminary reference was 
made to the Court of Justice of the European Union.15 Several issues were 
raised before the Court including the liability of eBay in the illegal activity, 
which was taking place on its website. In essence, the Court was asked two 
fundamental questions in relation to Article 14(1). First, did eBay fall within 
the definition of an ‘internet service provider’; second, could it be considered 
that eBay had been made aware of the illegal content on its site?16  
 
For the court, eBay could be considered as an online service provider and 
consequently could rely on the defence of being a ‘host’ rather than a 
‘publisher’ as governed under Article 14(1) of the directive. However, the 
 
14 C-324/09 L’Oréal SA and Others v eBay International AG and Others [2011] ECLI 474 
15 A preliminary reference is ‘… the mechanism by which national courts and tribunals may 
(or in some cases must) seek definitive “rulings” from the CJEU [Court of Justice of the 
European Union] on the interpretation of EU legislation.’ See, Steve Wilson, Helen 
Rutherford, Tony Storey & Natalie Wortley, English Legal System (2nd edn, Oxford University 
Press 2016) 202 
16 C-324/09 L’Oréal SA and Others n.14, [106] 
Page 307 of 449 
 
Court of Justice of the European Union concluded that on numerous 
occasions eBay had been given constructive knowledge of the illegal activity 
being carried out on its site:  
‘Where, by contrast, the operator has provided assistance which 
entails, in particular, optimising the presentation of the offers for sale 
in question or promoting those offers, it must be considered not to 
have taken a neutral position between the customer-seller concerned 
and potential buyers but to have played an active role of such a kind 
as to give it knowledge of, or control over, the data relating to those 
offers for sale. It cannot then rely, in the case of those data, on the 
exemption from liability referred to in Article 14(1) of Directive 
2000/31.’17 
 
On several occasions eBay had actively advertised L’Oréal products through 
Google ‘Ad Words’18 making them fully aware of the illegal content on their 
marketplace. In addition, L’Oréal had written to eBay to express its growing 
concerns surrounding trademark products being sold on its site. As a result, 
the Court of Justice of the European Union concluded that the defence 
contained in Article 14(1) could not be relied upon.   
 
The Court of Justice of the European Union has consequently set the limits 
for the defence of Article 14(1) though the judgment did not clarify a time limit 
for information service providers to remove illegal content. As previously 
stated under Article 14(1) when a company receives knowledge of an 
unlawful activity being carried out on its network, they must act ‘expeditiously’ 
to remove it. The directive does not define the term ‘expeditiously’, yet it has 
come to be accepted that it means within 24 hours, especially for social 
 
17 Ibid., [116] 
18 Google AdWords is as system developed by the search engine Google where businesses 
can pay to display advisements online.   
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media companies.19 Failure to comply with the removal of illegal content can 
result in an information society provider being in breach of the directive.   
 
Despite the obligations put on providers to remove illegal content from its 
network upon constructive knowledge of its appearance, Internet services 
are not under a positive obligation to actively search for illegal activity, as 
affirmed in Scarlet Extended SA v Société belge des auteurs, compositeurs 
et éditeurs SCRL (SABAM):20 
‘In that regard, the Court has already ruled that the prohibition applies 
in particular to national measures which would require an intermediary 
provider, such as an ISP, to actively monitor all the data of each of its 
customers in order to prevent any future infringement … such a 
general monitoring obligation would be incompatible with Article 3 of 
Directive 2004/48 [Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the enforcement of intellectual 
property rights], which states that the measures referred to by the 
directive must be fair and proportionate and must not be excessively 
costly …’.21  
 
Scarlet concerned copyright-protected material, which was being illegally 
downloaded via the Internet service provider, Scarlet. SABAM, a 
management company representing authors, editors of music and 
composers brought an action against Scarlet for copyright infringements for 
allowing their customers to download material illegally without paying 
royalties. The the cour d’appel de Bruxelles (Belgium) concluded that Scarlet 
had breached copyright provisions; an injunction was granted against Scarlet 
to invest in technology, which would actively seek out customers who were 
 
19 Justice and Consumers, ‘European Commission and IT Companies announce Code of 
Conduct on illegal online hate speech’ (European Commission, 31 May 2016) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/just/item-detail.cfm?item_id=31811> accessed 10 July 2018 
20 C-70/10 Scarlet Extended SA v Société belge des auteurs, compositeurs et éditeurs 
SCRL (SABAM) [2011] ECLI 771 
21 Ibid., [36]  
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partaking in illegal behaviour online. The injunction was later overruled by the 
Court of Justice of the European Union who affirmed that Internet service 
providers were not under a legal obligation to actively seek out unlawful 
behaviour, or as potently put by Rizzuto:  
‘The Court of Justice ruled that national rules must, in particular, 
respect art.15(1) of Directive 2000/31, which prohibits national 
authorities from adopting measures which would require an internet 
service provider to carry out general monitoring of the information that 
it transmits on its network.’22 
 
However, the advancement of technology has ‘… changed the way in which 
creative content is produced, distributed and accessed’.23 Consequently, the 
European Parliament has recently voted in favour of implementing the 
Directive of The European Parliament and of The Council on Copyright in the 
Digital Single Market COM/2016/0593 (EU Copyright Directive). The EU 
Copyright Directive seeks to create copyright regulations suited to a digital 
age. In particular Article 13(1) states:  
‘Information society service providers that store and provide to the 
public access to large amounts of works or other subject-matter 
uploaded by their users shall, in cooperation with rightholders, take 
measures to ensure the functioning of agreements concluded with 
rightholders for the use of their works or other subject-matter or to 
prevent the availability on their services of works or other subject-
matter identified by rightholders through the cooperation with the 
service providers.’ 
 
In essence, information society service providers such as social media 
companies can now be held liable for copyright-protected material which is 
uploaded onto their sites.24 Though the EU copyright directive does not place 
 
22 Francesco Rizzuto, ‘Case Comment: Injunctions against intermediate online service 
providers’ (2012) 18(3) Computer and Telecommunications Law Review 69, 71 (note) 
23 Commission, ‘Questions and Answers – European Parliament's vote in favour of 
modernised rules fit for digital age’ (European Commission Press Release, 30 April 2019) 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-19-1849_en.htm> accessed 30 April 2019      
24 The EU Copyright Directive does give a list of companies who are not affected by the 
change in law, including, though not limited to, not-for-profit online encyclopaedias, open 
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an obligation on information society service providers to actively search for 
copyright-protected material, critics of this legal provision suggest that 
companies will have no choice but to actively search for material which 
breaches copyright regulations.25  
 
The EU is consequently moving in the direction of better regulation of the 
Internet however these changes only currently apply to copyright-protected 
material. As a result, for all other behaviours companies must rely upon self-
regulation, meaning inappropriate and unlawful material is flourishing online. 
Consequently, Members States of the European Union have witnessed a 
spread of terrorist material online in recent years, which has helped pave the 
way for non-binding measures to be imposed by the European 
Commission.26  
 
In 2016 an online Code of Conduct was produced aimed at social media 
companies following terrorist attacks in Brussels.27 The purpose of the Code 
of Conduct was to create a set of guidelines for social media companies to 
tackle illegal content online, in particular hate speech and terrorist 
propaganda.28 The document places a number of obligations on social media 
companies including, specific guidelines for social media users, the removal 
of illegal hate speech within 24 hours and increased cooperation between 
 
source software development platforms and cloud storage services’. See, BBC, Chris Fox, 
‘What is Article 13? The EU's copyright directive explained’ The BBC (London, 14 February 
2019) <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-47239600> accessed 27 March 2019 
25 Ibid., 
26 Commission n.1. Note, this is not legally binding on social media companies.  
27 Justice and Consumers n.19 
28 Commission, ‘European Commission and IT Companies announce Code of Conduct on 
illegal online hate speech’ (European Commission Press Release, 31 May 2016) 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-1937_en.htm> accessed 10 July 2018 
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social media companies.29 The code of conduct only applies to companies 
who have agreed to its terms, including Facebook, Twitter and YouTube, 
known as the IT companies.  
 
Despite the Code of Conduct not being legally binding on social media 
companies, ‘significant progress has been made by the social platforms 
participating in the Code of Conduct’.30 A study conducted a year after the 
Code of Conduct was adopted found that in 51.4% of cases, the IT 
companies removed illegal hate speech within 24 hours of being notified of 
its existence, an increase of 11.4% on the previous six months.31 The mixed 
approach of binding and non-binding protocols used by the EU to help tackle 
online behaviour has had some positive impacts. The engagement of some 
social media sites in adhering to the Code of Conduct created by the 
European Commission is a significant step forward in combatting unlawful 
behaviour online. Nonetheless, problems have arisen following the 
emergence of the Facebook Cambridge Analytica scandal.32 
 
As discussed in detail in chapter one, in March 2017 it became apparent that 
a major data breach had occurred within Facebook’s network allowing 
Cambridge Analytica to harvest the personal data of 87 million Facebook 
 
29 Ibid., 
30 Věra Jourová, ‘Code of Conduct on countering illegal hate speech online: one year after’ 
(European Commission, June 2017) 
<https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/document.cfm?doc_id=40573> accessed 10 July 2018  
31 Ibid., 
32 The Cambridge Analytical scandal as discussed in chapter one, concerns personal data, 
which was harvested from Facebook profiles without consent. The data collected was later 
used to target voters during political events across the globe. See, Patrick Greenfield, ‘The 
Cambridge Analytica files: the story so far’ The Guardian (London, 26 March 2018) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/mar/26/the-cambridge-analytica-files-the-story-
so-far> accessed 10 July 2018 
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users.33 Therefore, posing the European Parliament to consider legislative 
provisions against social media companies:   
 ‘“We are still working on the possible legal proposals … still stand on 
 the position that for terrorism, extremism and images of child abuse 
 we should have a more reliable framework that could introduce 
 sanctions for lack of compliance … but the line between prohibiting 
 hate speech and censorship is very thin.”’34 
 
The perspective of the European Parliament in endorsing legislation in 
tackling illegal conduct online is not mirrored by the European Commission. 
The European Commission instead promotes the use of non-legally binding 
protocols to curtail social media companies.35 For example, strengthening 
the ‘European Strategy for Better Internet for Children.’36  
 
The European Strategy for Better Internet for Children was created by the 
Commission in 2012 following concerns about the exploitation of children 
online and issues surrounding cyberbullying. The paper puts forward several 
recommendations to social media companies to protect children online, 
including age-appropriate privacy settings.37 This recommendation was 
accepted by Facebook who have separate privacy settings for minors 
including in-depth help pages for both children38 and parents.39 However, this 
 
33 See chapter one for an in-depth discussion on this.  
34 Věra Jourová EU commissioner for consumers and justice. See, Daniel Boffey, ‘EU 
threatens to crack down on Facebook over hate speech’ The Independent (London, 11 April 
2011) <https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/apr/11/eu-heavy-sanctions-online-
hate-speech-facebook-scandal> accessed 10 July 2018 
35Jennifer Rankin, ‘Tech firms could face new EU regulations over fake news’ The Guardian 
(London, 24 April 2018) <https://www.theguardian.com/media/2018/apr/24/eu-to-warn-
social-media-firms-over-fake-news-and-data-mining> accessed 24 July 2018 
36 Commission, ‘European Strategy for a Better Internet for Children’ COM (2012) 196 final   
37 Ibid., 17 
38 Facebook, ‘Youth Portal’ (Facebook, 2018) <https://www.facebook.com/safety/youth> 
accessed 24 July 2018 
39 Facebook, ‘Parents Portal’ (Facebook, 2018) <https://www.facebook.com/safety/parents> 
accessed 24 July 2018  
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has not been reflected by other social media companies such as Twitter who 
continue to have the same default privacy settings for both adults and 
children.40  
 
The absence of specific legal provisions placed on social media sites in 
combatting illegal content has resulted in a lack of consistency between 
social media companies. Ideas have been put forward by the European 
Commission to continue to reduce illegal behaviour online, but social media 
sites are not under a legal obligation to adhere to these recommendations. 
Put simply, companies such as Facebook and Twitter can choose to ignore 
the opinion of the European Commission. Consequently, ‘a harmonised and 
coherent approach to removing illegal content does not exist across the 
EU.’41     
 
Similarly, in England and Wales there is no true consensus on how to tackle 
the growing issue of online abuse. Several Parliamentary Committees have 
commenced in recent years examining abuse on social media sites, 
alongside the current criminal law framework. In 2014 the UK 
Communications Committee concluded that the criminal law governing social 
media was ‘… appropriate for the prosecution of offences committed using 
social media’.42 Whereas in 2018 the Law Commission concluded that more 
needed to be done to successfully combat unlawful behaviour aided by 
 
40 Twitter, ‘Twitter Rules Enforcement’ (Twitter, 2018) 
<https://transparency.twitter.com/en/twitter-rules-enforcement.html#twitter-rules-
enforcement-jan-jun-2018> accessed 18 February 2019 
41 Commission n.1, 5  
42 Communications Committee, Social media and criminal offences (HL 2014-15, 37) [5] 
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social media, including strengthening non-legislative provisions.43 
Consequently, like that of EU bodies, ‘a harmonised and coherent approach 
to …’ governing social media does not exist within England and Wales.  
 
Australia  
In Australia, the law is made up of several entities: The Constitution, Federal 
Law and State Law. Consequently, there are certain online conducts which 
are only criminalised in specific States of Australia rather than being a 
criminal offence across the country. This creates inconsistencies across 
States when it comes to tackling online behaviour. For example, in Victoria 
legislation is in place suited to the digital age,44 whereas in Western Australia 
there are few legal provisions governing conduct carried out online.45 As a 
result, States such as Western Australia must rely on the federal Criminal 
Code to tackle the growing issue of online abuse.    
 
A body of law has been created by the Federal Government of Australia that 
relates to crime, the Criminal Code Act (1995) known as the Criminal Code. 
Under part 10.6 of the Criminal Code, offences related to 
telecommunications are criminalised including computer misuse,46 the use of 
a telecommunications network to commit a serious crime,47 and the 
prohibition of offensive material online.48 These behaviours are similar to 
 
43 Law Commission, Abusive and Offensive Online Communications: A Scoping Report (Law 
Com No 381, 2018) 
44 Parliament of Australia, Cyber Safety - Joint Select Committee High-wire act: Cyber-safety 
and the young Interim report (June 2011) [11.39]  
45 Ibid., [11.48] 
46 Criminal Code Act (1995) section 476.2 (Australia)   
47 Criminal Code Act (1995) section 474.14 (Australia)   
48 Criminal Code Act (1995) section 474.17 (Australia)   
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legal provisions contained in the criminal law of England and Wales. 
Whereas in England and Wales, many legal provisions have been shaped 
and adapted to cover technology; the Federal Government of Australia has 
created legal provisions specifically aimed at governing online conduct.  
 
Like that of England and Wales, it is a criminal offence in Australia to send, 
via a communications network, offensive material to another.49 The law 
prohibiting offensive commentary sent online also criminalises the use of 
technology to menace and harass another:    
‘A person commits an offence if: (a) the person uses a carriage 
service; and (b) the person does so in a way (whether by the method 
of use or the content of a communication, or both) that reasonable 
persons would regard as being, in all the circumstances, menacing, 
harassing or offensive.’50   
 
The Federal Government of Australia has specifically criminalised the 
conduct of online harassment. As outlined in chapter four cyber harassment 
is ‘… repeated attempts to impose unwanted communications and contact 
upon a victim in a manner that could be expected to cause distress or fear in 
any reasonable person’51 pursued via the use of technology. Whilst in 
England and Wales harassment laws are based on a course of conduct that 
causes an individual alarm or distress,52 in Australia the harassment of 
another is based on the concept of the reasonable person:  
‘The reasonable person test allows for community standards and 
common sense to be considered when determining whether certain 
conduct or content of a communication is menacing, harassing or of 
 
49 For example, the Communications Act 2003 section 127(1) 
50 Criminal Code Act (1995) section 474.17(1) (Australia)   
51 Home Office, ‘Circular: a change to the Protection from Harassment Act 1997’ (Gov.uk, 16 
October 2012) <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/a-change-to-the-protection-
from-harassment-act-1997-introduction-of-two-new-specific-offences-of-stalking> accessed 
27 July 2018 
52 Protection from Harassment Act (1997) section 1(1) 
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an offensive nature.’53  
 
Consequently, the laws governing online harassment in Australia are wider 
than those found in the criminal law of England and Wales. As discussed in 
chapter four the concept that an individual must be alarmed or distressed by 
a course of conduct to invoke the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, 
means harassment is often misunderstood by the criminal justice system. As 
noted by Salter and Bryden the conduct of online harassment is ‘disturbing, 
unpleasant and may transgress the norms of socially acceptable’ behaviour, 
but it is difficult to prove that the conduct crosses a line to warrant criminal 
law intervention under the Protection from Harassment Act.54  
 
In April 2019 the Criminal Code Amendment (Sharing of Abhorrent Violent 
Material) Bill (the Bill) was put before the Australian Parliament, following a 
terrorist attack in Christchurch New Zealand, which killed 50 people.55 The 
attack was livestreamed56 on Facebook, later being removed by the 
company around an hour after the event occurred.57 However, other 
Facebook users re-uploaded the video across social media sites.58 In the first 
 
53 David Plater, ‘“Setting the boundaries of acceptable behaviour?” South Australia’s latest 
legislative response to revenge pornography’ (2016) 2 UniSA Student Law Review 77, 82  
54 Michael Salter & Chris Bryden, ‘I can see you: harassment and stalking on the Internet’ 
(2009) 18(2) Information & Communications Technology Law 99, 100 
55 Paul Karp, ‘Australia passes social media law penalising platforms for violent content’ The 
Guardian (London, 4 April 2019) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/media/2019/apr/04/australia-passes-social-media-law-
penalising-platforms-for-violent-content?CMP=share_btn_tw> accessed 30 April 2019 
56 Livestreamed technology allows for online users to video share with other Internet users 
live. See, Facebook, ‘Going Live on Facebook’ (Facebook, 2019) 
<https://live.fb.com/about/> accessed 26 March 2019  
57 Jim Waterson, ‘Facebook removed 1.5m videos of New Zealand terror attack in first 24 
hours’ The Guardian (London, 17 March 2019) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/mar/17/facebook-removed-15m-videos-new-
zealand-terror-attack> accessed 26 March 2019 
58 The BBC, ‘Facebook: New Zealand attack video viewed 4,000 times’ The BBC (London, 
19 March 2019) <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-47620519> accessed 26 March 
2019 
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24 hours after the Christchurch attack, Facebook removed 1.5 million copies 
of the video from its site.59 As a direct consequence of this event, the 
Australian Government proposed a Bill on 3 April 2019 for the purpose of 
creating a new criminal offence for social media service providers60 that 
failed to remove abhorrent violent material, expeditiously.61 The subsequent 
Bill received Royal Assent two days later.62 
 
Under these new regulations, social media service providers need to remove 
videos that articulate terrorism, murder, attempted murder, torture, rape or 
kidnap63 from their sites within a ‘reasonable’ and ‘expeditious’ time-limit.64 
Failure to comply with the Bill will either result in a $10.5 million fine 
(£5,652,622.50),65 or in some cases, the imprisonment of company 
officials.66 However, the Bill has been heavily criticised by the tech industry 
and politicians within Australia as a ‘knee-jerk reaction to a tragic event.’67  
 
 
59 Waterson n.57 
60 Social media providers are defined as, ‘an electronic service that satisfies the following 
conditions: the sole or primary purpose of the service is to enable online social interaction 
between 2 or more end-users; the service allows end-users to link to, or interact with, some 
or all of the other end-users; the service allows end-users to post material on the service; 
such other conditions (if any) as are set out in the legislative rules’. Enhancing Online Safety 
Act 2015 section 9 (Australia) 
61 Parliament of Australia, ‘Criminal Code Amendment (Sharing of Abhorrent Violent 
Material) Bill 2019’ (Parliament of Australia, 2019) 
<https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Bills_Legislation/Bills_Search_Results/Re
sult?bId=s1201> accessed 30 April 2019 
62 Ibid., 
63 Criminal Code Amendment (Sharing of Abhorrent Violent Material) Bill 2019 section 
474.32 (Australia) 
64 Criminal Code Amendment (Sharing of Abhorrent Violent Material) Bill 2019 section 
474.34 (Australia) 
65 Or 10% of annual turnover.  
66 Criminal Code Amendment (Sharing of Abhorrent Violent Material) Bill 2019 section 
474.34(10) and (11) (Australia) 
67 The Law Council of Australia president, Arthur Moses. See, Paul Karp, ‘Australia passes 
social media law penalising platforms for violent content’ The Guardian (London, 4 April 
2019) <https://www.theguardian.com/media/2019/apr/04/australia-passes-social-media-law-
penalising-platforms-for-violent-content?CMP=share_btn_tw> accessed 30 April 2019  
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Under the Bill several terms are included which are not specifically defined 
such as ‘expeditiously’ and ‘reasonable time.’ For Government officials who 
support the Bill it will be for the jury or the e-Safety Commissioner, discussed 
in detail in later parts of this section, to determine if abhorrent violent material 
has been removed from sites in a timely manner.68 Subsequently, arguments 
have been put forward that the Bill is fundamentally ‘flawed’ putting at risk 
freedom of expression and legality in the criminal law.69  
 
The creation of specific criminal offences suited to the digital age in Australia 
can be considered as a positive step forward in tackling unlawful behaviour 
online, though legislation needs to be passed with appropriate consideration, 
rather than a ‘pass it now, change it later approach’.70 However, it is 
important to note not all abusive online conduct is prohibited contrary to the 
Criminal Code in Australia. Instead, State Officials have had to enact their 
own legislation to criminalise behaviours such as revenge pornography. 
 
In the State of Victoria, a person is prohibited from the sending of:  
‘… an intimate image of another person (B) to a person other than B; 
and … the distribution of the image is contrary to community 
standards of acceptable conduct.’71 
 
Whereas in England and Wales72 the sender of the image must have 
distributed revenge porn to cause distress, in Victoria this element is not 
needed. Consequently, the laws prohibiting revenge pornography like that of 
 
68 Ibid., per Attorney General, Christian Porter 
69 Ibid., per The Chief Executive of Atlassian, Scott Farquhar.  
70 Ibid., per Sunita Bose 
71 Summary Offences Act 1966 section 41DA(1) (Australia) 
72 For a discussion of revenge porn laws in England and Wales see chapter five. 
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the laws prohibiting online harassment in Australia, are significantly broader 
in Victoria as opposed to England and Wales. Similarly, in South Australia 
individuals can be held liable for the distribution of revenge pornography if 
they make available an ‘invasive image of another person’73 without the 
consent of the person in the picture. Here, the term ‘invasive’ is defined as a 
person: 
‘(a) engaged in a private act; or (b) in a state of undress such that - (i) 
in the case of a female - the bare breasts are visible; or (ii) in any case 
- the bare genital or anal region is visible.’ 74 
 
Despite the element of distress not being needed to prove a criminal offence 
in Victoria or South Australia, if the image in question can be considered to 
fall ‘within the standards of morality, decency and propriety generally 
accepted by reasonable adults in the community’, then it is unlikely that the 
conduct will be considered as revenge pornography.75 
 
The fragmentation of the law across Australia means that not all citizens are 
protected under revenge porn laws.76 Campaigns have started to emerge in 
Australia calling for the conduct of revenge pornography to be criminalised 
specifically under the Criminal Code,77 especially for digital feminists such as 
 
73 Summary Offences Act 1953 section 26C(1) (Australia) 
74 Summary Offences Act 1953 section 26A(2) (Australia) 
75 Office of Legislative Drafting and Publishing, ‘Guidelines for the Classification of 
Publications 2005: as amended’ (Gov.au, 19 March 2008) 
<https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/.../1ac3d219-38d6-4987-b21f-9e4b6ee27302> 
accessed 27 July 2018  
76 Arguments have been put forward that the Criminal Code of Australia prohibits revenge 
pornography, though this is disputed. See, Anastasia Powell, Asher Flynn & Nicola Henry, 
‘FactCheck Q&A: are there laws to protect against “revenge porn” in Australia?’ The 
Conversation (London, 8 March 2017) <https://theconversation.com/factcheck-qanda-are-
there-laws-to-protect-against-revenge-porn-in-australia-74154> accessed 27 July 2018 
77 For example, the office of the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions in Australia 
has publicly supported a change in the criminal law in relation to revenge pornography. See, 
Lauren Wilson, ‘Top prosecutor warns Australia’s revenge porn laws are too weak to 
properly protect women’ news.com.au (Sydney, 10 January 2016) 
<https://www.news.com.au/technology/online/security/top-prosecutor-warns-australias-
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Powell and Henry.78 The Federal Government of Australia has rejected this 
argument, instead suggesting that the offence should be prohibited under 
civil law as opposed to the criminal law.79 
 
In February 2018 laws were passed through the Senate of Australia 
imposing fines of up to $105,00080 Australian Dollars (£59,245) for those who 
distributed revenge pornography, which the reasonable person would 
consider inappropriate,81 including photoshopped imagery. Currently, under 
the legal provisions prohibiting revenge pornography in England and Wales, 
photoshopped imagery is beyond the scope of section 33 of the Criminal 
Justice and Courts Act 2015. In essence, a fake image of a person engaging 
in a sexual activity, which is distributed to cause distress upon the person 
capsulated in the picture, is not currently prohibited under revenge porn laws 
in England and Wales. In Australia, a tough stance has been undertaken 
regarding the distribution of non-consensual imagery after Senates accepted 
that ‘… non-consensual sharing of intimate images is exploitative, it’s 
humiliating and it’s a very damaging form of abuse.’82 Consequently, victims 
who have been subjected to revenge pornography can make a complaint to 
the Australian eSafety Commissioner.   
 
revenge-porn-laws-are-too-weak-to-properly-protect-women/news-
story/b597b7c0f1b0f76c7b7980ca545b512a> accessed 27 July 2018    
78 Anastasia Powell & Nicola Henry, Sexual Violence in a Digital Age (Springer 2017) 
79 The rationale for using the civil law to punish acts of revenge pornography is to ensure 
cases are dealt with quickly within the system, as complaints can be made directly to the 
eSafety Commissioner. 
80 Note, this is the fine for perpetrators of revenge pornography. Hosts of such content can 
be fined up to $525,000 (£296,226).  
81 AAP, ‘Revenge porn bill passes Australian Senate’ news.com.au (Sydney, 15 February 
2018) <https://www.news.com.au/technology/online/revenge-porn-bill-passes-australian-
senate/news-story/d911487ff7aa8b109f518d7ca0d72aa1> accessed 30 July 2018 
82 Ibid., 
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The eSafety Commissioner is responsible for the promotion of Internet safety 
across Australia whilst also helping to tackle cyberbullying, illegal content 
online and revenge pornography.83 Under the new non-consensual imagery 
based laws in Australia, victims of this form of behaviour are able to contact 
the Office of the eSafety Commissioner, who is then able to impose fines on 
both content hosts and the perpetrator to ensure images are removed from 
servers in a timely manner.84 Despite a strong civil approach to tackling 
revenge pornography, the Nick Xenophon Team a political party based 
primarily in South Australia, called for the Act to also criminalise this type of 
conduct.85 Whilst others opposed the recommendations put forward in the 
Act, fearing the construction of the law would threaten aspects of free 
speech, in particular satire communications: ‘If I posted a picture or a 
drawing of President Donald Trump urinating in Central Park, I shouldn’t face 
a $100,000 fine [sic].’86  
 
Despite the lack of coherent legislation across Australia controlling conduct 
carried out online, States and the Federal Government have implemented 
several successful non-legislative approaches to help reduce cybercrime, 
including a National Cybercrime Working Group (NCWG). The purpose of 
the NCWG is to enable jurisdictions to work together in order to tackle cyber-
related crime. Though the United Kingdom has a similar agency, the National 
 
83 Office of the eSafety Commissioner, ‘Role of the Office’ (Australian Government, 2018) 
<https://www.esafety.gov.au/about-the-office/role-of-the-office> accessed 30 July 2018 
84 AAP n.81 
85 Ibid., 
86 Liberal Democrat Senator David Leyonhjelm. See, AAP n.81 
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Cyber Crime Unit governed by the National Crime Agency,87 the NCWG has 
implemented an online policing strategy, whereby police officers are now 
present on social media sites. 88 In addition, the NCWG has adapted its 
approach to tackling unlawful behaviour online through its contribution 
towards educational campaigns.  
 
In Australia educational initiatives to combat inappropriate conduct online are 
regarded as ‘… one of the most important elements of crime prevention’.89 
Programmes have been created by the Federal Government such as 
‘Thinkuknow’,90 targeting both school-aged children and the wider public.91 
Similarly, in the UK in September 2018 a compulsory national computer 
curriculum was made available in all state-based schools92 to ensure:  
‘all young people are equipped to have healthy and respectful 
relationships in both the online and offline world, and leave school 
with the knowledge to prepare them for adult life.’93   
 
The creation of a compulsory national computer curriculum is a positive step 
forward in the educational system, but its implementation comes 14 years 
after Facebook was made available to the wider public. Whereas the 
 
87 National Crime Agency, ‘National Cyber Crime Unit’ (NCA, 2018) 
<http://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/about-us/what-we-do/national-cyber-crime-unit> 
accessed 27 July 2018  
88 Department of Home Affairs, ‘Cybercrime’ (Australian Government, 2017) 
<https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/about/crime/cybercrime> accessed 27 July 2018 
89 Parliament of Australia n.44, [11.18] 
90 Thinkuknow, ‘What we see, say, do online’ (Thinkuknow.org.au, 2018) 
<https://www.thinkuknow.org.au/what-we-see-say-do-online> accessed 27 July 2018  
91 Parliament of Australia n.44 [11.18] 
92 Throughout the UK there are several ways in which schools are funded. Those not run by 
the state do not always have to follow changes implemented by the Government. 
93 HM Government, ‘Government response to the Internet Safety Strategy Green Paper’ 
(Gov.uk, May 2018) 
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_d
ata/file/708873/Government_Response_to_the_Internet_Safety_Strategy_Green_Paper_-
_Final.pdf > accessed 27 July 2018  
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‘Thinkuknow’ initiative was created in Australia in 2010, where in its first 9 
months, 118 presentations were given to 4,450 individuals.94    
 
Specific State programmes have also been created to tackle online abuse. 
For example, in the State of Victoria the Victorian Government has funded 
the first project aimed at addressing sexual abuse and violence against 
women online.95 The purpose of the project, which is being led by Gender 
Equity Victoria, is to train users of the Internet to call out sexism, essentially 
creating a form of self-regulation online. Gender Equity Victoria aim to 
educate moderators based in media organisations to ‘… understand the 
gendered nature of violence’, whilst also ‘empowering’ online users to tackle 
sexism.96 In addition, recommendations were made by the Government of 
Australia to create a women’s safety strategy.97 Following the creation of the 
women’s safety strategy an ‘e-SafetyWomen’ programme was also created 
by the e-Safety Commissioner, to ‘empower Australian women to take 
control of their online experiences.’98 The purpose of the programme is to 
allow women to gain the tools needed to help manage online abuse, whilst 
also creating reporting mechanisms for users. In essence, a victimological 
approach to online abuse has occurred throughout Australia, whereby the 
 
94 Parliament of Australia n.44, [11.18] 
95 Melissa Davey, ‘Online sexism targeted in world-first “bystander” project’ The Guardian 
(London, 31 May 2018) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/01/online-sexism-
targeted-in-world-first-bystander-project> accessed 27 July 2018  
96 Ibid., 
97 Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, ‘$100 million to help keep women safe’ 
(Australian Government, 24 September 2015) <https://www.pmc.gov.au/news-centre/office-
women/100-million-help-keep-women-safe> accessed 30 July 2018  
98 Office of the eSafety Commissioner, ‘eSafetyWomen’ (Australian Government, 2018) 
<https://www.esafety.gov.au/women/about-us> accessed 30 July 2018 
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victims have been placed at the centre of the criminal justice system.     
 
The creation of an e-Safety Commissioner in Australia has been considered 
by the Australian Government as successful. Between its creation in 2015 
and research conducted in 2017, the e-Safety Commissioner resolved 450 
serious complaints of cyberbullying.99 Furthermore, 19,000 cases were 
referred to other appropriate authorities, such as the police. The success of 
the e-Safety Commissioner was also reflected in the eSafetyWomen project, 
whereby in 2017, 2,000 frontline professionals across Australia were trained 
to help women who were being subjected to inappropriate behaviours 
online.100 Individual States and the Federal Government of Australia are 
therefore attempting to tackle online abuse through a variety of different 
means.  
 
Though there is some legislation in place which can be used to criminalise 
certain online conducts the law itself in Australia is fragmented. However, the 
non-legislative approaches to combatting online hate in Australia seems to 
be creating a precedent for other countries to follow. Whereas the European 
Union and Australia have been more inclined to use non-legislative 
provisions to control inappropriate behaviours online, the German 
Government has created legislation imposing specific obligations on social 
 
99 Senator the Hon Mitch Fifield, ‘Esafety Commissioner to enhance online safety for all 
Australians’ (Senator the Hon Mitch Fifield, 20 June 2017) 
<http://mitchfifield.com/Media/MediaReleases/tabid/70/articleType/ArticleView/articleId/1380/
eSafety-Commissioner-to-enhance-online-safety-for-all-Australians.aspx> accessed 16 
August 2018     
100 Ibid., 
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media companies.  
 
Germany  
In 2017 the Federal Government of Germany passed the Act to Improve 
Enforcement of the Law in Social Networks, which became legally binding on 
1 October of the same year.101 The purpose of the Act was to impose 
punishments on social networking companies who were slow in their removal 
of illegal content online whilst also attempting to curtail ‘fake’ online news.102  
 
Following a New Year’s Eve celebration in Germany reports emerged online 
suggesting that Syrian refugees had been involved in disorderly conduct. 
The articles stated that 1,000 refugees had attacked police with fireworks, 
alongside setting a church alight.103 In fact, no officers had been attacked 
and only a small fire had broken out damaging some nearby nets after a 
firework went off course. These reports were actively shared across social 




101 The Act was implemented in October 2017 however social media sites had three months 
from the implementation of the Act to comply with its conditions, before it became legally 
enforceable on 1 January 2018.  
102 Fake news can be defined ‘… as information distributed via a medium - often for the 
benefit of specific social actors - that then proves unverifiable or materially incorrect.’ See, 
Simeon Yates, ‘“Fake news” – why people believe it and what can be done to counter it’ The 
Conversation (London, 13 December 2016) <https://theconversation.com/fake-news-why-
people-believe-it-and-what-can-be-done-to-counter-it-70013> accessed 31 July 2018.  
103 Will Worley, ‘German police “shook heads in disbelief” at Breitbart News reporting of New 
Year’s Eve events in Dortmund’ The Guardian (London, 7 January 2017) 
<https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/breitbart-news-dortmund-police-new-
years-eve-fake-news-germany-angela-merkel-syrians-refugee-crisis-a7514786.html> 
accessed 31 July 2018 
104 Consequently, these reports were then being used to justify hatred, racism and 
campaigns requesting the removal of refugees from Germany by online users.   
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The spread of fake news surrounding the events of 31 December 2016 led 
the Federal Government of Germany to come to a decision to legislate 
against fake news and online hate,105 after concluding that:  
‘Online discussions are often aggressive, abusive and hateful … Hate 
crime may seriously threaten the peace in a liberal, open and 
democratic society if it’s not suppressed and prosecuted 
effectively.’106 
 
Consequently, the German Government implemented the Act to Improve 
Enforcement of the Law in Social Networks (Network Enforcement Act) 2017. 
The Network Enforcement Act applies:  
‘… to telemedia service providers which, for profit-making purposes, 
operate Internet platforms which are designed to enable users to 
share any content with other users or to make such content available 
to the public ...’.107 
  
The purpose of the Act is to place obligations on social media sites to 
remove or block unlawful content in the State of Germany. Following the 
implementation of the Network Enforcement Act, Facebook had to employ 
10,000 new moderators to help tackle online hate.108 
 
For content to be considered as unlawful under the Network Enforcement Act 
it must breach the German Penal Code.109 Like that of Australia, Germany 
 
105 Lizzie Dearden, ‘Germany to fine social networks up to €50m for not taking down illegal 
“fake news” posts’ The Independent (London, 5 April 2017) 
<https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/germany-fake-news-social-networks-
fine-facebook-50-million-euros-illegal-content-hate-speech-angela-a7668731.html> 
accessed 31 July 2018  
106 Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection, ‘Questions and answers: Act to 
Improve Enforcement of the Law in Social Networks’ (German Government, 2017) 
<https://www.bmjv.de/SharedDocs/FAQ/EN/NetzDG/NetzDG.html> accessed 31 July 2018 
107 Act to Improve Enforcement of the Law in Social Networks (2017) 
108 The Local, ‘This is what Facebook moderators in Germany have to deal with’ The Local 
(Stockholm, 16 December 2016) <https://www.thelocal.de/20161216/this-is-what-facebook-
moderators-in-berlin-have-to-deal-with> accessed 31 July 2018 
109 Act to Improve Enforcement of the Law in Social Networks (2017) section 1(3). See also, 
Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection n.106 
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has codified the criminal law into one document. Under the German Penal 
Code, a total of twenty-two behaviours are criminalised which are considered 
to be applicable in an online context. For instance, incitement of hatred,110 
revenge pornography111 and defamation.112 Here, under the Network 
Enforcement Act, social media companies must remove or block113 content 
which can be considered to breach the Penal Code.114      
 
The specified time limit for social media companies to remove illegal content 
from its sites in Germany is dependent upon the classification of the unlawful 
content. The Act places different time constraints on the removal of 
‘manifestly unlawful content’ and content which is simply ‘unlawful’. 
‘Manifestly unlawful content’ must be removed or blocked from sites within 
24 hours of being ‘flagged’.115 Whereas content which is considered as 
‘unlawful’ contrary to the German Penal Code, must be removed within 
seven days.116 Yet the Act does not clarify the difference between ‘manifestly 
unlawful content’ and ‘unlawful content’.    
 
As explored in detail in chapter two the principle of legality in the criminal law 
is the concept that legal provisions need to be definable, clear and 
accessible in order for citizens to adhere to the law. Like that of the UK, 
 
110 German Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch) section 130 
111 German Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch) section 201a 
112 German Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch) section 166, 185, 186 & 187  
113 Content which is simply blocked results in the communication not being publicly viewable 
within the Federal State of Germany. Whereas communications which are deleted, are no 
longer viewable across the globe. See, Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection, 
n.106 
114 Act to Improve Enforcement of the Law in Social Networks (2017) section 3(2) (Germany) 
115 ‘Flagged’ is a term used to describe when a communication online has been reported to 
the network host.  
116 Act to Improve Enforcement of the Law in Social Networks (2017) section 3(3) (Germany) 
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Germany is a signatory to the European Convention on Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (the Convention). The ambiguity of the terms 
‘manifestly unlawful’ and ‘unlawful’ breaches the concept of legality within the 
criminal law. The Act contains no definition of the two terms yet social media 
sites must clearly differentiate between the two types of conducts to adhere 
to the law. Failure to comply with these time limits can result in a company 
being issued with a heavy fine,117 whilst putting a person’s right to freedom of 
speech at risk:  
‘The distinction between “manifestly unlawful” and “unlawful” is not 
clear, and difficult for a private enterprise to accurately predict: the Act 
provides no guidance to Social Networks on how they should 
differentiate “manifestly unlawful content” from “unlawful content”, and 
contains no duty on the part of Social Networks to consider user’s 
rights to freedom of expression when making these determinations 
(even though law enforcement authorities are required to consider this 
when acting to restrict freedom of expression pursuant to the GCC 
[German Criminal Code]).’  
 
In Germany, freedom of speech is protected under both Article 10 of the 
Convention and under Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, enforced by Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights. Like that of Article 10 of the Convention, as explained in 
detail in the previous chapter, Article 19 is a qualified right and can be 
restricted when certain criterions are met: the restriction is governed by law, 
the restriction pursues one of the legitimate aims found under the Article, and 
the restriction is necessary in a democratic society. Yet the Network 
Enforcement Act contains no safeguards for freedom of speech, in fact social 
media companies are under no legal obligation to take into account a 
 
117 Act to Improve Enforcement of the Law in Social Networks (2017) section 4 (Germany) 
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person’s right to freedom of expression when removing content which they 
consider to breach the German Penal Code.118  
 
For the campaign group ‘ARTICLE 19’ the new social media laws in 
Germany, violates a citizen’s right to freedom of expression:  
‘ARTICLE 19 finds the Act, taken overall, to be dangerous to the 
protection of freedom of expression in Germany, and we are 
particularly concerned that countered with much weaker institutional 
and legal safeguards for the protection of human rights are looking at 
this Act as a model for increasing intermediary liability.’119 
 
The Network Enforcement Act for ARTICLE 19 requires social media sites to 
act too quickly in the removal of content from its servers. Consequently, 
there is no guidance in place to protect freedom of speech. Therefore, social 
media sites are more likely to be over-cautious creating an ‘… environment 
wherein lawful content is routinely blocked or removed as a precaution.’120 
This perspective has been supported further by David Kaye, the UN's 
Special Rapporteur on freedom of expression:  
‘With these 24 hour [to] seven day deadlines - if you are a company 
you are going to want [to] avoid fines and bad public branding of your 
platform. If there is a complaint about a post you are just going to take 
it down. What is in it for you to leave it up? I think the result is likely to 
be greater censorship.’121 
 
Following the implementation of the Network Enforcement Act several 
individuals in Germany had their social media accounts blocked by social 
 
118 Whereas the Courts of Germany must take into account a person’s right to free speech.  
119 ARTICLE 19, ‘Germany: The Act to Improve Enforcement of the Law in Social Networks’ 
(article19.org, August 2017) 24 <https://www.article19.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/09/170901-Legal-Analysis-German-NetzDG-Act.pdf> accessed 13 
July 2018 
120 Ibid., 1 
121 David Kaye, the UN's Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression. See, Patrick Evans, 
‘Will Germany's new law kill free speech online?’ The BBC (London,18 September 2017) 
<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/blogs-trending-41042266> accessed 31 July 2018 
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media companies.122 For example, Beatrix von Storch the leader of the far-
right Alternative German Party, had her account blocked by Twitter for 12 
hours after posting the following tweet: ‘Are they seeking to appease the 
barbaric, Muslim, rapist hordes of men?’123 Consequently, the changes in the 
law in Germany has resulted in companies being overly cautious for fear of 
being fined.124  
 
Not only has the Act created an obligation on social media companies to 
remove unlawful content within a given time period, but social media 
companies must now also produce six-monthly reports detailing their 
approaches to the removal of illegal content:  
‘Providers of social networks which receive more than 100 complaints 
per calendar year about unlawful content shall be obliged to produce 
half-yearly German-language reports on the handling of complaints 
about unlawful content on their platforms … and shall be obliged to 
publish these reports in the Federal Gazette and on their own website 
no later than one month after the half-year concerned has ended. The 
reports published on their own website shall be easily recognisable, 
directly accessible and permanently available.’125 
 
The Act goes further to list the minimum information which needs to be 
included within the report, for instance: how users can submit complaints of 
unlawful behaviour,126 how many complaints were made in a given period127 
 
122 Philip Oltermann, ‘Tough new German law puts tech firms and free speech in spotlight’ 
The Guardian (London, 5 January 2018) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jan/05/tough-new-german-law-puts-tech-firms-
and-free-speech-in-spotlight> accessed 6 August 2018  
123 Joseph Nasr, ‘Beatrix von Storch: German police accuse AfD politician of hate incitement 
over anti-Muslim tweet’ The Independent (London, 2 January 2018) 
<https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/beatrix-von-storch-germany-afd-anti-
muslim-twitter-north-rhine-westphalia-new-years-eve-a8138086.html> accessed 31 July 
2018 
124 Oltermann n.122 
125 Act to Improve Enforcement of the Law in Social Networks (2017) section 2(1) (Germany) 
126 Act to Improve Enforcement of the Law in Social Networks (2017) section 2(2)2 
(Germany) 
127 Act to Improve Enforcement of the Law in Social Networks (2017) section 2(2)3 
(Germany) 
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and the time taken to remove unlawful content.128 This is a similar approach 
undertaken by the European Commission through their ‘Code of Conduct’. 
As stated previously the European Commission has imposed a non-legally 
binding code of conduct on social media sites, to remove illegal content 
within 24 hours. Similarly, reports are produced to examine social media 
companies compliance with this non-legislative approach to tackling hate 
speech online. However, Germany has now placed obligations on the likes of 
Facebook and Twitter to legally comply with the creation of reports detailing 
online abuse on its sites, or risk being issued with a fine of up to 500,000 
euros (£453,557).129 A deterrence effect has therefore been created by 
German authorities, although the deterrence aspect is aimed at social media 
companies as opposed to the user. 
 
The final decision on the fine posed on a company will be made by the 
Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection, with the backing of the 
Federal Ministry of the Interior and the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs 
and Energy.130 Though the authority must also obtain a ruling by the German 
Administrative Court that the content in question is unlawful, adding some 
protection for freedom of expression.131 The extent of the fine will be 
dependent upon the condition which has been breached, as set out in 
 
128 Act to Improve Enforcement of the Law in Social Networks (2017) section 2(2)8 
(Germany)  
129 Act to Improve Enforcement of the Law in Social Networks (2017) section 4(2) (Germany) 
130 Act to Improve Enforcement of the Law in Social Networks (2017) section 4(4) (Germany) 
131 Act to Improve Enforcement of the Law in Social Networks (2017) section 4(5) (Germany) 
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section 4 of the Act. For example, a failure to name a representative based in 
Germany132 can result in a fine of up to 50 million euros (£45,341,155).133  
 
The implementation of the Network Enforcement Act in Germany has created 
opposing opinions. Pro-freedom of speech activists argue that the Act 
breaches the fundamental principles of freedom of expression, as companies 
will be more inclined to remove online content which may be borderline 
unlawful.134 For ARTICLE 19 not only does the Network Enforcement Act 
limit a person’s freedom of speech, the Act does not comply with the 
fundamental principle of legality in the criminal law. For ARTICLE 19 the 
Network Enforcement Act contains a variety of ambiguous wording, including 
what constitutes a social network.135  
 
Social networks are defined under the Act as: 
‘… telemedia service providers which, for profit-making purposes, 
operate Internet platforms which are designed to enable users to 
share any content with other users or to make such content available 
to the public (social networks).’136 
 
For ARTICLE 19 the use of the terms ‘sharing’ or making content ‘available’ 
brings platforms, which would be traditionally not defined as ‘social 
networks’, into the reach of the Act. For instance, gaming platforms, instant 
messaging websites or websites whereby users can leave product reviews, 
 
132 Under section 5 of the Network Enforcement Act, all social media companies have to 
name a dedicated person who will answer any issues the German Government incur.  
133 Act to Improve Enforcement of the Law in Social Networks (2017) section 4(2) 
134 Johanna Spiegel, ‘Germany's Network Enforcement Act and its impact on social 
networks’ (TaylorWessing, 2018) <https://www.taylorwessing.com/download/article-
germany-nfa-impact-social.html> accessed 27 June 2019 
135 ARTICLE 19 n.119, 12-13  
136 Act to Improve Enforcement of the Law in Social Networks (2017) section 1 (Germany) 
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could be considered as social media under the Network Enforcement Act.137 
The German Government has attempted to clarify the position of some 
online services: 
‘Platforms with journalistic/editorial content are also excluded. This 
also applies to websites that use the infrastructure of another social 
network to make their own journalistic/editorial content available, e.g. 
in the form of a Facebook page or profile.’138 
 
Limitations have therefore been placed on the overall reach of the Act, 
whereby blogs and journalistic content are exempt from the conditions set 
out within the Network Enforcement Act.139  
 
The Network Enforcement Act has created mixed debates since its 
implementation into the legal system of Germany. The law tackles the hosts 
of unlawful content, rather than the publisher, putting the onus on companies 
to remove illegal content from its sites rather than pursuing the individual 
who posted such commentary. This approach differs from England and 
Wales. Currently, the criminal law in England and Wales governing social 
media conduct focusses on targeting the perpetrator of unlawful behaviour, 
as opposed to the social media company hosting the comment. Likewise, in 
India, the Indian Government has implemented legislation aimed at the 
online user.   
 
 
137 ARTICLE 19 n.119, 12-13  
138 Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection n.106  
139 In addition, social networking sites who have less than two million users in the State of 
Germany are also exempt from prosecution under the Act. Act to Improve Enforcement of 
the Law in Social Networks (2017) section 1(2) (Germany) 
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India   
Like that of Germany, India has taken a strong stance towards controlling 
unlawful behaviour online. In 2000 Indian authorities enacted the Information 
Technology Act, with the Act being updated in 2008.140 Unlike Germany, 
India has attempted to combat unlawful conduct online, rather than targeting 
website hosts. The purpose of the Information Technology Act was to create 
one specific Act of Parliament criminalising cybercrime.141 The Act also 
encompasses provisions from the Indian Criminal Code, in an attempt to 
make it more compatible with the advancements of changing technology.142   
 
The Information Technology Act is based on the United Nations Model Law 
on Electronic Commerce 1996,143 whilst also mirroring many provisions 
contained in the law of England and Wales. For example, under section 67 of 
the Act citizens are prohibited from the sending of: 
‘… material which is lascivious or appeals to the prurient interest or if 
its effect is such as to tend to deprave and corrupt persons who are 
likely, having regard to all relevant circumstances, to read, see or hear 
the matter contained or embodied in it …’. 
 
Section 67 contains similar provisions to the Obscene Publications Act 1959 
and 1964 in England and Wales, whereby communications which can be 
considered to deprave or corrupt a person are criminalised. However, this 
 
140 Ministry of Electronics & Information Technology, ‘Information Technology Act 2000’ 
(Government of India, 2018) <http://meity.gov.in/content/information-technology-act-2000> 
accessed 8 August 2018 
141 Information Technology Act 2000 section 1 (India) 
142 Krishna Deo Gaur, Textbook on the Indian Penal Code (Universal Law Publishing 2009) 
57-58 
143 Abhilash CM, ‘E-Commerce Law in Developing Countries: An Indian Perspective’ (2002) 
11(3) Information & Communications Technology Law 269  
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provision contained in the Information Technology Act has come under 
heavy criticism following its use to censor freedom of speech within India.   
 
Research undertaken by ‘Point of View’, a not-for-profit based organisation in 
India, has uncovered a growing trend in the use of section 67 to curtail 
political speech over the last few years:  
‘2015 was a bumper year for Section 67. A state in India secured its 
first-ever IT Act conviction - under this section. A case was filed 
against India's most famous porn actress - under this section. A 
comedy crew was booked [prosecuted] for roasting famous Bollywood 
stars. And a few individuals were charged with making fun of 
politicians - all under this section.’144  
 
In the same year an Indian citizen Ajay Hatewar was charged for both the 
sending of a defamatory communication contrary to section 67A of the Act, 
alongside a second charge under section 67, after posting a tweet aimed at 
the Chief Minister of Maharashtra, Devendra Fadnavis.145 The tweet in 
question simply contained a photo of Devendra Fadnavis on a yacht with his 
family, yet it was considered by the authorities as obscene. At no point could 
it be considered that the photo would deprave or corrupt those who viewed 
it.146 Section 67 of the Information Technology Act has therefore been used 
to limit political discourse throughout India:  
‘From 2015 to 2017, Section 67 was used for censoring tweets, posts 
and content which spoke out against politicians. More often than not, 
this content was not obscene.’147 
 
 
144 Bishakha Datta et al, ‘Guavas and Genital: A research study in Section 67 of the 
Information Technology Act’ (Point of View, 2017) 4 <https://itforchange.net/e-vaw/wp-
content/uploads/2018/01/Smita_Vanniyar.pdf> accessed 8 August 2018 
145 Venkat Narayan, ‘Man booked under IT Act for “defaming” CM Devendra Fadnavis’ The 
Times of India (Mumbai, 10 July 2015) <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Man-
booked-under-IT-Act-for-defaming-CM-Devendra-Fadnavis-in-
tweet/articleshow/48011122.cms> accessed 8 August 2018  
146 Datta et al n.144, 12  
147 Ibid., 11  
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Like that of section 67 of the Information Technology Act, section 66A of the 
Act was created based on similar legislation contained in the criminal law of 
England and Wales:  
‘Any person who sends, by means of a computer resource or a 
communication device (a) any information that is grossly offensive or 
has menacing character; or (b) any information which he knows to be 
false, but for the purpose of causing annoyance, inconvenience, 
danger, obstruction, insult, injury, criminal intimidation, enmity, hatred 
or ill will, persistently by making use of such computer resource or a 
communication device [will be prosecuted]’. 
 
The format of section 66A stems from section 127 of the Communications 
Act 2003 and the Malicious Communications Act 1988, however it has been 
expanded to cover specific situations. This section was substituted into the 
Information Technology Act in 2008 following arguments that the law did not 
adequately protect individuals from online abuse.148 The purpose of section 
66A was to criminalise the conduct of sending grossly offensive, menacing or 
false messages online. Like that of section 67 of the Act, it was later used to 
restrict freedom of expression in India.  
 
Following the death of a controversial political figure, Bal Thackeray, 
Shaheen Dhada took to Facebook to express her opinion on the subsequent 
shutdown of a major city in India:  
‘Every day thousand[s] of people die. But still the world moves on ... 
Just due to one politician dead. A natural death. Everyone goes crazy 
... Respect is earned not given out, definitely not forced. Today 
Mumbai shuts down due to fear not due to respect’.149  
 
 
148 Seema Chishti, ‘Prescription post Section 66A: “Change law to punish hate speech 
online”’ The Indian Express (New Delhi, 6 October 2017) 
<https://indianexpress.com/article/india/hate-speech-online-punishment-supreme-court-
section-66a-information-technology-act-narendra-modi-4876648/> accessed 8 August 2018 
149 Rajini Vaidyanathan, ‘India Facebook arrests: Shaheen and Renu speak out’ The BBC 
(London, 26 November 2012) <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-india-20490823> 
accessed 8 August 2018  
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Soon after she posted the message on Facebook Dhada received phone 
calls from friends telling her to remove the message. Later the same day, 
she was arrested for her own safety after supporters of Thackeray took 
offence to the Facebook post. The following day after being held in a police 
cell overnight, Dhada was rearrested for violating section 295a of the Indian 
Penal Code. However, she was subsequently charged under section 66A of 
the Information Technology Act. In addition, a friend of Dhada, Renu 
Srinivasan, was also charged for the same offence under the Information 
Technology Act for liking, sharing and commenting on the original post.150 
 
In India a person’s right to free speech is protected under Article 19(1) of the 
Constitution of India 1949: ‘All citizens shall have the right … to freedom of 
speech and expression …’. Like that of Article 10 of the Convention, freedom 
of expression can be limited by the state of India:  
‘… in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security 
of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, 
decency or morality or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or 
incitement to an offence.’151  
 
Only in the circumstances above can Indian authorities limit a person’s right 
to freedom of speech. Failure to comply with these conditions and the Indian 
Constitution can result in the Supreme Court of India striking down a 
provision contained within an Act, as demonstrated in Shreya Singhal v 




151 The Constitution of India 1949 Article 19(2)  
152 Shreya Singhal v Union of India (2013) 12 S.C.C. 73 
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The Shreya Singhal case stemmed from nine writ petitions filed under Article 
32 of the Indian Constitution: ‘Right to Constitutional Remedies’.153 The 
Supreme Court in this matter was asked to consider a number of issues, 
including the compatibility of section 66A of the Information Technology Act 
with Article 19 of the Constitution, a person’s right to free speech. In addition, 
the court also examined if section 66A was clear and predictable therefore 
complying with the principles of legality in the criminal law. For Judge 
Natiman:  
‘… a penal law is void for vagueness if it fails to define the criminal 
offence with sufficient definiteness. Ordinary people should be able to 
understand what conduct is prohibited and what is permitted. Also, 
those who administer the law must know what offence has been 
committed so that arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of the law 
does not take place.’154  
 
Consequently, the court looked at the key terms of section 66A in detail, 
including the prohibition of grossly offensive and menacing material being 
sent via a communications network.  
 
As previously stated, section 66A is built on the provisions contained in the 
Malicious Communications Act and section 127 of the Communications Act. 
Like that of the Malicious Communications Act and section 127 of the 
Communications Act, section 66A does not define the terms ‘grossly 
offensive’ or ‘menacing’.155 For the Supreme Court of India this raised 
concerns that the terms were ambiguous, and consequently did not comply 
with the principles of legality:   
 
153 In essence, under this Article the Supreme Court of India has the right to rule on the 
compliance of an Act with the Constitution of India. 
154 Shreya n.152, [56]  
155 For further discussion on this point see chapter six. 
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‘Quite apart from this, as has been pointed out above, every 
expression used is nebulous in meaning. What may be offensive to 
one may not be offensive to another. What may cause annoyance or 
inconvenience to one may not cause annoyance or inconvenience to 
another. Even the expression “persistently” is completely imprecise - 
suppose a message is sent twice, can it be said that it was sent 
“persistently”? Does a message have to be sent (say) at least eight 
times, before it can be said that such message is “persistently” sent? 
There is no demarcating line conveyed by any of these expressions - 
and that is what renders the Section unconstitutionally vague.’ 
 
Here, the Supreme Court examined in detail two cases from English Law: 
Director of Public Prosecutions v Collins156 and Chambers v Director of 
Public Prosecutions.157 
 
For the Supreme Court of India, the cases of Collins and Chambers provided 
evidence of the ambiguity of the terms ‘grossly offensive’ and ‘menacing’: 
‘These two cases illustrate how judicially trained minds would find a 
person guilty or not guilty depending upon the Judge’s notion of what 
is “grossly offensive” or “menacing”. In Collins’ case, both the 
Leicestershire Justices and two Judges of the Queen’s Bench would 
have acquitted Collins whereas the House of Lords convicted him. 
Similarly, in the Chambers case, the Crown Court would have 
convicted Chambers whereas the Queen’s Bench acquitted him. If 
judicially trained minds can come to diametrically opposite 
conclusions on the same set of facts it is obvious that expressions 
such as “grossly offensive” or “menacing” are so vague that there is 
no manageable standard by which a person can be said to have 
committed an offence or not to have committed an offence.’158  
 
The lack of a clear definition for the key terms, ‘menacing’ and ‘grossly 
offensive’, led the Supreme Court of India to conclude that section 66A of the 
Information Technology Act did not comply with the notion of legality in the 
criminal law. In addition, the Court supported the argument that section 66A 
provided no safeguards for freedom of speech and conflicted with Article 19 
 
156 Director of Public Prosecutions v Collins [2006] UKHL 40 
157 Chambers v Director of Public Prosecutions [2012] EWHC 2157 (Admin), [2013] 1 WLR 
183 
158 Shreya Singhal n.152, [82] 
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on the Indian Constitution. Consequently, this particular section of the 
Information Technology Act was considered as void by the Supreme Court 
and struck down.159  
 
The judgment of the Supreme Court in Shreya Singhal has removed section 
66A from the Information Technology Act meaning it can no longer be used 
in the criminal justice system of India. One of the overriding rationales for 
striking down section 66A concerned issues of legality, using the cases of 
Collins and Chambers to support their judgement. Yet in England and Wales 
authorities continually use the Malicious Communications Act and section 
127(1) of the Communications Act to prosecute social media offences, 
despite no clear definition contained in English law in relation to ‘grossly 
offensive’ and ‘menacing’ communications. As argued in chapter six the lack 
of a clear understanding as to the meaning of these terms can create 
inconsistencies in the criminal justice system, as demonstrated clearly in R v 
Alison Chabloz.160  
 
Whereas in England and Wales it can be suggested that there seems to be a 
failure to act on complaints of online abuse, in India, authorities are using the 
Information Technology Act to the extreme to curtail free speech, through the 
use of deterrence. Since the implementation of the Information Technology 
Act, the law has been heavily criticised for its use by authorities.161 
 
159 Ibid., [119] 
160 R v Alison Chabloz Westminster Magistrates’ Court 25 May 2018 (unreported) 
161 Richa Kaul Padte, ‘Keeping women safe? Gender, online harassment and Indian law’ 
(Internet Democracy Project, 29 June 2013) <https://internetdemocracy.in/reports/keeping-
women-safe-gender-online-harassment-and-indian-law/> accessed 14 August 2018   
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Consequently, Indian authorities have a long way to go before it can be said 
that they are striking a balance between online abuse and freedom of 
expression. 
 
Chapter Overview  
There is no one singular approach to containing unlawful conduct carried out 
online. The European Union has attempted to create a coherent approach 
across all Members of States through directives, but illegal content is on the 
rise. The growing use of social media has raised criticism from the European 
Parliament who have called for social media companies to do more.162 
Recently, Mark Zuckerberg the founder of Facebook, has been before the 
European Parliament and the Commission where he was posed questions 
from Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), about what his company 
was doing to curtail unlawful behaviour and fake news online. During the 
conversations with MEPs, Zuckerberg was warned about the powers his 
company possesses:  
‘You have to ask yourself how you will be remembered - as one of the 
three big Internet giants together with Steve Jobs and Bill Gates who 
have enriched our worlds and our societies. Or on the other, in fact, a 
genius who created a digital monster that is destroying our 
democracies and our societies.’163 
 
Despite the power social media companies have across the globe, the 
European Commission has maintained its stance in strengthening non-
 
162 Alexis C Madrigal, ‘A Belgian Legislator Berates and Scoffs at Mark Zuckerberg’ The 
Atlantic (Boston, 22 May 2018) <https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2018/05/a-
belgian-legislator-berates-and-scoffs-at-mark-zuckerberg/560960/> accessed 16 August 
2018 
163 Ibid., 
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legislative approaches to reducing unlawful behaviour online. This is a similar 
approach endorsed in Australia.   
 
For those countries who have taken a legislative approach to tackle illegal 
online behaviour, two main criticisms have been raised: freedom of speech 
and legality. Free speech is an important aspect of any democratic state, as 
upheld by the European Court of Human Rights:   
‘Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of 
such a society, one of the basic conditions for its progress and for the 
development of every man.’164  
 
As explored in the previous chapter freedom of speech is a fundamental 
legal principle which needs to be maintained but, there is a boundary 
between freedom of expression and interfering with a person’s privacy. The 
examples given above illustrate the difficulties lawmakers have in creating 
legislation which curtails unlawful behaviour online, whilst also maintaining 
free speech in a democratic society. However, the main problem with legal 
provisions which have been implemented in India and Germany concerns the 
principle of legality in the criminal law.  
 
The principle of legality ensures that all criminal law provisions are clear, 
certain and accessible. In India the Supreme Court has struck down 
legislation used to curtail online behaviour after it was considered that the 
terms ‘menacing’ and ‘grossly offensive’ were ambiguous, yet in England and 
Wales similar laws remain in place. Whereas in Germany the Network 
Enforcement Act is a relatively new piece of legislation, and therefore it 
 
164 Handyside v United Kingdom (1976) 1 EHRR 737 [49] 
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remains to be seen if the Act will be upheld as being constitutionally viable. It 
will be for future cases which are brought before the German Judiciary to 
establish if the Network Enforcement Act complies to the principles of legality 
in the criminal law.  
 
From the discussion above a mixed-method approach is needed to help 
combat the growing issues of unlawful conduct online. Non-legislative 
approaches allow digital education to be strengthened within society. 
Nonetheless, this needs to be done alongside further changes in the legal 
system. Germany has paved the way for specific social media laws, but it is 
far from perfect.  
 
Chapter eight: Recommendations    
• Create a harmonised approach between legislation and non-
legislative provisions governing online abuse;  
• Ensure social media companies are held to account for abusive 
content facilitated by their sites in the form of a fine;  
• Create better educational schemes for children, parents and law 
enforcement relating to digital literacy skills;  
• Create clear and precise legal rules regulating online conduct and 
abuse in the form of a coherent Act of Parliament, whilst also ensuring 
provisions are in place to protect freedom of expression; 
• The creation of an e-Safety Commissioner in the UK overseeing the 
regulation of social media companies, a digital authority and 
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educational schemes aimed at law enforcement, school children and 
parents;  
• Define grossly offensive and menacing material with the aid of case 
law examples and the Crown Prosecution Service guidelines on social 
media prosecutions; and 
• Create a transparent reviewing system of all legal provisions 
implemented to govern social media abuse to ensure democracy is 
maintained and freedom of speech is not curtailed. 






‘Since its inception, the Internet has been an amazing force for good. 
It has had an extraordinary impact on people around the globe. It has 
created lines of communication; driven innovation, growth and new 
business models; and, it has connected and given a voice to the 
previously disenfranchised. For the first time ever, anyone, anywhere, 
with a smartphone and an internet connection can grow their own 
business and connect with people from around the world … but as the 
Internet has developed, risks have emerged online and behaviours 
that would not be tolerated in the real world are increasingly condoned 
online.’1 
 
This thesis set out to examine how the current criminal law framework of 
England and Wales governs online abuse aided by social media, and the 
law’s adequacy in protecting those subjected to abuse online. The previous 
chapters have exposed several issues with the current criminal law 
framework and its use in a social media setting. Using the issues highlighted 
throughout this thesis recommendations will be put forward in the following 
discussion as to how the criminal justice system, and society can better 
protect victims of online abuse.     
 
In recent years reports have been conducted by the Government, 
parliamentary committees and not-for-profit organisations examining different 
aspects of online abuse. In April 2019 the UK Government released an 
‘ambitious’ White Paper on Online Harms (the White Paper),2 supporting the 
idea that a ‘… new regulatory framework’ was needed to ensure the UK 
 
1 HM Government, ‘Internet Safety Strategy – Green paper’ (Gov.uk, October 2018) 2 
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_d
ata/file/650949/Internet_Safety_Strategy_green_paper.pdf > accessed 19 March 2019 
2 HM Government, Online Harms White Paper (CP 57, 2019) 1 
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becomes ‘… the safest place in the world to go online.’3 The 
recommendations put forward by the Government mirror some of the 
recommendations suggested in this chapter, but there are also some key 
differences; a comparison between the two will occur throughout the 
discussion below.  
 
The Criminal Justice System  
The previous chapters have exposed continuing issues with how the criminal 
justice system currently tackles abusive behaviour online. Arguments have 
been put forward concerning the legality of the current criminal law 
framework and its application in a social media setting. As highlighted in 
chapters four and six the use of the Public Order Act 1986, the Serious 
Crime Act 2007, the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, the Malicious 
Communications Act 1988 and section 127 of the Communications Act 2003, 
in a social media context, does not always conform to the principle of legality 
in the criminal law.  
 
Issues have also been highlighted at various points in this thesis concerning 
the current approach law enforcement and the Crown Prosecution Service 
(CPS) have taken in matters relating to online abuse. For instance, Caroline 
Criado-Perez as discussed in chapter four, has been highly critical of the 
criminal justice systems approach to the continued online abuse she was 
subjected to in 2013 by Peter Nunn:4  
 
3 Ibid., [1] 
4 For an in-depth discussion of this case see chapter four. 
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‘This man [Peter Nunn] made me fear for my life as no-one ever has 
before. I felt he was a clear and present threat to me. He made me 
scared to go outside, to appear in public. He stopped me being able to 
sleep; being able to work. He seemed obsessed enough to carry out 
his threats. I am glad he has been found guilty [of sending grossly 
offensive messages contrary to section 127(1) of the Communications 
Act]. I am glad he cannot contact me again. I hope he has learnt from 
this. But I think the CPS got the charge wrong. I don’t feel they 
understood what happened to me.’5 
 
The conduct of Peter Nunn, in sending abusive messages to Ms Criado-
Perez, might be thought to be more serious than the crime for which he was 
convicted - sending indecent, obscene or menacing messages - for which he 
received a six week custodial sentence.6 Rather, it might be thought that his 
actions amounted to harassment or stalking. If so, this suggests that the 
potential of the law to protect individuals from online abuse is not being used 
to the full,7 meaning victims are often let down.  
 
The following section will suggest a new Bill, aimed at controlling 
inappropriate conduct aided by social media, an example of which can be 
located in Appendix A. In addition, it will be argued that more adequate 
training and education is needed within police forces, before turning to look 
at the CPS guidelines on prosecuting cases involving communications sent 
via social media (the guidelines). 
      
The Criminal Justice System: The Social Media Bill  
 
5 Caroline Criado-Perez, ‘A Brief Comment on Peter Nunn, Sentenced Today For Twitter 
Abuse’ (Week Women, 2014) <https://weekwoman.wordpress.com/2014/09/29/a-brief-
comment-on-peter-nunn/> accessed 29 October 2016 
6 R v Peter Nunn The City of London Magistrates Court 29 September 2014 (unreported) 
7 Similar arguments have been raised regarding revenge pornography. See, Ben Robinson 
& Nicola Dowling, ‘Revenge porn laws “not working”, says victims group’ The BBC (London, 
19 May 2019) <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-48309752> accessed 26 June 2019 
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The purpose of the Social Media Bill will be to protect individuals from 
abusive and oppressing behaviour aided by new technology. By creating a 
coherent framework of social media related offences, the Bill will act as a 
form of deterrence for future online conduct. It codifies, consolidates, and 
creates new substantive offences which can be aided by new technology, 
creating strong legal provisions which both protects citizens from online 
abuse, whilst also deterring individuals from taking part in inappropriate 
behaviour online. The Social Media Bill will take precedence in matters 
relating to digital media, as opposed to the current use of adapting and 
shaping Acts of Parliament never intended to govern online conduct. This in 
turn creates provisions better suited to a digital age.  
 
Unlike many of the current legal provisions contained in the legal system of 
England and Wales, the Social Media Bill has been created specifically with 
new technology in mind. Though the Bill will mainly cover social media, to 
ensure the Bill keeps pace with the changing nature of technology the Social 
Media Bill does not contain a specific definition of social media. Instead, the 
Bill uses the term ‘technology’ which is defined as ‘a device for storing, 
processing and retrieving information’.8 This allows some form of flexibility 
within the law, without breaching the fundamental principle of legality in the 
criminal law. As potently put by Lord Bingham:    
‘It is accepted that absolute certainty is unattainable, and might entail 
excessive rigidity since the law must be able to keep pace with 
changing circumstances, some degree of vagueness is inevitable ...’.9 
 
 
8 Director of Public Prosecutions v McKeown [1997] 1 W.L.R. 295 per Lord Hoffman 302 
9 R v Rimmington, R v Goldstein [2005] UKHL 63, [2006] 1 A.C. 459 per Lord Bingham [35] 
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By creating strong legal provisions suited to a digital age the Bill will not only 
conform to freedom of speech, it will in turn protect a person’s right to 
privacy. As highlighted in chapter seven the criminal justice system currently 
tilts in the direction of freedom of expression. By strengthening the law’s 
surrounding online abuse, a person’s right to physical and psychological 
integrity will be more adequately protected.  
 
To protect freedom of expression, in many of the provisions contained under 
the Act reference is made to ‘reasonable members of society’. Here, 
reasonable members of society will be considered the reasonable social 
media user as endorsed by the UK Supreme Court in Stoker v Stoker:10 
‘The touchstone remains what would the ordinary reasonable reader 
consider the words to mean … All of this, of course, emphasises that 
the primary role of the court is to focus on how the ordinary 
reasonable reader would construe the words. And this highlights the 
court’s duty to step aside from a lawyerly analysis and to inhabit the 
world of the typical reader of a Facebook post. To fulfil that obligation, 
the court should be particularly conscious of the context in which the 
statement was made …’.11 
 
Here, the police, the CPS and the courts will need to take into consideration 
how the reasonable social media user would interpret the objectionable 
content, alongside any other criteria contained within the proposed Social 
Media Bill.  
 
In addition, to ensure the protection of privacy, which as discussed in chapter 
seven entails the protection of another’s physical and psychological integrity, 
many of the provisions put forward in the draft Social Media Bill, contain the 
 
10 Stoker v Stoker [2019] UKSC 17 
11 Ibid., per Lord Kerr [37-38] 
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clause that the behaviour must cause another anxiety or distress. Under the 
Bill, utilising the judgment of the court in Majrowski v Guy’s and St Thomas’s 
NHS Trust12 anxiety is defined as ‘something just short of a recognised 
psychiatric illness’.13 Whereas distress is defined as ‘oppressive and 
unreasonable behaviour’ based on the reasonable person.14 This allows for 
the courts, the CPS and the police to be more aware of the harms associated 
with online abuse. Below, each provision contained in the draft Social Media 
Bill will be taken in turn and explained.  
       
Cyber Harassment and Cyberstalking 
Though harassment and stalking are currently criminalised under sections 2 
and 2A of the Protection from Harassment Act, as discussed in chapter four 
there are several issues with the application of the Protection from 
Harassment Act in a digital age. For example, chapter four highlighted issues 
with a lack of clarity as to the meaning of harassment and stalking, which in 
turn has led to a number of failures in the criminal justice system, particularly 
when these behaviours are conducted via the use of social media. For 
instance, a report conducted by the Criminal Justice Inspectorates and HM 
Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate in 2017 outlined failures by the 
police to truly understand the difference between harassment and stalking.15 
This is despite the White Paper suggesting that cyber harassment and 
 
12 Majrowski v Guy’s and St Thomas’s NHS Trust [2005] EWCA Civ 251, [2005] Q.B 848  
13 Ibid., per Auld LJ [45 
14 Ibid., per May LJ [82] 
15 Criminal Justice Inspectorates & HM Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate, ‘Living in 
fear – the police and CPS response to harassment and stalking’ (justiceinspectorates.gov, 
July 2017) <http://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmicfrs/wp-content/uploads/living-in-fear-
the-police-and-cps-response-to-harassment-and-stalking.pdf> accessed 29 November 2017 
Page 351 of 449 
 
cyberstalking are clearly defined.16 The proposed Social Media Bill, located 
in Appendix A, has attempted to overcome this issue by specifically 
criminalising the conducts of cyber harassment and cyberstalking with a 
clear and accessible definition, whilst also removing the condition of a course 
of conduct.17 
 
Under the Social Media Bill cyber harassment is defined as the use of 
technology which the reasonable person would regard as causing another 
anxiety or distress, in which there is an awareness on behalf of the 
defendant that their behaviour could cause another anxiety or distress. 
The actus reus of the offence consists of two elements. First, the person 
must conduct the behaviour with the aid of technology. Second, the 
reasonable person must consider the behaviour as causing another anxiety 
or distress. The use of the term ‘reasonable person’ mirrors provisions 
contained in the criminal code of Australia which prohibits the use of 
technology to harass, menace or send offensive content to another, as 
highlighted in chapter eight:  
‘A person commits an offence if: (a) the person uses a carriage 
service; and (b) the person does so in a way (whether by the method 
of use or the content of a communication, or both) that reasonable 
persons would regard as being, in all the circumstances, menacing, 
harassing or offensive.’18   
 
 
16 HM Government n.2, [2.2] 
17 As discussed in chapter four in order to prove harassment, the Protection from 
Harassment Act 1997 states that contact must occur between the defendant and the victim 
on at least two occasions over a reasonable period of time, known as a course of conduct. 
See, the Protection from Harassment Act 1999 7(3) 
18 Criminal Code Act (1995) section 474.17(1) (Australia)   
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Not only does the inclusion of the term ‘reasonable person’ in both the 
Australian Criminal Code and the proposed Social Media Bill protect freedom 
of expression it also, as potently put by Plater:  
‘… allows for community standards and common sense to be 
considered when determining whether certain conduct or content of a 
communication is menacing, harassing or of an offensive nature.’19   
 
Whereas, the mens rea of the offence contained in the Social Media Bill is 
based on the construction of knowledge. Here, the defendant needs to know, 
or ought to know, that their behaviour would cause another anxiety or 
distress, mirroring the mens rea of harassment contained in section 1 of the 
Protection from Harassment Act. 
 
The Social Media Bill goes on to specifically criminalise cyberstalking. Like 
that of cyber harassment, the conduct of cyberstalking must be conducted 
with the aid of technology, in which the reasonable social media user would 
regard the conduct as amounting to the anxiety or distress of another. In 
addition, to separate cyberstalking from cyber harassment the conduct must 
‘be considered as continued unwanted contact’, removing the minimum 
requirement set out by Parliament under the Protection from Harassment 
Act. Like cyber harassment, the mens rea of the offence is based on the 
construction of knowledge, whereby the defendant must know or ought to 
know that their behaviour could cause another anxiety or distress. 
 
 
19 David Plater, ‘“Setting the boundaries of acceptable behaviour?” South Australia’s latest 
legislative response to revenge pornography’ (2016) 2 UniSA Student Law Review 77, 82  
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The behaviours of cyber harassment and cyberstalking can have a 
significant effect on a person’s wellbeing, as highlighted at various points in 
this thesis. It has given rise to not only victims changing their online habits, 
but it has also resulted in devastating consequences for those who have 
become subjected to this form of abuse. By directly placing cyber 
harassment and cyberstalking on a statutory footing, it allows for the criminal 
justice system to better protect those who become victims of this form of 
abuse.   
 
Cyber Related Revenge Pornography 
Revenge pornography has been defined as the ultimate humiliation of 
another,20 with it becoming a specific criminal offence in England and Wales 
in 2015 under section 33 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act. As 
discussed in chapter five the criminalisation of revenge pornography has 
been hailed as a success by the CPS.21 However, the law itself is not without 
fault due to the narrow nature in which the law has been constructed.22 For 
instance, the definition of sexual imagery does not cover photoshopped 
images, the mens rea of the offence is one of intent, and images sent to 
another which are not distributed to cause distress upon the person 
contained in the image, will fall outside the realms of the Act.  
 
 
20 HC Deb 19 June 2014, vol 582, col 1368 
21 The Crown Prosecution Service, ‘Violence against women and girls report: tenth edition’ 
(CPS.gov, 2017) 1 <https://www.cps.gov.uk/sites/default/files/documents/publications/cps-
vawg-report-2017.pdf> accessed 30 January 2018 
22 Robinson & Dowling n.7 
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As outlined in Appendix A, the Social Media Bill attempts to overcome the 
issues highlighted in chapter five by widening the scope of section 33 of the 
Criminal Justice and Courts Act. Consequently, the mens rea of the offence 
has been altered to include photos or videos which are sent recklessly, 
mirroring the mens rea suggested by Mitchell as previously discussed in 
chapter five.23 By extending the mens rea of section 33 of the Criminal 
Justice and Courts Act, it allows for victims of this form of abuse to be better 
protected by the law.  
 
Furthermore, to satisfy the mens rea of the offence contained in clause 2 of 
the Social Media Bill, there must also be some form of knowledge on behalf 
of the defendant that the material being disclosed lacks consent on behalf of 
the person capsulated in the image or video. Like that of cyber harassment 
and cyberstalking, under the Social Media Bill knowledge is built on the 
principle that the defendant should know or ought to know that there was a 
lack of consent. Here, the term ‘consent’ includes ‘… general consent 
covering the disclosure, as well as consent to the particular disclosure.’24 
This ensures that individuals who reshare the image online may only be 
prosecuted if they actively know that there is a lack of consent.  
 
The actus reus of the offence, like that of section 33 of the Criminal Justice 
and Courts Act is the disclosure of private sexual photographs or films to 
another. However, under the new provisions put forward in the Social Media 
 
23 Justine Mitchell, ‘Censorship in cyberspace: closing the net on “revenge porn”’ (2014) 
25(8) Entertainment Law Review 283, 288 
24 The Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 section 33(7)a 
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Bill, the condition that the picture has to be sent to cause distress upon the 
person contained in the material, has been removed. Furthermore, in order 
to widen the scope of revenge porn laws the definition of ‘private sexual 
photograph or film to another’, under the Social Media Bill has been 
expanded to reflect the work of Mitchell.25 Here, the term ‘sexual’ is defined 
as a person:  
‘engaged in sexual intercourse; or unclothed external genitalia, the 
perineum and anus of a male or female; Buttocks of a male or female; 
Breasts and nipples of a female; and covered erectile genitalia of a 
male are clearly visible; or a photo or film that the reasonable person 
would consider as sexually explicit’.26 
 
The Social Media Bill also makes it an offence to send a ‘private sexual 
photograph or film to another’ even if the image is photoshopped. As outlined 
in previous chapters the advancements of changing technology means 
photos can be dramatically altered to the point in which the person viewing 
the photo may not be able to see that it is a fake image. 
 
One of the most crucial changes put forward in clause 2 of the Social Media 
Bill relates to anonymity. As highlighted in chapter five one of the major 
criticisms of section 33 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act relates to the 
lack of anonymity given to revenge porn victims.27 Revenge porn is akin to a 
sexual offence as opposed to blackmail despite arguments to the contrary 
made by ex-policing minister Mike Penning.28 Victims are left traumatised, 
resulting in significant mental health issues, as the law as it currently stands 
 
25 Mitchell n.23. See chapter five for a detailed discussion.  
26 Ibid., 288 
27 Robinson & Dowling n.7  
28 Jocelyn Ledward & Jennifer Agate, ‘“Revenge porn” and s.33: the story so far’ 28(2) 
Entertainment Law Review 40, 41 
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neglects victimological aspects of revenge porn. Consequently, the Social 
Media Bill, by utilising section 1(1) of the Sexual Offences (Amendment Act) 
1992, gives anonymity to victims of revenge pornography to ensure they are 
given full protection under the law. 
 
Online Abuse 
As outlined in chapter six both sections 127 of the Communications Act and 
the Malicious Communications Act, can be considered as provisions 
criminalising miscellaneous online offences. Between these two legal 
provisions conduct that can be labelled as threatening, false, obscene, 
indecent, grossly offensive or menacing are prohibited. Indeed, in recent 
years both these provisions have become interchangeable within the criminal 
justice system.29 Despite this, both provisions can be considered to take 
precedence in social media related offences. However, as discussed 
previously neither provision is without fault. For instance, the term grossly 
offensive as contained in section 127(1) of the Communications Act and 
within the Malicious Communications Act, has been criticised for its lack of a 
definitive definition.30 In fact in India, as discussed in chapter eight provisions 
of the Information Technology Act 2000 have been struck down by the Indian 
Supreme Court as the term ‘grossly offensive’ was considered too vague and 
lacked an agreed definition.31  
 
 
29 Laura Scaife, Handbook of Social Media and the Law (Routledge 2015) 166 
30 Laura Bliss, ‘The crown prosecution guidelines and grossly offensive comments: an 
analysis’ (2017) 9(2) Journal of Media Law 173 
31 Shreya Singhal v Union of India (2013) 12 S.C.C. 73 
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Under clause 4 of the Social Media Bill as illustrated in Appendix A, it is 
proposed that it will be an offence to send a message or content that can be 
labelled as either grossly offensive or menacing via the use of technology. 
The actus reus of the offence consists of three elements. First, the offence 
must be committed using technology. As explained above technology is 
given a wide definition under the Bill, to ensure that the law is flexible to 
advancements of digital media. Second, it must be found that the reasonable 
person, i.e. the reasonable social media user,32 would consider the content 
as contributing to the anxiety or distress of another. Finally, the conduct in 
question needs to amount to an offence which can be labelled as either 
grossly offensive or of a menacing nature.  
 
Under the Bill menacing is defined as ‘something just short of a credible 
threat’, reflecting the definition given to the term by Sedley LJ in Director of 
Public Prosecutions v Collins.33 Whereas grossly offensive will be defined 
under the Social Media Bill as something:  
‘more than offensive, shocking or disturbing; or satirical, iconoclastic 
or rude comment; or the expression of unpopular or unfashionable 
opinion about serious or trivial matters, or banter or humour, even if 
distasteful to some or painful to those subjected to it; or an uninhibited 
and ill thought out contribution to a casual conversation where 
participants expect a certain amount of repartee’.34   
 
 
32 Stoker v Stoker n.10  
33 Director of Public Prosecutions v Collins [2005] EWHC 1308 (Admin), [2006] 1 W.L.R. 308 
per Sedley LJ [10]. See also, David Allen Green, ‘The “Twitter Joke Trial” returns to the High 
Court’ (NewStatesman, 22 June 2012) <https://www.newstatesman.com/blogs/david-allen-
green/2012/06/twitter-joke-trial-david-allen-green> accessed 30 April 2018. 
34 The Crown Prosecution Service, ‘Guidelines on Prosecuting Cases Involving 
Communications Sent via Social Media’ (CPS.gov, 21 August 2018) [28] 
<https://www.cps.gov.uk/legal-guidance/social-media-guidelines-prosecuting-cases-
involving-communications-sent-social-media> accessed 11 October 2018 
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The inclusion of the term ‘more than’ allows for freedom of speech to be 
protected. Here, it will be for the criminal justice system, based on the 
reasonable social media user, to determine when a comment breaches the 
elements contained in the above definition.35 
 
Providing a clearer definition of the terms grossly offensive and menacing 
with the aid of case law examples would ensure that the Social Media Bill 
adheres to the principle of legality, whilst also maintaining free speech within 
society. The mens rea of knowledge also adds further protection for freedom 
of speech in a digital age. The application of this provision will be aided 
further by updated social media prosecuting guidelines, discussed in detail in 
further sections of this chapter.  
   
Clause 4 of the Social Media Bill will also directly criminalise the sending of 
false messages and messages sent using false credentials. As discussed in 
chapter six fake online profiles are becoming a prominent problem within 
society. These profiles are often created for the sole aim of abusing another. 
In fact, Twitter has no ‘real name’ policy, meaning users can create a Twitter 
account using false credentials. Under the Social Media Bill it will be an 
offence to send via technology, a message of a grossly offensive or 
menacing nature which the person knows to be false or the message is sent 
using a fake social media account. Like that of other provisions contained in 
the Social Media Bill, the mens rea will be based on the construction of 
knowledge. 
 
35 Stoker v Stoker n10 
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Furthermore, clause 4 proposes that it will be an offence to send a message 
of an obscene nature, contrary to the Obscene Publications Act 1959 and 
1964. As outlined in chapter six, although section 127(1) of the 
Communications Act makes it an offence to send a message or material of 
an obscene nature, the Obscene Publications Act seems to take precedence 
in cases relating to obscene material. The Obscene Publications Act can be 
considered to conform to the principles of legality, whilst also protecting 
freedom of expression, as affirmed by the European Court of Human 
Rights.36 It is proposed that the Obscene Publications Act will take 
precedence in matters relating to obscene material sent via the use of 
technology.  
 
The final behaviour criminalised under clause 4 of the Social Media Bill 
relates to the use of technology to send a threat, in particular threats of a 
sexual nature to another. The actus reus of the offence contains three 
elements. Like that of other provisions contained in the Bill, the material must 
be sent via the use of technology, which the reasonable social media user37 
would consider as amounting to the anxiety or distress of another. The third 
element relates to the content of the material. Here, it must be found that the 
communication under review either contains a credible threat of violence or 
an explicit threat of rape or sexual violence. Here, the term ‘explicit’ will take 
its ordinary dictionary meaning, namely, a clear and precise threat of sexual 
 
36 Handyside v United Kingdom (1976)1 EHRR 737 
37 Stoker v Stoker n.10 
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violence, reflecting how the law currently governs extreme pornography.38 
Like that of other provisions contained in the Bill, the mens rea is based on 
the construction of knowledge. 
 
Inciting Others  
Following the 2017 General Election in the United Kingdom the then Prime 
Minister, Theresa May, announced plans to investigate the continued abuse 
of MPs during the campaign period. In December 2017 the Committee on 
Standards in Public Life released their report examining the intimidation of 
those serving in public office.39 The report highlighted the continuing issue of 
dogpiling. As discussed in chapter one dogpiling is considered the behaviour 
of actively encouraging other online users to abuse another online. It is 
becoming a prevalent problem in a digital society, especially for MPs: 
‘It got so bad during the election that for much of the campaign I came 
off social media and didn’t post anything which impacted on my ability 
to campaign’.40 
 
The Social Media Bill therefore specifically criminalises the behaviour of 
dogpiling.  
 
Under the Bill it is an offence to: 
‘intentionally incite multiple persons to target another, which D 




38 The Crown Prosecution Service, ‘Extreme Pornography’ (CPS.gov, 2019) 
<https://www.cps.gov.uk/legal-guidance/extreme-pornography> accessed 13 May 2019 
39 Committee on Standards in Public Life, Intimidation in Public Life: A Review by the 
Committee on Standards in Public Life (HC 2017-18) 
40 Ibid., per Maria Caulfield MP 39 
41 Appendix A  
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The actus reus consists of several key elements. First, multiple people must 
incite others to target another online. Under the Bill multiple is defined as 
more than two people, mirroring provisions contained in section 2 of the 
Protection from Harassment Act. As dogpiling is akin to harassment the 
conduct must also amount to the harassment of another. Here, the definition 
of harassment contained in the cyber harassment provision of the Bill will be 
utilised. In essence, the reasonable person must conclude that the conduct 
amounts to the anxiety or distress of another.  
 
Clause 5 of the Social Media Bill also makes it an offence to incite another to 
commit a further criminal offence governed by law. The purpose of this 
provision is to create a coherent and clear offence of incitement, which 
conforms to the principles of legality. In previous cases as outlined in chapter 
four, sections 44 and 46 of the Serious Crime Act have been used to govern 
the incitement of others to commit a further criminal offence.42 However, the 
Serious Crime Act when first enacted was never intended to cover abusive 
conduct carried out via social media. Consequently, its usage can be seen 
not to conform with the principles of legality in the criminal law.  
 
The Social Media Bill makes it an offence to intentionally incite another to 
commit a further criminal offence, which the defendant reasonably believes 
will result in a further criminal offence taking place. The actus reus of the 
offence is the incitement of another to commit a further criminal act. Here, 
the further criminal act must be governed by statute or the common law, 
 
42 For instance, see R v Blackshaw [2011] EWCA Crim 2312, [2012] 1 W.L.R. 1126 
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similar to that of sections 44 to 46 of the Serious Crime Act. Whereas the 
mens rea consists of two elements. First, the incitement must be done with 
intention. Intention as governed under Regina Respondent v Woollin 
Appellant,43 refers to the defendants aim or purpose. The second element of 
the mens rea is one of belief. Here, it must be found that the defendant, ‘… in 
the light of all the circumstances …’ reasonably believed that a further 
criminal offence would take place.44 
 
Hate Crime  
Anyone can become a victim of online abuse though there are growing 
concerns surrounding the use of the Internet to target another because of a 
protected characteristic.45 For instance, targeting someone because of their 
race or sexuality. In fact, in recent years there has been an increase in the 
use of social media sites to subject women to gender-specific threats of 
rape.46 The Social Media Bill will contain a direct provision in which the 
police, the CPS and the courts must consider if any of the behaviours 
contained in the Social Media Bill are conducted because of someone’s 
protected characteristic. However, to reflect the changing nature of society a 
wide definition will be given to the term protected characteristic:  
‘protected characteristic covers the following: race; ethnicity; national 
origin; religious affiliation; sexual orientation; caste; sex; gender or 
gender identity; or disability.’47   
 
43 Regina Respondent v Woollin Appellant [1998] 3 W.L.R. 382, [1999] 1 A.C. 82 per Lord 
Steyn 93 
44 R v Edward Leonard Hall (1985) 81 Cr. App. R. 260 per Boreham J 264 
45 The BBC, ‘Hate crime “police priority” as social media cases soar’ The BBC (London, 17 
March 2018) <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-glasgow-west-43436900> accessed 
19 July 2019 
46 Amnesty International UK, ‘Online abuse of women widespread in UK’ (Amnesty 
International, 2017) <https://www.amnesty.org.uk/online-abuse-women-widespread> 
accessed 3 October 2018   
47 Appendix A  




The final provision contained in the Social Media Bill relates to computer 
misuse. As discussed in chapter five, though it is rare, computer misuse can 
and has been used to abuse others online.48 However, unlike many other 
Acts analysed throughout this thesis, the Computer Misuse Act can be 
considered as conforming to the principle of legality. Consequently, clause 7 
contained in the Social Media Bill ensures that in matters relating to 
computer misuse, the Computer Misuse Act is utilised.  
 
Section Overview  
 
The Social Media Bill attempts to strengthen the criminal law framework in 
matters relating to inappropriate behaviours online. However, to ensure 
consistency changes are needed across the criminal justice system 
including, digital media training for police officers, alongside updated and 
transparent social media guidelines.   
 
The Criminal Justice System: The Police  
In recent years, the police in England and Wales have witnessed a dramatic 
increase in reports relating to malicious communications sent online. As 
outlined in chapter one in 2017 the BBC released a Freedom of Information 
request, highlighting the number of police reports generated during 2015 and 
2016 concerning online malicious communications.49 In 2015, 33,462 reports 
 
48 R v Crosskey [2012] EWCA Crim 1645, [2013] 1 Cr. App. R. (S.) 76 
49 The BBC, ‘Teenager's life “ruined” by Live.me and Twitter “trolls”’ The BBC (London, 24 
October 2017) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-41693437> accessed 30 January 
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were made to thirty-eight out of forty-three police forces in England and 
Wales relating to malicious communications. By 2016 this figure had 
increased to 76,372 police reports.50 However, examples have been 
illustrated throughout this thesis of the police failing to take reports of online 
abuse seriously, encouraging a victim-blaming orthodox in some instances.  
 
A report undertaken by the Criminal Justice Inspectorates and HM Crown 
Prosecution Service Inspectorate in 2017 as discussed in detail in chapter 
four, exposed a lack of understanding across the criminal justice system in 
relation to harassment and stalking offences.51 In particular, concerns were 
raised regarding the criminal justice systems approach to stalking and 
harassment in an online context:   
‘Basically they’ve told me [the police], any contact that I receive 
through social media is irrelevant, because they can’t prove that it’s 
associated to them [the abuser].’52 
 
Throughout the Criminal Justice Inspectorates and HM Crown Prosecution 
Service Inspectorate report, examples are given of failures by both the police 
and the CPS in adequately protecting those who are subjected to 
harassment or stalking. Social media has in recent years changed how 
harassment and stalking can be carried out. For instance, of the 112 reports 
examined by the Criminal Justice Inspectorates and HM Crown Prosecution 
Service Inspectorate, 82 cases involved the use of modern technology, such 
 
2018. Here, the term ‘malicious communication’ was used as a generic term for abusive 
commentary sent online 
50 Ibid., 
51 Criminal Justice Inspectorates & HM Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate n.15 
52 Ibid., 27  
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as social media, by the perpetrator to carry out the offence.53 Failure by the 
police in taking online abuse seriously can have serious consequences.  
 
In 2017 Molly McLaren was stabbed 75 times outside a gym by her ex-
partner.54 Ms McLaren had previously ended her relationship with Joshua 
Stimpson over concerns about his controlling behaviour. He proceeded to 
harass her via Facebook.55 She reported Stimpson’s behaviour to her local 
police force stating that he had ‘lost the plot’ and she was in fear of her own 
life.56 Despite these concerns Stimpson simply received a phone call from a 
police officer, warning him about his behaviour. A week after the phone call 
Stimpson killed Ms McLaren resulting in Kent Police force referring 
themselves to the Independent Office for Police Misconduct.57 
 
From the examples given above and throughout this thesis, more adequate 
training is needed for police officers relating to the use of social media to 
commit unlawful behaviour.58 Training however needs to go beyond 
establishing when certain conduct crosses the line to warrant criminal law 
intervention; it needs to include a better understanding across police forces 
with regard to how social media websites work, how to adequately support 
victims who are being subjected to online abuse, tackle the stigma that 
 
53 Ibid., 52  
54 Sarah Ditum, ‘If the law actually worked, Joshua Stimpson wouldn’t have been able to 
stab Molly McLaren 75 times in broad daylight’ The Independent (London,7 February 2018) 
<https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/molly-mclaren-stalking-joshua-stimpson-stabbed-
theodore-johnson-cps-a8198836.html> accessed 3 April 2019 
55 Laura Bliss, ‘The Protection from Harassment Act 1997: Failures by the Criminal Justice 
System in a Social Media Age’ (2019) 83(3) Journal of Criminal Law 217, 226 
56 Ibid., 
57 As of 16 April 2019, The Independent Office for Police Misconduct were still investigating 
the matter. 
58 Robinson & Dowling n.7 
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online abuse is outside the realms of the ‘real world’, and updated training in 
relation to major technological changes or advancements.   
 
The approach that social media is beyond the scope of the legal system has 
now been eroded. In England and Wales nearly half of all crime is aided by 
social media.59 Police officers need to be adequately trained in the 
advancements of changing technology. The Home Office in 2016 announced 
plans to invest in the education of law enforcement. As part of a £4.6 million 
Police Transformation fund programmes will be created to help ‘… build 
police capability to respond to the full range of digital crime types, through 
investment in technology and training.’60 However, for training to be 
successful police forces need to be aided by up-to-date social media 
prosecuting guidelines which are explicit and clear.  
 
The Criminal Justice System: The Crown Prosecution Service 
Guidelines  
 
Following growing concerns about the lack of consistency between police 
forces in matters relating to social media;61 the matter of Paul Chambers, an 
individual prosecuted for the sending of a tweet threatening to blow an airport 
‘sky high’;62 and the case of Daniel Thomas, a footballer who sent a 
 
59 Kate McCann, ‘Social media giants should be forced to pay for policing social media, 
report backed by Amber Rudd claims’ The Telegraph (London, 1 May 2017) 
<https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/04/30/social-media-giants-should-forced-pay-
policing-social-media/> accessed 24 January 2019 
60 HM Government n.2, [1.16] 
61 Bliss n.30, 174 
62 Chambers v Director of Public Prosecutions [2012] EWHC 2157 (Admin), [2013] 1 WLR 
183 
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homophobic tweet about the divers Tom Daley and Peter Waterfield,63 the 
CPS announced plans to implement prosecuting guidelines on social media 
offences. As discussed in detail in chapter six the guidelines were introduced 
in 2013, later being updated in 2016 and 2018. The purpose of the guidelines 
was to provide clear advice for prosecutors and the police in cases relating to 
inappropriate behaviour carried out via social media.64 However, as exposed 
in chapter six there have been several issues in the application of the 
guidelines to cases of online abuse.   
 
Alison Chabloz in 2018 was successfully convicted under section 127(1) of 
the Communications Act for the sending of grossly offensive, obscene or 
menacing messages relating to the Holocaust.65 Yet as outlined in chapter 
six the original case before the courts was brought by a private prosecution, 
following a failure by the police and the CPS to take legal action against 
Chabloz; providing a prime example of the lack of consistency still present in 
the criminal justice system, despite social media prosecuting guidelines 
being in place. Furthermore, following the implementation of the guidelines 
and subsequent updates, fewer recommendations for prosecutions were put 
forward by the CPS.66  
 
 
63 The Crown Prosecution News Brief, ‘DPP Statement on Tom Daley Case and Social 
Media Prosecutions’ (CPS.gov, 2012) <http://blog.cps.gov.uk/2012/09/dpp-statement-on-
tom-daley-case-and-socialmedia-prosecutions.html> accessed 29 April 2018 
64 The Crown Prosecution Service, ‘Guidelines on Prosecuting Cases Involving 
Communications Sent via Social Media’ (CPS.gov, 2013) 
<http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/a_to_c/communications_sent_via_social_ media/index.html> 
accessed 27 February 2016 
65 R v Alison Chabloz Westminster Magistrates’ Court 25 May 2018 (unreported) 
66 See figure six chapter six 
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Throughout the guidelines significant reference is made to freedom of 
expression with very little reference to privacy. As discussed in chapter 
seven freedom of expression is an important aspect of a democracy and 
needs to be taken into consideration, but this should not be at the expense of 
privacy. Privacy is more than a person’s right to a life away from the public 
realm, it is a right not to have ones physical or psychological integrity 
attacked.67 Here, the CPS guidelines should endorse the approach of the 
House of Lords in Campbell v MGN Ltd68 where the concept of privacy was 
examined first, before turning to look at freedom of expression: 
‘… [the] question is whether the objective of the restriction on the 
article 10 right - the protection of [Ms] Campbell's right under article 8 
to respect for her private life - is sufficiently important to justify limiting 
the fundamental right to freedom of expression …’.69 
 
In essence, the guidelines need to encourage prosecutors and the police to 
take into account the victims right to privacy before that of the perpetrators 
right to freedom of expression.  
 
The balance between freedom of expression and the right to privacy is not 
unique to the digital age, it has always existed with traditional forms of 
media. However, social media has dramatically changed behaviours 
commonly associated with the physical world such as bullying, stalking and 
harassment. These behaviours can now be aided or solely conducted via 
social media and often occur around the clock.70 The CPS guidelines should 
be updated regularly to include case examples which clearly highlight the 
 
67 Pfeifer v Austria App no 125561/03 [2007] ECTHR 935 [33] 
68 Campbell v MGN Limited [2004] UKHL 22 
69 Ibid., per Lord Hope of Craighead [113] 
70 Neil MacEwan, ‘The new stalking offences in English law: will they provide effective 
protection from cyberstalking?’ (2012) 10 Criminal Law Review 767, 771 
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decisions of the CPS and the courts. So, for instance include examples of 
cases which were deemed worthy of prosecution, highlighting why this 
decision was made alongside the judgment of the court. In addition, cases 
which were not put forward for prosecution should be included to ensure 
transparency.  
 
The CPS guidelines on social media prosecutions were a significant step 
forward in helping to tackle the growing issue of online abuse, but they are 
far from perfect, as highlighted in the recent Law Commission’s report into 
online behaviours.71 Nevertheless, it is accepted that in order to help tackle 
online abuse, changes outside the criminal justice system also need to be 
strengthened, creating a multidimensional approach to tackling online abuse.  
 
Education72  
Education is an important tool in creating a safe online environment for all 
Internet users. As outlined in chapter eight the Federal Government of 
Australia believes that education is ‘… one of the most important elements of 
crime prevention’,73 an approach that needs to be mirrored on a global scale. 
Indeed:  
‘[c]hildren have also told us [the Government] that they want more 
education about online safety, as well as more support from tech 
 
71 Law Commission, Abusive and Offensive Online Communications: A Scoping Report (Law 
Com No 381, 2018) [4.147] 
72 Education in the United Kingdom is a devolved issue between England, Scotland, Wales 
and Northern Ireland. In this section reference is made to changes put forward by the 
Department of Education who oversee the education of the younger generation in England. 
However, the recommendations put forward in this section should be implemented across 
the whole of the United Kingdom, including schools which are not run by the State.  
73 Parliament of Australia, Cyber Safety - Joint Select Committee High-wire act: Cyber-safety 
and the young Interim report (June 2011) [11.18] 
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companies to keep them safe.’74 
 
Education needs to take a two-dimensional approach. First, better education 
is needed within schools relating to the online world. Second, parents also 
need to be educated to ensure they fully understand the implications of 
inappropriate behaviour online.  
 
Education: Children  
Technology has had a significant impact on educational institutions across 
the globe.75 We are now living within a society where some generations do 
not know a world without the Internet, or indeed social media. Yet in England 
compulsory computer education is only just starting to be implemented within 
state-based schools76 to ensure:  
‘all young people are equipped to have healthy and respectful 
relationships in both the online and offline world, and leave school 
with the knowledge to prepare them for adult life.’77    
 
Though this is a significant step forward the Internet has been part of 
mainstream society since the turn of the millennium. Consequently, the 
United Kingdom’s Government is wanting to implement more adequate 
computer-based education within Primary and Secondary schools.   
 
 
74 HM Government n.74, [9.3] 
75 George Veletsianos ‘The Defining Characteristics of Emerging Technologies and 
Emerging Practises in Digital Education’ in George Veletsianos (ed), Emergence and 
Innovation in Digital Learning: Foundations and Applications (Athabasca University Press 
2016) 10 
76 As previously noted throughout the UK, there are several ways in which schools are 
funded. Those not run by the state do not always have to follow the changes implemented 
by the Government.  
77 HM Government, n.1 
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The education of the younger generation is built on three interlocking pillars: 
reading, writing and mathematics.78 These three subjects are considered the 
foundation of the educational system in which all students should leave 
school knowing how to read, write and have a basic understanding of 
arithmetic. In recent years there has been a drive to add a fourth pillar: 
Digital Literacy.79 Digital Literacy is:  
‘[t]he social and emotional literacy and digital competency to positively 
respond to and deal with any risks they might be exposed to when 
they [online users] are using social media or going online’.80  
 
In essence, Digital Literacy will encompass educating all students on all 
aspects of the digital world, from how to use technology to behaviours which 
are unacceptable online such as cyberbullying.  
 
Currently, under the new computer curriculum students are taught basic 
computer skills such as word processing, spreadsheets and how to use 
search engines.81 Whereas schools that endorse a Digital Literacy approach 
will ensure that students are educated about the dangers of the online world, 
including how to spot online dangers, encourage students to think critically 
about the content they are exposed to, understand that actions conducted 
online have real-life consequences, and help to build online resilience.82  
 
 
78 Select Committee on Communications, Growing up with the internet (HL 2016-17, 130) 4 
79 Ibid., 
80 Young Minds, ‘Resilience for the digital world’ (Young Minds, January 2016) 
<https://youngminds.org.uk/assets/0002/6859/Resilience_for_the_Digital_World_YM_Positio
ning.pdf> accessed 21 March 2019 
81 HM Government n.1, 26 
82 Ibid., 
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The Department of Education, which oversees the curriculum in schools in 
England, is due to publish an Education Technology strategy in late 2019. 
The purpose of the strategy will be to provide clear guidance to schools and 
colleges to support the implementation of Digital Literacy within the school 
curriculum.83 Furthermore, the UK Government has funded a UK Safer 
Internet Centre to aid schools in providing online safety toolkits and updated 
guidance on cyberbullying.84 However, presently, Digital Literacy is not 
compulsory across all schools, leaving in many cases not-for-profit 
organisations to educate the younger generation about online safety.85   
 
Digital Literacy is an important aspect in helping to tackle inappropriate 
behaviour online. In the UK alone 99% of 12 to 15 year olds use the Internet 
regularly.86 The Government’s White Paper endorses a number of principles 
which will underpin Digital Literacy lessons, including:  
‘[e]nsuring that users can be more resilient in dealing with mis- and 
disinformation, including in relation to democratic processes and 
representation; [e]quipping people to recognise and deal with a range 
of deceptive and malicious behaviours online, including catfishing, 
grooming and extremism; [e]nsuring people with disabilities are not 
excluded from digital literacy education and support; [and] 
[d]eveloping media literacy approaches to tackling violence against 
women and girls online.’87  
 
By educating the younger generation the foundations for a safer online world 
are created, where individuals can understand the ethical, social and criminal 
implications of their behaviour online.  
 
83 HM Government n.2, [8.17] 
84 Ibid., [9.10] 
85 For instance, Online Media UK. See, Dr Holly Powell-Jones, ‘Online Social Media: Law 
and Ethics’ (Online Media Law UK, 2019) <https://cml.sad.ukrd.com/document/612785.pdf> 
accessed 21 March 2019 
86 HM Government n.2 
87 Ibid., [9.19] 
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To financially support Digital Literacy Skills workshops, the United Kingdom’s 
Government has proposed to implement a social media levy:    
‘Some companies have already invested heavily to improve the online 
safety of their users, including through supporting end-user and civil 
society groups. However, we [UK Government] believe that more 
needs to be done and that it is right that all companies should be 
involved and encouraged to play their part. This is the reason we [UK 
Government] will introduce a levy, to help us combat online harms.’88  
 
The purpose of the levy is to help with the costs of educating sectors of 
society about online harms. However, social media companies will not be 
obliged to contribute to the levy as it will be a voluntary payment, like the 
voluntary levy contained in section 10C of the Gambling Act 2005.  
 
Under the Gambling Act the Secretary of State has created regulations to 
impose a voluntary annual payment on organisations who hold licenses 
issued by the Gambling Commission.89 In essence, each year organisations, 
such as Highstreet Bookmakers make a voluntary payment to the Gambling 
Commission. These funds are then used to aid charity organisations such as 
GambleAware, who support those with gambling addictions. The voluntary 
payment by the gambling industry has been a success. For instance, 
between 2015 and 2016 GambleAware was issued with £8.1 million to help 
with not only the costs of educating the public but also to help provide 
treatments for gambling addicts.90  
 
 
88 HM Government n.1, 16  
89 Gambling Act 2005 section 10C 1 
90 HM Government n.1, 17  
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The Government anticipates that the success of the gambling levy can be 
mirrored in the creation of a social media levy. In the first quarter of 2018 
Facebook generated $11.97 billion in revenue, despite negative press 
reports surrounding the Cambridge Analytica Scandal, in which it emerged 
that 87 billion Facebook users had their data harvested by a third party.91 
The social media levy will be used to help create educational schemes 
across the United Kingdom aimed at promoting online safety, educate social 
media users on the harms associated with online abuse, and help to provide 
support for those who are subjected to abuse online.  
 
Education: Parents   
Parental guardians are now more concerned about the safety of their 
children online than smoking or drinking.92 We live in a society dominated by 
an ‘always on’ culture where bullying now emerges outside the context of the 
school environment:  
‘We have talked to young people who describe the distress they face 
in the playground because people are calling them names. That 
distress follows them on to their Facebook page, and it follows them 
on to their WhatsApp group among all their friends. Suddenly, it is as 
if they are always being seen; they cannot hide from that abuse. It is 
important to recognise that, because the constant surveillance means 
they feel that they are constantly under threat.’93  
 
 
91 Olivia Solon, ‘Facebook posts record revenues for first quarter despite privacy scandal’ 
The Guardian (London, 25 April 2018) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/apr/25/facebook-first-quarter-2018-
revenues-zuckerberg> accessed 27 March 2019 
92 Personal, Social, Health and Economic Association, ‘Parents call for education to address 
sexting by children and young people’ (PSHE Association, 20 July 2016) <https://www.pshe-
association.org.uk/news/parents-call-education-address-sexting-children> accessed 25 
March 2019 
93 Select Committee on Communications n.78, [118] 
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The dominance of the Internet, in particular social media means that parents 
need to fully understand not only how the Internet works, but the safety 
mechanisms that can be employed to better protect their children.  
 
Like that of the younger generation, in recent years there has been a move 
towards educating the older generation about online safety.94 Local libraries 
often run computer-based skills workshops but funding cuts across the 
country are putting these workshops at risk.95 To combat the discrepancies in 
children and adult Digital Literacy skills, the Government has announced 
plans for parents and carers with children in primary schools to receive 
online safety guidance.96 This will allow parents to get a better understanding 
of the online world from an early stage, rather than waiting until the issue 
directly affects them. As outlined by the Communications Committee parents 
need clear guidance on social media usage.97  
 
In early 2019 stories started to emerge online concerning a puppet who 
supposedly appeared during videos uploaded onto the social media site 
YouTube.98 Allegedly, the puppet Momo, would encourage users to partake 
in dangerous activities such as self-harm and asphyxiation, known as the 
Momo challenge. Following the increasing reports online concerning Momo, 
 
94 HM Government n.1, 32  
95 Sian Cain, ‘Nearly 130 public libraries closed across Britain in the last year’ The Guardian 
(London, 7 December 2018) <https://www.theguardian.com/books/2018/dec/07/nearly-130-
public-libraries-closed-across-britain-in-the-last-year> accessed 25 March 2019    
96 HM Government n.1, 27-28  
97 Communications Committee, Regulating in a digital world (HL 2017-19, 299) 62 
98 Phoebe Southworth, ‘Parents warned about 'Momo' suicide game on YouTube’ The 
Telegraph (London, 27 February 2019) 
<https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2019/02/27/parents-warned-online-suicide-game-
appearing-peppa-pig-videos/> accessed 25 March 2019  
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which quickly caught the media’s attention, parents across the country 
panicked with many choosing to limit their child’s technology intake and 
schools issuing warnings to parents.99 Though the Momo challenge was later 
proven to be a hoax, it illustrated the need to educate the wider public on 
online safety.100  
 
The Government has announced that it will continue to support parents in 
helping to prevent and deal with harms associated with the online world.101 
Education is an important aspect in tackling online abuse. By educating 
online user’s issues such as online safety and how to conduct oneself online 
can be strengthened. This in turn can allow users to understand the real-life 
implications online abuse can have on another person, such as the 
detrimental psychological effects that can occur, as discussed in chapter one 
and seven. Yet it is not just for schools and parents to educate online users, 
social media companies also need to help educate their users by ensuring 
that education and advice become integrated into the online experience.102 
 
Gatekeepers  
The dominance of social media today means that companies such as 
Facebook and Twitter need to do more to help restrict unlawful behaviour 
and abuse that continues to be a problem on their sites. Though Facebook 
 
99 Ibid., 
100 Keza MacDonald, ‘Parents: don't panic about Momo - worry about YouTube Kids instead’ 
The Guardian (London, 28 February 2019) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/feb/28/parents-momo-scare-youtube-
kids> accessed 25 March 2019  
101 HM Government n.2, [9.15] 
102 Communications Committee n.97, 62 
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and Twitter are continuing to strengthen their terms of service agreements 
and implement new systems to tackle inappropriate behaviour online, as 
exposed in chapter three, issues remain. For instance, Artificial Intelligence 
(AI) technology is currently inadequate when it comes to highlighting hate-
related speech, there is a lack of legal repercussions for social media sites, 
and inconsistencies across social media platforms with regards to what 
content is or is not acceptable online. The following discussion will outline 
how social media companies can do more to control inappropriate 
behaviours on their sites, in particular looking at the advancements of AI 
technology and the implementation of a universal code of conduct.103 
 
Gatekeepers: AI Technology  
AI Technology is considered by Facebook founder and CEO Mark 
Zuckerberg, as one of the ‘… greatest opportunities to keep people safe’ 
online.104 AI technology encompasses computer algorithm programmes to 
search for certain content on a given website or platform. So, for instance in 
relation to social media, it can be used to find certain content that contains a 
specific word or hashtag. This allows for social media companies to locate 
unlawful or abusive behaviour before it becomes publicly viewable.  
 
Following a Terrorist attack in Christchurch New Zealand, social media 
companies employed AI technology to locate and remove a video taken by 
the perpetrator of the offence, which was being actively shared across social 
 
103 A draft Universal Code of Conduct is located in Appendix B. 
104 Mark Zuckerberg, ‘Building Global Community’ (Facebook, 16 February 2017) 
<https://www.facebook.com/notes/mark-zuckerberg/building-global-
community/10154544292806634/> accessed 14 January 2019 
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media sites.105 The original video which was livestreamed106 on Facebook 
was removed an hour after the event occurred.107 However, other Facebook 
users reuploaded the video across social media sites. In the first 24 hours 
after the Christchurch attack, Facebook removed 1.5 million copies of the 
video from its site, with the aid of AI technology.108 Of this, in 1.2 million 
instances AI technology allowed Facebook to block users from uploading the 
video before it became publicly viewable.109 However, a further 300,000 
videos were actively removed from Facebook by moderators after they had 
been made publicly available, which had not been flagged by AI 
technology.110      
 
AI technology is a significant tool in helping to combat unlawful behaviour 
online, but as the events surrounding the Christchurch attack illustrated, it is 
far from perfect. The Government in their Internet Safety Strategy uphold the 
ideal that the best solutions to keep individuals safe online involve 
technology, but more needs to be done to encourage social media 
companies to work faster at advancing AI technology.111 This has been 
further endorsed in the White Paper:  
 
105 The BBC, ‘Facebook: New Zealand attack video viewed 4,000 times’ The BBC (London, 
19 March 2019) <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-47620519> accessed 26 March 
2019 
106 Livestreamed technology allows for online users to video share with other internet users 
live. See, Facebook, ‘Going Live on Facebook’ (Facebook, 2019) 
<https://live.fb.com/about/> accessed 26 March 2019  
107 Jim Waterson, ‘Facebook removed 1.5m videos of New Zealand terror attack in first 24 
hours’ The Guardian (London, 17 March 2019) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/mar/17/facebook-removed-15m-videos-new-




111 HM Government n.1, 20 See also, Committee on Standards in Public Life n.39, 14 
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‘Technology can play a crucial role in keeping users safe online. By 
designing safer and more secure online products and services, the 
tech sector can equip all companies and users with better tools to 
tackle online harms.’112 
  
In essence, social media companies would be under an obligation to invest 
in digital technology to help control unlawful content on their sites. Endorsing 
a proactive rather than a reactive approach, similar to approaches 
recommended by the European Union (EU).  
 
As discussed in chapter eight social media companies are currently given 
specific protection under Article 14(1) of the Directive 2000/31/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 (the directive):  
‘Where an information society service is provided that consists of the 
storage of information provided by a recipient of the service, Member 
States shall ensure that the service provider is not liable for the 
information stored at the request of a recipient of the service …’.  
 
Furthermore, under Article 15(1) of the directive information society services 
such as Facebook and Twitter, are not under a legal obligation to ‘… monitor 
the information which they transmit’ across their sites. Social media 
companies under current EU provisions are not obliged to actively seek out 
unlawful content published on their sites, as affirmed in Scarlet Extended SA 
v Société belge des auteurs, compositeurs et éditeurs SCRL (SABAM).113 
 
The directive gives significant protection to social media companies. The 
directive itself was implemented into the legal system of the EU nearly 20 
years ago, before two of the biggest social media sites today, Facebook and 
 
112 HM Government n.2, [8.1] 
113 C-70/10 Scarlet Extended SA v Société belge des auteurs, compositeurs et éditeurs 
SCRL (SABAM) [2011] ECLI 771 
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Twitter were made available to the public. As outlined in chapter one social 
media dominates societies across the globe. Facebook in the UK alone has 
32.6 million active users.114 On average around 500 million tweets are sent 
each day via Twitter.115 Consequently, the directive can be considered 
outdated in comparison with the advancements of technology:      
‘The e-Commerce Directive was introduced in what now feels like a 
bygone era … One of the biggest winners … has been the online 
platforms. They can provide services to millions of people worldwide, 
harvest their data and make millions in revenue, and yet have zero 
responsibility for what their customers see and experience and the 
harm they suffer whilst under their care. Yes, the platforms have to 
remove illegal content once they are notified, but they have no 
obligation proactively to stop that content from reaching our eyes and 
ears, even if they know their sites are full of it.’116  
 
Nonetheless, in March 2019 the European Parliament voted in favour of 
implementing new copyright laws, which have been considered as 
revolutionising Internet governance.117 Under these new legal provisions, 
tech companies will be held responsible for copyright material posted on their 
sites, removing the host rather than publisher defence in relation to content 
that breaches copyright regulations.118 The controversial changes, which 
have been heavily criticised by tech companies such as Google and 
YouTube,119 is the first step in ensuring tech companies are held to account 
 
114 Mark Sweney, ‘Is Facebook for old people? Over-55s flock in as the young leave’ The 
Guardian (London, 12 February 2018) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/feb/12/is-facebook-for-old-people-over-55s-
flock-in-as-the-young-leave> accessed 29 November 2018 
115 Ursula Smartt, Media & Entertainment Law (Taylor & Francis 2017) 79 
116 Communications Committee n.97, 186 
117 Zoe Kleinman, ‘Article 13: Memes exempt as EU backs controversial copyright law’ The 
BBC (London, 26 March 2019) <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-47708144> 
accessed 27 March 2019. See also, Chris Fox, ‘What is Article 13? The EU's copyright 
directive explained’ The BBC (London, 14 February 2019) 
118 Article 13 Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market 2016/0280 
119 Kleinman n,117. See also, Chris Fox, ‘What is Article 13? The EU's copyright directive 
explained’ The BBC (London, 14 February 2019) <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-
47239600> accessed 27 March 2019 
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for conduct that occurs across their sites. Though the host rather than 
publisher defence remains in relation to online abuse, this could be the first 
step in ensuring better online governance.  
     
Gatekeepers: Universal Codes of Conduct  
All social media companies have terms of service agreements between 
themselves and their users. These agreements detail what behaviour is, and 
is not, acceptable on a given site. Failure on behalf of users to comply with a 
company’s terms of service agreement can result in the user being denied 
access to the site. However, as outlined in chapter three issues have been 
raised with the compliance of users to adhere to terms of service 
agreements, social media companies not enforcing their terms of service 
agreements and a lack of consistency across social media companies with 
regards to behaviours which are prohibited on their sites. So, for instance 
Twitter allows users to use online aliases to set up their Twitter account, 
whereas Facebook has a real name policy.120 
 
Different forms of universal codes of practices exist across the globe. For 
example, as outlined in chapter eight the European Commission has created 
and implemented a code of conduct specifically aimed at some of the largest 
technology services across the world, defined by the European Commission 
as the ‘IT companies’. The IT companies are under an obligation to remove 
unlawful content from their sites within 24 hours, though there are no legal 
 
120 Facebook, ‘What names are allowed on Facebook?’ (Facebook, 2019) 
<https://www.facebook.com/help/112146705538576?helpref=faq_content> accessed 22 
April 2019 
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repercussions for failure to do so. Similarly, following the publication of the 
UK’s Internet Safety Strategy and the implementation of the Digital Economy 
Act 2017, the United Kingdom’s Government has endorsed the use of a 
digital code of conduct aimed at social media companies to tackle 
inappropriate behaviour online.  
 
In April 2019 the Secretary of State published the UK’s first digital code of 
conduct, in line with the publication of the White Paper. Essentially, the 
digital code of conduct contains four overlapping provisions which all social 
media providers must adhere to, or face possible fines:121 
• Clear and accessible reporting processes to flag harmful material; 
• An efficient process to update users who report unlawful content; 
• Contained in the terms of service agreement should be clear and 
accessible mechanisms to report harmful content; and  
• Clear information to users and the wider public about the actions 
undertaken in relation to harmful material that has been reported.122 
The provisions contained in the digital code of conduct relate to social media 
companies being more transparent about how they deal with harmful content 
on their sites, as opposed to a specific code of conduct aimed at helping to 
reduce inappropriate behaviour online. However, the Government maintains 
 
121 HM Government n.2, [19] 
122 Department of Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, ‘Code of Practice for providers of online 
social media platforms’ (Gov.uk, 12 April 2019) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/code-of-practice-for-providers-of-online-social-
media-platforms/code-of-practice-for-providers-of-online-social-media-platforms> accessed 
22 April 2019 
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in their White Paper that a more precise code of conduct will be produced for 
unlawful content on social media sites such as terrorism and child abuse.123   
 
From discussions throughout this thesis more needs to be done to tackle 
online abuse. It is proposed that a universal code of conduct should be 
created, alongside social media terms of service user agreements to ensure 
consistency across social media platforms in tackling online abuse. Whereas 
the digital code of conduct produced by the Secretary of State is aimed at 
ensuring social media providers are transparent, the proposed universal 
code of conduct as located in Appendix B is aimed at creating more specific 
obligations that all social media companies must adhere to. As noted by 
Williams, a lack of suitable guardians encourages criminal behaviour.124 So, 
for instance the proposed universal code of conduct places an obligation on 
social media sites to produce terms of service agreements which are clear 
and accessible for all users.  
 
As highlighted in chapter three Facebook and Twitter’s terms of service 
agreements are at points ambiguous.125 The ambiguity of terms of service 
agreements was clearly illustrated in a report conducted by the UK’s 
Children’s Commissioner in January 2017.126 As part of a House of Lords 
investigation into digital media and young people, the Children’s 
 
123 HM Government n.2, [1.28] 
124 Katherine S. Williams, Textbook on Criminology (7th edn, Oxford University Press 2012) 
312 
125 Communications Committee n.97, 108 
126 Children’s Commissioner, ‘Growing Up Digital: A reports of the Growing Up Digital 
Taskforce’ (Children’s Commissioner, January 2017) 
<https://www.childrenscommissioner.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Growing-Up-
Digital-Taskforce-Report-January-2017_0.pdf> accessed 26 March 2019 
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Commissioner directed a law firm to rewrite part of the terms of service 
agreement for the social media site Instagram,127 to highlight the lack of 
clarity contained within the document. For instance, Instagram’s terms of 
service agreement states:  
‘We do not claim ownership of your content, but you grant us a license 
to use it … Instead, when you share, post, or upload content that is 
covered by intellectual property rights (like photos or videos) on or in 
connection with our Service, you hereby grant to us a non-exclusive, 
royalty-free, transferable, sub-licensable, worldwide license to host, 
use, distribute, modify, run, copy, publicly perform or display, 
translate, and create derivative works of your content (consistent with 
your privacy and application settings).’128  
 
When written into simplistic terminology the above term can be translated as:  
‘Officially you own any original pictures and videos you post, but we 
are allowed to use them, and we can let others use them as well, 
anywhere around the world. Other people might pay us to use them 
and we will not pay you for that.’129  
 
Consequently, social media companies under the proposed universal code of 
conduct put forward in this thesis would need to ensure that all their terms 
are accessible and clear. In turn, this will aid moderators when reviewing 
flagged content. 
 
The provisional code of conduct places further obligations on social media 
companies to directly tackle unlawful behaviour on their sites, with particular 
reference given to prohibiting hate speech, revenge pornography, trolling, 
bullying and threats of a sexual nature. Social media companies must, under 
the universal code of conduct, be more proactive in reducing and removing 
online abuse. Though the proposed universal code of conduct can be 
 
127 Note, Instagram is owned by Facebook. 
128 Instagram, ‘Terms of Use’ (Instagram, 2016) 
<https://help.instagram.com/581066165581870> accessed 26 March 2019 
129 Children’s Commissioner n.126, 10  
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considered as a step forward in tackling online abuse from the current 
system in which social media companies have been ‘… allowed to mark their 
own homework …’,130 issues will continue to remain without a regulatory 
body overseeing social media companies. 
 
Regulatory Body 
Though there is some form of Internet governance in the United Kingdom, 
there is currently no direct regulatory body policing social media companies. 
Instead, social media companies have been allowed to self-regulate, which 
in turn has led to numerous issues in recent years. For instance, the 
Cambridge Analytica Scandal in 2017, the dominance of fake news, and 
abusive messages sent to MPs during the 2017 General Election. 
Consequently, arguments have emerged that a new regulatory body is 
needed to hold Internet based organisations to account. However, there is 
currently no consensus as to who should regulate social media companies. 
The Government’s White Paper supports the concept that the Office of 
Communications, commonly referred to as Ofcom, should oversee the 
regulation of social media as outlined below. However, as discussed in later 
parts of this chapter it is proposed that a new regulatory body, the Digital 
Authority, should be created overseen by the implementation of an e-Safety 
Commissioner.        
  
Regulatory Body: Ofcom 
 
130 Communications Committee n.97, 40 
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Ofcom is the United Kingdom’s communications regulator and was created 
under the Office of Communications Act 2002, receiving their full statutory 
power under part one of the Communications Act. They govern several 
enterprises including, television, radio, video, the postal system and Internet 
broadband providers.131 In addition, Ofcom has several regulatory powers 
under the Communications Act. For instance, setting conditions for 
broadcasters,132 overseeing complaints,133 and imposing penalties on 
communication providers who breach Ofcom’s rules and procedures. Though 
Ofcom is often associated with regulating television broadcasters, Ofcom 
does have some statutory powers relating to the Internet.134 However, these 
powers relate to Internet service providers such as British Telecom or Sky as 
opposed to online companies, such as social media providers.135  
 
Following growing concerns relating to the dominance of social media it has 
been suggested that Ofcom’s powers should be extended to regulate social 
media companies:  
‘Given the urgency of the need to address online harms, we believe 
that in the first instance the remit of Ofcom should be expanded … 
Ofcom has experience of surveying digital literacy and consumption, 
and experience in assessing inappropriate content and balancing it 
against other rights, including freedom of expression.’136 
 
For the UK Government Ofcom already has the experience and expertise 
needed to regulate social media companies, as they already ‘…  tackle 
 
131 Ofcom, ‘About Ofcom’ (Ofcom, 2019) <https://www.Ofcom.org.uk/about-Ofcom> 
accessed 28 March 2019 
132 Communications Act 2003 section 3 
133 Communications Act 2003 section 8 
134 Communications Act 2003 part two 
135 Ofcom, ‘Phones, telecoms and internet’ (Ofcom, 2019) 
<https://www.Ofcom.org.uk/phones-telecoms-and-internet> accessed 28 March 2019 
136 Communications Committee n.97, 206 
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harmful or offensive content, in the context of TV and radio’.137 Furthermore, 
Ofcom does already have some statutory power related to Internet usage. 
For instance, live streaming subscription services138 such as Amazon Prime 
Video is required, in the United Kingdom, to have an Ofcom license 
alongside complying with the Broadcasting Code.139 For the Government, 
Ofcom has the expertise needed to regulate social media companies, whilst 
also providing a cost-effective mechanism for social media governance. 
 
Though Ofcom would provide a quick, easy and cheap solution to social 
media regulation, it is important to note that Ofcom already regulates several 
forms of communications. By allowing Ofcom to also oversee the regulation 
of social media companies, this could create a monopoly of power which 
limits the checks and balances in place to ensure freedom of expression is 
not restricted. To ensure transparency and rigidity a new regulatory body 
should be created in the form of a Digital Authority, which is overseen by an 
e-Safety Commissioner140 using a co-regulatory approach.141    
 
Regulatory Body: Digital Authority and e-Safety Commissioner  
The proposed Digital Authority in this thesis would oversee the day-to-day 
regulation of social media companies across the United Kingdom and will be 
 
137 HM Government n.2, [5.16] 
138 Live steaming subscription service is the process whereby a programme is streamed live 
and recorded at the same time.  
139 HM Government n.2, [5.28] 
140 The role of the e-Safety Commissioner will be discussed in detail in later parts of this 
chapter.  
141 Co-regulation, ‘is where a regulatory body delegates responsibility to enforce rules to an 
industry body.’ See, Communications Committee n.97, 15. Co-regulation already exists in 
the United Kingdom for instance, under the Communications Act Ofcom have a statutory 
duty to regulate broadcasting advertisements, but this has since been delegated to the 
Advertising Standards Agency. 
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headed by an e-Safety Commissioner. The Digital Authority would have a 
number of obligations including, overseeing the implementation of the 
universal code of conduct, investigating complaints from online users 
concerning decisions made by social media companies, liaising with the CPS 
in cases which can be considered as breaching legal provisions, and issue 
fines to social media companies who fail to adhere to the universal code of 
conduct.   
 
The proposed Digital Authority would have a similar function to the regulatory 
body suggested by the Government in their White Paper. Though, instead of 
the power resting with Ofcom a new independent body will be created. 
Whereas for the Government ‘[a] new body would … be more costly to set up 
and take longer to become operational and risks further complicating the 
regulatory landscape’,142 it is proposed in this thesis that a new body needs 
to be created to ensure Ofcom does not become a monopoly of power. 
Though this will incur a cost and will take time to implement, the Government 
needs to ensure adequate regulation of social media companies rather than 
implementing a quick and money-saving approach which may become 
flawed in the future.143      
 
As previously mentioned, the proposed Digital Authority would be headed by 
an e-Safety Commissioner, endorsing a similar approach to social media 
 
142 HM Government n.2, [5.15] 
143 For instance, flaws have been exposed with how the United Kingdom currently regulates 
the press. See, Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport and Leveson Inquiry, 
‘Leveson Inquiry - Report into the culture, practices and ethics of the press’ (Gov.uk, 29 
November 2012) <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/leveson-inquiry-report-into-
the-culture-practices-and-ethics-of-the-press> accessed 23 April 2019 
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regulation currently being utilised in Australia. As illustrated in Appendix C 
and D the e-Safety Commissioner, alongside the Digital Authority would be 
responsible for the creation and implementation of a universal code of 
conduct.144 Here, the e-Safety Commissioner and the Digital Authority would 
work alongside stakeholders such as Facebook, Twitter and not-for-profit 
organisations to create a universal code of conduct similar to the one 
proposed in Appendix B.   
 
To ensure adequate checks and balances are in place the e-Safety 
Commissioner will be responsible for decisions made by the Digital Authority. 
To protect freedom of expression, a clear and transparent complaints 
procedure will be implemented for social media companies who wish to 
challenge a decision made by the Digital Authority. Initial complaints will be 
made to the e-Safety Commissioner who will ensure that all concerns are 
reviewed adequately and transparently. All decisions made by the e-Safety 
Commissioner following a complaint can be referred to the Administrative 
Court under the principles of Judicial Review. To add further protection, to 
ensure democracy and free speech is maintained, each year the e-Safety 
Commissioner will be required to report back to Parliament, as discussed 
further in Appendix D.   
 
The funds generated by both the voluntary social media levy, and any fines 
issued to social media companies, will be used to aid educational schemes 
across the United Kingdom, and help with the costs of continued research 
 
144 An example of which can be found in Appendix A. 
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into social media behaviours, to ensure that freedom of speech is not being 
restricted and all regulatory bodies are working together to help tackle the 
growing issue of online abuse. An approach that tackles both regulation and 
education ensures that society keeps pace with the changing nature of 
technology.  
 
Chapter Overview  
The recommendations above may seem complex, but as illustrated 
throughout this thesis so is online abuse. A multidimensional approach is 
needed to help tackle the growing issue of inappropriate behaviours online. 
As has been illustrated at various points in this thesis the current system of 
self-regulation is not working. 
 
This thesis recommends the following changes:  
The Law 
• Create clear and precise legal rules regulating online conduct and 
abuse in the form of a coherent Bill, whilst also ensuring provisions 
are in place to protect freedom of expression; 
• Produce a clear and precise legal rule regulating the encouragement 
of another to either commit a further criminal offence or incite others to 
target another online; 
• Create a clear and precise legal rule regulating online hate speech. 
Here, what constitutes hate speech should be expanded;  
• Specifically criminalise cyber harassment and cyberstalking ensuring 
a clear and precise definition is created; 
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• Adapt section 33 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 to 
expand the mens rea of the offence to include recklessness;  
• Expand the definition of ‘sexual imagery’ in relation to revenge 
pornography; 
• Prohibit revenge pornography in the form of fake images or videos;  
• Ensure anonymity is given to victims of revenge pornography;  
• Include a clear and precise definition of false communications with the 
aid of case law examples; and 
• Define grossly offensive and menacing material with the aid of case 
law examples and the CPS guidelines on social media prosecutions. 
 
Social Media Prosecuting Guidelines  
• Ensure the social media prosecuting guidelines are updated to include 
examples to illustrate when a comment or conduct breaches legal 
provisions, taking into consideration both privacy and freedom of 
expression;  
• The inclusion of the Computer Misuse Act 1990 in the CPS social 
media prosecuting guidelines; and  
• Give better protection for victims of online abuse in particular ensuring 
someone’s right to privacy is maintained in a digital age. 
 
Training and Education  
• Better training for police forces as to what constitutes harassment and 
stalking, especially those conducted online;  
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• Ensure better education is given to the police and social media users 
concerning the psychological effects of online abuse;  
• Digital training for police officers to ensure they fully understand the 
effects of online abuse on those who are subjected to it; and 
• Create better educational schemes for children, parents and law 
enforcement in relation to digital literacy skills.  
 
Social Media Companies  
• Create a universal code of conduct aimed at all social media 
companies to ensure they are protecting individuals from online 
abuse. The universal code of conduct needs to be created in a clear 
and precise manner;  
• Guarantee social media companies are transparent with their users;  
• Updated training on a regular basis for moderators;  
• Ensure social media companies aid law enforcement; and  
• Where social media companies fail to comply with the universal code 
of conduct create a punishment process in the form of a fine, 
governed by the e-Safety Commissioner and the Digital Authority.   
 
Governance  
• Create a harmonised approach between legislation and non-
legislative provisions governing online abuse;  
• The creation of a Digital Authority headed by an e-Safety 
Commissioner overseeing the regulation of social media companies;  
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• Create a transparent reviewing system of all legal provisions 
implemented to govern social media abuse to ensure democracy is 
maintained, and freedom of speech is not curtailed; and 
• Any legal provisions that are created ensure that the advancements in 
new technology or new social media companies are not restricted. 




‘In our view, good regulation is not only about restricting certain types 
of conduct; rather, it makes the digital world work better for everyone 
and engenders a more respectful and trustworthy culture.’1 
 
Conclusion  
Research findings and limitations  
This thesis set out to examine the extent to which the current criminal law 
framework, social media companies and society can better govern abusive 
conduct aided by social media. It has found that the current use of adapting 
legislative provisions, some of which were never intended to cover the 
internet, let alone social media, leaves two significant issues: the law is 
failing to adequately protect those subjected to online abuse and the law in 
some cases is being used arbitrarily. In addition, it is clear from previous 
discussions that social media gatekeepers need to do more to protect their 
users from abusive behaviour. However, to better protect victims of online 
abuse and ensure adequate regulation, changes are needed throughout 
society, such as educational schemes, before it can be said that we are 
tackling the growing issue of online abuse.  
 
The recommendations put forward in this thesis have therefore been 
influenced from examining the current criminal law framework from the 
perspective of legality, alongside investigating how the likes of Facebook and 
Twitter have attempted to tackle abusive behaviour on their sites. To enrich 
the recommendations, chapter eight evaluated how other countries and 
 
1 Communications Committee, Regulating in a digital world (HL 2017-19, 299) [19] 
Page 395 of 449 
 
institutions have attempted to govern abusive behaviour online. However, 
like all studies, there are some limitations:  
• It can be suggested that some arguments put forward in this thesis 
attempt to justify the actions of the perpetrator by proposing that they 
have been prosecuted or convicted under the wrong Act of 
Parliament. However, this is not the case but by taking a non- 
consequentialist approach, the researcher is interested in the process 
undertaken in determining which Act of Parliament should be applied 
in a given situation. At no point does the researcher wish to justify the 
actions of abusing another online.  
• Flaws may exist within the proposed Social Media Bill. However, the 
Social Media Bill put forward in Appendix A is considered the 
foundational point in attempting to create legal provisions which 
comply with the principle of legality. At no point does the researcher 
believe that the Bill should receive royal assent in its current format, it 
is simply a draft provision which will be further strengthened by 
discussions with other interested parties, such as non-government 
organisations.  
• It is accepted that other theoretical perspectives and methods could 
have been utilised to strengthen the research. However, as outlined in 
chapter two, legality can be considered the foundation of the criminal 
justice system on which all legal provisions should be built upon. 
Consequently, the principle of legality was used as the theoretical 
perspective underpinning this thesis as without legality, it leaves open 
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the possibility that the law can be used arbitrarily, in which serious 
misunderstandings can occur throughout the criminal justice system.    
 
Chapter Summary and Final Remarks  
The advancement of changing technology has altered many aspects of 
society, from how we obtain our news to changing how individuals 
communicate with others. As discussed in chapter one social media has 
been prevalent in this change. Though this thesis has illustrated the darker 
side of social media, it can and has, been a force for good. In recent years 
society has seen campaigns to create changes within the UK’s criminal 
justice system,2 campaigns to highlight the continued abuse of women within 
society,3 and campaigns to end the stigma surrounding domestic violence,4 
all of which have been aided by social media. Social media allows individuals 
to connect instantly across the globe and keep updated with world events. 
However, it does have a darker side in which misogyny, harassment and 
revenge pornography, to name but a few can flourish. 
 
Chapter one exposed the growing issues of online abuse. Though there is no 
agreed definition of online abuse or indeed abuse, it has come to be 
accepted that certain behaviours can constitute abuse online. For instance, 
 
2 For example, campaigns surrounding the criminalisation of upskirting. See, Katie O'Malley, 
‘What Is Upskirting And When Did It Become A Criminal Offence?’ The Independent 
(London, 12 April 2019) <https://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/women/upskirting-illegal-
definition-crime-uk-sexual-harassment-a8864636.html> accessed 24 April 2019 
3 Bri Lee, ‘Sharing our stories is the strength at the heart of #MeToo. We must repeal gag 
laws’ The Guardian (London, 19 November 2018) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/nov/19/sharing-our-stories-is-the-
strength-at-the-heart-of-metoo-we-must-repeal-gag-laws> accessed 27 November 2018 
4 Jessamy Gleeson, ‘“(Not) working 9–5”: the consequences of contemporary Australian-
based online feminist campaigns as digital labour’ (2016) 16(1) Media International Australia 
77 <http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/1329878X16664999>  
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concerns have been repeatedly raised about cyberbullying, particularly its 
effects on the younger generation:  
‘We know that bullying is not a new phenomenon, but the digital 
landscape has fundamentally changed the way that young people are 
experiencing it. It is increasingly the case that children are being 
bullied online through social media platforms and the complexity of 
these social networks means bullying can take on different forms on 
different platforms.’5  
 
Cyberbullying can have a detrimental effect on a person’s wellbeing. For 
instance, a survey conducted by Ditch the Label in 2017 found that of those 
who had suffered cyberbullying, 41% had developed anxiety, 37% developed 
depression, 26% experienced suicidal thoughts, with 25% of participants 
identifying that they had self-harmed because of cyberbullying.6 However, 
online abuse does not just affect the younger generation, anyone can 
become a victim of abuse online.  
 
In 2013 following a public campaign to get the author Jane Austin printed on 
banknotes in the United Kingdom, Caroline Criado-Perez, was subjected to a 
crusade of misogynistic abuse online.7 Comments included, ‘rape her nice 
arse’, ‘I will fuck you at 9pm … shall we meet near your house’, and ‘If your 
friends survived rape, they weren’t raped properly [sic]’. At its height, Ms 
 
5 The Children’s Society, ‘Safety Net: Cyberbullying’s impact on young people’s mental 
health Inquiry report’ (The Children’s Society, 2018) 
<https://www.childrenssociety.org.uk/sites/default/files/social-media-cyberbullying-inquiry-
full-report_0.pdf> accessed 24 April 2019 
6 Ditch the Label, ‘The Annual Bullying Survey 2017’ (Ditch the Label, 2017) 
<https://www.ditchthelabel.org/wp-content/ uploads/2017/07/The-Annual-Bullying-Survey-
2017-2.pdf> accessed 24 April 2019  
7 Alexandra Topping, ‘Jane Austen Twitter row: two plead guilty to abusive tweets’ The 
Guardian (London, 7 January 2014) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/society/2014/jan/07/jane-austen-banknote-abusive-tweets-
criado-perez> accessed 10 October 2016 
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Criado-Perez was receiving 50 highly abusive messages per hour.8 Similarly, 
Jess Phillips an MP from the Birmingham area has publicly spoken about 
receiving more than 600 threats of rape in one night alone via Twitter.9  
 
Whereas chapter one provided a contextualisation as to why research into 
social media abuse was needed, chapter two outlined the theoretical position 
of this thesis, legality. To justify using the perspective of legality to review the 
criminal law framework, chapter two outlined other theoretical perspectives 
which could have been utilised, including deterrence theory, rational choice 
theory, feminism, digital feminism and victimology. However, it was decided 
that legality was the appropriate theoretical position to use for the research 
questions posed as it allowed the researcher to criticise the law from both the 
perspective of the victim and the perpetrator; illustrating the fundamental 
flaws in applying outdated legislation to unlawful behaviour aided by social 
media.  
 
To fully understand the continuing issues in governing online abuse, 
chapter three examined in detail the mechanisms Facebook and Twitter have 
implemented on to their sites to help reduce and control inappropriate 
behaviours online. Yet despite both companies continuingly investing in 
Artificial Intelligence Technology and moderators, Twitter and Facebook are 
failing to keep pace with unlawful and harmful content which is flourishing 
 
8 The BBC, ‘Caroline Criado-Perez Twitter abuse case leads to arrest’ The BBC (London, 29 
July 2013) <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-23485610> accessed 8 February 2019 
9 Sally Hayden, ‘Labour's Jess Phillips received “600 rape and death threats in a single day”’ 
The Independent (London, 27 August 2017) <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-
news/labour-mp-jess-phillips-rape-death-threats-one-day-social-media-attacks-training-
a7915406.html> accessed 25 October 2017 
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across their sites, resulting in other agencies and law enforcement having to 
intervene; justifying as to why social media companies need to do more in 
order to reduce unlawful and abusive behaviour on their sites, whilst also 
emphasising the need for strong legal provisions. 
 
In England and Wales, there is no specific Act of Parliament governing 
conduct carried out online. Instead, Acts have been adapted to fit a digital 
age. In chapter four the Serious Crime Act 2007, the Public Order Act 1986 
and the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 were examined. These three 
Acts can be defined as non-technology-based laws yet have since been 
used to control unlawful behaviours online. The application of these Acts in a 
digital context has given rise to several issues. For example, the Serious 
Crime Act was never intended to cover social media abuse, instead its 
purpose was to target the most serious and organised crime across the 
United Kingdom, for instance human trafficking, drug offences and money 
laundering. Despite this, in 2011 part three of the Serious Crime Act was 
used to convict two individuals for inciting others via Facebook to participate 
in disorderly behaviour.   
 
In August 2011 following the shooting of Mark Duggan by armed police, riots 
started to emerge across the country.10 During the height of the riots two 
individuals, Jordan Blackshaw11 and Perry Sutcliffe-Keenan12 took to 
 
10 Vikram Dodd & Caroline Davies, ‘London riots escalate as police battle for control’ The 
Guardian (London, 9 August 2011) <https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2011/aug/08/london-
riots-escalate-police-battle> accessed 3 November 2011 
11 R v Jordan Blackshaw Chester Crown Court 16 August 2011 (unreported) 
12 R v Perry Sutcliffe-Keenan Chester Crown Court 16 August 2011 (unreported) 
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Facebook to create public event pages to incite others to become involved in 
disorderly behaviour. Despite the riots they attempted to organise not taking 
place both individuals were prosecuted and convicted to 4 years 
imprisonment under the Serious Crime Act. Similarly, in 2012 the Public 
Order Act was used to successfully convict Liam Stacey for the sending of 
racist and obscene messages via Twitter, following the collapse of Bolton 
Wanderers star Fabrice Muamba during a football match.13  
 
The use of these two Acts of Parliament, the Serious Crime Act and the 
Public Order Act, can be considered as a breach of the principle of legality in 
the criminal law. As outlined above the principle of legality is considered the 
idea that the law should be accessible and clear to guide citizens.14 As 
argued in chapter four the use of the Serious Crime Act and the Public Order 
Act to prosecute social media offences can be considered as outside 
Parliament’s original intentions and therefore, cannot be considered as a 
guiding mechanism for citizens within England and Wales.  
 
Chapter four also exposed growing concerns in the use of the Protection 
from Harassment Act in a social media context. In the legal system of 
England and Wales, the terms harassment and stalking have no definitive 
definition, meaning they are often misunderstood by the police and the 
Crown Prosecution Service (CPS).15 This has resulted in devastating 
 
13 R V Liam Stacey Swansea Crown Court On Appeal From The Magistrates’ Court 
A20120033 
14 Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law (Oxford University Press 1979) 218 
15 Criminal Justice Inspectorates & HM Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate, ‘Living in 
fear – the police and CPS response to harassment and stalking’ (justiceinspectorates.gov, 
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consequences for victims of this form of abuse, especially when the 
behaviour is conducted or aided by modern technology.16 The lack of a clear 
and accessible meaning to these terms, in line with the principle of legality, 
means those who are subjected to cyber harassment or cyberstalking are 
often let down by the criminal justice system.   
 
Chapter five discussed in detail the use of the Computer Misuse Act 1990 
and section 33 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015. Both these 
provisions were created and implemented with digital technology in mind, 
though the Computer Misuse Act may not have necessarily been 
implemented to govern social media. As outlined in chapter five both these 
provisions conform to the principle of legality. Though section 33 of the 
Criminal Justice and Courts Act, which criminalises revenge pornography, is 
not without fault. In law a narrow definition is given to the offence of 
distributing an explicit image of another. For instance, a person can only be 
convicted of revenge pornography if they send a sexually explicit image of 
another to cause distress. Consequently, images sent for say financial gain 
are outside the realms of the Act. Issues have also arisen with the lack of 
anonymity given to those who are subjected to revenge porn.  
 
Despite several Acts and provisions currently being utilised in a social media 
context as discussed in chapter six, section 127 of the Communications Act 
2003 and the Malicious Communications Act 1988 have become prevalent in 
 
July 2017) <http://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmicfrs/wp-content/uploads/living-in-fear-
the-police-and-cps-response-to-harassment-and-stalking.pdf> accessed 29 November 2017 
16 Laura Bliss, ‘The Protection from Harassment Act 1997: Failures by the Criminal Justice 
System in a Social Media Age’ 83(3) Journal of Criminal Law 217 
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governing conduct carried out online. Both provisions can be considered as 
similar, which has resulted in them becoming interchangeable within the 
criminal justice system.17 Between the two provisions, it is an offence to send 
an indecent, obscene, menacing, false, threatening or a grossly offensive 
communication; though issues have arisen regarding the meaning of these 
terms, particularly the meaning of grossly offensive or menacing messages.  
 
As outlined in chapter six when it comes to grossly offensive messages, 
there is a boundary between offensive commentary, which is protected under 
Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, and grossly offensive commentary which is not. However, the 
issue remains as to where the boundary lies between the two, as clearly 
illustrated in R v Woods18 and the matter of Daniel Thomas.19      
 
Thomas who at the time was a Port Talbot footballer, took to Twitter to post 
the following comment: ‘if there is any consolation for finishing fourth at least 
[sic] daley and waterfield [sic] can go bum each other #teamHIV’.20 Despite 
the homophobic and offensive nature of the tweet, a decision was made by 
the CPS not to prosecute.21 Whereas in Woods, the defendant was convicted 
under section 127(1) of the Communications Act for the sending of grossly 
offensive material, following comments posted on Facebook concerning a 
 
17 Laura Scaife, Handbook of Social Media and the Law (Routledge 2015) 166 
18 R v Matthew Woods, Chorley Magistrates Court, 8 October 2012 (unreported) 
19 The Crown Prosecution News Brief, ‘DPP Statement on Tom Daley Case and Social 
Media Prosecutions’ (CPS.gov, 2012) <http://blog.cps.gov.uk/2012/09/dpp-statement-on-
tom-daley-case-and-socialmedia-prosecutions.html> accessed 29 April 2018 
20 Ibid., 
21 Ibid., 
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missing schoolchild in Wales. Comments included, ‘I woke up this morning in 
the back of a transit van with two beautiful little girls, I found April in a 
hopeless place.’ ‘Could have just started the greatest Facebook argument 
EVER [sic]. April fools, who wants Maddie? I love April Jones.’22 In essence:  
‘[i]t is perhaps easy to see why the comments made by Woods were 
grossly offensive and so worthy of prosecution. It is less obvious why 
those made by Thomas were not. Or, to put the matter more 
pertinently, if the two cases of Woods and Thomas are on either side 
of a line between comments which are merely offensive and those 
which are grossly so, the question arises as to where that line lies.’23 
 
Similar issues have arisen concerning menacing communications as 
highlighted in the case of R v Chambers,24 discussed in detail in chapter six. 
 
Chapter seven examined two significant rights when it comes to governing 
conduct carried out online: freedom of expression versus a person’s right to 
privacy, which need to be balanced against each other. Freedom of 
expression is an important aspect of any democratic society and is given 
significant protection by the European Court of Human Rights,25 but as 
discussed in chapter seven it is not an absolute right. Consequently, a 
person’s right to free speech can be restricted when three criterions are met: 
the restriction is governed by law, the restriction achieves one of the 
legitimate aims contained in the second paragraph of the right, and the 
restriction is necessary in a democratic society. Likewise, privacy is also a 
 
22 Steven Morris & Dan Sabbagh, ‘April Jones: Matthew Woods jailed over explicit Facebook 
comments’ The Guardian (London, 8 October 2012) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2012/oct/08/april-jones-matthew-woods-jailed> accessed 
29 April 2018  
23 Laura Bliss, ‘The crown prosecution guidelines and grossly offensive comments: an 
analysis’ (2017) 9(2) Journal of Media Law 173, 177 
24 Chambers v Director of Public Prosecutions [2012] EWHC 2157 (Admin), [2013] 1 WLR 
183 
25 Handyside v United Kingdom (1976)1 EHRR 737 
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qualified right. However, privacy as exposed in varies points of this thesis is 
more than the protection of a person’s private life, it encompasses a right not 
to have ones physical and physiological integrity breached.  
 
As highlighted in chapter seven a person’s right to privacy needs to be taken 
into consideration when it comes to restricting online behaviours, alongside 
that of freedom of expression. Currently, the criminal justice system tilts in 
the direction of freedom of expression. This thesis has argued that privacy 
needs to be taken into consideration first before that of freedom of 
expression. Consequently, the proposed changes put forward in this thesis 
more adequately protects individuals from online abuse, and in turn protects 
their right to privacy.    
 
To conclude this thesis several recommendations have been put forward, 
aided by examining how other institutions and countries are currently tackling 
unlawful behaviours. The rationale on focussing on the European Union, 
Australia, Germany and India relate to the different approaches each have 
taken in attempting to combat the same issue, online abuse. Chapter eight 
therefore exposed that there is not just one universal approach to Internet 
governance. The European Union and Australia have both implemented 
legislative and non-legislative approaches to deal with inappropriate 
behaviours online. Whereas Germany and India, have endorsed a legislative 
approach to tackling online abuse aimed at either the social media provider 
or the online user. The discussions in chapter eight underpin many of the 
recommendations put forward in chapter nine. 
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Chapter nine argued that a multidimensional approach to social media 
regulation was needed. The Social Media Bill as located in Appendix A has 
attempted to overcome issues highlighted throughout various points of this 
thesis. The Bill includes a clear and accessible definition of the term’s cyber 
harassment and cyberstalking, specifically criminalises dogpiling and 
provides a definition of the term’s grossly offensive and menacing 
communications. In addition, the Bill creates a wider definition of revenge 
pornography to reflect the detrimental effects this form of abuse can have on 
another. However, both legislative and non-legislative approaches are 
needed to keep pace with changing technology. Therefore, it has been 
proposed that a Digital Authority should be created to oversee the regulation 
of social media companies, headed by an e-Safety Commissioner. In turn, a 
universal code of conduct needs to be created alongside universal digital 
education. 
 
Social media is of paramount importance within society, but the darker side 
of this relatively new form of communication can have detrimental effects on 
both a person’s mental and physical wellbeing. This thesis set out to 
investigate how the current criminal law framework deals with online abuse. 
It is clear from previous chapters that the current approach to shaping and 
adapting legal provisions to fit a social media context is failing to protect 
those who are abused online. We must therefore act now to help tackle the 
growing issue of online abuse.  
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Future Research  
 
• Engaging with non-government organisations and other interested 
parties such as victims and gatekeepers to strengthen the 
recommendations put forward in this thesis;  
• Interviewing actors in the criminal justice system and victims of online 
abuse to get their opinions on the current regulation of social media; 
and  
• Further examination of how other countries and institutions are 
attempting to tackle online abuse.  
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Appendix A: Social Media Bill 
 
A Bill to make provision for protecting persons from abusive conduct aided 
by new technology in particular, social media.  
(1) Cyber Harassment  
(1) A person is guilty of an offence if:  
(a) The person uses technology in a way which the reasonable 
person would consider as amounting to causing distress or 
anxiety to another; and 
(b) The defendant knows or ought to know that their behaviour 
may cause another distress or anxiety  
 
(2) Interpretation:  
(a) ‘Technology’ is defined as a device for storing, processing 
and retrieving information 
(b) ‘Anxiety’ is defined as something just short of a recognised 
psychiatric illness 
(c) ‘Distress’ is defined as oppressive and unreasonable 
behaviour  
 
(2) Cyberstalking  
(1) A person is guilty of an offence if:  
(a) The person uses technology in a way which the reasonable 
person would consider as amounting to causing distress or 
anxiety to another; and 
(b) The behaviour can be considered as continued unwanted 
contact; and 
(c) The defendant knows or ought to know that their behaviour 
may cause another distress or anxiety  
 
(2) Interpretation:  
(a) ‘Technology’ is defined as a device for storing, processing 
and retrieving information 
(b) ‘Anxiety’ is defined as something just short of a recognised 
psychiatric illness 
(c)  ‘Distress’ is defined as oppressive and unreasonable 
behaviour  
 
(3) Cyber Related Revenge Pornography  
(1) A person commits an offence if:  
(a) He intentionally or recklessly discloses a private sexual 
photograph or film to another; and 
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(b) Knowingly discloses a private sexual photograph or film 
without the consent of the individual who appears in the 
content; and  
(c) The disclosure is made using technology  
 
(2) Where an allegation has been made that an offence to which this 
clause applies has been committed against a person, no matter 
relating to that person shall during that person’s lifetime be included in 
any publication 
 
(3) Interpretation:  
(a) ‘Sexual’ is defined as a person: 
a. Engaged in sexual intercourse; or  
b. Unclothed external genitalia, the perineum and anus 
of a male or female; Buttocks of a male or female; 
Breasts and nipples of a female; and covered erectile 
genitalia of a male are clearly visible; or  
c. A photo or film that the reasonable person would 
consider as sexually explicit  
(b) ‘Photo or film’ is defined as a still or moving picture, 
including a photoshopped image or video  
(c) A person “discloses” something to a person if, by any 
means, he or she gives or shows it to the person or makes 
it available to the person 
(d) ‘Technology’ is defined as a device for storing, processing 
and retrieving information 
 
(4) Online Abuse  
(1) An offence is committed if:  
a. A person uses technology in a way which the reasonable 
person would consider as amounting to causing distress or 
anxiety to send;  
i. Content that can be labelled as grossly offensive or 
menacing by reasonable members of society; and 
ii. The defendant knows or ought to know that their 
behaviour may cause another distress or anxiety  
 
(2) An offence is committed if;  
a. A person uses technology in a way which the reasonable 
person would consider as amounting to causing distress or 
anxiety to send;  
b. Content that is either:  
i. False information which D knows to be false; or  
ii. Is produced using false credentials; and 
Page 441 of 449 
 
c. The conduct can be labelled as grossly offensive or 
menacing by reasonable members of society; and  
d. The defendant knows or ought to know that their behaviour 
may cause another distress or anxiety  
 
(3) In matters relating to obscene material, the Obscene Publications 
Act 1949 and 1964 will be utilised  
 
(4) An offence is committed if;  
a. A person uses technology in a way which the reasonable 
person would consider as amounting to causing distress or 
anxiety to send; 
i. Explicit threats of rape or sexual violence; or  
ii. Credible threats of violence; and  
b. The defendant knows or ought to know that their behaviour 
may cause another distress or anxiety  
 
(5) Interpretation:  
a. ‘Technology’ is defined as a device for storing, processing 
and retrieving information 
b. ‘Grossly Offensive’ is defined as more than; 
i. Offensive, shocking or disturbing; or 
ii. Satirical, iconoclastic or rude comment; or 
iii. The expression of unpopular or unfashionable 
opinion about serious or trivial matters, or banter or 
humour, even if distasteful to some or painful to 
those subjected to it; or 
iv. An uninhibited and ill thought out contribution to a 
casual conversation where participants expect a 
certain amount of repartee 
c. ‘Menacing’ is defined as something just short of a credible 
threat  
d. ‘False credentials’ include fake accounts  
e. ‘Anxiety’ is defined as something just short of a recognised 
psychiatric illness 
f. ‘Distress’ is defined as oppressive and unreasonable 
behaviour 
g. ‘Explicit’ is defined as a clear and precise threat of sexual 
violence  
 
(5) Inciting Others  
(1) It is an offence to intentionally incite multiple persons to target another 
in a way which D reasonably believes will cause harassment of 




(2) It is an offence to intentionally incite others to commit a further 
criminal offence either governed by statute or the common law which 




a. ‘Harassment’ consists of:   
i. The use of technology which; 
ii. The reasonable person would consider amounts to 
distress or anxiety  
b. ‘Technology’ is defined as a device for storing, processing and 
retrieving information 
c. ‘Anxiety’ is defined as something just short of a recognised 
psychiatric illness 
d. ‘Distress’ is defined as oppressive and unreasonable behaviour  
e. ‘Belief’ is defined as something short of knowledge  
f. ‘Multiple’ is defined as two or more people  
 
 (6) Online Hate 
(1) If any of the behaviours listed in this Bill are targeted at a person: 
a. Because of a protected characteristic or presumed 
characteristic; and 
b. There is an intention on part of D to target another because of 
a protected characteristic, this will be considered as a hate 
crime.  
 
(2)  Interpretation  
a. Protected characteristics covers the following:  
i. Race; 
ii. Ethnicity; 
iii. National Origin; 
iv. Religious Affiliation; 
v. Sexual Orientation; 
vi. Caste; 
vii. Sex; 
viii. Gender or Gender Identity; or  
ix. Disability 
 
(7) Computer Misuse  
(1) In matters relating to Computer Misuse, the Computer Misuse Act 
1990 will be utilised  
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 (8) e-Safety Commissioner  
(1) The Secretary of State must create an e-Safety Commissioner  
 
(2) The e-Safety Commissioner will oversee the creation of a universal 
code of conduct with the aid of stakeholders, not-for-profit 
organisations, a Digital Authority and any other body the e-Safety 
Commissioner feels has appropriate knowledge to aid discussions: 
a. The e-Safety Commissioner will make the final decision on the 
content of the universal code of conduct  
b. The universal code of conduct will implement a voluntary levy 
to be paid by all social media companies  
i. The e-Safety Commissioner will determine the levy to be 
paid; and  
ii. The levy will not exceed the percentage levy paid under 
the Gambling Act 2005 
c. Failure of social media companies to comply with the universal 
code of conduct will result in a fine 
 
(3) The e-Safety Commissioner will create a Digital Authority to oversee 
the day-to-day running of the universal code of conduct  
a. The Digital Authority must: 
i. Regulate and enforce the universal code of conduct;  
ii. Act as an advisory body to the Crown Prosecution 
Service; and 
iii. Investigate complaints by online users against social 
media companies  
 
(4) The e-Safety Commissioner and the Digital Authority will also:  
a. Oversee the implementation of Digital Literacy educational 
schemes across schools throughout the United Kingdom;  
b. Ensure parents, teachers and the police receive adequate 
education relating to conduct carried out via social media; and   
c. Aid research into social media  
 
(5) Interpretation:  
a. ‘Stakeholders’ will include social media companies  
‘Social media companies’ are defined as website hosts who, for profit-making 
purposes, operate an Internet platform which enables users to create content 
and communicate instantly. Journalistic websites and websites with less than 
10,000 global users are exempt.
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Appendix B: Draft Universal Code of Conduct 
 
This code provides a universally accepted standard which all ‘social media 
companies must adhere to. For the purpose of this code of conduct ‘social 
media companies’ are defined as ‘website hosts who, for profit-making 
purposes, operate an Internet platform which enables users to create content 
and communicate instantly. Journalistic websites and websites with less than 
10,000 global users,1 are exempt from the conditions listed below.’  
 
General Conditions  
 
1. Social media companies must ensure maximum privacy settings are 
listed as the default option when a person creates a social media 
profile.  
2. Maximum privacy settings are compulsory for all those aged under 18.  
3. Social media companies must remove unlawful content within 48 
hours of being made aware of the content.  
4. Terrorist content and hate related speech must be removed within 24 
hours:  
a. Hate speech is defined as content that targets someone’s 
‘race, ethnicity, national origin, religious affiliation, sexual 
orientation, caste, sex, gender, gender identity and serious 
disease or disability.’2 
5. Terms of service agreements must be written in clear English and 
where appropriate, examples are given.   
6. Users must be able to report objectionable content with ease, and 
where appropriate social media companies must classify reported 
content. For instance, content that incites violence, hate related 
speech and sexual exploitation.  
7. Where a data breach has occurred, social media companies must 
make the e-Safety Commissioner aware of the breach within 48 hours 
of the breach coming to the company’s attention.  
8. Social media companies must continue to invest in AI technology to 
flag inappropriate content BEFORE it becomes publicly viewable.   
9. Mandatory training for all social media moderators: 
a. All moderators will be issued with training manuals which 
clearly illustrates content which is and is not acceptable on a 
given site;  
b. All manuals must be in clear English;  
c. Where moderators believe that a person or persons are at risk, 
reporting mechanisms are in place to flag content to 
appropriate authorities; and  
d. Moderators must receive updated training every 18 months.  
 
1 This ensures that small companies are not at an unfair advantage and free competition is 
protected, whilst giving protection to freedom of speech   
2 Facebook, ‘Community Standards: Hate Speech’ (Facebook, 2018) 
<https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards/hate_speech> accessed 9 December 
2018 
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10.  Links must be available for online users to seek further support for a 
range of issues, including, self-harm, suicide, mental health 




1. Hate speech:  
a. Hate speech is defined as content that targets someone’s 
‘race, ethnicity, national origin, religious affiliation, sexual 
orientation, caste, sex, gender, gender identity and serious 
disease or disability.’3 
2. Revenge Pornography: 
a. Revenge pornography is defined as sexually explicit or nude 
images of another, or images of a sexual nature which have 
been uploaded without the consent of the person capsulated in 
the image: 
i. Image includes both still and moving pictures. 
ii. Sexual’ is defined as a person: 
1. Engaged in sexual intercourse; or  
2. Unclothed external genitalia, the perineum and 
anus of a male or female; Buttocks of a male or 
female; Breasts and nipples of a female; and 
covered erectile genitalia of a male are clearly 
visible; or  
3. A photo or film that the reasonable person would 
consider as sexually explicit  
3. Directly abusive content which amounts to the trolling or bullying of 
another.  
4. Dogpiling: 
a. Encouraging other Internet users to target a specific individual. 
5. Threats of violence or threats of a sexual nature: 
a. This includes physical threats of violence, threats of rape and 
threats of sexual assault.    
 
Social Media Levy  
 
1. All social media companies will be asked to pay a voluntary levy to aid 
research, education and the Digital Authority in helping to tackle 
online abuse.  
2. The levy will be decided by the e-Safety Commissioner, but it will not 
exceed the Gambling Act levy.   
3. All earnings gained from the social media levy will be used for:  
a. Universal educational schemes relating to Digital Literacy skills 
as overseen by the e-Safety Commissioner. These 
 
3 Facebook, ‘Community Standards: Hate Speech’ (Facebook, 2018) 
<https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards/hate_speech> accessed 9 December 
2018 
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programmes will be aimed at school aged children, parents, the 
criminal justice system and teachers; 
b. Help with the financial costs of creating a Digital Authority; and 
c. Aid continued research into social media behaviour.     
 
Digital Authority and Fines   
 
1. To oversee the implementation of the universal code of conduct, 
regulate social media companies and act as an advisor to the CPS, 
the e-Safety Commissioner will create a Digital Authority:  
a. The Digital Authority will deal with the day-to-day regulation of 
social media companies. 
2. The Digital Authority may issue fines to social media companies who 
are in clear breach of the universal code of conduct.  
3. Social media companies may appeal to the e-Safety Commissioner in 
relation to any fines issued, or decisions made by the Digital Authority.  
4. Social media companies may seek Judicial review if they believe that 
a decision made by the e-Safety Commissioner is unlawful.    
 
All social media companies must adhere to the terms above. Where there is 
a conflict between social media companies terms of service agreements and 
the universal code of conduct, the universal code will prevail.   
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Appendix C: Recommendations Flowchart 
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A Bill to make provision for protecting persons from abusive conduct aided 
by Social Media. The Bill itself will have two main purposes. First, it will 
criminalise abusive conduct aimed at individuals via social media, as 
illustrated in Appendix A. Second, it will provide the legal authority for an e-




The e-Safety Commissioner, alongside the Digital Authority, will oversee the 
regulation of social media companies through the creation of a universal 
code of conduct (see point 6); oversee the implementation of compulsory 
educational schemes across the United Kingdom, aimed at parents, children, 
teachers and the criminal justice system, alongside funding research projects 
examining online behaviours. The e-Safety Commissioner will also 
investigate any complaints against the Digital Authority in a clear and 




Research is an important aspect of understanding online behaviour. The e-
Safety Commissioner will oversee and fund research in this area, with the aid 
of the social media levy. Research will include, but is not limited to, online 
safety, social media conduct, privacy, online behaviours and educational 
schemes set up by the e-Safety Commissioner and not-for-profit 




Education is an important aspect in tackling online abuse. As outlined in the 
recommendations chapter, social media-based education needs to be a 
compulsory subject within all educational institutions. The e-Safety 
Commissioner will oversee the running of educational programmes aimed at 
advancing Digital Literacy skills in children. In addition, educational schemes 
will be generated targeting teachers, parents and the criminal justice system. 
These educational programmes will be funded by the social media levy.  
 
Point 5  
 
The main role of the Digital Authority will be to ensure that social media 
companies are adhering to the universal code of conduct. The Digital 
Authority will answer to the e-Safety Commissioner. The Digital Authority can 
also impose fines on social media companies who fail to comply with the 
universal code of conduct. These fines, alongside the social media levy, will 
be used to fund research into social media usage and behaviour, help with 
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the costs of implementing an educational scheme and help towards the costs 




The e-Safety Commissioner, the Digital Authority and stakeholders will also 
be responsible for the creation and implementation of a universal code of 
conduct. As outlined in the recommendations chapter, the universal code of 
conduct will consist of a universal set of standards which all social media 
companies must adhere to. An example of the universal code of conduct can 
be found in Appendix B. However, the day-to-day moderation of this code of 
conduct will be overseen by the Digital Authority.  
 
Point 7    
 
The Digital Authority will investigate complaints from online users concerning 
decisions made by social media companies and regulate the implementation 
of the universal code of conduct. They will work alongside the e-Safety 
Commissioner to run educational campaigns, oversee the day-to-day 





Where the Digital Authority feels that a criminal offence has taken place, as 
governed under the Social Media Bill or another Act of Parliament, they will 
refer the case to the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS), who will decide if 
any further action should be taken. They will also act as an advisory body for 
the CPS.           
 
Point 9  
 
On a yearly occurrence, the e-Safety Commissioner will report either to 
Parliament or the Communications Committee to answer questions relating 
to the regulation of social media companies. The e-Safety Commissioner will 
also produce a yearly report detailing key decisions made, failures in the 




See Appendix A.  
 
